{"pred": "\nThis report discusses the use of multiyear procurement (MYP) and block buy contracting (BBC) by the Department of Defense (DOD). MYP allows DOD to use a single contract for more than one year's worth of procurement of a given kind of item without having to exercise a contract option for each year after the first year. Block buy contracting is similar to MYP but does not have a permanent statute governing its use. The report discusses how MYP and BBC can potentially save money by reducing the cost of weapons being procured. However, using MYP and BBC can also reduce Congress's and DOD's flexibility for making changes in procurement programs in future years in response to changing strategic or budgetary circumstances. The report also discusses whether to use MYP and BBC more frequently, less frequently, or about as frequently as they are currently used. The Coast Guard has expressed some interest in using BBC in its acquisition programs, but has not yet done so. The report concludes by summarizing the key points and issues for Congress to consider.", "answers": ["Multiyear procurement (MYP) and block buy contracting (BBC) are special contracting mechanisms that Congress permits the Department of Defense (DOD) to use for a limited number of defense acquisition programs. Compared to the standard or default approach of annual contracting, MYP and BBC have the potential for reducing weapon procurement costs by a few or several percent. Under annual contracting, DOD uses one or more contracts for each year's worth of procurement of a given kind of item. Under MYP, DOD instead uses a single contract for two to five years' worth of procurement of a given kind of item without having to exercise a contract option for each year after the first year. DOD needs congressional approval for each use of MYP. There is a permanent statute governing MYP contracting—10 U.S.C. 2306b. Under this statute, a program must meet several criteria to qualify for MYP. Compared with estimated costs under annual contracting, estimated savings for programs being proposed for MYP have ranged from less than 5% to more than 15%, depending on the particulars of the program in question, with many estimates falling in the range of 5% to 10%. In practice, actual savings from using MYP rather than annual contracting can be difficult to observe or verify because of cost growth during the execution of the contract due to changes in the program independent of the use of MYP rather than annual contracting. BBC is similar to MYP in that it permits DOD to use a single contract for more than one year's worth of procurement of a given kind of item without having to exercise a contract option for each year after the first year. BBC is also similar to MYP in that DOD needs congressional approval for each use of BBC. BBC differs from MYP in the following ways: There is no permanent statute governing the use of BBC. There is no requirement that BBC be approved in both a DOD appropriations act and an act other than a DOD appropriations act. Programs being considered for BBC do not need to meet any legal criteria to qualify for BBC, because there is no permanent statute governing the use of BBC that establishes such criteria. A BBC contract can cover more than five years of planned procurements. Economic order quantity (EOQ) authority—the authority to bring forward selected key components of the items to be procured under the contract and purchase the components in batch form during the first year or two of the contract—does not come automatically as part of BBC authority because there is no permanent statute governing the use of BBC that includes EOQ authority as an automatic feature. BBC contracts are less likely to include cancellation penalties. Potential issues for Congress concerning MYP and BBC include whether to use MYP and BBC in the future more frequently, less frequently, or about as frequently as they are currently used; whether to create a permanent statute to govern the use of BBC, analogous to the permanent statute that governs the use of MYP; and whether the Coast Guard should begin making use of MYP and BBC."], "all_classes": null, "length": 8537}
{"pred": "\nThe report examines the trends in aircraft availability and operating and support costs for 12 fixed-wing aircraft selected by the Air Force and Navy. The aircraft include the B-52, C-17, E-8C, F-16, F/A-18A-D, AV-8B, E-2C, E-2D, F/A-18E-F, and EA-18G. The report found that:\n\n- The Air Force and Navy have different sustainment strategies and policies for legacy systems. The Navy has not documented sustainment strategies for the C-2A, E-2C, and F/A-18A-D.\n\n- The Air Force has documented sustainment strategies for its five selected aircraft, but the Navy has not updated its sustainment strategies for four of its seven selected aircraft since 2012.\n\n- The Air Force and Navy regularly review sustainment metrics and have improvement plans to address aircraft availability.\n\n- The report identified sustainment challenges for each aircraft, such as aging, maintenance, and supply support, and mitigation actions to address these challenges.\n\n- The report found that the Air Force and Navy have different approaches to sustainment, with the Air Force focusing on extending the service life of aircraft and the Navy focusing on updating sustainment strategies.\n\n- The report recommends that the Navy update its sustainment strategies for legacy systems to ensure consistency with DOD policy.\n\nIn summary, the report highlights the differences in sustainment strategies and policies between the Air Force and Navy, and the need for the Navy to update its sustainment strategies for legacy systems to ensure consistency with DOD policy.", "answers": ["DOD spends billions of dollars annually to sustain its weapon systems to support current and future operations. The Air Force and Navy are operating many of their fixed-wing aircraft well beyond their original designed service lives and therefore are confronted with sustainment challenges. House Report 114-537 included a provision for GAO to evaluate the sustainment of major weapon systems. This report, among other things, (1) examines the trends in availability and O&S costs for selected Air Force and Navy fixed-wing aircraft since fiscal year 2011, including whether they met availability goals, and (2) assesses the extent that the departments documented sustainment strategies, reviewed sustainment metrics, and implemented plans to improve aircraft availability. GAO selected a nongeneralizable sample of 12 fixed-wing aircraft by considering a variety of factors, such as the type, age, and manufacturer of the aircraft, among other factors, and analyzed condition and availability data, O&S costs, and sustainment challenges from fiscal year 2011 through March 2017 for each aircraft in a “Sustainment Quick Look.” GAO also analyzed policies, strategies, and plans, and interviewed Navy and Air Force officials in program offices, squadrons, and maintenance depots. Between fiscal years 2011 and 2016, the Air Force and Navy generally did not meet aircraft availability goals, and operating and support (O&S) cost trends for GAO's selected fixed-wing aircraft varied. Specifically, GAO found that availability declined for 6 of 12 aircraft—3 from each service—between fiscal years 2011 and 2016; availability fell short of goals for 9 of 12 aircraft in fiscal year 2016; and O&S costs increased for 5 of the aircraft, and maintenance costs—the largest share—increased for 8 of 12 aircraft. GAO found, and officials agreed, that these aircraft face similar challenges. a Obsolescence means a part is unavailable due to its lack of usefulness or it is no longer current or available for production. b Diminishing manufacturing sources is a loss or impending loss of manufacturers or suppliers. The Air Force and Navy have documented sustainment strategies for some aircraft, regularly reviewed sustainment metrics, and implemented improvement plans. The Air Force has documented sustainment strategies for all aircraft GAO reviewed; however, the Navy has not documented or updated its sustainment strategies for four aircraft. Specifically, the Navy does not have a documented sustainment strategy for the C-2A, and has not updated the strategies for the E2C, EA-18G, and F/A-18A-D since before 2012. The Navy is in the process of documenting its strategies, but Department of Defense (DOD) policy is unclear on whether a sustainment strategy is required and has to be updated every 5 years for weapon systems that are in the operations and support phase of their life cycle (i.e., legacy systems). Also, Navy guidance does not specify a requirement for legacy systems, although Air Force guidance does. Clarifying the requirements to document sustainment strategies for legacy systems, and documenting those strategies, would add additional visibility over the availability and O&S costs of DOD aircraft and any associated sustainment risks. This is a public version of a sensitive report issued in April 2018. Information on aircraft availability and other related information was deemed to be sensitive and has been omitted from this report. GAO is recommending that DOD and the Navy update or issue new policy and guidance clarifying the requirements for documenting sustainment strategies for legacy weapon systems. DOD concurred with the recommendations."], "all_classes": null, "length": 12207}
{"pred": "\nThe United Nations, International Criminal Police Organization, and other organizations have attempted to measure the value of illegally traded wildlife, but available estimates are subject to uncertainty. In 2016, the United Nations Environment Programme reported that various sources estimated the global scale of illegal wildlife trade to be from $7 billion to $23 billion annually. UNEP also estimated that the scale of wildlife crime has increased in part due to environmental crime. \n\nThe United States Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS) and National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) have attempted to combat wildlife trafficking through the use of financial rewards for information on illegal activities. However, the agencies have not prioritized the use of rewards and were unable to provide sufficient assurance that the 27 rewards they paid during fiscal years 2007 through 2017 represented all of the rewards they provided during that period.\n\nThe report found that:\n\n- FWS and NOAA have policies outlining the processes their law enforcement agents are to use in making reward payments, but FWS's policy does not specify factors for its agents to consider when developing proposed reward amounts, which could make the agency's use of rewards less effective.\n\n- FWS and NOAA have advertised the potential for rewards in specific cases when agents had no other information, but have otherwise communicated little information to the public on the potential availability of rewards.\n\n- FWS and NOAA have not reviewed the effectiveness of their use of financial rewards or considered whether any changes might improve the usefulness of rewards as a law enforcement tool.\n\n- FWS and NOAA have not tracked reward information so that it is clearly documented and readily available for examination, which could help the agencies manage their use of rewards more effectively.\n\nThe report recommends that FWS and NOAA:\n\n- Track financial reward information so that it is clearly documented and readily available for examination.\n- Augment FWS's financial reward policy to specify factors law enforcement agents are to consider when developing proposed reward amounts.\n- Determine the types of additional information to communicate to the public on financial rewards and then develop and implement a plan for communicating that information.\n- Review the effectiveness of the ag", "answers": ["Wildlife trafficking—the poaching and illegal trade of plants, fish, and wildlife—is a multibillion-dollar, global criminal activity that imperils thousands of species. FWS and NOAA enforce laws prohibiting wildlife trafficking that authorize the agencies to pay financial rewards for information about such illegal activities. GAO was asked to review FWS's and NOAA's use of financial rewards to combat wildlife trafficking. This report examines (1) laws that authorize FWS and NOAA to pay rewards for information on wildlife trafficking and the extent to which the agencies paid such rewards from fiscal years 2007 through 2017, (2) the agencies' reward policies, (3) information available to the public on rewards, and (4) the extent to which the agencies reviewed the effectiveness of their use of rewards. GAO reviewed laws, examined FWS and NOAA policies and public communications on rewards, analyzed agency reward data for fiscal years 2007 through 2017 and assessed their reliability, interviewed FWS and NOAA officials, and compared agency policies and public communications on rewards to federal internal control standards. Multiple laws—such as the Endangered Species Act and Lacey Act—authorize the Departments of the Interior's U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS) and Commerce's National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) to pay rewards for information on wildlife trafficking. FWS and NOAA reported paying few rewards from fiscal years 2007 through 2017. Specifically, the agencies collectively reported paying 27 rewards, totaling $205,500. Agency officials said that the information was complete to the best of their knowledge but could not sufficiently assure that this information represented all of their reward payments. FWS and NOAA have reward policies that outline the general process for preparing reward proposals, but FWS's policy does not specify factors for its agents to consider when developing proposed reward amounts. Some FWS agents GAO interviewed said that in developing proposals, they did not know whether their proposed reward amounts were enough, too little, or too much. By augmenting its policy to specify factors for agents to consider, FWS can better ensure that its agents have the necessary quality information to prepare proposed reward amounts, consistent with federal internal control standards. FWS and NOAA communicate little information to the public on rewards. For example, most agency websites did not indicate that providing information on wildlife trafficking could qualify for a reward. This is inconsistent with federal standards that call for management to communicate quality information so that external parties can help achieve agency objectives. FWS and NOAA officials said they have not communicated general reward information because of workload concerns, but they said it may be reasonable to provide more information in some instances. By developing plans to communicate more reward information to the public, the agencies can improve their chances of obtaining information on wildlife trafficking that they otherwise might not receive. FWS and NOAA have not reviewed the effectiveness of their use of rewards. The agencies have not done so because using rewards has generally not been a priority. FWS and NOAA officials agreed that such a review would be worthwhile but provided no plans for doing so. By reviewing the effectiveness of their use of rewards, FWS and NOAA can identify opportunities to improve the usefulness of rewards as a tool for combating wildlife trafficking. GAO is making seven recommendations, including that FWS and NOAA track reward information, FWS augment its reward policy to specify factors for agents to consider when developing proposed reward amounts, FWS and NOAA develop plans to communicate more reward information to the public, and FWS and NOAA review the effectiveness of their reward use. Both agencies concurred with these recommendations."], "all_classes": null, "length": 8129}
{"pred": "\nThe report discusses the issue of cross-border data flows and privacy in the context of international trade agreements. Cross-border data flows are essential for conducting digital trade and commerce, but they also raise concerns around data security and privacy. The United States has traditionally supported open data flows and regulated privacy at a sectoral level. However, other countries are developing privacy policies that restrict cross-border data flows. The report highlights the challenges in balancing these objectives and the need for a least trade-restrictive approach to ensure data flows while protecting privacy. The United States has contributed to developing international guidelines and principles related to privacy and cross-border data flows, but there are no comprehensive multilateral rules. The report discusses the impact of digital technologies on trade and the need for a system of interoperability between different national privacy regimes to minimize costs and allow data to flow freely between regions. The report concludes that Congress may consider enacting comprehensive privacy legislation to provide a least trade-restrictive approach to protecting privacy while promoting digital trade.", "answers": ["\"Cross-border data flows\" refers to the movement or transfer of information between computer servers across national borders. Such data flows enable people to transmit information for online communication, track global supply chains, share research, provide cross-border services, and support technological innovation. Ensuring open cross-border data flows has been an objective of Congress in recent trade agreements and in broader U.S. international trade policy. The free flow of personal data, however, has raised security and privacy concerns. U.S. trade policy has traditionally sought to balance the need for cross-border data flows, which often include personal data, with online privacy and security. Some stakeholders, including some Members of Congress, believe that U.S. policy should better protect personal data privacy and security, and have introduced legislation to set a national policy. Other policymakers and analysts are concerned about increasing foreign barriers to U.S. digital trade, including data flows. Recent incidents of private information being shared or exposed have heightened public awareness of the risks posed to personal data stored online. Consumers' personal online data is valued by organizations for a variety of reasons, such as analyzing marketing information and easing the efficiency of transactions. Concerns are likely to grow as the amount of online data organizations collect and the level of global data flows expand. As Congress assesses policy options, it may further explore the link between cross-border data flows, online privacy, and trade policy; the trade implications of a comprehensive data privacy policy; and the U.S. role in establishing best practices and binding trade rules that seek to balance public policy priorities. There is no globally accepted standard or definition of data privacy in the online world, and there are no comprehensive binding multilateral rules specifically about cross-border data flows and privacy. Several international organizations, including the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), G-20, and Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum, have sought to develop best practice guidelines or principles related to privacy and cross-border data flows, although none are legally binding. U.S. and other recent trade agreements are establishing new enforceable trade rules and disciplines. Countries vary in their data policies and laws; some focus on limiting access to online information by restricting the flow of data beyond a country's borders, aiming to protect domestic interests (e.g., constituents' privacy). However, these policies can also act as protectionist measures. The EU and China, two top U.S. trading partners, have established prescriptive rules on cross-border data flows and personal data from different perspectives. The EU General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) is driven by privacy concerns; China is focused on security. Their policies affect U.S. firms seeking to do business in those regions, as well as in other markets that emulate the EU and Chinese approaches. Unlike the EU or China, the United States does not broadly restrict cross-border data flows and has traditionally regulated privacy at a sectoral level to cover data, such as health records. U.S. trade policy has sought to balance the goals of consumer privacy, security, and open commerce. The proposed United States-Mexico-Canada Agreement (USMCA) represents the Trump Administration's first attempt to include negotiated trade rules and disciplines on privacy, cross-border data flows, and security in a trade agreement. While the United States and other countries work to define their respective national privacy strategies, many stakeholders seek a more global approach that would allow interoperability between differing national regimes to facilitate and remove discriminatory trade barriers to cross-border data flows; this could offer an opportunity for the United States to lead the global conversation. Although Congress has examined issues surrounding online privacy and has considered multiple bills, there is not yet consensus on a comprehensive U.S. online data privacy policy. Congress may weigh in as the Administration seeks to define U.S. policy on data privacy and engages in international negotiations on cross-border data flows."], "all_classes": null, "length": 7088}
{"pred": "\nThe report discusses the federal government's role in supporting airport infrastructure development through the Airport Improvement Program (AIP) and the Passenger Facility Charge (PFC). AIP provides grants to airports for airport development and planning, while PFCs allow airports to collect revenue to fund eligible airport-related projects. The report details the history of AIP funding, including the authorization and appropriation process, the formula grants and discretionary grants, and the different types of projects that can be funded. The report also discusses the different funding sources available to airports, including taxes, PFCs, state and local grants, and bonds. The report highlights the debate over PFCs, including proposals to raise the cap or eliminate it, and the ongoing issues with grant assurances and noise mitigation. The report concludes by summarizing the current AIP funding authorization and appropriations, as well as the potential changes that could be made to the program in future reauthorization bills.", "answers": ["There are five major sources of airport capital development funding: the federal Airport Improvement Program (AIP); local passenger facility charges (PFCs) imposed pursuant to federal law; tax-exempt bonds; state and local grants; and airport operating revenue from tenant lease and other revenue-generating activities such as landing fees. Federal involvement is most consequential in AIP, PFCs, and tax-exempt financing. The AIP has been providing federal grants for airport development and planning since the passage of the Airport and Airway Improvement Act of 1982 (P.L. 97-248). AIP funding is usually spent on projects that support aircraft operations such as runways, taxiways, aprons, noise abatement, land purchase, and safety or emergency equipment. The funds obligated for AIP are drawn from the airport and airway trust fund, which is supported by a variety of user fees and fuel taxes. Different airports use different combinations of these sources depending on the individual airport's financial situation and the type of project being considered. Although smaller airports' individual grants are of much smaller dollar amounts than the grants going to large and medium hub airports, the smaller airports are much more dependent on AIP to meet their capital needs. This is particularly the case for noncommercial airports, which received over 25% of AIP grants distributed in FY2018. Larger airports are much more likely to issue tax-exempt bonds or finance capital projects with the proceeds of PFCs. The FAA Reauthorization Act of 2018 (P.L. 115-254) provided annual AIP funding of $3.35 billion from the airport and airway trust fund for five years from FY2019 to FY2023. The act left the basic structure of AIP unchanged, but authorized supplemental annual funding of over $1 billion from the general fund to the AIP discretionary funds, starting with $1.02 billion in FY2019, and required at least 50% of the additional discretionary funds to be available to nonhub and small hub airports. The act included a provision permitting eligible projects at small airports (including those in the State Block Grant Program) to receive a 95% federal share of project costs (otherwise capped at 90%), if such projects are determined to be successive phases of a multiphase construction project that received a grant in FY2011. The 2018 reauthorization expanded the number of states that could participate in the State Block Grant Program from 10 to 20 and also expanded the existing airport privatization pilot program (now renamed the Airport Investment Partnership Program) to include more than 10 airports. The law included a provision that forbids states or local governments from levying or collecting taxes on a business at an airport that \"is not generally imposed on sales or services by that State, political subdivision, or authority unless wholly utilized for airport or aeronautical purposes.\" The airport improvement issues Congress generally faces in the context of FAA reauthorization include the following: Should airport development funding be increased or decreased? Should the $4.50 ceiling on PFCs be eliminated, raised, or kept as it is? Could AIP be restructured to address congestion at the busiest U.S. airports, or should a large share of AIP resources continue to go to noncommercial airports that lack other sources of funding? Should Congress set tighter limits on the purposes for which AIP and PFC funds may be spent? This report provides an overview of airport improvement financing, with emphasis on AIP and the related passenger facility charges. It also discusses some ongoing airport issues that are likely to be included in a future FAA reauthorization debate."], "all_classes": null, "length": 9366}
