# It's not recommended to modify this file in-place, because it will be
# overwritten during upgrades.  If you want to customize, the best
# way is to use the "systemctl edit" command to create an override unit.
#
# For example, to pass additional options, create an override unit
# (as is done by systemctl edit) and enter the following:
#
#     [Service]
#     Environment=OPTIONS="-l 127.0.0.1,::1"


[Unit]
Description=memcached daemon
After=network.target

[Service]
Environment=PORT=11211
Environment=USER=memcached
Environment=MAXCONN=1024
Environment=CACHESIZE=256
Environment="OPTIONS=-l 127.0.0.1"
ExecStart=/usr/bin/memcached -p ${PORT} -u ${USER} -m ${CACHESIZE} -c ${MAXCONN} $OPTIONS

# Set up a new file system namespace and mounts private /tmp and /var/tmp
# directories so this service cannot access the global directories and
# other processes cannot access this service's directories.
PrivateTmp=true

# Mounts the /usr, /boot, and /etc directories read-only for processes
# invoked by this unit.
ProtectSystem=full

# Ensures that the service process and all its children can never gain new
# privileges
NoNewPrivileges=true

# Sets up a new /dev namespace for the executed processes and only adds API
# pseudo devices such as /dev/null, /dev/zero or /dev/random (as well as
# the pseudo TTY subsystem) to it, but no physical devices such as /dev/sda.
PrivateDevices=true

# Required for dropping privileges and running as a different user
CapabilityBoundingSet=CAP_SETGID CAP_SETUID CAP_SYS_RESOURCE

# Restricts the set of socket address families accessible to the processes
# of this unit. Protects against vulnerabilities such as CVE-2016-8655
RestrictAddressFamilies=AF_INET AF_INET6 AF_UNIX


# Some security features are not in the older versions of systemd used by
# e.g. RHEL7/CentOS 7. The below settings are automatically edited at package
# build time to uncomment them if the target platform supports them.

# Attempts to create memory mappings that are writable and executable at
# the same time, or to change existing memory mappings to become executable
# are prohibited.
##safer##MemoryDenyWriteExecute=true

# Explicit module loading will be denied. This allows to turn off module
# load and unload operations on modular kernels. It is recommended to turn
# this on for most services that do not need special file systems or extra
# kernel modules to work.
##safer##ProtectKernelModules=true

# Kernel variables accessible through /proc/sys, /sys, /proc/sysrq-trigger,
# /proc/latency_stats, /proc/acpi, /proc/timer_stats, /proc/fs and /proc/irq
# will be made read-only to all processes of the unit. Usually, tunable
# kernel variables should only be written at boot-time, with the sysctl.d(5)
# mechanism. Almost no services need to write to these at runtime; it is hence
# recommended to turn this on for most services.
##safer##ProtectKernelTunables=true

# The Linux Control Groups (cgroups(7)) hierarchies accessible through
# /sys/fs/cgroup will be made read-only to all processes of the unit.
# Except for container managers no services should require write access
# to the control groups hierarchies; it is hence recommended to turn this
# on for most services
##safer##ProtectControlGroups=true

# Any attempts to enable realtime scheduling in a process of the unit are
# refused.
##safer##RestrictRealtime=true

# Takes away the ability to create or manage any kind of namespace
##safer##RestrictNamespaces=true

[Install]
WantedBy=multi-user.target
