| draft-nottingham-for-the-users-08.txt | draft-iab-for-the-users-00.txt | |||
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Network Working Group M. Nottingham | Network Working Group M. Nottingham | |||
| Internet-Draft June 10, 2019 | Internet-Draft July 1, 2019 | |||
| Intended status: Informational | Intended status: Informational | |||
| Expires: December 12, 2019 | Expires: January 2, 2020 | |||
| The Internet is for End Users | The Internet is for End Users | |||
| draft-nottingham-for-the-users-08 | draft-iab-for-the-users-00 | |||
| Abstract | Abstract | |||
| This document explains why the IETF should consider end-users as its | This document explains why the IAB believes the IETF should consider | |||
| highest priority concern, and how. | end-users as its highest priority concern, and how that can be done. | |||
| Note to Readers | Note to Readers | |||
| The issues list for this draft can be found at | The issues list for this draft can be found at | |||
| https://github.com/mnot/I-D/labels/for-the-users [1]. | https://github.com/mnot/I-D/labels/for-the-users [1]. | |||
| The most recent (often, unpublished) draft is at | The most recent (often, unpublished) draft is at | |||
| https://mnot.github.io/I-D/for-the-users/ [2]. | https://mnot.github.io/I-D/for-the-users/ [2]. | |||
| Recent changes are listed at https://github.com/mnot/I-D/commits/gh- | Recent changes are listed at https://github.com/mnot/I-D/commits/gh- | |||
| skipping to change at page 1, line 45 ¶ | skipping to change at page 1, line 45 ¶ | |||
| Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering | Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering | |||
| Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute | Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute | |||
| working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet- | working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet- | |||
| Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/. | Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/. | |||
| Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months | Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months | |||
| and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any | and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any | |||
| time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference | time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference | |||
| material or to cite them other than as "work in progress." | material or to cite them other than as "work in progress." | |||
| This Internet-Draft will expire on December 12, 2019. | This Internet-Draft will expire on January 2, 2020. | |||
| Copyright Notice | Copyright Notice | |||
| Copyright (c) 2019 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the | Copyright (c) 2019 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the | |||
| document authors. All rights reserved. | document authors. All rights reserved. | |||
| This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal | This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal | |||
| Provisions Relating to IETF Documents | Provisions Relating to IETF Documents | |||
| (https://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of | (https://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of | |||
| publication of this document. Please review these documents | publication of this document. Please review these documents | |||
| carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect | carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect | |||
| to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must | to this document. | |||
| include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of | ||||
| the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as | ||||
| described in the Simplified BSD License. | ||||
| Table of Contents | Table of Contents | |||
| 1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 | 1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 | |||
| 2. What Are "End Users"? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 | 2. What Are "End Users"? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 | |||
| 3. Why End Users Should Be Prioritised . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 | 3. Why End Users Should Be Prioritised . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 | |||
| 4. How End Users are Prioritised . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 | 4. How End Users are Prioritised . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 | |||
| 5. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 | 5. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 | |||
| 6. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 | 6. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 | |||
| 7. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 | 7. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 | |||
| 7.1. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 | 7.1. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 | |||
| 7.2. URIs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 | 7.2. URIs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 | |||
| Appendix A. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 | Appendix A. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 | |||
| Author's Address . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 | Author's Address . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 | |||
| 1. Introduction | 1. Introduction | |||
| Many who participate in the IETF are most comfortable making what we | Many who participate in the IETF are most comfortable making what we | |||
| believe to be purely technical decisions; our process is defined to | believe to be purely technical decisions; our process is defined to | |||
| favor technical merit, through our well-known mantra of "rough | favor technical merit, through our well-known mantra of "rough | |||
| consensus and running code." | consensus and running code." | |||