{"pred": "\nThe report examines how the Department of Defense (DOD) uses military construction (MILCON) appropriations to fund construction projects. MILCON appropriations are used to fund projects in the US and overseas. Each year, Congress authorizes amounts for MILCON appropriations, which DOD must use to fund projects. DOD must also follow specific guidelines when requesting MILCON funds. The report found that while DOD has guidelines for cost estimating and managing MILCON projects, there are gaps in the guidelines that could lead to unreliable cost estimates. Specifically, the Unified Facilities Criteria, DOD's primary construction criteria, does not fully incorporate all steps needed for developing high-quality, reliable cost estimates. DOD partially agreed with the recommendation to improve its cost estimating guidance by fully incorporating all 12 steps needed for developing high-quality, reliable estimates. The report recommends that DOD work with its construction agents, military departments, and other offices to improve its MILCON cost estimating guidance.", "answers": ["Between fiscal years 2005 and 2016, Congress annually appropriated between $2.5 to $9.6 billion in MILCON funding for the active component of the U.S. military to use for projects worldwide. Reliable project construction cost estimates are of great importance, since those estimates drive these appropriations. House Report 114-537 accompanying a proposed bill authorizing national defense activities for fiscal year 2017 included a provision for GAO to report on DOD's MILCON cost estimating. This report examines the extent to which (1) the active component obligated and expended the MILCON appropriations received during fiscal years 2005-2016, (2) the active component reprogrammed MILCON appropriations during fiscal years 2010 through 2016, and (3) DOD's MILCON cost estimates are reliable for selected projects and DOD's guidance for developing estimates fully incorporates the steps needed for developing reliable estimates. GAO analyzed the active components' MILCON execution data and reviewed DOD's guidance for cost estimating and compared it with the best practices identified in GAO's Cost Estimating and Assessment Guide . During fiscal years 2005 through 2016, Congress appropriated about $66 billion in military construction funds (MILCON) to the active duty Army, Navy, and Air Force (referred to as the active component) for projects. As of September 30, 2016, the active component had obligated all but about $5.1 billion and expended all but about $11 billion of those funds. Of the $5.1 billion remaining unobligated, about $4.6 billion was still available to be obligated because MILCON appropriations are generally available for new obligations for 5 years. According to Department of Defense (DOD) officials, available but unobligated amounts no longer needed may be either taken back by Congress or reprogrammed to other MILCON projects that the active component identifies as needing additional funding. During fiscal years 2010 through 2016, the active component reprogrammed about $1.6 billion in MILCON appropriations to fund emergency projects, projects that were authorized but did not receive specific appropriations, and projects needing additional funding. Of this amount, the Army reprogrammed about $789 million; the Navy, about $535 million; and the Air Force, about $295 million. DOD's guidance does not fully incorporate the steps needed for developing reliable estimates and the estimates for three projects that GAO reviewed were not reliable. Specifically, two of the three high-value projects GAO examined experienced a more than 30-percent increase from the initial cost estimates submitted to Congress. GAO determined that DOD cost estimators did not follow all the best practices associated with the four characteristics—comprehensive, well-documented, accurate, and credible—of a reliable estimate for these projects. GAO's Cost Estimating and Assessment Guide identifies 12 steps that, if used, are more likely to result in reliable and valid cost estimates. However, as shown below, DOD's construction guidance—the Unified Facilities Criteria—does not include all of these steps. Until DOD incorporates these steps, DOD and congressional decision-makers may not have reliable estimates to inform their decisions regarding appropriations and the oversight of projects. GAO recommends that DOD ensure that its cost estimating guidance fully incorporate the steps needed for developing reliable cost estimates. DOD partially concurred with GAO's recommendation and stated that it will issue revised cost guidance in fiscal year 2019 that more fully incorporates those steps that would benefit the military construction program."], "all_classes": null, "length": 6142}
{"pred": "\nThe report discusses how the US Department of Education's Federal Student Aid (FSA) agency certifies postsecondary schools to participate in federal student aid programs. To be certified, schools must meet certain standards related to communication, personnel, policies, procedures, and internal controls. FSA conducts ongoing financial oversight of certified schools, including reviewing annual financial statements and compliance audits. Compliance audits provide information on schools' administration of federal student aid, but FSA and the Office of Inspector General (OIG) have identified issues with audit quality. FSA and OIG have taken steps to address audit quality, including training auditors, improving audit guides, and coordinating with schools on audit findings. FSA's certification procedures assess a school's capability to administer federal student aid, including reviewing documents submitted by schools, proof of accreditation, state authorization, audited financial statements, and self-reported data. FSA denies certification for schools that do not meet eligibility requirements, and provisionally certifies schools with issues. Most schools remain in provisional certification status the first time they are recertified. FSA relies on compliance audits as the primary annual review to assess schools' administrative capability, but differences in findings between audits and program reviews may occur due to differences in records reviewed. FSA and OIG officials identified issues with auditor training, experience, and school selection. FSA and OIG efforts to address audit quality could improve the accuracy and reliability of information used in recertification decisions.", "answers": ["Education provided over $122 billion in grants, loans and work study funds to help students pay for college at about 6,000 schools in fiscal year 2017. Education is responsible for certifying that these schools are eligible for and capable of properly administering federal student aid funds. Schools are required to submit an annual compliance audit that provides information on schools' administrative capability, which Education considers in its school certification decisions. GAO was asked to review Education's process for certifying schools to receive federal student aid. This report examines (1) how Education certifies schools to administer federal student aid and how frequently schools are approved and denied certification; and (2) the role of compliance audits in the certification process and what, if any, steps Education has taken to address the quality of the audit information. GAO analyzed data on school certification outcomes for calendar years 2006-2017 (when GAO determined data were most reliable); reviewed data and reports summarizing Education's reviews of compliance audit quality for fiscal years 2006-2017; reviewed a non-generalizable sample of 21 school certification decisions from fiscal years 2015 and 2016, selected for a mix of decisions, school characteristics, and geographic regions; examined relevant federal laws, regulations, policy manuals and guidance; and interviewed Education officials. The Department of Education (Education) is responsible for evaluating a variety of information to determine whether a postsecondary school should be certified to administer federal student aid programs, and agency data show that it approves most schools that apply. Education procedures instruct regional office staff to review school policies, financial statements, and compliance audits prepared by independent auditors, among other things. Education can certify schools to participate in federal student aid programs for up to 6 years, or it can provisionally certify them for less time if it determines that increased oversight is needed—for example, when a school applies for certification for the first time or when it has met some but not all requirements to be fully certified. In calendar years 2006 through 2017, Education fully or provisionally approved most schools applying for initial or recertification to receive federal student aid (see figure). Note: Schools applying for certification for the first time and approved are placed in provisional certification. In deciding whether to certify schools, Education particularly relies on compliance audits for direct information about how well schools are administering federal student aid, and Education's offices of Federal Student Aid and Inspector General have taken steps to address audit quality. The Inspector General annually selects a sample of compliance audits for quality reviews based on risk factors, such as auditors previously cited for errors. In fiscal years 2006 through 2017, 59 percent of the 739 selected audits received failing scores. Audits that fail must be corrected; if not, the school generally must repay federal student aid covered by the audit. Because higher risk audits are selected for review, Inspector General officials said they cannot assess the overall prevalence of quality problems in compliance audits. These two Education offices have taken steps to improve audit quality. For example, the Inspector General offered additional training to auditors on its revised 2016 audit guide and provided guidance to schools on hiring an auditor, while Federal Student Aid created a working group to strengthen its procedures for addressing poor quality compliance audits. Education's efforts to address audit quality could help ensure that these audits provide reliable information for school certification decisions. GAO is not making recommendations in this report."], "all_classes": null, "length": 3366}
{"pred": "\nThe report summarizes the results of a GAO audit of the federal government's approach and strategy for securing information systems. The audit found that many federal agencies have not effectively implemented the government's approach and strategy to securing information systems. Only 13 of 23 civilian agencies were managing risks to their enterprise, while the other 10 were at risk of identifying and protecting against cyber threats. Most agencies had significant information security deficiencies and did not fully implement key intrusion detection and prevention capabilities. The report recommends that OMB and DHS take steps to improve agencies' intrusion detection and prevention capabilities, including providing more training and guidance. OMB and DHS also need to finalize policies and strategies to address challenges with perimeter security and protecting high-value assets.", "answers": ["Federal agencies are dependent on information systems to carry out operations. The risks to these systems are increasing as security threats evolve and become more sophisticated. To reduce the risk of a successful cyberattack, agencies can deploy intrusion detection and prevention capabilities on their networks and systems. GAO first designated federal information security as a government-wide high-risk area in 1997. In 2015, GAO expanded this area to include protecting the privacy of personally identifiable information. Most recently, in September 2018, GAO updated the area to identify 10 critical actions that the federal government and other entities need to take to address major cybersecurity challenges. The federal approach and strategy for securing information systems is grounded in the provisions of the Federal Information Security Modernization Act of 2014 and Executive Order 13800. The act requires agencies to develop, document, and implement an agency-wide program to secure their information systems. The Executive Order, issued in May 2017, directs agencies to use the National Institute of Standards and Technology's cybersecurity framework to manage cybersecurity risks. The Federal Cybersecurity Enhancement Act of 2015 contained a provision for GAO to report on the effectiveness of the government's approach and strategy for securing its systems. GAO determined (1) the reported effectiveness of agencies' implementation of the government's approach and strategy; (2) the extent to which DHS and OMB have taken steps to facilitate the use of intrusion detection and prevention capabilities to secure federal systems; and (3) the extent to which agencies reported implementing capabilities to detect and prevent intrusions. To address these objectives, GAO analyzed OMB reports related to agencies' information security practices including OMB's annual report to Congress for fiscal year 2017. GAO also analyzed and summarized agency-reported security performance metrics and IG-reported information for the 23 civilian CFO Act agencies. In addition, GAO evaluated plans, reports, and other documents related to DHS intrusion detection and prevention programs, and interviewed OMB, DHS, and agency officials. The 23 civilian agencies covered by the Chief Financial Officers Act of 1990 (CFO Act) have often not effectively implemented the federal government's approach and strategy for securing information systems (see figure below). Until agencies more effectively implement the government's approach and strategy, federal systems will remain at risk. To illustrate: As required by Office of Management and Budget (OMB), inspectors general (IGs) evaluated the maturity of their agencies' information security programs using performance measures associated with the five core security functions—identify, protect, detect, respond, and recover. The IGs at 17 of the 23 agencies reported that their agencies' programs were not effectively implemented. IGs also evaluated information security controls as part of the annual audit of their agencies' financial statements, identifying material weaknesses or significant deficiencies in internal controls for financial reporting at 17 of the 23 civilian CFO Act agencies. Chief information officers (CIOs) for 17 of the 23 agencies reported not meeting all elements of the government's cybersecurity cross-agency priority goal. The goal was intended to improve cybersecurity performance through, among other things, maintaining ongoing awareness of information security, vulnerabilities, and threats; and implementing technologies and processes that reduce malware risk. Executive Order 13800 directed OMB, in coordination with the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), to assess and report on the sufficiency and appropriateness of federal agencies' processes for managing cybersecurity risks. Using performance measures for each of the five core security functions, OMB determined that 13 of the 23 agencies were managing overall enterprise risks, while the other 10 agencies were at risk. In assessing agency risk by core security function, OMB identified a few agencies to be at high risk (see figure at the top of next page). DHS and OMB facilitated the use of intrusion detection and prevention capabilities to secure federal agency systems, but further efforts remain. For example, in response to prior GAO recommendations, DHS had improved the capabilities of the National Cybersecurity Protection System (NCPS), which is intended to detect and prevent malicious traffic from entering agencies' computer networks. However, the system still had limitations, such as not having the capability to scan encrypted traffic. The department was also in the process of enhancing the capabilities of federal agencies to automate network monitoring for malicious activity through its Continuous Diagnostics and Mitigation (CDM) program. However, the program was running behind schedule and officials at most agencies indicated the need for additional training and guidance. Further, the Federal CIO issued a mandated report assessing agencies' intrusion detection and prevention capabilities, but the report did not address required information, such as the capability of NCPS to detect advanced persistent threats, and a cost/benefit comparison of capabilities to commercial technologies and tools. Selected agencies had not consistently implemented capabilities to detect and prevent intrusions into their computer networks. Specifically, the agencies told GAO that they had not fully implemented required actions for protecting email, cloud services, host-based systems, and network traffic from malicious activity. For example, 21 of 23 agencies had not, as of September 2018, sufficiently enhanced email protection through implementation of DHS' directive on enhanced email security. In addition, less than half of the agencies that use cloud services reported monitoring these services. Further, most of the selected 23 agencies had not fully implemented the tools and services available through the first two phases of DHS's CDM program. Until agencies more thoroughly implement capabilities to detect and prevent intrusions, federal systems and the information they process will be vulnerable to malicious threats. GAO is making two recommendations to DHS, to among other things, coordinate with agencies to identify additional needs for training and guidance. GAO is also making seven recommendations to OMB to, among other things, direct the Federal CIO to update the mandated report with required information, such as detecting advanced persistent threats. DHS concurred with GAO's recommendations. OMB did not indicate whether it concurred with the recommendations or not."], "all_classes": null, "length": 12551}
{"pred": "\nThe report examines the status of ESF assistance and projects provided to the West Bank and Gaza for fiscal years 2015 and 2016, including payments to PA creditors, and the extent to which USAID conducted required vetting of PA creditors to ensure that assistance would not support entities or individuals associated with terrorism and assessed PA ministries' capacity to use ESF assistance as intended. USAID obligated over $5 billion in ESF assistance to the West Bank and Gaza since 193, primarily using funds appropriated through the Economic Support Fund. USAID provides project assistance and debt relief payments to PA creditors, with overall foreign policy guidance from State. As of March 31, 2018, USAID had obligated about $54.1 million and expended about $35.6 million of ESF assistance for the West Bank and Gaza in fiscal years 2015 and 2016. Payments to PA creditors accounted for about 26% of fiscal year 2015 obligations and 28% of fiscal year 2016 obligations. USAID conducted vetting of each PA creditor that received payments and completed the vetting within 12 months before signing debt relief agreements. External assessments identified weaknesses in PA ministries' medical referral and petroleum procurement systems, but no findings were identified that posed a significant risk to USAID funds. USAID took additional steps to mitigate the findings, including confirming controls and systems with fuel companies and obtaining written confirmation of fuel costs. Audits did not identify any questioned or ineligible costs or material weaknesses in internal controls. The report concludes that USAID's procedures for providing ESF assistance to the West Bank and Gaza were generally effective in ensuring that assistance did not support entities or individuals associated with terrorism and that PA ministries had sufficient capacity to use the assistance as intended.", "answers": ["Since 1993, the U.S. government has committed more than $5 billion in bilateral assistance to the Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza. According to the Department of State, this assistance to the Palestinians promotes U.S. economic and political foreign policy interests by supporting Middle East peace negotiations and financing economic stabilization programs. USAID is primarily responsible for administering ESF assistance to the West Bank and Gaza. Appropriations acts for fiscal years 2015 and 2016 included provisions for GAO to review the treatment, handling, and uses of funds provided through the ESF for assistance to the West Bank and Gaza. This report examines (1) the status of ESF assistance and projects provided to the West Bank and Gaza for fiscal years 2015 and 2016, including project assistance and payments to PA creditors, and (2) the extent to which USAID conducted required vetting of PA creditors to ensure that this assistance would not support entities or individuals associated with terrorism and assessed PA ministries' capacity to use ESF assistance as intended. GAO reviewed relevant laws and regulations and USAID financial data, policies, procedures, and documents. GAO also interviewed USAID and State Department officials. As of March 2018, the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) had allocated about $545 million of funding appropriated to the Economic Support Fund (ESF) for assistance in the West Bank and Gaza for fiscal years 2015 and 2016. USAID obligated about $544 million (over 99 percent) and expended about $351 million (over 64 percent) of the total allocations. Project assistance accounted for approximately $399 million of the obligated funds, while payments to Palestinian Authority (PA) creditors accounted for $145 million (see figure). USAID's obligations for project assistance in the West Bank and Gaza for fiscal years 2015 and 2016 supported three development objectives—Economic Growth and Infrastructure ($239 million), Investing in the Next Generation ($107 million), and Governance and Civic Engagement (about $25 million). In fiscal years 2015 and 2016, USAID made payments directly to PA creditors—two Israeli fuel companies, to cover debts for petroleum purchases, and a local Palestinian bank, to pay off a line of credit used for PA medical referrals to six hospitals in the East Jerusalem Hospital network. USAID vetted PA creditors to ensure that the program assistance would not provide support to entities or individuals associated with terrorism and also conducted external assessments and financial audits of PA ministries of Health and Finance and Planning. USAID documentation showed that, as required, officials checked the vetting status of each PA creditor within 12 months before USAID signed its debt relief grant agreements with the PA. In addition, although USAID determined that it was not legally required to assess the PA Ministry of Health's medical referral services and the Ministry of Finance and Planning's petroleum procurement system, the agency commissioned external assessments of both ministries. These assessments found some weaknesses in both ministries' systems; however, USAID mission officials stated that these weaknesses did not affect USAID debt relief payments to the PA creditors. Nevertheless, USAID took additional steps to mitigate the identified weaknesses. For example, a USAID contractor worked with the Ministry of Health to update, revise, and approve guidelines for medical referrals. In addition, USAID commissioned financial audits of the debt relief grant agreements between USAID and the PA for direct payments to PA creditors in fiscal year 2015 and 2016. The audits did not identify any ineligible costs, reportable material weaknesses in internal control, or material instances of noncompliance with the terms of the agreements. GAO is not making recommendations in this report."], "all_classes": null, "length": 3091}
{"pred": "\nThe report discusses the Small Business Lending Fund (SBLF) established by the Small Business Jobs Act of 2010. The SBLF was created to increase lending to small businesses and create jobs. The report summarizes the history of the SBLF, including its legislative origins, provisions, and implementation. The SBLF authorized the Secretary of the Treasury to invest up to $30 billion in eligible institutions with total assets of $1 billion or less to increase small business lending. Participating institutions were required to submit a small business lending plan and submit quarterly reports to determine their dividend rate. The SBLF reportedly helped increase small business lending, but questions were raised about the validity of the reported amounts. The SBLF's costs were estimated to be around $1 billion, with a lifetime positive return of $31 million for the Treasury General Fund. Congress oversaw the SBLF's potential long-term costs and effects on small business lending, with disagreements on the best way to assist small businesses. Some advocated for additional federal resources, while others worried about the program's potential cost and adverse economic effects.", "answers": ["Congressional interest in small business access to capital has increased in recent years because of concerns that small businesses might be prevented from accessing sufficient capital to enable them to start, continue, or expand operations and create jobs. Some have argued that the federal government should provide additional resources to assist small businesses. Others worry about the long-term adverse economic effects of spending programs that increase the federal deficit. They advocate business tax reduction, reform of financial credit market regulation, and federal fiscal restraint as the best means to assist small businesses and create jobs. Several laws were enacted during the 111th Congress to enhance small business access to capital. For example, P.L. 111-5, the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 (ARRA), provided the Small Business Administration (SBA) an additional $730 million, including funding to temporarily subsidize SBA fees and increase the 7(a) loan guaranty program's maximum loan guaranty percentage to 90%. P.L. 111-240, the Small Business Jobs Act of 2010, authorized the Secretary of the Treasury to establish a $30 billion Small Business Lending Fund (SBLF), in which $4.0 billion was issued, to encourage community banks with less than $10 billion in assets to increase their lending to small businesses. It also authorized a $1.5 billion State Small Business Credit Initiative to provide funding to participating states with small business capital access programs, numerous changes to the SBA's loan guaranty and contracting programs, funding to continue the SBA's fee subsidies and the 7(a) program's 90% maximum loan guaranty percentage through December 31, 2010, and about $12 billion in tax relief for small businesses. P.L. 111-322, the Continuing Appropriations and Surface Transportation Extensions Act, 2011, authorized the SBA to continue its fee subsidies and the 7(a) program's 90% maximum loan guaranty percentage through March 4, 2011, or until available funding was exhausted, which occurred on January 3, 2011. This report focuses on the SBLF. It opens with a discussion of the supply and demand for small business loans. The SBLF's advocates claimed the SBLF was needed to enhance the supply of small business loans. The report then examines other arguments presented both for and against the program. Advocates argued that the SBLF would increase lending to small businesses and, in turn, create jobs. Opponents contended that the SBLF could lose money, lacked sufficient oversight provisions, did not require lenders to increase their lending to small businesses, could serve as a vehicle for Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP) recipients to effectively refinance their TARP loans on more favorable terms with little or no resulting benefit for small businesses, and could encourage a failing lender to make even riskier loans to avoid higher dividend payments. The report concludes with an examination of the program's implementation and a discussion of bills introduced to amend the SBLF. For example, during the 112th Congress, S. 681, the Greater Accountability in the Lending Fund Act of 2011, would have limited the program's authority to 15 years from enactment and prohibited TARP recipients from participating in the program. H.R. 2807, the Small Business Leg-Up Act of 2011, would have transferred any unobligated and repaid funds from the SBLF to the Community Development Financial Institutions Fund \"to increase the availability of credit for small businesses.\" H.R. 3147, the Small Business Lending Extension Act, would have extended the Department of the Treasury's investment authority from one year to two years. During the 113th Congress, H.R. 2474, the Community Lending and Small Business Jobs Act of 2013, would have transferred any unobligated and repaid funds from the SBLF to the Community Development Financial Institutions Fund."], "all_classes": null, "length": 11426}
{"pred": "\nThe report discusses the Navy's proposed FY2020 budget and shipbuilding plans. The Navy requests funding for 12 new ships, including an aircraft carrier, submarines, and surface combatants. The report highlights issues for Congress to consider regarding the Navy's force structure and shipbuilding plans, including the 35-ship force-level goal, the mix of ships, and the affordability of the Navy's 30-year shipbuilding plan. The Navy's proposed FY2020 shipbuilding budget also requests funding for ships that have been procured in prior fiscal years and ships that are to be procured in future fiscal years. Congress has taken action on the Navy's FY2020 funding request for Navy shipbuilding. The report discusses the strategic and budgetary context in which the Navy's force structure and shipbuilding plans are considered, including the shift in international security environment and the need for a larger Navy to counter renewed great power competition. The Navy's shipbuilding plans are expected to require significant investment in facilities, workforce, and supply chain. The industry is ready to support increased shipbuilding, but stable funding and procurement plans are needed to justify investments. The Navy's Force Structure Assessment calls for a 35-ship Navy, which is different from the 38-ship force-level goal called for in the Navy's 2016 Force Structure Goals. The Navy's 35-ship goal is expected to be achieved through a distributed architecture that includes a reduced proportion of large surface combatants and a larger proportion of small surface combatants. The report also discusses lessons learned in Navy shipbuilding, considerations relating to warranties and avoiding procurement cost growth, and the size of the Navy and shipbuilding rate.", "answers": ["The current and planned size and composition of the Navy, the rate of Navy ship procurement, and the prospective affordability of the Navy's shipbuilding plans have been oversight matters for the congressional defense committees for many years. On December 15, 2016, the Navy released a force-structure goal that calls for achieving and maintaining a fleet of 355 ships of certain types and numbers. The 355-ship force-level goal is the result of a Force Structure Assessment (FSA) conducted by the Navy in 2016. The Navy states that a new FSA is now underway as the successor to the 2016 FSA. This new FSA, Navy officials state, is to be completed by the end of 2019. Navy officials have suggested in their public remarks that this new FSA could change the 355-ship figure, the planned mix of ships, or both. The Navy's proposed FY2020 budget requests funding for the procurement of 12 new ships, including one Gerald R. Ford (CVN-78) class aircraft carrier, three Virginia-class attack submarines, three DDG-51 class Aegis destroyers, one FFG(X) frigate, two John Lewis (TAO-205) class oilers, and two TATS towing, salvage, and rescue ships. The Navy's FY2020 five-year (FY2020-FY2024) shipbuilding plan includes 55 new ships, or an average of 11 new ships per year. The Navy's FY2020 30-year (FY2020-FY2049) shipbuilding plan includes 304 ships, or an average of about 10 per year. If the FY2020 30-year shipbuilding plan is implemented, the Navy projects that it will achieve a total of 355 ships by FY2034. This is about 20 years sooner than projected under the Navy's FY2019 30-year shipbuilding plan—an acceleration primarily due to a decision announced by the Navy in April 2018, after the FY2019 plan was submitted, to increase the service lives of all DDG-51 destroyers to 45 years. Although the Navy projects that the fleet will reach a total of 355 ships in FY2034, the Navy in that year and subsequent years will not match the composition called for in the FY2016 FSA. One issue for Congress is whether the new FSA that the Navy is conducting will change the 355-ship force-level objective established by the 2016 FSA and, if so, in what ways. Another oversight issue for Congress concerns the prospective affordability of the Navy's 30-year shipbuilding plan. Decisions that Congress makes regarding Navy force structure and shipbuilding plans can substantially affect Navy capabilities and funding requirements and the U.S. shipbuilding industrial base."], "all_classes": null, "length": 14630}
{"pred": "\nThe Small Business Administration (SBA) provides 7(a) loans to small businesses that cannot obtain credit from conventional lenders at reasonable terms. SBA relies on lenders with delegated authority to determine eligibility for these loans. However, a recent report found that SBA's monitoring of lenders' compliance with the credit elsewhere requirement was limited. Specifically, SBA does not require its reviewers to document their assessment of lenders' policies and practices for complying with the credit elsewhere requirement. SBA also does not routinely collect or analyze information on the criteria used for credit elsewhere justifications to evaluate patterns in lender practices. \n\nThe report analyzed data on 7(a) loans from fiscal years 2007 through 2016. It found that:\n\n- 70% of 7(a) loans were approved through delegated lenders\n- 35% of 7(a) loans went to new businesses\n- 43% of 7(a) loans went to minority-owned businesses\n- 24% of 7(a) loans went to borrowers in economically distressed areas\n\nThe report also found that lenders had difficulty documenting their credit elsewhere determinations. SBA conducted on-site reviews to evaluate lenders' compliance with the credit elsewhere requirement, but did not require reviewers to document their assessment of lenders' policies and practices. SBA also did not collect or analyze information on the criteria used for credit elsewhere justifications.\n\nThe report recommends that SBA require reviewers to document their assessment of lenders' policies and practices and collect and analyze information on the criteria used for credit elsewhere justifications. This would help SBA better understand lenders' practices and identify areas where lenders may be at risk of noncompliance.\n\nIn summary, the report found that SBA's monitoring of lenders' compliance with the credit elsewhere requirement was limited and recommended that SBA improve its oversight to ensure that 7(a) loans are reaching their intended target population of small businesses that cannot obtain credit from conventional lenders at reasonable terms.", "answers": ["SBA's 7(a) program is required to serve creditworthy small business borrowers who cannot obtain credit through a conventional lender at reasonable terms. The Joint Explanatory Statement of the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2017 includes a provision for GAO to review the 7(a) program. This report discusses, among other things, (1) how SBA monitors lenders' compliance with the credit elsewhere requirement, (2) the extent to which SBA evaluates trends in lender credit elsewhere practices, and (3) lenders' views on the credit elsewhere criteria for 7(a) loans. GAO analyzed SBA data on 7(a) loans approved for fiscal years 2007–2016, the latest available, and reviewed literature on small business lending; reviewed standard operating procedures, other guidance, and findings from SBA reviews performed in fiscal year 2016; and interviewed lender associations and a nonrepresentative sample of 7(a) lenders selected that concentrated on larger lenders. For its 7(a) loan program, the Small Business Administration (SBA) has largely delegated authority to lenders to make 7(a) loan determinations for those borrowers who cannot obtain conventional credit at reasonable terms elsewhere. To monitor lender compliance with the “credit elsewhere” requirement SBA primarily uses on-site reviews conducted by third-party contractors with SBA participation and oversight, and other reviews. According to SBA guidance, lenders making 7(a) loans must take steps to ensure and document that borrowers meet the program's credit elsewhere requirement. However, GAO noted a number of concerns with SBA's monitoring efforts. Specifically, GAO found the following: Over 40 percent (17 of 40) of the on-site lender reviews performed in fiscal year 2016 identified lender noncompliance with the requirement. On-site reviewers identified several factors, such as weakness in lenders' internal control processes that were the cause for lender noncompliance. Most on-site reviewers did not document their assessment of lenders' policies or procedures, because SBA does not require them to do so. As a result SBA does not have information that could help explain the high noncompliance rate. Federal internal control standards state that management should design control activities, including appropriate documentation, and use quality information to achieve the entity's objectives. Without better information on lenders' procedures for complying with the documentation requirement, SBA may be limited in its ability to promote compliance with requirements designed to help ensure that the 7(a) program reaches its target population. SBA does not routinely collect or analyze information on the criteria used by lenders for credit elsewhere justifications. SBA recently began collecting some information on lenders' use of the criteria, but this information is limited, and SBA does not analyze the information that it does collect to better understand lenders' practices. Federal internal control standards state that management should use quality information to achieve the entity's objectives. Without more robust information and analysis, SBA may be limited in its ability to understand how lenders are using the credit elsewhere criteria and identify patterns of use by certain lenders that place them at a higher risk of not reaching borrowers who cannot obtain credit from other sources at reasonable terms. In general, representatives from 8 of 11 lenders that GAO interviewed stated that SBA's credit elsewhere criteria are adequate for determining small business eligibility for the 7(a) program. These criteria help them target their lending to small businesses that would otherwise have difficulty obtaining conventional credit because they are often new businesses or have a shortage of collateral. However, they also said that other factors—such as lender policies and economic conditions—can affect their decisions to offer 7(a) loans. In January 2018, SBA issued revised guidance for the 7(a) program and has provided training on this new guidance to lenders and trade associations. Lenders told GAO they are still in the process of understanding the new requirements. GAO recommends that SBA (1) require its on-site reviewers to document their assessment of lenders' policies and procedures related to the credit elsewhere documentation requirement, (2) collect information on lenders' use of credit elsewhere criteria, and (3) analyze that information to identify trends. SBA generally agreed with the recommendations."], "all_classes": null, "length": 8215}
{"pred": "\nThe report examines how federal agencies are using performance information to make decisions and improve results. The Government Performance and Results Act of 1993 and the GPRA Modernization Act of 2010 aim to focus federal agencies on performance by requiring agencies to develop long-term and annual goals and measure and report on progress towards those goals. However, the report finds that agencies have not made significant progress in using performance information to improve results. \n\nThe report analyzes survey results from 2013 and 2017 of federal managers at 24 agencies. It finds that:\n\n- While agencies have reported using more performance information in 2017 compared to 2007, the results are not statistically significant.\n\n- Only 5 agencies had statistically significant improvements in their use of performance information.\n\n- Being subject to data-driven reviews required by GPRAMA was associated with higher use of performance information.\n\n- OMB has taken steps to improve the use of performance information, but more needs to be done to expand data-driven reviews to include other goals and activities.\n\n- The PIC has not yet undertaken a systematic approach to identify and share practices for increasing the use of performance information.\n\n- The report recommends that OMB work with the PIC to identify and share proven practices for expanding data-driven reviews.\n\nIn summary, the report finds that while some agencies have made improvements in using performance information, more needs to be done to improve the use of performance information more extensively within agencies and across the federal government. OMB and the PIC should take additional actions to support this effort.", "answers": ["To reform the federal government and make it more efficient and effective, agencies need to use data about program performance. The benefit of collecting performance information is only fully realized when it is used by managers to make decisions aimed at improving results. GAO was asked to review agencies' use of performance information. This report assesses, among other things, the extent to which: (1) 24 agencies' reported use of performance information and related leading practices has changed since 2013 and (2) the Executive Branch has taken actions to enhance the use of performance information. To address the first objective, GAO analyzed results from its 2017 survey of federal managers, and compared them to 2013 results. The survey covered a stratified random sample of 4,395 managers from the 24 Chief Financial Officers Act agencies. The survey had a 67 percent response rate and results can be generalized to the population of managers government-wide and at each agency. For the second objective, GAO reviewed agency documents and interviewed staff from OMB and the PIC. Agencies' reported use of performance information to make decisions, and leading practices that can promote such use, generally has not improved since GAO's last survey of federal managers in 2013. However, GAO's survey results continue to point to certain practices that could help agencies improve managers' use of performance information. For example, as shown in the table below, GAO's survey found that managers whose programs were subject to data-driven reviews (regular reviews used to assess progress on select agency goals) to a greater extent reported statistically significantly greater use of performance information to make decisions. The Executive Branch has begun taking steps to improve the use of performance information within agencies and across the government. For example, In the President's Management Agenda and government-wide reform plan, released in March and June 2018 respectively, the administration acknowledged the need to do more, and announced a goal, among other actions, to improve the use of data in federal decision making. However, the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) and others responsible for this goal have yet to fully develop action plans to hold agencies accountable for achieving it. The Performance Improvement Council (PIC), which is chaired by OMB, has undertaken efforts to improve the use of performance information by, for example, creating a working group on agency performance reviews. But it has not yet taken a systematic approach to identify and share proven practices that led to, or challenges that may be hampering, increased use of performance information by managers. GAO's survey results identified agencies that may have insights into such practices and challenges. More fully developing action plans for the new goal, and identifying and sharing proven practices and challenges, could help ensure the Executive Branch takes further steps to improve the use of performance information by managers within agencies and across the federal government. To improve the use of performance information within agencies and across the federal government, GAO recommends that OMB work with (1) fellow goal leaders to more fully develop action plans for the new goal to improve the use of data and (2) the PIC to prioritize efforts to identify and share proven practices and challenges. OMB had no comments on this report."], "all_classes": null, "length": 8501}
{"pred": "\nThe report examines how federal agencies are using telework to reduce their real estate footprint. The Telework Enhancement Act of 2010 requires agencies to designate a Telework Managing Officer and incorporate telework into their continuity of operations plans. However, the report finds that agencies still face challenges in using telework as a space-planning tool. The General Services Administration (GSA) has extensive experience with telework and has implemented hoteling to reduce space. However, GSA lacks a government-wide tool to measure the costs and benefits of telework. The report recommends that GSA develop guidance and tools to help agencies use telework strategically to reduce space. The report surveyed 23 civilian CFO Act agencies and found that 70% of employees teleworked in fiscal year 2015, but only 50% teleworked 3 or more days per pay period. The majority of agencies reported that human capital issues and difficulty measuring cost savings were major challenges. The report concludes that GSA should develop guidance and tools to help agencies use telework strategically to reduce space.", "answers": ["Federal agencies are exploring ways to use telework as a tool to reduce the federal footprint and use space more efficiently. GAO was asked to examine the effects of telework on agencies' space-planning efforts. In this report, GAO reviewed: (1) how the 23 civilian CFO Act agencies reported using telework in office space planning; (2) the specific ways selected agencies and GSA used telework in their office space planning; and (3) any challenges the civilian CFO Act agencies faced in using telework in office space planning. GAO surveyed all 23 civilian CFO Act agencies, analyzed each agency's space-planning documents, and Real Property Efficiency Plans . GAO reviewed four agencies in greater detail based on analysis of telework data and other factors. For those four agencies GAO conducted site visits, interviewed officials, and analyzed agency documents. GAO also identified challenges agencies faced in using telework in space planning, based on survey results, agency documents, and interviews. The 23 civilian Chief Financial Officer (CFO) Act agencies reported various ways of considering and using telework as a space-planning tool, by, for example, implementing desk-sharing for employees who telework in order to relinquish leased space, or increasing the number of staff working in an existing space without increasing its size. All of the 23 agencies discussed telework in the context of space planning and achieving greater space efficiencies in either their space-planning documents or Real Property Efficiency Plans . The agencies that used telework as a space-planning tool generally reported implementing smaller or unassigned workstations. Three of the four agencies GAO reviewed in greater detail––the General Services Administration (GSA); the Office of Justice Programs at the Department of Justice; the Centers for Disease Control at the Department of Health and Human Services; and the Bureau of the Fiscal Service at the Department of the Treasury––leveraged telework to reduce or use office space more efficiently. For example, GSA and the Office of Justice Programs used telework to accommodate more employees in a smaller office space as illustrated in figure 1 below. The Centers for Disease Control used telework to accommodate more employees in the same amount of space. The Bureau of the Fiscal Service reduced space without telework by reducing the size of individual workstations. The 23 civilian CFO Act agencies reported several challenges in using telework to reduce space including human capital issues, mission suitability, and measuring cost savings attributable to telework. About two-thirds of the agencies said they would find it helpful to have additional information, assistance, or resources in using telework as a space-planning tool. GSA provides guidance to improve space utilization. However, GAO found that GSA last developed relevant formal guidance in 2006. This information, and that on GSA's telework and space-planning websites, was neither specific nor detailed and therefore of limited assistance to agencies that would like to use telework as a space-planning tool. Additionally, GSA's space-planning tool—the Workplace Investment and Feasibility Tool, intended to help agencies quantify the benefits and costs of telework––remains under development after more than 4 years, and GSA officials have not decided whether to make the tool available to other federal agencies. As such, agencies reported that they lack adequate guidance to determine how best to reduce space or use it more efficiently, and how to assess the benefits and costs of using telework in space planning. GSA concurred with recommendations that GSA should: (1) develop guidance on how agencies can use telework as a strategic space-planning tool and make this guidance readily available and (2) complete and make the Workplace Investment and Feasibility Tool available to federal agencies for use in assessing the benefits and costs of telework."], "all_classes": null, "length": 6903}