| Nevertheless, the running code that results from our process (when | Nevertheless, the running code that results from our process (when | |||
| things work well) inevitably has an impact beyond technical | things work well) inevitably has an impact beyond technical | |||
| considerations, because the underlying decisions afford some uses | considerations, because the underlying decisions afford some uses | |||
| while discouraging others; while we believe we are making purely | while discouraging others; while we believe we are making purely | |||
| technical decisions, in reality, we are defining what is possible on | technical decisions, in reality, we are defining what is possible on | |||
| the Internet itself. Or, in the words of Lawrence Lessig [CODELAW]: | the Internet itself. | |||
| Ours is the age of cyberspace. It, too, has a regulator... This | ||||
| regulator is code -- the software and hardware that make | ||||
| cyberspace as it is. This code, or architecture, sets the terms | ||||
| on which life in cyberspace is experienced. It determines how | ||||
| easy it is to protect privacy, or how easy it is to censor speech. | ||||
| It determines whether access to information is general or whether | ||||
| information is zoned. It affects who sees what, or what is | ||||
| monitored. In a host of ways that one cannot begin to see unless | ||||
| one begins to understand the nature of this code, the code of | ||||
| cyberspace regulates. | ||||
| This impact has become significant. As the Internet increasingly | This impact has become significant. As the Internet increasingly | |||
| mediates essential functions in societies, it has unavoidably become | mediates essential functions in societies, it has unavoidably become | |||
| profoundly political; it has helped people overthrow governments and | profoundly political; it has helped people overthrow governments and | |||
| revolutionize social orders, control populations and reveal secrets. | revolutionize social orders, control populations, collect data about | |||
| It has created wealth for some individuals and companies while | individuals, and reveal secrets. It has created wealth for some | |||
| destroying others'. | individuals and companies while destroying others'. | |||
| All of this raises the question: Who do we go through the pain of | All of this raises the question: Who do we go through the pain of | |||
| gathering rough consensus and writing running code for? | gathering rough consensus and writing running code for? | |||
| After all, there are a variety of identifiable parties in the broader | After all, there are a variety of identifiable parties in the broader | |||
| Internet community that standards can provide benefit to, such as | Internet community that standards can provide benefit to, such as | |||
| (but not limited to) end users, network operators, schools, equipment | (but not limited to) end users, network operators, schools, equipment | |||
| vendors, specification authors, specification implementers, content | vendors, specification authors, specification implementers, content | |||
| owners, governments, non-governmental organisations, social | owners, governments, non-governmental organisations, social | |||
| movements, employers, and parents. | movements, employers, and parents. | |||
| Successful specifications will provide some benefit to all of the | Successful specifications will provide some benefit to all of the | |||
| relevant parties because standards do not represent a zero-sum game. | relevant parties because standards do not represent a zero-sum game. | |||
| However, there are sometimes situations where there is a need to | However, there are sometimes situations where there is a need to | |||
| balance the benefits of a decision between two (or more) parties. | balance the benefits of a decision between two (or more) parties. | |||
| In these situations, when one of those parties is an "end user" of | In these situations, when one of those parties is an "end user" of | |||
| the Internet - for example, a person using a Web browser, mail | the Internet - for example, a person using a Web browser, mail | |||
| client, or another agent that connects to the Internet - this | client, or another agent that connects to the Internet - the Internet | |||
| document argues that the IETF should protect their interests over | Architecture Board argues that the IETF should protect their | |||
| those of parties. | interests over those of parties. | |||
| Section 2 explains what is meant by "end users"; Section 3 outlines | Section 2 explains what is meant by "end users"; Section 3 outlines | |||
| why they should be prioritised in IETF work, and Section 4 describes | why they should be prioritised in IETF work, and Section 4 describes | |||
| how that can be done. | how that can be done. | |||
| 2. What Are "End Users"? | 2. What Are "End Users"? | |||
| In this document, "end users," means non-technical users whose | In this document, "end users," means non-technical users whose | |||
| activities IETF protocols are designed to support, sometimes | activities IETF protocols are designed to support, sometimes | |||
| indirectly. Thus, the end user of a protocol to manage routers is | indirectly. Thus, the end user of a protocol to manage routers is | |||
| skipping to change at page 5, line 23 ¶ | skipping to change at page 5, line 11 ¶ | |||
| helps to ensure the long-term health of the Internet. Many aspects | helps to ensure the long-term health of the Internet. Many aspects | |||
| of the Internet are user-focused, and it will (deservedly) lose their | of the Internet are user-focused, and it will (deservedly) lose their | |||
| trust if prioritises others' interests. Because one of the primary | trust if prioritises others' interests. Because one of the primary | |||
| mechanisms of the Internet is the "network effect", such trust is | mechanisms of the Internet is the "network effect", such trust is | |||