{"pred": "\nThe Government Accountability Office (GAO) has released a report on the federal government's efforts to address cybersecurity threats. The report highlights five key challenges:\n\n1. Establishing a comprehensive cybersecurity strategy and performing effective oversight. The federal government has faced challenges in establishing a comprehensive strategy to provide a framework for how the United States will engage both domestically and internationally on cybersecurity matters. \n\n2. Securing federal systems and information. The federal government faces challenges in ensuring that the nation's systems and information are protected from cyber threats.\n\n3. Protecting cyber critical infrastructure. The federal government has identified critical infrastructure that is vital to national security and other efforts, such as providing essential services that underpin American society.\n\n4. Enhancing the federal response to cyber incidents. The federal government has experienced weaknesses in responding to cyber incidents.\n\n5. Addressing privacy and sensitive data. Advances in technology have made it easier to collect and store data about individuals, which raises concerns about protecting personal privacy.\n\nThe report recommends that the federal government take actions to address these challenges, including:\n\n- Improve implementation of government-wide cybersecurity initiatives\n- Address weaknesses in federal information security programs\n- Enhance the federal response to cyber incidents\n- Appropriately limit the collection and use of personal information and ensure it is obtained with appropriate knowledge or consent\n\nThe report also highlights specific examples of federal agencies' efforts to address these challenges, such as the Department of Homeland Security's National Cybersecurity and Communications Integration Center and the Department of Defense's cybersecurity strategy.\n\nIn summary, the report identifies five key challenges and recommends actions to address them to improve the federal government's ability to protect against cyber threats and protect sensitive data.", "answers": ["Federal agencies and the nation's critical infrastructures—such as energy, transportation systems, communications, and financial services—are dependent on information technology systems to carry out operations. The security of these systems and the data they use is vital to public confidence and national security, prosperity, and well-being. The risks to these systems are increasing as security threats evolve and become more sophisticated. GAO first designated information security as a government-wide high-risk area in 1997. This was expanded to include protecting cyber critical infrastructure in 2003 and protecting the privacy of personally identifiable information in 2015. This report provides an update to the information security high-risk area. To do so, GAO identified the actions the federal government and other entities need to take to address cybersecurity challenges. GAO primarily reviewed prior work issued since the start of fiscal year 2016 related to privacy, critical federal functions, and cybersecurity incidents, among other areas. GAO also reviewed recent cybersecurity policy and strategy documents, as well as information security industry reports of recent cyberattacks and security breaches. GAO has identified four major cybersecurity challenges and 10 critical actions that the federal government and other entities need to take to address them. GAO continues to designate information security as a government-wide high-risk area due to increasing cyber-based threats and the persistent nature of security vulnerabilities. GAO has made over 3,000 recommendations to agencies aimed at addressing cybersecurity shortcomings in each of these action areas, including protecting cyber critical infrastructure, managing the cybersecurity workforce, and responding to cybersecurity incidents. Although many recommendations have been addressed, about 1,000 have not yet been implemented. Until these shortcomings are addressed, federal agencies' information and systems will be increasingly susceptible to the multitude of cyber-related threats that exist. GAO has made over 3,000 recommendations to agencies since 2010 aimed at addressing cybersecurity shortcomings. As of August 2018, about 1,000 still needed to be implemented."], "all_classes": null, "length": 14863}
{"pred": "\nThe report examines the effectiveness of the Department of Homeland Security's (DHS) Planning, Analysis, and Information Directorate (PLCY) in leading, conducting, and coordinating policy and strategy development. PLCY was established by the 2016 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) to equalize its position with other DHS management offices and headquarters components. However, since its establishment, the position of Under Secretary for Strategy, Policy, and Plans has remained vacant, and the Deputy Under Secretary has been performing both roles. PLCY has four main responsibilities: leading, conducting, and coordinating policy and strategy development, and providing strategic planning guidance to DHS. However, PLCY has faced challenges due to ambiguous roles and responsibilities and lack of clear processes and procedures. PLCY has encountered confusion about who should lead and engage in policy efforts, not engaging components at the right times, incompatible expectations around timelines, and uncertainty about its role in harmonizing policies. PLCY also lacks a delegation of authority to clearly define its roles and responsibilities. The report recommends that the Secretary of Homeland Security finalize a delegation of authority to PLCY, establish processes and procedures to implement the mission, roles, and responsibilities defined in the delegation, use the DHS Workforce Planning Guide to identify and analyze workforce gaps, and enhance collaboration and communication mechanisms to connect with staff in components with policy and strategy responsibilities.", "answers": ["GAO has designated DHS management as high risk because of challenges in building a cohesive department. PLCY supports cohesiveness by, among other things, coordinating departmentwide policy and strategy. In the past, however, questions have been raised about PLCY's efficacy. In December 2016, the NDAA codified PLCY's organizational structure, roles, and responsibilities. GAO was asked to evaluate PLCY's effectiveness. This report addresses the extent to which (1) DHS established an organizational structure and processes and procedures that position PLCY to be effective, (2) DHS and PLCY have ensured alignment of workforce with priorities, and (3) PLCY has engaged relevant component staff to help identify and respond to emerging needs. GAO analyzed the NDAA, documents describing specific responsibilities, and departmentwide policies and strategies. GAO also interviewed officials in PLCY and all eight operational components. According to our analysis and interviews with operational components, the Department of Homeland Security's (DHS) Office of Strategy, Policy, and Plans' (PLCY) organizational structure and efforts to lead and coordinate departmentwide and crosscutting strategies—a key organizational objective–have been effective. For example, PLCY's coordination efforts for a strategy and policy executive steering committee have been successful, particularly for strategies. However, PLCY has encountered challenges leading and coordinating efforts to develop, update, or harmonize policies that affect multiple DHS components. In large part, these challenges are because DHS does not have clearly-defined roles and responsibilities with accompanying processes and procedures to help PLCY lead and coordinate policy in a predictable, repeatable, and accountable manner. Until PLCY's roles and responsibilities for policy are more clearly defined and corresponding processes and procedures are in place, situations where the lack of clarity hampers PLCY's effectiveness in driving policy are likely to continue. Development of a delegation of authority, which involves reaching agreement about PLCY's roles and responsibilities and clearly documenting them, had been underway. However, it stalled due to changes in department leadership. As of May 2018, the effort had been revived, but it is not clear whether and when DHS will finalize it. PLCY does some workforce planning as part of its annual budgeting process, but does not systematically apply key principles of the DHS Workforce Planning Guide to help ensure that PLCY's workforce aligns with its and DHS's priorities and goals. According to PLCY officials, the nature of its mission requires a flexible staffing approach. As such, a portion of the staff functions as generalists who can be assigned to meet the needs of different situations, including unexpected changing priorities due to an emerging need. However, shifting short-term priorities requires tradeoffs, which may divert attention and resources from longer-term priorities. As of June 5, 2018, PLCY also had a number of vacancies in key leadership positions, which further limited attention to certain priorities. According to PLCY officials, PLCY recently began a review to identify the office's authorities in the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2017 (NDAA) and other statutes, compare these authorities to the current organization and operations, and address any workforce capacity gaps. Employing workforce planning principles—in particular, systematic identification of workforce demand, capacity gaps, and strategies to address them—consistent with the DHS Workforce Planning Guide could better position PLCY to use its workforce as effectively as possible under uncertain conditions and to communicate effectively with DHS leadership about tradeoffs. Officials from PLCY and DHS operational components praised existing mechanisms to coordinate and communicate at the senior level, especially about strategy, but component officials identified opportunities to better connect PLCY and component staff to improve communication flow about emerging policy and strategy needs. Among the ideas offered by component officials to enhance communication and collaboration were holding routine small-group meetings, creating forums for periodic knowledge sharing, and maintaining accurate and up-to-date contact information for all staff-level stakeholders. GAO is making four recommendations. DHS concurred with three recommendations, including that DHS finalize a delegation of authority defining PLCY's roles and responsibilities and develop corresponding processes and procedures. DHS did not concur with a recommendation to apply the DHS Workforce Planning Guide to identify and communicate workforce needs. GAO believes this recommendation is valid as discussed in the report."], "all_classes": null, "length": 6229}
{"pred": "\nThe report discusses the Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act, which establishes the process for states or tribal entities to request a presidential disaster declaration. FEMA has primary responsibility for coordinating the federal response when a disaster is declared and recovery, providing grants to assist state and tribal entities. The report focuses on the Individual Assistance (IA) program, which provides financial and direct assistance to disaster victims. FEMA evaluates states' or tribes' IA requests and makes a recommendation to the President based on six regulatory factors. However, FEMA's regional offices do not consistently obtain and document information on all elements of the current IA regulatory factors in their Regional Administrator's Validation and Recommendation (RVAR). This lack of transparency and consistency in evaluating the factors could lead to inconsistent evaluations and denials of IA declarations. GAO recommends that FEMA evaluate why regions are not completing the RVAR for each element of the IA regulatory factors and take corrective steps, if necessary. FEMA concurred with the recommendation and plans to conduct a survey of region officials to identify the reasons.", "answers": ["FEMA's IA program provides help to individuals to meet their immediate needs after a disaster, such as shelter and medical expenses. When a state, U.S. territory, or tribe requests IA assistance through a federal disaster declaration, FEMA evaluates the request against regulatory factors, such as concentration of damages, and provides a recommendation to the President, who makes a final declaration decision. GAO was asked to review FEMA's IA declaration process. This report examines (1) the number of IA declaration requests received, declared, and denied, and IA actual obligations from calendar years 2008 through 2016, (2) the extent to which FEMA accounts for the regulatory factors when evaluating IA requests, and (3) any challenges FEMA regions and select states reported on the declaration process and factors and any FEMA actions to revise them. GAO reviewed FEMA's policies, IA declaration requests and obligation data, and FEMA's RVARs from July 2012 through December 2016, the most recent years for which data were available. GAO also reviewed proposed rulemaking comments and interviewed FEMA officials from all 10 regions and 11 state emergency management offices selected based on declaration requests and other factors. From calendar years 2008 through 2016, the Department of Homeland Security's (DHS) Federal Emergency and Management Agency (FEMA) received 294 Individual Assistance (IA) declaration requests from states, U.S. territories, and tribes to help individuals meet their immediate needs after a disaster. Of these, the President declared 168 and denied 126 requests. Across the various types of IA declaration requests, severe storms (190) were the most common disaster type and drought (1) was among the least common. FEMA obligated about $8.6 billion in IA for disaster declarations during this period. GAO found that FEMA regions did not consistently obtain and document information on all elements of established IA regulatory factors when making IA recommendations to headquarters. Following a declaration request, a FEMA region is to prepare a Regional Administrator's Validation and Recommendation (RVAR)—a document designed to include data on each of the six IA regulatory factors for each declaration request as well as the regional administrator's recommendation. GAO reviewed all 81 RVARs from July 2012—the date FEMA began using the new RVAR template—through December 2016. GAO found that regions did not consistently obtain and document information for the elements required under the six regulatory factors (see table). For example, only 44 of the 81 RVARs documented all elements under the concentration of damage factor. By evaluating why regions are not completing all elements of each current IA regulatory factor, FEMA could identify whether any corrective steps are needed. Officials from the 10 FEMA regions and 11 states GAO interviewed, reported positive relationships with each other, but also cited various challenges with the IA declaration process and regulatory factors. For example, these officials told GAO that there are no established minimum thresholds for IA, making final determinations more subjective and the rationale behind denials unclear. However, as required by the Sandy Recovery Improvement Act of 2013, FEMA has taken steps to revise the IA factors by issuing a notice of proposed rulemaking. According to FEMA, the proposed rule aims to provide more objective criteria, clarify the threshold for eligibility, and speed up the IA declaration process. As of April 2018, the proposed rule was still under consideration. According to FEMA officials, they plan to finalize the rule in late 2018; therefore, it is too early to know the extent to which it will address these challenges. GAO recommends that FEMA evaluate why regions are not completing the RVARs for each element of the current IA regulatory factors and take corrective steps, if necessary. DHS concurred with the recommendation."], "all_classes": null, "length": 4428}
{"pred": "\nThe USDA Forest Service has deficiencies in its processes and related control activities over its budgetary resources, according to a recent GAO report. The report identified several areas where the Forest Service's processes and control activities were not adequately designed or implemented:\n\n1. Allotments of budgetary resources: The Forest Service did not have a process to reasonably assure that amounts designated in appropriations acts for specific purposes were properly used for those purposes.\n\n2. System for administrative control of funds: The Forest Service did not have a comprehensive system for administrative control of funds, which is required by USDA policy.\n\n3. Fund transfers: The Forest Service did not have properly designed control activities over its process for fund transfers related to wildland fire suppression activities.\n\n4. Reimbursable agreements: The Forest Service did not have adequate processes and related control activities for its fire incident cooperative agreements and reimbursable and advanced collection agreements.\n\n5. Unliquidated obligations: The Forest Service's process and related control activities over its review and certification of unliquidated obligations were not adequately described in manuals and handbooks.\n\nThe Forest Service agreed with the report's findings and stated that it has made significant progress to address the issues. However, the report highlights the need for the Forest Service to improve its processes and control activities to ensure that its budgetary resources are properly managed and used for its intended purposes.", "answers": ["The Forest Service, an agency within USDA, performs a variety of tasks as steward of 193 million acres of public forests and grasslands. Its budget execution process for carrying out its mission includes (1) allotments, which are authorizations by an agency to incur obligations within a specified amount, and (2) unliquidated obligations, which represent budgetary resources that have been committed but not yet paid. Deobligation refers to an agency's cancellation or downward adjustments of previously incurred obligations, which may result in funds that may be available for reobligation. GAO was asked to review the Forest Service's internal controls over its budget execution processes. This report examines the extent to which the Forest Service properly designed control activities over (1) allotments of budgetary resources, its system for administrative control of funds, and any fund transfers between Forest Service appropriations; (2) reimbursables and related collections; and (3) review and certification of unliquidated obligations. GAO reviewed the Forest Service's policies, procedures, and other documentation and interviewed agency officials. In fiscal years 2015 and 2016, the Forest Service received discretionary no-year appropriations of $5.1 billion and $5.7 billion, respectively. It is critical for the Forest Service to manage its budgetary resources efficiently and effectively. While the Forest Service had processes over certain of its budget execution activities, GAO found the following internal control deficiencies: Budgetary resources . The purpose statute requires that amounts designated in appropriations acts for specific purposes are used as designated. The Forest Service did not have an adequate process and related control activities to reasonably assure that amounts were used as designated. In fiscal year 2017, GAO issued a legal opinion that the Forest Service had failed to comply with the purpose statute with regard to a $65 million line-item appropriation specifically provided for the purpose of acquiring aircraft for the next-generation airtanker fleet. Further, the Forest Service lacked a process and related control activities to reasonably assure that unobligated no-year appropriation balances from prior years were reviewed for their continuing need; did not have a properly designed system for administrative control of funds, which keeps obligations and expenditures from exceeding limits authorized by law; and had not properly designed control activities for fund transfers to its Wildland Fire Management program. These deficiencies increase the risk that the Forest Service may make budget requests in excess of its needs. Reimbursable agreements . To carry out its mission, the Forest Service enters into reimbursable agreements with agencies within the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA), other federal agencies, state and local government agencies, and nongovernment entities. The Forest Service (1) did not have adequately described processes and related control activities in manuals and handbooks for its reimbursable agreement processes and (2) lacked control activities related to segregating incompatible duties performed by line officers and program managers. For example, line officers may be responsible for initiating cost sharing agreements, modifying cost settlement packages, and changing or canceling the related receivable, which represent incompatible duties. As a result, programs and resources may not be protected from waste, fraud, and mismanagement. Unliquidated obligations . The Forest Service's processes and control activities over the review and certification of unliquidated obligations were not properly designed to reasonably assure the best use of funds and that unliquidated obligations would be efficiently and effectively deobligated and made available for other program needs. Further, the current process, as designed, was inconsistent with USDA and Forest Service policy. In addition, the Forest Service's manuals and handbooks, which provide directives for the areas that GAO reviewed, had not been reviewed by management in accordance with the Forest Service's 5-year review policy. Further, standard operating procedures and desk guides prepared by staff to supplement the manuals and handbooks were not issued as directives and therefore were not considered official policy. This increases the risk that control activities may not be consistently performed across the agency. GAO is making 11 recommendations to improve processes and related internal control activities over the management of the Forest Service's budgetary resources, reimbursable receivables and collections, and its process for reviewing unliquidated obligations. The Forest Service generally agreed with the report and stated that it has made significant progress to address the report findings."], "all_classes": null, "length": 8760}
{"pred": "\nThe report describes the process by which the US Senate provides advice and consent on presidential nominations. The President nominates officials and the Senate considers and confirms or rejects them. The process involves several steps:\n\n1) The President sends nominations to the Senate in writing. \n\n2) The nominations are referred to committees for investigation and hearings. \n\n3) Committees gather information from nominees and hold hearings.\n\n4) Committees report the nomination to the Senate or take no action.\n\n5) The Senate votes to confirm or reject the nomination.\n\nThe report highlights several key points:\n\n- The Senate confirms a high percentage of nominations, especially military appointments and promotions.\n\n- The Senate has changed its rules to streamline the process in recent years.\n\n- Holds and cloture motions are used to delay or block nominations.\n\n- The Senate can waive the rule requiring nominations to be considered during the same Congress session.\n\n- Recess appointments can be made without Senate confirmation but require a new nomination.\n\nIn summary, the Senate provides advice and consent on presidential nominations through a process involving referral to committees, hearings, and votes. While the process has evolved over time, the Senate generally confirms a high percentage of nominations, especially military appointments.", "answers": ["Article II, Section 2, of the Constitution provides that the President shall appoint officers of the United States \"by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate.\" This report describes the process by which the Senate provides advice and consent on presidential nominations, including receipt and referral of nominations, committee practices, and floor procedure. Committees play the central role in the process through investigations and hearings. Senate Rule XXXI provides that nominations shall be referred to appropriate committees \"unless otherwise ordered.\" Most nominations are referred, although a Senate standing order provides that some \"privileged\" nominations to specified positions will not be referred unless requested by a Senator. The Senate rule concerning committee jurisdictions (Rule XXV) broadly defines issue areas for committees, and the same jurisdictional statements generally apply to nominations as well as legislation. A committee often gathers information about a nominee either before or instead of a formal hearing. A committee considering a nomination has four options. It can report the nomination to the Senate favorably, unfavorably, or without recommendation, or it can choose to take no action. It is more common for a committee to take no action on a nomination than to reject a nominee outright. The Senate handles executive business, which includes both nominations and treaties, separately from its legislative business. All nominations reported from committee are listed on the Executive Calendar, a separate document from the Calendar of Business, which lists pending bills and resolutions. Generally speaking, the majority leader schedules floor consideration of nominations on the Calendar. Nominations are considered in \"executive session,\" a parliamentary form of the Senate in session that has its own journal and, to some extent, its own rules of procedure. The Senate can call up a nomination expeditiously, because a motion to enter executive session to consider a specific nomination on the Calendar is not debatable. This motion requires a majority of Senators present and voting, a quorum being present, for approval. After a nomination has been called up, the question before the Senate is \"will the Senate advise and consent to this nomination?\" A majority of Senators voting is required to approve a nomination. However, Senate rules place no limit on how long a nomination may be debated, and ending consideration could require invoking cloture. On April 6, 2017, the Senate reinterpreted Rule XXII in order to allow cloture to be invoked on nominations to the Supreme Court by a majority of Senators voting. This expanded the results of similar actions taken by the Senate in November 2013, which changed the cloture vote requirement to a majority for nominations other than to the Supreme Court. After the 2013 decision, the number of nominations subjected to a cloture process increased. On April 3, 2019, the Senate reinterpreted Rule XXII again. The Senate reduced, from 30 hours to 2 hours, the maximum time nominations can be considered after cloture has been invoked. This change applied to all executive branch nominations except to high-level positions such as heads of departments, and it applied to all judicial nominations except to the Supreme Court and the U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals. The full impact of this change is difficult to assess at this time, but it is likely to shorten the time between a cloture vote and a vote on the nomination. If Senators respond as they did to the last reinterpretation of the cloture rule, it might also increase the number of nominations subjected to a cloture process. Nominations that are pending when the Senate adjourns sine die at the end of a session or recesses for more than 30 days are returned to the President unless the Senate, by unanimous consent, waives the rule requiring their return (Senate Rule XXXI, clause 6). If a nomination is returned, and the President still desires Senate consideration, he must submit a new nomination."], "all_classes": null, "length": 5595}
{"pred": "\nThe Longshore and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act (LHCA) provides workers' compensation coverage for maritime workers in the United States. The LHCA is a federal program that covers workers who work on or near navigable waters, including longshore workers and harbor workers. The program is administered by the Department of Labor (DOL) and provides medical and disability benefits to injured workers and survivors of workers who die on the job. The LHCA covers most private and public-sector workers in the United States, but Texas is the only state that has opted out of the program. The program has been amended several times to expand coverage to new groups of workers. The LHCA provides medical benefits, disability benefits, and survivors benefits to workers who are injured or killed on the job. Employers are required to provide coverage to their workers, either through private insurance or self-insurance, and the DOL authorizes insurance carriers and companies to self-insure. The program is funded through an annual assessment on employers and insurance carriers and a Special Fund. The LHCA adjusts benefits based on wage inflation, not price inflation. Decisions on benefit eligibility and amounts are made by the DOL, but employers and workers have the right to contest claims and appeal decisions.", "answers": ["The Longshore and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act (LHWCA) is a federal workers' compensation program that covers certain private-sector maritime workers. Firms that employ these workers are required to purchase workers' compensation or self-insure and are responsible for providing medical and disability benefits to covered workers who are injured or become ill on the job and survivors benefits to the families of covered workers who die on the job. The LHWCA is administered by the Department of Labor (DOL), and all benefit costs are paid by employers and their insurance carriers. In 2016, more than $1.4 billion in LHWCA benefits were paid to beneficiaries. Congress has extended the LHWCA provisions to cover workers outside of the maritime industry, such as overseas government contractors and civilian employees of military post exchanges. As part of the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 (ARRA), persons who repair recreational vessels of any size were added to the LHWCA exemption list. In 2011, the DOL implemented this provision; since then, those regulations have proven controversial and numerous bills have been introduced to modify the regulatory definition to increase the number of workers exempted from the LHWCA. The LHWCA pays for all medical care associated with a covered injury or illness. Disability benefits are based on a worker's pre-injury wage, and, unlike comparable state workers' compensation benefits, are adjusted annually to reflect national wage growth."], "all_classes": null, "length": 3317}
{"pred": "\nThis report analyzes the annual appropriations for the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) for FY2019. It compares the enacted FY2018 appropriations for DHS, the Trump Administration's FY2019 budget request, and the appropriations measures developed and considered by Congress in response to it. The report identifies additional informational resources, reports, and products on DHS appropriations that provide context for the discussion. The suite of CRS reports on homeland security appropriations tracks legislative action and congressional issues related to DHS appropriations, with particular attention paid to discretionary funding amounts. The report discusses appropriations legislation and identifies several key concepts, including budget authority, obligations, outlays, discretionary and mandatory spending, offsetting collections, and allocations. The report also provides comparisons of FY2018 enacted appropriations, FY2019 requested appropriations, and FY2019 appropriations bills developed by the appropriations committees. The total net discretionary appropriation for DHS was $49.41 billion in the final FY2019 Consolidated Appropriations Act, $1.69 billion more than FY2018.", "answers": ["This report provides an overview and analysis of FY2019 appropriations for the Department of Homeland Security (DHS). The primary focus of this report is on congressional direction and funding provided to DHS through the appropriations process. It includes an Appendix with definitions of key budget terms used throughout the suite of Congressional Research Service reports on homeland security appropriations. It also directs the reader to other reports providing context for specific component appropriations. As part of an overall DHS budget that the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) estimated to be $74.88 billion, the Trump Administration requested $47.43 billion in adjusted net discretionary budget authority through the appropriations process for DHS for FY2018. The request amounted to a $0.29 billion (0.6%) decrease from the $47.72 billion in annual appropriations enacted for FY2018 through the Department of Homeland Security Appropriations Act, 2018 (P.L. 115-141, Division F). The Administration also requested discretionary funding for DHS components that does not count against discretionary spending limits and is not reflected in the adjusted net discretionary budget authority total. The Administration requested an additional $6.65 billion for the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) in disaster relief funding, as defined by the Budget Control Act (P.L. 112-25; BCA), and in the budget request for the Department of Defense (DOD), $165 million in Overseas Contingency Operations designated funding (OCO) from the Operations and Maintenance budget of the U.S. Navy. On June 21, 2018, the Senate Committee on Appropriations reported out S. 3109, the Department of Homeland Security Appropriations Act, 2019, accompanied by S.Rept. 115-283. Committee-reported S. 3109 included $48.33 billion in adjusted net discretionary budget authority for FY2019. This was $901 million (1.9%) above the level requested by the Administration, and $611 million (1.3%) above the enacted level for FY2018. The Senate committee-reported bill included the Administration-requested levels for disaster relief funding, and included the OCO funding in an appropriation to the Coast Guard, rather than as a transfer from the U.S. Navy. On July 26, 2018, the House Appropriations Committee marked up H.R. 6776, its version of the Department of Homeland Security Appropriations Act, 2019. H.Rept. 115-948 was filed September 12, 2018. Committee-reported H.R. 6776 included $51.44 billion in adjusted net discretionary budget authority. The House committee-reported bill included the Administration-requested levels for disaster relief funding, but unlike S. 3109, did not include the OCO funding for the Coast Guard. As some of the annual appropriations for FY2019 remained unfinished, a consolidated appropriations bill that included a continuing resolution was passed by Congress and signed into law on September 28, 2018. The resolution, which covered DHS along with several other departments and agencies, continued funding at a rate of operations equal to FY2018 with some exceptions. This continuing resolution was extended through December 21, 2018, after which point annual appropriations lapsed. A partial government shutdown ensued for 35 days until continuing appropriations were resumed January 25, 2019, by P.L. 116-5. P.L. 116-6, the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2019, was passed by Congress on February 14, 2019, and signed into law the following day. Division A of the act included the Homeland Security Appropriations Act, 2019, which included $49.41 billion in adjusted net discretionary budget authority, $12 billion designated for the costs of major disasters, and $165 million in OCO funding for the Coast Guard. This report will be updated in the event of FY2019 supplemental appropriations actions."], "all_classes": null, "length": 5686}
{"pred": "\nThis report discusses the role of race in higher education and affirmative action policies. It explains that affirmative action policies have two doctrinal roles: those mandated by the states to eliminate vestiges of de jure segregation and those voluntary policies adopted to promote diversity. The Equal Protection Clause requires states to eliminate all vestiges of de jure segregation in public education, including through race-conscious measures. The Supreme Court has addressed affirmative action policies in higher education in two contexts: those mandated by states to eliminate de jure segregation and those voluntary policies adopted to promote diversity. The Court has subjected voluntary race-conscious measures to strict scrutiny, approving them only when they are narrowly tailored to serve compelling educational goals. The report concludes that while affirmative action policies have been approved in higher education, Congress still has a say in this area through its authority to revise Title VI and oversee its enforcement.", "answers": ["When federal courts have analyzed and addressed \"affirmative action\" in higher education, they have done so in two distinct but related senses, both under the Fourteenth Amendment's guarantee of \"equal protection.\" The first has its roots in the original sense of \"affirmative action:\" the mandatory use of race by public education systems to eliminate the remnants of state-imposed racial segregation. Because state-sanctioned race segregation in public education violates the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause, in certain cases involving a state's formerly de jure segregated public university system, a state's consideration of race in its higher education policies and practices may be an affirmative obligation. As the U.S. Supreme Court explained in its consequential 1992 decision United States v. Fordice, equal protection may require states that formerly maintained de jure segregated university systems to consider race for the purpose of eliminating all vestiges of their prior \"dual\" systems. Drawing upon its precedent addressing racially segregated public schools in the K-12 context, the Court established a three-part legal standard in Fordice for evaluating the sufficiency and effectiveness of a state's efforts in \"dismantl[ing]\" its formerly de jure segregated public university system. To that remedial end, mandatory race-conscious measures—in this de jure context—are not limited to admissions. Instead, remedies may also address policies and practices relating to academic programs, institutional missions, funding, and other aspects of public university operations. Outside this de jure context, \"affirmative action\" has come to refer to a different category of race-conscious policies. These involve what the Court at one time called the \"benign\" use of racial classifications—voluntary measures designed not to remedy past de jure discrimination, but to help racial minorities overcome the effects of their earlier exclusion. And for institutions of higher education, the Court has addressed one type of affirmative action policy in particular: the use of race as a factor in admissions decisions, a practice now widely observed by both public and private colleges and universities. The federal courts have come to subject these voluntary race-conscious policies—\"affirmative action\" in its perhaps more familiar sense—to a particularly searching form of review known as strict scrutiny. And even though this heightened judicial scrutiny has long been regarded as strict in theory but fatal in fact, the Court's review of race-conscious admissions policies in higher education has proved a notable exception, with the Court having twice upheld universities' use of race as one of many factors considered when assembling their incoming classes. The Court has long grappled with this seeming tension—between the strictness of its scrutiny and its approval of race-conscious admissions policies—beginning with its landmark 1978 decision in Regents of the University of California v. Bakke through its 2016 decision in Fisher v. University of Texas. Though the Equal Protection Clause generally concerns public universities and their constitutional obligations under the Fourteenth Amendment, federal statutory law also plays a role in ensuring equal protection in higher education. To that end, Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 prohibits recipients of federal funding—including private colleges and universities—from, at a minimum, discriminating against students and applicants in a manner that would violate the Equal Protection Clause. Federal agencies, including the Departments of Justice and Education, investigate and administratively enforce institutions' compliance with Title VI."], "all_classes": null, "length": 12474}
{"pred": "\nThe Rehabilitation Act of 1973, as amended by WIOA, authorizes the provision of vocational rehabilitation services to individuals with disabilities. In 2014, WIOA required states to provide pre-employment transition services to students with disabilities. States were required to designate a single agency to administer the program, although some states have designated separate agencies for serving individuals who are blind or visually impaired. In 2016, Education provided guidance and technical assistance to states to implement pre-employment transition services. However, states have faced challenges in implementing these services, including coordinating with state educational agencies, collecting data, and balancing pre-employment transition services with other vocational rehabilitation services. Education has taken steps to address these challenges, including providing additional guidance and technical assistance. However, states have not used all of the funds reserved for pre-employment transition services and have not updated interagency agreements between state VR and educational agencies. Education should establish timeframes for providing additional information on allowable expenditures and take additional steps to help states coordinate services. Education should also develop a written plan with specific timeframes and activities to identify and disseminate best practices for implementing pre-employment transition services.", "answers": ["WIOA requires states to reserve at least 15 percent of their total State Vocational Rehabilitation Services program funds to provide pre-employment transition services to help students with disabilities transition from school to work. GAO was asked to review how states were implementing these services. This report examines (1) steps states reported taking to implement pre-employment transition services, and (2) implementation challenges states reported and how Education has addressed them. GAO reviewed documents and funding data from Education, and federal laws and regulations; surveyed all 79 state VR agencies (74 responded); held discussion groups with representatives of 29 state VR agencies; and interviewed officials from Education and three states (Idaho, Illinois, and Maryland) GAO selected for variety in size and type of agencies, among other factors. Of the 74 state vocational rehabilitation (VR) agencies that responded to GAO's survey, most reported expanding services to help students with disabilities transition from school to work as required under the Workforce Innovation and Opportunity Act (WIOA), enacted in July 2014. Most state agencies reported serving more students and providing work-based learning experiences and other activities, referred to as pre-employment transition services (see figure). State VR agencies reported two key challenges with implementing pre-employment transition services for students as required by WIOA. Spending reserved funds : States reported spending about $357 million out of the $465 million reserved for these services in fiscal year 2016. Education officials said that states had difficulty determining what expenditures were allowable, and some state officials said they would like more detailed information from Education. Education officials said they plan to clarify guidance but have no timeframe for providing further information, which would help states to better plan their use of reserved funds. Finalizing interagency agreements : Fewer than half the state VR agencies that responded to GAO's survey (34 of 74) reported updating their interagency agreement with their state's educational agency. Interagency agreements can help promote collaboration by, for example, establishing roles and responsibilities of each agency. Although Education offers technical assistance on interagency agreements, without increased efforts to raise awareness about the importance of these agreements and provide assistance to states where needed, Education may miss opportunities to help state VR and educational agencies efficiently and effectively coordinate services. In addition, WIOA requires Education to highlight best state practices, and most VR agencies responding to GAO's survey (63 of 74) reported this would be useful. Education does not have a written plan or timeframe for identifying and disseminating best practices. As a result, Education may miss opportunities to help more students with disabilities successfully transition from school to work. GAO is recommending that Education (1) establish timeframes for providing additional information on allowable expenditures, (2) take additional steps to assist states that have not updated and finalized their interagency agreements, and (3) develop a written plan with specific timeframes and activities for identifying and disseminating best practices. Education agreed with the first recommendation and disagreed with the other two. GAO revised the second recommendation and maintains that specific information is needed for the third, as discussed in the report."], "all_classes": null, "length": 9550}
{"pred": "\nThe report provides an overview of the Medicare program, including its structure, benefits, payment methods, and funding. Medicare is a federal program that provides health insurance to individuals aged 65 and older and those with certain disabilities. It is administered by the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS) within the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS). Medicare consists of four parts:\n\nPart A (Hospital Insurance) covers inpatient hospital services, skilled nursing facility care, and hospice care. Part B (Supplementary Medical Insurance) covers outpatient services and home health care. Part C (Medicare Advantage) provides private plan options for Part A and B benefits. Part D provides outpatient prescription drug benefits.\n\nMedicare pays for covered services based on payment rates set by law or negotiated with providers. Payments are made to hospitals, physicians, and other providers based on a prospective payment system or a fee-for-service system.\n\nMedicare is funded through payroll taxes paid by current workers and employers, as well as premiums paid by beneficiaries. The Hospital Insurance (Part A) trust fund is projected to become insolvent in 2026 due to expenses exceeding income. The Supplementary Medical Insurance (Part B and D) trust fund is funded through general revenues and premiums.\n\nCongress has made several reforms to Medicare in recent years, including the Medicare Prescription Drug Improvement and Modernization Act of 2003, the Medicare Improvements for Patients and Providers Act of 2008, and the Affordable Care Act. These reforms have expanded benefits, increased funding for certain providers, and modified payment rates.\n\nIn summary, Medicare provides health insurance to millions of Americans aged 65 and older and those with disabilities. While it is funded primarily through payroll taxes and premiums, it also receives income from interest on securities and transfers from states. As the population ages and healthcare costs rise, Medicare faces financial challenges in funding its benefits.", "answers": ["Medicare is a federal program that pays for covered health care services of qualified beneficiaries. It was established in 1965 under Title XVIII of the Social Security Act to provide health insurance to individuals 65 and older, and has been expanded over the years to include permanently disabled individuals under the age of 65. Medicare, which consists of four parts (A-D), covers hospitalizations, physician services, prescription drugs, skilled nursing facility care, home health visits, and hospice care, among other services. Generally, individuals are eligible for Medicare if they or their spouse worked for at least 40 quarters in Medicare-covered employment, are 65 years old, and are a citizen or permanent resident of the United States. Individuals may also qualify for coverage if they are a younger person who cannot work because they have a medical condition that is expected to last at least one year or result in death, or have end-stage renal disease (permanent kidney failure requiring dialysis or transplant). The program is administered by the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS) within the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) and by private entities that contract with CMS to provide claims processing, auditing, and quality oversight services. In FY2019, the program is expected to cover approximately 61 million persons (52 million aged and 9 million disabled) at a total cost of about $772 billion. Spending under the program (except for a portion of administrative costs) is considered mandatory spending and is not subject to the annual appropriations process. Services provided under Parts A and B (also referred to as \"original\" or \"traditional\" Medicare) are generally paid directly by the government on a \"fee-for-service\" basis, using different prospective payment systems or fee schedules. Under Parts C and D, private insurers are paid a monthly \"capitated\" amount to provide enrollees with required benefits. Medicare is required to pay for all covered services provided to eligible persons, so long as specific criteria are met. Since 1965, the Medicare program has undergone considerable change. For example, during the 111th Congress, the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA; P.L. 111-148 and P.L. 111-152) made numerous changes to the Medicare program that modified provider reimbursements, provided incentives to increase the quality and efficiency of care, and enhanced certain Medicare benefits. In the 114th Congress, the Medicare Access and CHIP Reauthorization Act of 2015 (MACRA; P.L. 114-10) changed the method for calculating updates to Medicare payment rates to physicians and altered how physicians and other practitioners will be paid in the future. Projections of future Medicare expenditures and funding indicate that the program will place increasing financial demands on the federal budget and on beneficiaries. For example, the Hospital Insurance (Part A) trust fund is projected to become insolvent in 2026. Additionally, although the Supplementary Medical Insurance (Parts B and D) trust fund is financed in large part through federal general revenues and cannot become insolvent, associated spending growth is expected to put increasing strains on the country's competing spending priorities. As such, Medicare is expected to be a high-priority issue in the current Congress, and Congress may consider a variety of Medicare reform options ranging from further modifications of provider payment mechanisms to redesigning the entire program. This report provides a general overview of the Medicare program including descriptions of the program's history, eligibility criteria, covered services, provider payment systems, and program administration and financing. A list of commonly used acronyms, as well as information on beneficiary cost sharing, may be found in the appendixes."], "all_classes": null, "length": 13111}