| crucial to maintain; the Internet itself depends upon it. | crucial to maintain; the Internet itself depends upon it. | |||
| 4. How End Users are Prioritised | 4. How End Users are Prioritised | |||
| The IETF community does not have any unique insight into what is | The IETF community does not have any unique insight into what is | |||
| "good for end users." To inform its decisions, it has a | "good for end users." To inform its decisions, it has a | |||
| responsibility to interact with the greater Internet community, | responsibility to analyse and consider the impacts of its work, as | |||
| well as, where needed, interact with the greater Internet community, | ||||
| soliciting input from others and considering the issues raised. | soliciting input from others and considering the issues raised. | |||
| End users are typically not technical experts; their experience of | End users are typically not technical experts; their experience of | |||
| the Internet is often based upon inadequate models of its properties, | the Internet is often based upon inadequate models of its properties, | |||
| operation, and administration. Therefore, the IETF should primarily | operation, and administration. Therefore, the IETF should primarily | |||
| engage with those who understand how changes to it will affect end | engage with those who understand how changes to it will affect end | |||
| users; in particular civil society organisations, as well as | users; in particular civil society organisations, as well as | |||
| governments, businesses and other groups representing some aspect of | governments, businesses and other groups representing some aspect of | |||
| end-user interests. | end-user interests. | |||
| The onus is on us to engage with these parties on terms that suit | The IAB encourages the IETF to explicitly consider user impacts and | |||
| them; it is not acceptable to require them to understand the mores | points of view in any IETF work. The IAB also encourages the IETF to | |||
| and peculiarities of the IETF community - even as we attempt to | engage with the above parties on terms that suit them; it is not | |||
| enculture them into it. This means that when appropriate, we should | reasonable to require them to understand the mores and peculiarities | |||
| take the initiative to contact these communities and explain our | of the IETF community - even though we encourage them to participate | |||
| work, solicit their feedback, and encourage their participation. In | in it. | |||
| cases where it is not reasonable a stakeholder community to engage in | ||||
| the IETF, we should go to them - for example, holding workshops. | That means, when appropriate, the technical community should take the | |||
| initiative to contact these communities and explain our work, solicit | ||||
| their feedback, and encourage their participation. In cases where it | ||||
| is not reasonable for a stakeholder community to engage in the IETF | ||||
| process, the technical community should meet with them. IAB | ||||
| workshops can serve this purpose and the IAB encourages suggestions | ||||
| for topics where this would be of benefit. | ||||
| At our best, this will result in work that promotes the social good. | At our best, this will result in work that promotes the social good. | |||
| In some cases, we will consciously decide to be neutral and open- | In some cases, we will consciously decide to be neutral and open- | |||
| ended, allowing the "tussle" among stakeholders to produce a range of | ended, allowing the "tussle" among stakeholders to produce a range of | |||
| results (see [TUSSLE] for further discussion). | results (see [TUSSLE] for further discussion). | |||
| At the very least, however, we must examine our work for harm to end | At the very least, however, we must examine our work for impact on | |||
| users, and take positive steps to avoid it where we see it. In | end users, and take positive steps to avoid it where we see it. In | |||
| particular, when we've identified a conflict between the interests of | particular, when we've identified a conflict between the interests of | |||
| end users and another stakeholder, we should err on the side of | end users and another stakeholder, we should err on the side of | |||
| finding a solution that avoids that harm. | finding a solution that avoids harmful consequences to end sers. | |||
| Note that "harm" is not defined in this document; that is something | Note that "harmful" is not defined in this document; that is | |||
| that the relevant body (e.g., Working Group) needs to discuss. | something that the relevant body (e.g., Working Group) needs to | |||
| Furthermore, harm to end users is judged just like any other decision | discuss. Furthermore, harm to end users is judged just like any | |||
| in the IETF, with consensus gathering and the normal appeals process; | other decision in the IETF, with consensus gathering and the normal | |||
| merely asserting that something is harmful is not adequate. The | appeals process; merely asserting that something is harmful is not | |||
| converse is also true, though; it's not permissible to avoid | adequate. The converse is also true, though; it's not permissible to | |||
| identifying harms, nor is it acceptable to ignore them when brought | avoid identifying harms, nor is it acceptable to ignore them when | |||
| to us. | brought to us. | |||
| The IETF has already established a body of guidance for situations | The IETF has already established a body of guidance for situations | |||
| where this sort of conflict is common, including (but not limited to) | where this sort of conflict is common, including (but not limited to) | |||
| [RFC7754] on filtering, [RFC7258] and [RFC7624] on pervasive | [RFC7754] on filtering, [RFC7258] and [RFC7624] on pervasive | |||
| surveillance, [RFC7288] on host firewalls, and [RFC6973] regarding | surveillance, [RFC7288] on host firewalls, and [RFC6973] regarding | |||
| privacy considerations. When specific advice is not yet available, | privacy considerations. When specific advice is not yet available, | |||