{"pred": "\nThis report provides an overview of the U.S. foreign aid program, its objectives, costs, organization, and how it compares to other aid donors. It covers the following topics:\n\n1. The U.S. foreign aid budget has grown from $20 billion in 1948 to $34.12 billion in 2017.\n\n2. The majority of aid is provided as grants rather than loans.\n\n3. The majority of aid is concentrated in the Middle East, reflecting U.S. strategic interests.\n\n4. The share of aid to sub-Saharan Africa has increased significantly in recent years.\n\n5. The share of aid to Europe/Eurasia has declined.\n\n6. The U.S. foreign aid program has been rationalized over time to focus on counterterrorism, global health, and humanitarian aid.\n\n7. The U.S. foreign aid program has faced challenges in recent years, including budget constraints and procurement reforms.\n\n8. The U.S. foreign aid program has been criticized for being too focused on U.S. economic benefits.\n\n9. The U.S. foreign aid program has been praised for promoting U.S. economic growth and trade.\n\n10. The U.S. foreign aid program has been seen as a key instrument of U.S. foreign policy.\n\nIn summary, the U.S. foreign aid program has evolved over time to focus on counterterrorism, global health, and humanitarian aid, while facing challenges in recent years. It has been praised for promoting U.S. economic growth and trade, but criticized for being too focused on U.S. economic benefits.", "answers": ["Foreign assistance is the largest component of the international affairs budget and is viewed by many as an essential instrument of U.S. foreign policy. On the basis of national security, commercial, and humanitarian rationales, U.S. assistance flows through many federal agencies and supports myriad objectives. These include promoting economic growth, reducing poverty, improving governance, expanding access to health care and education, promoting stability in conflict regions, countering terrorism, promoting human rights, strengthening allies, and curbing illicit drug production and trafficking. Since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, foreign aid has increasingly been associated with national security policy. At the same time, many Americans and some Members of Congress view foreign aid as an expense that the United States cannot afford given current budget deficits. In FY2017, U.S. foreign assistance, defined broadly, totaled an estimated $49.87 billion, or 1.2% of total federal budget authority. About 44% of this assistance was for bilateral economic development programs, including political/strategic economic assistance; 35% for military aid and nonmilitary security assistance; 18% for humanitarian activities; and 4% to support the work of multilateral institutions. Assistance can take the form of cash transfers, equipment and commodities, infrastructure, or technical assistance, and, in recent decades, is provided almost exclusively on a grant rather than loan basis. Most U.S. aid is implemented by nongovernmental organizations rather than foreign governments. The United States is the largest foreign aid donor in the world, accounting for about 24% of total official development assistance from major donor governments in 2017 (the latest year for which these data are available). Key foreign assistance trends in the past decade include growth in development aid, particularly global health programs; increased security assistance directed toward U.S. allies in the anti-terrorism effort; and high levels of humanitarian assistance to address a range of crises. Adjusted for inflation, annual foreign assistance funding over the past decade was the highest it has been since the Marshall Plan in the years immediately following World War II. In FY2017, Afghanistan, Iraq, Israel, Jordan, and Egypt received the largest amounts of U.S. aid, reflecting long-standing aid commitments to Israel and Egypt, the strategic significance of Afghanistan and Iraq, and the strategic and humanitarian importance of Jordan as the crisis in neighboring Syria continues. The Near East region received 27% of aid allocated by country or region in FY2017, followed by Africa, at 25%, and South and Central Asia, at 15%. This was a significant shift from a decade prior, when Africa received 19% of aid and the Near East 34%, reflecting significant increases in HIV/AIDS-related programs concentrated in Africa between FY2007 and FY2017 and the drawdown of U.S. military forces in Iraq and Afghanistan. Military assistance to Iraq began to decline starting in FY2011, but growing concern about the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS) has reversed this trend. This report provides an overview of the U.S. foreign assistance program by answering frequently asked questions on the subject. It is intended to provide a broad view of foreign assistance over time, and will be updated periodically. For more current information on foreign aid funding levels, see CRS Report R45168, Department of State, Foreign Operations and Related Programs: FY2019 Budget and Appropriations, by Susan B. Epstein, Marian L. Lawson, and Cory R. Gill."], "all_classes": null, "length": 9677}
{"pred": "\nThe National Popular Vote Interstate Compact aims to establish direct popular election of the President and Vice President through an interstate compact among states. The compact would require states to appoint electors pledged to the presidential/vice presidential ticket that won the national popular vote. The compact has been introduced in 14 states and the District of Columbia, with 189 electoral votes. Proponents argue that the compact would guarantee the President and Vice President to the candidate who receives the most popular votes nationwide, eliminating the possibility of a \"misfire\" or \"wrong winner.\" Opponents argue that the compact is unconstitutional, violates the Compact Clause of the Constitution, and would create more problems than it solves. The compact would also require congressional approval, which is uncertain. Legal issues related to the Compact Clause and Voting Rights Act have been raised. While some progress has been made in gaining support for the compact, it remains to be seen if it can gain enough momentum to become effective.", "answers": ["The National Popular Vote (NPV) initiative proposes an agreement among the states, an interstate compact that would effectively achieve direct popular election of the President and Vice President without a constitutional amendment. It relies on the Constitution's grant of authority to the states in Article II, Section 1 to appoint presidential electors \"in such Manner as the Legislature thereof may direct.... \" Any state that joins the NPV compact pledges that if the compact comes into effect, its legislature will award all the state's electoral votes to the presidential ticket that wins the most popular votes nationwide, regardless of who wins in that particular state. The compact would, however, come into effect only if its success has been assured; that is, only if states controlling a majority of electoral votes (270 or more) join the compact. By early May 2019, 14 states and the District of Columbia had joined the compact. After early momentum—eight states and the District of Columbia joined the NPV Compact between 2007 and 2011—the pace of state accessions slowed through 2018. Since then, four additional states joined, bringing the total number of electoral votes controlled by NPV member states to 189. During the same period, legislation to join the compact had been introduced during the current session in at least one chamber of the legislature in 14 additional states that control an additional 150 electors. The NPV initiative emerged following the presidential election of 2000, in which one ticket gained an electoral vote majority, winning the presidency, but received fewer popular votes than its opponents. NPV grew out of subsequent discussions among scholars and activists about how to avoid similar outcomes in the future and to achieve direct popular election. Proponents of NPV assert that it would guarantee the presidential candidates who win the most popular votes nationwide will always win the presidency; that it would end the inequities of the general ticket/winner-take-all system of awarding electoral votes; and that candidates would extend their focus beyond winning the \"battleground states,\" campaigning more widely and devoting greater attention to issues of concern to other parts of the country. They further assert that NPV would accomplish this while avoiding the exacting standards set for the proposal and ratification of constitutional amendments. Opponents argue that NPV would undermine the authority of states under the Constitution and the Founders' intention that presidential elections should be both national and federal contests; that it is an admitted \"end run\" around the Constitution that would circumvent the amendment process; and that it might actually lead to more disputed presidential elections characterized by politically contentious state recounts. The NPV has also been debated on legal grounds. Some observers maintain that it must be approved by Congress, because it is an interstate compact that would affect key provisions of constitutional presidential election procedures. NPV Inc., the organization managing the initiative's advocacy campaign, responds that congressional approval is not necessary because NPV concerns the appointment of electors, a subject that falls within state constitutional authority, and that the Supreme Court has previously rejected arguments that similar compacts would impair the rights of nonmember states. Other critics claim that NPV might violate the Voting Rights Act by diluting minority voter influence and avoiding the recently invalidated preclearance requirement for election procedure changes in covered jurisdictions. In response, NPV Inc. has asserted that the compact is \"entirely consistent with the goal of the Voting Rights Act.\" This report monitors the NPV's progress in the states and will identify and analyze further developments as warranted."], "all_classes": null, "length": 10755}
{"pred": "\nThe report from the Government Accountability Office (GAO) discusses the federal government's investment in IT and the challenges it faces in managing and securing its IT systems. The federal government plans to invest $96 billion in IT in fiscal year 2018, the largest amount ever. However, past reports have shown that IT projects often result in cost overruns and schedule slippages and contribute little to mission-related outcomes. The GAO found that many federal agencies lack effective management of their IT acquisitions and operations, including:\n\n- Lack of disciplined and effective project planning and governance\n- Limited oversight and governance\n- Security deficiencies\n\nThe GAO recommends that agencies implement policies to enhance the role of the Chief Information Officer (CIO) and improve IT management. For example, the CIO should review and approve IT contracts and strategies. The Federal Information Technology Acquisition Reform Act (FITARA) provides additional CIO authority, but the GAO found that agencies need to improve their implementation of FITARA guidance.\n\nThe GAO also found that agencies need to improve their data center consolidation efforts, software license management, and cybersecurity practices. Agencies need to implement comprehensive policies and practices to manage software licenses and protect their information systems and information. The GAO recommends that agencies implement the information security programs required by the Federal Information Security Management Act (FISMA) and submit related cybersecurity metrics.\n\nIn summary, the GAO found that while the federal government is investing more in IT, it still faces significant challenges in managing and securing its IT systems. The GAO recommends that agencies implement policies and practices to improve their IT management and security to realize cost savings and improve mission outcomes.", "answers": ["The federal government plans to invest almost $96 billion in IT in fiscal year 2018. Historically, IT investments have too often failed or contributed little to mission-related outcomes. Further, increasingly sophisticated threats and frequent cyber incidents underscore the need for effective information security. As a result, GAO added two areas to its high-risk list: IT security in 1997 and the management of IT acquisitions and operations in 2015. This statement summarizes agencies' progress in improving IT management and ensuring the security of federal IT. It is primarily based on GAO's prior reports issued between February 1997 and May 2018 (and an ongoing review) on (1) CIO responsibilities, (2) agency CIOs' involvement in approving IT contracts, (3) data center consolidation efforts, (4) the management of software licenses, and (5) compliance with cybersecurity requirements. The Office of Management and Budget (OMB) and federal agencies have taken steps to improve the management of information technology (IT) acquisitions and operations and ensure the security of federal IT through a series of initiatives. As of May 2018, agencies had fully implemented about 61 percent of the approximately 800 IT management-related recommendations that GAO made from fiscal years 2010 through 2015. Likewise, since 2010, agencies had implemented about 66 percent of the approximately 2,700 security-related recommendations as of May 2018. Even with this progress, significant actions remain to be completed. Chief Information Officer (CIO) responsibilities . Laws such as the Federal Information Technology Acquisition Reform Act (FITARA) and related guidance assigned 35 key IT management responsibilities to CIOs to help address longstanding challenges. However, in a draft report on CIO responsibilities, GAO's preliminary results suggest that none of the 24 selected agencies have policies that fully address the role of their CIO, as called for by federal laws and guidance. GAO intends to recommend that OMB and each of the selected 24 agencies take actions to improve the effectiveness of CIO's implementation of their responsibilities. IT contract approval . According to FITARA, covered agencies' CIOs are required to review and approve IT contracts. Nevertheless, in January 2018, GAO reported that most of the CIOs at 22 selected agencies were not adequately involved in reviewing billions of dollars of IT acquisitions. Consequently, GAO made 39 recommendations to improve CIO oversight over IT acquisitions. Consolidating data centers . OMB launched an initiative in 2010 to reduce data centers, which was codified and expanded in FITARA. According to agencies, data center consolidation and optimization efforts have resulted in approximately $3.9 billion of cost savings through 2018. Even so, additional work remains. GAO has made 160 recommendations to OMB and agencies to improve the reporting of related cost savings and to achieve optimization targets; however, as of May 2018, 80 of the recommendations have not been fully addressed. Managing software licenses . Effective management of software licenses can help avoid purchasing too many licenses that result in unused software. In May 2014, GAO reported that better management of licenses was needed to achieve savings, and made 135 recommendations to improve such management. Four years later, 78 of the recommendations remained open. Improving the security of federal IT systems . While the government has acted to protect federal information systems, agencies need to improve security programs, cyber capabilities, and the protection of personally identifiable information. Over the last several years, GAO has made about 2,700 recommendations to agencies aimed at improving the security of federal systems and information. These recommendations identified actions for agencies to take to strengthen their information security programs and technical controls over their computer networks and systems. As of May 2018, about 800 of the information security-related recommendations had not been implemented. From fiscal years 2010 through 2015, GAO made about 800 recommendations to OMB and federal agencies to address shortcomings in IT acquisitions and operations. Since 2010, GAO also made about 2,700 recommendations to federal agencies to improve the security of federal systems. These recommendations include those to improve the implementation of CIO responsibilities, the oversight of the data center consolidation initiative, software license management efforts, and the strength of security programs and technical controls. Most agencies agreed with these recommendations, and GAO will continue to monitor their implementation."], "all_classes": null, "length": 6259}
{"pred": "\nThe report discusses the current political and economic situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina, a country that has faced challenges since the end of the 1992-1995 war. The Dayton Peace Agreement established Bosnia's political system, which is dominated by ethnic groups and has led to entrenched ethnic divisions. The country faces issues such as corruption, economic stagnation, and a lack of political will to reform. The United States played a significant role in ending the war and shaping Bosnia's political system, but its engagement has decreased in recent years. The report highlights several challenges Bosnia faces, including:\n\n- Ethnic divisions that reinforce the political system and make it difficult to pass reforms\n- Nationalist politicians who manipulate historical memory to maintain power and obstruct reforms\n- A lack of trust in the political system and institutions\n- Economic dependence on patronage networks and corruption\n- External influence from Russia, Turkey, and China\n- A lack of progress on EU and NATO membership\n\nThe report concludes that Bosnia's challenges are complex and require a comprehensive approach to address. The United States and European Union can play a role in supporting reforms, countering corruption, and promoting a political community that transcends ethnic divisions. However, the report notes that U.S. engagement has decreased in recent years and that Bosnia's political system remains dysfunctional.", "answers": ["Bosnia and Herzegovina (hereafter, \"Bosnia\") drew heavily on U.S. support after gaining independence from Yugoslavia in 1992. The United States helped end the Bosnian war (1992-1995), one of the most lethal conflicts in Europe since the Second World War, by leading NATO airstrikes against Bosnian Serb forces, brokering the Dayton Peace Agreement in 1995, and deploying 20,000 U.S. troops. Some Members of Congress became involved in policy debates over these measures, and Congress monitored and at times challenged the Bush and Clinton Administrations' response through numerous hearings, resolutions, and legislative proposals. Since 1995, the United States has been a major source of aid to Bosnia and firmly supports its territorial integrity. The United States also supports Bosnia's aspirations for NATO and European Union (EU) membership. Today, Bosnia faces serious challenges. Nearly 25 years after the Dayton Agreement, Bosnia continues to use part of the Agreement as its constitution, which divides the country into two ethnoterritorial entities. Critics charge that Bosnia's political system is too decentralized to enact the reforms required for NATO and EU membership. They also contend that the ethnic power-sharing arrangements and veto points embedded in numerous government bodies are sources of gridlock. Domestic and international courts have ruled against several aspects of Bosnia's constitution, yet the Bosnian government thus far has failed to implement these rulings. Since Bosnia's independence, its politics has been dominated by ethnic parties representing the country's three main groups: Bosniaks (Slavic Muslims), Croats, and Serbs. These parties have prospered under a system that critics charge lacks transparency and accountability. Critics also maintain that ethnic party leaders use divisive nationalist rhetoric to distract from serious issues affecting the country as a whole, including poverty, unemployment, and stalled political reforms. The Bosnian population exhibits low trust in political parties and the government, and disaffection toward the country's elite. U.S. and EU officials brokered several ultimately unsuccessful rounds of constitutional reform negotiations, and continue to call on Bosnia's leaders to implement reforms to make governance more efficient and effective, dismantle patronage networks, and bring Bosnia closer to EU and NATO membership. However, there is little consensus among the country's leaders on how the country should be reformed. Bosnian Serb leaders from the Serb-majority entity (Republika Srpska) have called for greater autonomy and even secession from Bosnia. Some Bosnian Croat leaders have called for partitioning Bosnia's other entity, the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, to create a separate Croat-majority entity. Bosniak leaders, by contrast, generally prefer a more centralized state. Many analysts caution that any move to partition the country could lead to renewed violence, while greater decentralization could make Bosnia's government less functional. U.S. policy has long been oriented toward preserving Bosnia's statehood. Bosnia's 2018 general elections largely returned to power the same entrenched ethnic parties. Of particular concern is the election of Bosnian Serb leader Milorad Dodik to Bosnia's collective presidency. Dodik, a sharp critic of the United States and NATO, has periodically called for a referendum on Republika Srpska's secession. He is under U.S. sanctions for obstructing the Dayton Agreement. In addition to these internal challenges, U.S. and EU officials have expressed concern over external influence in the region. Russia reportedly relies on soft power, energy leverage, and \"spoiler\" tactics to influence Bosnia, particularly in the Serb-majority entity. Turkish soft power draws on Bosnia's Ottoman-era heritage and Turkey's shared religious tradition with Bosniaks. China is a more recent presence in the region, but its heavy investments and lending have prompted concern on both sides of the Atlantic. Policymakers have also expressed concern at the challenges posed by the return of Bosnians who fought with the Islamic State and Nusra Front in Syria and Iraq. Many observers contend that the United States remains a stakeholder in Bosnia's future because of its central role in resolving the conflict and shaping the postwar Bosnian state. Given the history of U.S. involvement in Bosnia, Bosnia's importance to regional stability in the Balkans, and concerns over Russian and Chinese influence in Bosnia, Members of Congress may be interested in monitoring how the country navigates its internal and external challenges. Congress may also consider future U.S. aid levels to Bosnia and the degree to which such assistance supports the long-standing U.S. policy objectives for Bosnia of territorial integrity, NATO and EU integration, energy security, and resilience against malign influence."], "all_classes": null, "length": 8598}
{"pred": "\nThe report summarizes the findings of an investigation into the restitution process for federal offenders. The Department of Justice (DOJ) oversees the restitution process, which includes identifying victims, determining their losses, and collecting restitution debts. The Judiciary plays a role in requesting and collecting restitution. The report found that:\n\n- DOJ and USAOs have identified a significant portion of outstanding restitution debt as uncollectible, but they have also identified $10 billion of outstanding restitution debt that could be collected.\n\n- USAOs have identified a lack of ability to pay as the main reason for uncollectible debt.\n\n- DOJ has identified improving debt collection as a major management initiative but does not have performance measures or goals to assess its progress.\n\n- The report recommends that DOJ develop performance measures and goals for each USAO related to the collection of restitution to gauge progress and improve practices.\n\n- DOJ should gather information on cases where forfeited assets were not used to compensate victims and take action if warranted to increase their use.\n\n- The report found that victims are unlikely to receive any meaningful portion of court-ordered restitution due to offenders' inability to pay. However, the judiciary and DOJ should ensure that restitution is properly managed and overseen to meet their responsibilities to victims.\n\n- The report provides recommendations to the judiciary and DOJ to improve the restitution process and collection of restitution debt.", "answers": ["One of the goals of federal criminal restitution is to restore victims of federal crimes to the position they occupied before the crime was committed by providing compensation. Various entities within the federal government are involved in the process of requesting, ordering, and collecting restitution for crime victims, including DOJ and the judiciary. The Justice for All Reauthorization Act of 2016 includes a provision for GAO to review the federal criminal restitution process for fiscal years 2014 through 2016. This report addresses, among other things: (1) the extent to which information is available on restitution requested by DOJ and ordered by courts; (2) the amount of restitution debt DOJ collected and the amount that remains outstanding; and, (3) the extent to which DOJ has conducted oversight on the collection of restitution. GAO analyzed laws, policies and procedures as well as USSC data on restitution orders and DOJ data on restitution collected from fiscal years 2014 through 2016. GAO also selected a non-generalizable sample of six federal judicial districts based on restitution collections and spoke with USAO officials and federal probation officers. Officials from selected U.S. Attorney's Offices (USAO) stated that they document requests for restitution in case files and employ other internal controls, such as the use of templates and forms, throughout the prosecution process to ensure that prosecutors request restitution as appropriate. GAO's analysis of U.S. Sentencing Commission (USSC) data—an agency within the judiciary—showed that information on restitution orders was available for 95 percent of all offenders sentenced from fiscal years 2014 through 2016. Specifically, 214,578 federal offenders were sentenced during this time period and restitution was ordered for 33,158, or 15 percent, of those offenders. Collectively, courts ordered these offenders to pay $33.9 billion in restitution. Most federal offenders sentenced during these years were sentenced for immigration or drug-related offenses. In interviews, USAO officials stated that these offenses do not typically have victims requiring restitution. GAO found that data on reasons why restitution was not ordered were incomplete for 5 percent of all offenders sentenced from fiscal years 2014 through 2016. Determining why data on restitution orders are incomplete may inform the judiciary of the cause of the incomplete data and any efforts needed to improve USSC data. GAO's analysis of Department of Justice (DOJ) data showed that USAOs collected $2.95 billion in restitution debt in fiscal years 2014 through 2016, see figure below. However, at the end of fiscal year 2016, $110 billion in previously ordered restitution remained outstanding, and USAOs identified $100 billion of that outstanding debt as uncollectible due to offenders' inability to pay. DOJ identified improving debt collection—including restitution—as a major management initiative in its 2014-2018 Strategic Plan. While DOJ is developing analytical tools to monitor the collection of restitution, it has not established performance measures or goals. Performance measures and goals would allow DOJ to gauge USAOs' success in collecting restitution and, by extension, the department's success in achieving a major management initiative. GAO is making three recommendations. GAO is making one to the judiciary to determine why data on restitution orders are incomplete. GAO is making two recommendations to DOJ, including one to implement performance measures and goals for the collection of restitution. The judiciary and DOJ concurred with the recommendations."], "all_classes": null, "length": 8541}
{"pred": "\nThis report summarizes the actions taken by the Department of Defense (DOD), the Obama Administration, and Congress to address the issue of sexual assault in the U.S. military from 2013 to 2016. In 2013, the DOD released the Annual Report on Sexual Harassment and Violence at the Military Service Academies, which showed a decrease in reported incidents of sexual assault. In response, Congress held hearings to investigate the issue and proposed legislation to improve the military justice system. In 2013 and 2014, the DOD released the Military Criminal Investigative Organizations' (MCOIs) sexual assault investigations, which found most cases resulted in criminal charges. In 2014, the DOD released the 2013 Annual Report on Sexual Harassment and Violence at the Military Service Academies, which showed a decrease in reported incidents. In 2015, the DOD proposed UCMJ changes to improve sentencing guidelines for sexual assault offenders. In 2016, the DOD launched a new strategy to curb sexual assault and the Air Force proposed dismissal of sexual assault cases transferred to Washington. Congress proposed legislation to improve the military justice system and provide specialized support to sexual assault victims. The report highlights the DOD's efforts to address the issue and Congress' hearings and legislation to improve the situation.", "answers": ["This report focuses on previous activity in Congress regarding high profile incidents of sexual assault in the military during the summer 2013 through 2016. Included are separate sections on the official responses related to these incidents by the Department of Defense (DOD), the Obama Administration, and Congress including legislation during the 113th (2013-2014) Congress and 114th Congress (2015-2016). The last section is a resource guide for sources in this report and related materials on sexual assault and prevention during this period. This report will not be updated and supersedes CRS Report R43168, Military Sexual Assault: Chronology of Activity in Congress and Related Resources. For current information regarding Congress and issues on sexual assault in the military, see CRS Report R44944, Military Sexual Assault: A Framework for Congressional Oversight, by Kristy N. Kamarck and Barbara Salazar Torreon. For legislative initiatives in the 115th Congress, see CRS Report R44923, FY2018 National Defense Authorization Act: Selected Military Personnel Issues, by Kristy N. Kamarck, Lawrence Kapp, and Barbara Salazar Torreon and CRS Report R45343, FY2019 National Defense Authorization Act: Selected Military Personnel Issues, by Bryce H. P. Mendez et al."], "all_classes": null, "length": 12479}
{"pred": "\nThe Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act (Stafford Act) authorizes the President to declare a Fire Management Assistance Grant (FMAG) to provide federal assistance for fire suppression activities on public or private land. FEMA Regional Administrators have been delegated this authority. FMAGs require a cost-sharing component where state, local, and tribal governments are responsible for 25% of expenses. FMAGs can be requested by a state when a fire is out of control and threatens to become a major disaster. Requests are evaluated based on criteria such as the threat to lives and property, availability of state and local resources, and potential economic impacts. FEMA has developed fire cost thresholds to determine eligibility for assistance. FMAGs are funded through FEMA's Disaster Relief Fund and do not reduce the amount of funding available for major disasters. FMAGs provide reimbursement for eligible activities such as equipment, personnel, and supplies. The cost-share for FMAGs is 75% federal and 25% grantee. FMAGs can be used in conjunction with other federal assistance programs, but most fires on federal land are the responsibility of the federal agency.", "answers": ["Section 420 of the Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act (P.L. 93-288, hereinafter the Stafford Act) authorizes the President to \"declare\" a Fire Management Assistance Grant (FMAG). In the interest of saving time, the authority to make the declaration has been delegated to the Federal Emergency Management Agency's (FEMA's) Regional Administrators. Once issued, the FMAG declaration authorizes various forms of federal fire suppression assistance such as the provision of equipment, personnel, and grants to state, local, and tribal governments for the control, management, and mitigation of any fire on certain public or private forest land or grassland that might become a major disaster. This federal assistance requires a cost-sharing component such that state, local, and tribal governments are responsible for 25% of the expenses. This report answers frequently asked questions about FMAGs. This report will be updated as events warrant."], "all_classes": null, "length": 2096}
{"pred": "\nThe Indian Health Service (IHS) faces significant challenges in recruiting and retaining healthcare providers, particularly in rural areas. IHS provides health services to American Indian/Alaska Native communities through a network of hospitals, clinics, and health stations. However, IHS has struggled to fill vacancies for providers, particularly in rural areas due to geographic isolation and limited amenities. IHS has implemented various recruitment and retention strategies, including financial incentives, professional development opportunities, and subsidized housing. However, the demand for these incentives exceeds the resources available. IHS lacks agency-wide information on temporary contract providers, which hinders its ability to make informed decisions on resource allocation and staffing. GAO recommends that IHS obtain agency-wide information on temporary provider contractors, including their cost and number of full-time equivalents, to inform decisions on resource allocation and provider staffing.", "answers": ["IHS is charged with providing health care to AI/AN people who are members or descendants of 573 tribes. According to IHS, AI/AN people born today have a life expectancy that is 5.5 years less than all races in the United States, and they die at higher rates than other Americans from preventable causes. The ability to recruit and retain a stable clinical workforce capable of providing quality and timely care is critical for IHS. GAO was asked to review provider vacancies at IHS. This report examines (1) IHS provider vacancies and challenges filling them; (2) strategies IHS has used to recruit and retain providers; and (3) strategies IHS has used to mitigate the negative effects of provider vacancies. GAO reviewed IHS human resources data for the provider positions that the agency tracks. GAO also reviewed policies, federal internal control standards, and legal authorities related to providers in federally operated IHS facilities. GAO interviewed IHS officials at the headquarters and area level and at selected facilities. GAO selected facilities based on variation in their number of direct care outpatient visits and inpatient hospital beds in 2014. Indian Health Service (IHS) data show sizeable vacancy rates for clinical care providers in the eight IHS geographic areas where the agency provides substantial direct care to American Indian/Alaska Native (AI/AN) people. The overall vacancy rate for providers—physicians, nurses, nurse practitioners, certified registered nurse anesthetists, certified nurse midwives, physician assistants, dentists, and pharmacists—was 25 percent, ranging from 13 to 31 percent across the areas. IHS officials told GAO that challenges to filling these vacancies include the rural location of many IHS facilities and insufficient housing for providers. Officials said long-standing vacancies have a negative effect on patient access, quality of care, and employee morale. IHS uses multiple strategies to recruit and retain providers, including offering increased salaries for certain positions, but it still faces challenges matching local market salaries. IHS also offers other financial incentives, and has made some housing available when possible. In addition, IHS uses strategies, such as contracting with temporary providers, to maintain patient access to services and reduce provider burnout. Officials said these temporary providers are more costly than salaried employees and can interrupt patients' continuity of care. However, IHS lacks agency-wide information on the costs and number of temporary providers used at its facilities, which impedes IHS officials' ability to target its resources to address gaps in provider staffing and ensure access to health services across IHS facilities. GAO recommends that IHS obtain, on an agency-wide basis, information on temporary provider contractors, including their associated cost and number of full-time equivalents, and use this information to inform decisions about resource allocation and provider staffing. IHS concurred with GAO's recommendation."], "all_classes": null, "length": 6957}
{"pred": "\nThe Navy currently has 51 attack submarines, including 3 Los Angeles class, 3 Seawolf class, and 15 Virginia class submarines. However, the Navy has experienced persistent maintenance delays and idle time in its attack submarine fleet. In 1963, the USS Thresher sank during deep submergence tests off the coast of New England, leading to the establishment of strict safety requirements for submarines. The Navy has since established the SUBSAFE program to ensure critical systems are protected and allow for emergency surfacing in case of flooding. However, this program requires submarines to adhere to strict maintenance schedules and pass materiel condition assessments before submergence. Delays in completing depot maintenance have resulted in significant maintenance delays and idle time for attack submarines. The Navy has hired additional workers at public shipyards to address workforce shortages, but this has not fully mitigated the challenge. The Navy needs to conduct a comprehensive business case analysis to inform maintenance workload allocation between public and private shipyards to minimize attack submarine idle time and delays. This analysis should assess the costs, benefits, and risks of attack submarines sitting idle, as well as the potential for additional availability to combatant commanders. The Navy's investment in attack submarines provides an asymmetric advantage, but the maintenance delays have not yet been fully addressed. The Secretary of the Navy should ensure the Chief of Naval Operations conducts such an analysis to maximize attack submarine readiness.", "answers": ["According to the Navy, its 51 attack submarines provide the United States an asymmetric advantage to gather intelligence undetected, attack enemy targets, and insert special forces, among others. These capabilities make attack submarines some of the most–requested assets by the global combatant commanders. GAO was asked to review the readiness of the Navy's attack submarine force. This report discusses the extent to which the Navy (1) has experienced maintenance delays in its attack submarine fleet and costs associated with any delays; and (2) has addressed any challenges and developed mitigation plans for any maintenance delays. GAO analyzed readiness information from fiscal years 2008-2018, operating and support costs, maintenance performance, and other data; visited attack submarines and squadrons; and interviewed public and private shipyard and fleet officials. This is a public version of a classified report issued in October 2018. Information the Department of Defense deemed classified or sensitive, such as attack submarine force structure requirements and detailed data on attack submarine maintenance delays, has been omitted. The Navy has been unable to begin or complete the vast majority of its attack submarine maintenance periods on time resulting in significant maintenance delays and operating and support cost expenditures. GAO's analysis of Navy maintenance data shows that between fiscal year 2008 and 2018, attack submarines have incurred 10,363 days of idle time and maintenance delays as a result of delays in getting into and out of the shipyards. For example, the Navy originally scheduled the USS Boise to enter a shipyard for an extended maintenance period in 2013 but, due to heavy shipyard workload, the Navy delayed the start of the maintenance period. In June 2016, the USS Boise could no longer conduct normal operations and the boat has remained idle, pierside for over two years since then waiting to enter a shipyard (see figure). GAO estimated that since fiscal year 2008 the Navy has spent more than $1.5 billion in fiscal year 2018 constant dollars to support attack submarines that provide no operational capability—those sitting idle while waiting to enter the shipyards, and those delayed in completing their maintenance at the shipyards. The Navy has started to address challenges related to workforce shortages and facilities needs at the public shipyards. However, it has not effectively allocated maintenance periods among public shipyards and private shipyards that may also be available to help minimize attack submarine idle time. GAO's analysis found that while the public shipyards have operated above capacity for the past several years, attack submarine maintenance delays are getting longer and idle time is increasing. The Navy may have options to mitigate this idle time and maintenance delays by leveraging private shipyard capacity for repair work. But the Navy has not completed a comprehensive business case analysis as recommended by Department of Defense guidelines to inform maintenance workload allocation across public and private shipyards. Navy leadership has acknowledged that they need to be more proactive in leveraging potential private shipyard repair capacity. Without addressing this challenge, the Navy risks continued expenditure of operating and support funding to crew, maintain, and support attack submarines that provide no operational capability because they are delayed in getting into and out of maintenance. GAO recommends that the Navy conduct a business case analysis to inform maintenance workload allocation across public and private shipyards. The Department of Defense concurred with GAO's recommendation."], "all_classes": null, "length": 3817}
{"pred": "\nThe report provides background information and issues for Congress on the Aegis ballistic missile defense (BMD) program carried out by the Missile Defense Agency (MDA) and the Navy. The Aegis system is used by Navy cruisers and destroyers to conduct BMD operations. The report discusses the following issues:\n\n1. Procurement and funding of Aegis BMD ships and missiles. The Navy plans to increase the number of BMD-capable Aegis ships from 38 to 59 by 2024.\n\n2. Technical risks and test and evaluation issues in the Aegis BMD program. The program has had some successes but still faces challenges in fully demonstrating its capabilities.\n\n3. Burden sharing and potential for allied contributions to regional BMD capabilities. Japan is planning to deploy its own Aegis Ashore system.\n\n4. Potential for ship-based lasers, electromagnetic railguns, and gun-launched guided projectiles to contribute to BMD operations.\n\n5. Potential for converting the Aegis test facility in Hawaii into an operational land-based BMD site.\n\n6. Required numbers of BMD-capable Aegis ships versus available numbers. The Navy's 2016 Force Structure Assessment sets the requirement for 54 BMD-capable ships.\n\n7. Potential impact of shifting BMD operations to shore-based sites. The CNO wants to end standing BMD patrols and transfer the mission to shore-based assets.\n\n8. Potential for the Aegis BMD system to intercept certain ICBMs with the new SM-3 Block IIA missile. The SM-3 Block IIA is currently being developed.\n\n9. Relationship between BMD operations and the Navy's fleet of Aegis ships. BMD operations are placing a strain on the fleet.\n\n10. Potential for the Aegis BMD system to contribute to other missions beyond BMD. The Aegis system has been modified for air defense and anti-submarine warfare.\n\nIn summary, the report discusses the technical and operational aspects of the Aegis BMD program, the burden it places on the Navy's", "answers": ["The Aegis ballistic missile defense (BMD) program, which is carried out by the Missile Defense Agency (MDA) and the Navy, gives Navy Aegis cruisers and destroyers a capability for conducting BMD operations. Under the FY2020 budget submission, the number of BMD-capable Navy Aegis ships is projected to increase from 38 at the end of FY2018 to 59 at the end of FY2024. BMD-capable Aegis ships operate in European waters to defend Europe from potential ballistic missile attacks from countries such as Iran, and in in the Western Pacific and the Persian Gulf to provide regional defense against potential ballistic missile attacks from countries such as North Korea and Iran. The Aegis BMD program is funded mostly through MDA's budget. The Navy's budget provides additional funding for BMD-related efforts. MDA's proposed FY2020 budget requests a total of $1,784.2 million (i.e., about $1.8 billion) in procurement and research and development funding for Aegis BMD efforts, including funding for two Aegis Ashore sites in Poland and Romania. MDA's budget also includes operations and maintenance (O&M) and military construction (MilCon) funding for the Aegis BMD program. Issues for Congress regarding the Aegis BMD program include the following: whether to approve, reject, or modify MDA's FY2020 funding procurement and research and development funding requests for the program; required numbers of BMD-capable Aegis ships versus available numbers of BMD-capable Aegis ships; the burden that BMD operations may be placing on the Navy's fleet of Aegis ships, and whether there are alternative ways to perform BMD missions now performed by U.S. Navy Aegis ships, such as establishing more Aegis Ashore sites; burden sharing—how allied contributions to regional BMD capabilities and operations compare to U.S. naval contributions to overseas regional BMD capabilities and operations; whether to convert the Aegis test facility in Hawaii into an operational land-based Aegis BMD site; the potential for ship-based lasers, electromagnetic railguns (EMRGs), and hypervelocity projectiles (HVPs) to contribute in coming years to Navy terminal-phase BMD operations and the impact this might eventually have on required numbers of ship-based BMD interceptor missiles; and technical risk and test and evaluation issues in the Aegis BMD program."], "all_classes": null, "length": 6599}
{"pred": "\nThe report examines how U.S. agencies implement funding restrictions on promoting tobacco exports overseas. U.S. appropriations laws since the 1990s have prohibited the use of funds appropriated for State, Commerce, and USDA from promoting the sale or export of U.S. tobacco or tobacco products. These agencies have developed guidance to implement these restrictions. However, not all officials were aware of the restrictions and more than half had not received training about the restrictions. The report found that:\n\n- State, Commerce, and USDA have implemented the funding restrictions on promoting tobacco as outlined in the interagency guidance issued by State.\n- Post officials identified three areas of the guidance that may benefit from additional clarification: attendance at events, the types of permitted services, and the description of tobacco products.\n- Commerce officials at posts asked for additional guidance about the types of services they are permitted to provide tobacco companies or the types of companies or products they can support.\n- The guidance lacks specific examples of the types of services officials are allowed to provide tobacco interests and a clear description of tobacco products.\n\nTo address these issues, the report recommends:\n\n- State should work with the Foreign Service Institute to include information about the funding restrictions and relevant guidance on promoting the sale or export of tobacco or tobacco products in its training materials for employees conducting export promotion activities overseas.\n- USDA should include information about the funding restrictions and relevant guidance on promoting the sale or export of tobacco or tobacco products in training materials for employees conducting export promotion activities overseas.\n- State, in consultation with Commerce and USDA, should assess the interagency guidance on promoting tobacco in light of questions raised by officials at posts overseas and update it as needed.", "answers": ["The World Health Organization estimates that tobacco use kills over 7 million people each year, more than tuberculosis, HIV/AIDS, and malaria combined. Since the 1990s, Congress has enacted restrictions regarding the use of certain appropriated funds to promote U.S. tobacco exports. GAO was asked to review the implementation of these restrictions. This report examines (1) guidance select U.S. agencies have issued to implement these restrictions, (2) whether overseas officials from select U.S. agencies were aware of the restrictions and guidance, and (3) select U.S. agencies' implementation of the guidance overseas. GAO reviewed U.S. laws, agency guidance, and internal communications; analyzed Commerce data; and interviewed agency officials in Washington, D.C. and in 24 offices across 11 overseas posts in 9 countries. GAO selected these countries based on criteria that included U.S. tobacco export totals, smoking rates, and geographic dispersion. Congress has restricted the use of certain appropriated funding to promote tobacco exports and the Departments of State (State), Commerce (Commerce), and Agriculture (USDA) have issued interagency guidance through the cable system that they rely on to implement these restrictions. State collaborates with these and other agencies to periodically update this cable. The cable informs officials about the types of actions they should take—such as providing routine business facilitation services to all U.S. companies—and the types of actions they should not take—such as attending events sponsored by tobacco companies. Most, but not all, officials overseas that GAO interviewed were aware of the restrictions and received some guidance concerning the restrictions. However, GAO found that some officials did not recall receiving the interagency guidance cable. In addition, State and USDA's current training materials do not address the restrictions. Federal internal control standards state that appropriate training is essential to an organization's operational success. Thus, providing officials overseas with training about the funding restrictions and related guidance would help to ensure that officials are aware of the restrictions. U.S. officials overseas have implemented restrictions on promoting tobacco, but some officials said that the interagency guidance lacks clarity. Officials said that they have not promoted tobacco by, for example, attending events sponsored solely by tobacco companies. However, officials identified three areas of the guidance that are unclear: (1) attendance at events not sponsored by U.S. tobacco companies but attended by representatives of these companies; (2) the types of services officials can provide tobacco companies; and (3) the description of tobacco products, such as whether component parts for electronic cigarettes are included. Federal standards for internal control state that management should clearly document internal controls in policies and guidance to prevent officials from failing to achieve an objective or address a risk. By providing more specific guidance, the agencies would help ensure that officials consistently implement the funding restrictions on promoting tobacco. GAO recommends that (1) State and USDA include information about the funding restrictions and guidance in training materials for relevant employees and (2) State, in consultation with Commerce and USDA, assess and update the interagency guidance cable, as needed, on promoting tobacco in light of questions raised by officials at posts overseas. State and USDA concurred with the recommendations."], "all_classes": null, "length": 5128}