| we try to find a different solution or another way to frame the | we try to find a different solution or another way to frame the | |||
| problem, distilling the underlying principles into more general | problem, distilling the underlying principles into more general | |||
| advice where appropriate. | advice where appropriate. | |||
| Much of that advice has focused on maintaining the end-to-end | Much of that advice has focused on maintaining the end-to-end | |||
| security properties of a connection. This does not mean that our | security properties of a connection. This does not mean that our | |||
| responsibility to users stops there; protocols decisions might affect | responsibility to users stops there; protocol decisions might affect | |||
| users in other ways. For example, inappropriate concentration of | users in other ways. For example, data collection by various | |||
| applications even inside otherwise secure connections is a major | ||||
| problem in the Internet today. Also, inappropriate concentration of | ||||
| power on the Internet has become a concerning phenomenon - one that | power on the Internet has become a concerning phenomenon - one that | |||
| protocol design might have some influence upon. | protocol design might have some influence upon. | |||
| When the needs of different end users conflict (for example, two sets | When the needs of different end users conflict (for example, two sets | |||
| of end users both have reasonable desires) we again should try to | of end users both have reasonable desires) we again should try to | |||
| minimise harm. For example, when a decision improves the Internet | minimise harm. For example, when a decision improves the Internet | |||
| for end users in one jurisdiction, but at the cost of potential harm | for end users in one jurisdiction, but at the cost of potential harm | |||
| to others elsewhere, that is not a good tradeoff. As such, we | to others elsewhere, that is not a good tradeoff. As such, we | |||
| effectively design the Internet for the pessimal environment; if a | effectively design the Internet for the pessimal environment; if a | |||
| user can be harmed, they probably will be. | user can be harmed, they probably will be. | |||
| skipping to change at page 7, line 15 ¶ | skipping to change at page 7, line 9 ¶ | |||
| 6. Security Considerations | 6. Security Considerations | |||
| This document does not have any direct security impact; however, | This document does not have any direct security impact; however, | |||
| failing to prioritise end users might well affect their security | failing to prioritise end users might well affect their security | |||
| negatively in the long term. | negatively in the long term. | |||
| 7. References | 7. References | |||
| 7.1. Informative References | 7.1. Informative References | |||
| [CODELAW] Lessig, L., "Code Is Law: On Liberty in Cyberspace", 2000, | ||||
| <http://harvardmagazine.com/2000/01/code-is-law-html>. | ||||
| [RFC3935] Alvestrand, H., "A Mission Statement for the IETF", | [RFC3935] Alvestrand, H., "A Mission Statement for the IETF", | |||
| BCP 95, RFC 3935, DOI 10.17487/RFC3935, October 2004, | BCP 95, RFC 3935, DOI 10.17487/RFC3935, October 2004, | |||
| <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3935>. | <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3935>. | |||
| [RFC6973] Cooper, A., Tschofenig, H., Aboba, B., Peterson, J., | [RFC6973] Cooper, A., Tschofenig, H., Aboba, B., Peterson, J., | |||
| Morris, J., Hansen, M., and R. Smith, "Privacy | Morris, J., Hansen, M., and R. Smith, "Privacy | |||
| Considerations for Internet Protocols", RFC 6973, | Considerations for Internet Protocols", RFC 6973, | |||
| DOI 10.17487/RFC6973, July 2013, | DOI 10.17487/RFC6973, July 2013, | |||
| <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6973>. | <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6973>. | |||
| skipping to change at page 8, line 17 ¶ | skipping to change at page 8, line 9 ¶ | |||
| [1] https://github.com/mnot/I-D/labels/for-the-users | [1] https://github.com/mnot/I-D/labels/for-the-users | |||
| [2] https://mnot.github.io/I-D/for-the-users/ | [2] https://mnot.github.io/I-D/for-the-users/ | |||
| [3] https://github.com/mnot/I-D/commits/gh-pages/for-the-users | [3] https://github.com/mnot/I-D/commits/gh-pages/for-the-users | |||
| [4] https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-nottingham-for-the-users/ | [4] https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-nottingham-for-the-users/ | |||
| Appendix A. Acknowledgements | Appendix A. Acknowledgements | |||
| Thanks to Edward Snowden for his comments regarding the priority of | This document was influenced by many discussions, both inside and | |||
| end users at IETF93. | outside of the IETF and IAB. In particular, Edward Snowden's | |||
| comments regarding the priority of end users at IETF 93 and the | ||||
| Thanks to the WHATWG for blazing the trail with the Priority of | WHATWG's Priority of Constituencies for HTML were both influential. | |||
| Constituencies. | ||||
| Thanks to Harald Alvestrand for his substantial feedback and Mohamed | Many people gave feedback and input, including Harald Alvestrand, | |||
| Boucadair, Stephen Farrell, Joe Hildebrand, Lee Howard, Russ Housley, | Mohamed Boucadair, Stephen Farrell, Joe Hildebrand, Lee Howard, Russ | |||
| Niels ten Oever, Mando Rachovitsa, Martin Thomson, and Brian Trammell | Housley, Niels ten Oever, Mando Rachovitsa, Martin Thomson, Brian | |||
| for their suggestions. | Trammell, John Klensin, Eliot Lear, Ted Hardie, and Jari Arkko. | |||
| Author's Address | Author's Address | |||
| Mark Nottingham | Mark Nottingham | |||
| Email: mnot@mnot.net | Email: mnot@mnot.net | |||
| URI: https://www.mnot.net/ | URI: https://www.mnot.net/ | |||
| End of changes. 20 change blocks. | ||||
| 65 lines changed or deleted | 55 lines changed or added | |||
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