{"pred": "\nThe report found that the Veterans Affairs (VA) medical centers reviewed lacked documentation of clinical care reviews for 46 providers after concerns were raised about their care. Specifically, focused professional practice evaluations (FPPEs) for cause were not conducted for 26 providers, and retrospective reviews were not conducted for 21 providers. The medical centers also failed to conduct reviews in a timely manner, with some providers waiting for months or even years before reviews began. The lack of documentation and timely reviews made it difficult for VA officials to make decisions about providers' privileges and take appropriate actions when necessary. The report also found that providers were not reported to the National Practitioner Data Bank (NPDB) and state licensing boards as required by VA policy. The main reasons for this were a lack of familiarity with VA policies and misinterpretation of the policies. To address these issues, the report recommends that VA require documentation of all reviews, establish a timeliness requirement for initiating reviews, and strengthen oversight by requiring networks to oversee VA medical centers. VA concurred with the recommendations and described plans to revise policies and update the standardized audit tool used by networks.", "answers": ["This testimony summarizes the information contained in GAO's November 2017 report, entitled VA Health Care: Improved Policies and Oversight Needed for Reviewing and Reporting Providers for Quality and Safety Concerns ( GAO-18-63 ). Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) medical center (VAMC) officials are responsible for reviewing the clinical care delivered by their privileged providers—physicians and dentists who are approved to independently perform specific services—after concerns are raised. The five VAMCs GAO selected for review collectively required review of 148 providers from October 2013 through March 2017 after concerns were raised about their clinical care. GAO found that these reviews were not always documented or conducted in a timely manner. GAO identified these providers by reviewing meeting minutes from the committee responsible for requiring these types of reviews at the respective VAMCs, and through interviews with VAMC officials. The selected VAMCs were unable to provide documentation of these reviews for almost half of the 148 providers. Additionally, the VAMCs did not start the reviews of 16 providers for 3 months to multiple years after the concerns were identified. GAO found that VHA policies do not require documentation of all types of clinical care reviews and do not establish timeliness requirements. GAO also found that the Veterans Health Administration (VHA) does not adequately oversee these reviews at VAMCs through its Veterans Integrated Service Networks (VISN), which are responsible for overseeing the VAMCs. Without documentation and timely reviews of providers' clinical care, VAMC officials may lack information needed to reasonably ensure that VA providers are competent to provide safe, high quality care to veterans and to make appropriate decisions about these providers' privileges. GAO also found that from October 2013 through March 2017, the five selected VAMCs did not report most of the providers who should have been reported to the National Practitioner Data Bank (NPDB) or state licensing boards (SLB) in accordance with VHA policy. The NPDB is an electronic repository for critical information about the professional conduct and competence of providers. GAO found that selected VAMCs did not report to the NPDB eight of nine providers who had adverse privileging actions taken against them or who resigned during an investigation related to professional competence or conduct, as required by VHA policy, and none of these nine providers had been reported to SLBs. GAO found that officials at the selected VAMCs misinterpreted or were not aware of VHA policies and guidance related to NPDB and SLB reporting processes resulting in providers not being reported. GAO also found that VHA and the VISNs do not conduct adequate oversight of NPDB and SLB reporting practices and cannot reasonably ensure appropriate reporting of providers. As a result, VHA's ability to provide safe, high quality care to veterans is hindered because other VAMCs, as well as non-VA health care entities, will be unaware of serious concerns raised about a provider's care. For example, GAO found that after one VAMC failed to report to the NPDB or SLBs a provider who resigned to avoid an adverse privileging action, a non-VA hospital in the same city took an adverse privileging action against that same provider for the same reason 2 years later."], "all_classes": null, "length": 1743}
{"pred": "\nThis report discusses the Congressional Review Act (CRA) and how it applies to agency actions that are not subject to notice-and-comment rulemaking procedures. The CRA requires agencies to submit actions that fall within the CRA's definition of a rule to both houses of Congress and to GAO before the actions may take effect. The report explains how GAO's role in determining whether agency actions are covered by the CRA appears to be voluntary and advisory, and how GAO opinions may be treated as dispositive by Congress. The report also discusses how the CRA's definition of \"rule\" is incorporated into the definition of \"rule\" under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), and how the two definitions differ in their exclusions. The report concludes by summarizing the 21 GAO opinions to date on whether certain agency actions were rules and eligible for disapproval under the CRA.", "answers": ["The Congressional Review Act (CRA) allows Congress to review certain types of federal agency actions that fall under the statutory category of \"rules.\" The CRA requires that agencies report their rules to Congress and provides special procedures under which Congress can consider legislation to overturn those rules. A joint resolution of disapproval will become effective once both houses of Congress pass a joint resolution and it is signed by the President, or if Congress overrides the President's veto. The CRA generally adopts a broad definition of the word \"rule\" from the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), defining a rule as \"the whole or a part of an agency statement of general or particular applicability and future effect designed to implement, interpret, or prescribe law or policy or describing the organization, procedure, or practice requirements of an agency.\" The CRA, however, provides three exceptions to this broad definition: any rule of particular applicability, including a rule that approves or prescribes for the future rates, wages, prices, services, or allowances therefor, corporate or financial structures, reorganizations, mergers, or acquisitions thereof, or accounting practices or disclosures bearing on any of the foregoing; any rule relating to agency management or personnel; or any rule of agency organization, procedure, or practice that does not substantially affect the rights or obligations of non-agency parties. The class of rules the CRA covers is broader than the category of rules that are subject to the APA's notice-and-comment requirements. As such, some agency actions, such as guidance documents, that are not subject to notice-and-comment rulemaking procedures may still be considered rules under the CRA and thus could be overturned using the CRA's procedures. The effect of Congress disapproving a rule that is not subject to notice-and-comment rulemaking may be subject to debate, given that such rules are generally viewed to lack any legal effect in the first place. Nonetheless, the CRA does encompass some such rules, as highlighted by the recent enactment of a CRA resolution overturning a bulletin from the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau that was not subject to the notice-and-comment procedures. Even if an agency action falls under the CRA's definition of \"rule,\" however, the expedited procedures for considering legislation to overturn the rule only become available when the agency submits the rule to Congress. In many cases in which agencies take actions that fall under the scope of a \"rule\" but have not gone through notice-and-comment rulemaking procedures, agencies fail to submit those rules. Thus, questions have arisen as to how Members can avail themselves of the CRA's special fast-track procedures if the agency has not submitted the action to Congress. To protect its prerogative to review agency rules under the CRA, Congress and the Government Accountability Office (GAO) have developed an ad hoc process in which Members can request that GAO provide a formal legal opinion on whether a particular agency action qualifies as a rule under the CRA. If GAO concludes that the action in question falls within the CRA's definition of \"rule,\" Congress has treated the publication of the GAO opinion in the Congressional Record as constructive submission of the rule. In other words, an affirmative opinion from GAO can allow Congress to use the CRA procedures to consider legislation overturning an agency action despite the agency not submitting that action to Congress."], "all_classes": null, "length": 12318}
{"pred": "\nThe report discusses how the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) is struggling to align its medical facilities and services with the needs of veterans due to geographic shifts, changes in healthcare delivery, and limited stakeholder involvement. VA has a large inventory of vacant or underutilized buildings that are over 60 years old, which makes modernizing or renovating them difficult and costly. VA has also encountered challenges in aligning its facilities with the needs of veterans due to a lack of effective stakeholder engagement. VA's facility planning processes, including the Strategic Capital Investment Planning (SCIP) and VA Integrated Planning (VAIP), have limitations that make it difficult to accurately identify the capital needed to address service and infrastructure gaps. The report recommends that VA address these limitations, evaluate the value of the VAIP facility master plans, and establish an organizational structure and common analytical framework to ensure consistency in applying selection criteria. VA should also involve the audit community to improve data accuracy and establish BRAC oversight mechanisms to ensure implementation of recommendations. The report highlights two key challenges that affected DOD's implementation of BRAC: sustained senior leadership attention and effective planning involving multiple stakeholders.", "answers": ["VA operates one of the largest health care systems in the United States, utilizing more than 6,000 federally owned and 1,500 leased buildings. DOD has repeatedly applied the BRAC process to reduce the amount of unneeded property that it owns and leases and to save billions of dollars that could be applied to higher priority defense needs. This statement is based on GAO's April 2017 report related to VA facility alignment ( GAO-17-349 ) and numerous GAO reports related to the BRAC process as summarized in a June 2011 testimony ( GAO-11-704T ) and a March 2012 testimony ( GAO-12-513T ). This statement addresses (1) the factors that affect VA's facility alignment and the extent to which VA's capital-planning process facilitates the alignment of facilities with the veterans' population, and (2) the key elements and challenges affecting DOD and the Commission in BRAC 2005. Detailed information on our scope and methodologies for this work can be found in these published products, cited throughout this testimony. Geographic shifts in the veterans' population, changes in health care delivery, aging infrastructure, and limited stakeholder involvement affect the Department of Veterans Affairs' (VA) efforts to align its services and real property portfolio to meet the needs of veterans. For example, a shift over time from inpatient to outpatient care will likely result in underutilized space once used for inpatient care. Further, the historic status of some VA facilities adds to the complexity of converting or disposing of them. In such instances, it is often difficult and costly for VA to modernize, renovate, and retrofit these older facilities. GAO reported that two of the planning processes VA uses to align its facilities—VA's Strategic Capital Investment Planning (SCIP) and the VA Integrated Planning (VAIP)—have limitations that undermine VA's efforts to achieve its goals. Specifically: VA relies on the SCIP process to plan and prioritize capital projects, but VA routinely asks its facility planners to submit their next year's planned project narratives before knowing if their previous submissions have been funded. The overlapping budget cycle, which is outside of VA's control, combined with other SCIP limitations—including subjective narratives, long time frames, and restricted access to information—make it difficult for VA to rely on SCIP to accurately identify the capital necessary to address its service and infrastructure gaps. VA concurred that it needs to address SCIP limitations that are within its control, as GAO recommended; VA has made some progress in implementing the recommendation has made some progress in implementing the recommendation.\\ The VAIP process is estimated to cost $108 million and to produce market-level service delivery plans and facility master plans. However, the VAIP master plans incorrectly assume that all future growth in services will be provided directly through VA facilities without considering alternatives, such as purchasing care from the community. GAO recommended that VA consider discontinuing the VAIP facility master plans pending an assessment of their value as a facility-planning tool. VA agreed with the recommendation and is implementing it while pursuing a national realignment strategy.. Key elements of the Department of Defense's (DOD) 2005 Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) process could benefit VA's asset and infrastructure review. The key elements included: (1) establishing goals for the process, (2) developing criteria for evaluating closures and realignments, and (3) establishing an organizational structure to develop closure and realignment options. GAO identified key challenges that affected DOD's implementation of BRAC 2005 and the results achieved; these challenges would need to be addressed if VA is to successfully apply the process. These challenges included: (1) large, complex recommendations required sustained senior leadership's attention and a high level of coordination among many stakeholders, and (2) the large number of actions that depend on each other for successful implementation. In the April 2017 report, GAO made recommendations related to capital planning and stakeholder involvement. VA concurred with the recommendations to the extent that they were within its control and has started making improvements."], "all_classes": null, "length": 2561}
{"pred": "\nThe report assesses the Department of Homeland Security's (DHS) TRIO components' alternatives analysis (AA) processes for transitioning to a modernized financial management system. DHS's TRIO components - the U.S. Coast Guard, Transportation Security Administration, and Domestic Nuclear Detection Office - conducted AAs in 2012 and 2013 to determine the best alternative. GAO evaluated the TRIO components' AAs against 22 best practices for an analysis of alternatives (AOA) process identified by GAO. GAO found that while some TRIO components partially met some of the best practices, others did not fully meet them. This lack of adherence to best practices increased the risk that the preferred alternative selected may not represent the best solution for meeting mission needs. DHS's guidance for conducting AAs and AAs did not fully incorporate the 22 best practices identified by GAO. DHS's TRIO components did not fully or partially meet all four characteristics of a reliable, high-quality AOA process. GAO recommends that DHS develop and implement effective processes and improve guidance to reasonably assure that future AAs fully follow AOA process best practices and reflect the four characteristics of a reliable, high-quality AOA process.", "answers": ["To help address long-standing financial management system deficiencies, DHS initiated its TRIO project, which has focused on migrating three of its components to a modernized financial management system provided by IBC, an OMB-designated, federal SSP. House Report Number 3128 included a provision for GAO to assess the risks of DHS using IBC in connection with its modernization efforts. This report examines (1) the extent to which DHS and the TRIO components followed best practices in analyzing alternatives, and the key factors, metrics, and processes used in their choice of a modernized financial management system; (2) the extent to which DHS managed the risks of using IBC for its TRIO project consistent with risk management best practices; and (3) the key factors and challenges that have impacted the TRIO project and DHS's plans for completing remaining key priorities. GAO interviewed key officials, reviewed relevant documents, and determined whether DHS followed best practices identified by GAO as necessary characteristics of a reliable, high-quality AOA process and other risk management best practices. The Department of Homeland Security's (DHS) TRIO project represents a key effort to address long-standing financial management system deficiencies. During 2012 and 2013, the TRIO components—U.S. Coast Guard (Coast Guard), Transportation Security Administration (TSA), and Domestic Nuclear Detection Office (DNDO)—each completed an alternatives analysis (AA) to determine a preferred alternative for modernizing its financial management system. GAO found that DNDO's AA substantially met the four characteristics—well-documented, comprehensive, unbiased, and credible—that GAO previously identified for a reliable, high-quality analysis of alternatives (AOA) process. However, Coast Guard's and TSA's AAs did not fully or substantially meet three of these characteristics, and DHS guidance for conducting AAs did not substantially incorporate certain best practices, such as identifying significant risks and mitigation strategies and performing an independent review to help validate the AOA process. Based on these analyses and other factors, the TRIO components determined that migrating to a federal shared service provider (SSP) represented the best alternative, and in 2014, DHS selected the Department of the Interior's Interior Business Center (IBC) as the federal SSP for the project. However, because Coast Guard's and TSA's AAs did not fully or substantially reflect all of the characteristics noted above, they are at increased risk that the alternative selected may not achieve mission needs. DHS also did not fully follow best practices for managing project risks related to its use of IBC on the TRIO project. Specifically, DHS followed three of seven risk management best practices, such as determining risk sources and categories and establishing a risk management strategy. However, it did not fully follow four best practices for defining risk parameters, identifying risks, developing risk mitigation plans, and implementing these plans largely because its guidance did not sufficiently address these best practices. For example, although DHS created joint teams with IBC and provided additional resources to IBC to help address risk mitigation concerns, it did not always develop sufficiently detailed risk mitigation plans that also included contingency plans for selected critical risks. As a result, although IBC's capacity and experience for migrating large agencies the size of Coast Guard and TSA was identified as a risk in July 2014, a contingency plan working group to address this concern was not established until January 2017. By not fully following risk management best practices, DHS is at increased risk that potential problems may not be identified or properly mitigated. DHS, IBC, Office of Management and Budget (OMB), and other federal oversight agencies identified various challenges that have impacted the TRIO project and contributed to a 2-year delay in the implementation of Coast Guard's and TSA's modernized solutions. These challenges include the lack of sufficient resources, aggressive schedule, complex requirements, increased costs, and project management and communication concerns. To help address these challenges, DHS and IBC established review teams and have taken other steps to assess potential mitigating steps. In May 2017, DHS determined that migrating the solution from IBC to a DHS data center represented the best option and initiated discovery efforts to further assess this as its path forward for the TRIO project. GAO recommends that DHS more fully follow best practices for conducting an AOA process and managing risks. DHS concurred with GAO's recommendations and described actions it will take, or has taken, in response."], "all_classes": null, "length": 10649}
{"pred": "\nThe report assesses the Internal Revenue Service's (IRS) efforts to use information collected under the Foreign Account Tax Compliance Act (FATCA) to improve taxpayer compliance. The following are the key findings:\n\n1. IRS lacks accurate and complete Taxpayer Identification Numbers (TINs) from foreign financial institutions (FFIs), which makes it difficult to match information reported by FFIs to individual taxpayers. \n\n2. IRS does not have consistent and complete data collected from individuals' electronic and paper filings of Form 8938 and parent tax returns, which affects its ability to extract and analyze FATCA data.\n\n3. There is overlap between FATCA and Common Reporting Standard (CRS) reporting requirements, resulting in duplicative reporting of foreign financial assets.\n\n4. FATCA has created challenges for some U.S. persons living abroad, including loss of access to foreign financial services and difficulty obtaining Social Security numbers.\n\n5. IRS lacks a comprehensive plan to leverage FATCA data to improve tax compliance.\n\n6. Many Forms 8938 may have been filed unnecessarily, which could reduce taxpayer burden and processing costs for IRS.\n\n7. IRS should develop a plan to mitigate risks with compliance activities due to lack of accurate and complete TINs.\n\n8. IRS should ensure business units have access to consistent and complete data collected from Forms 8938 and tax returns.\n\n9. IRS should employ a comprehensive plan for managing efforts to leverage FATCA data.\n\n10. IRS should assess factors contributing to unnecessary Form 8938 reporting and take steps to address the issue.\n\n111. Treasury, State, and SSA should establish a formal means to collaboratively address ongoing issues U.S. persons living abroad encounter from FATCA implementation.", "answers": ["Concerns over efforts by U.S. taxpayers to use offshore accounts to hide income or evade taxes contributed to the passage of FATCA in 2010, which sought to create greater transparency and accountability over offshore assets held by U.S. taxpayers. House Report 114-624 included a provision for GAO to evaluate FATCA implementation and determine the effects of FATCA on U.S. citizens living abroad. GAO—among other things—(1) assessed IRS's efforts to use FATCA-related information to improve taxpayer compliance; (2) examined the extent to which Treasury administers overlapping reporting requirements on financial assets held overseas; and (3) examined the effects of FATCA implementation unique to U.S. persons living abroad. GAO reviewed applicable documentation; analyzed tax data; and interviewed officials from IRS, other federal agencies and organizations, selected tax practitioners, and more than 20 U.S. persons living overseas. Data quality and management issues have limited the effectiveness of the Internal Revenue Service's (IRS) efforts to improve taxpayer compliance using foreign financial asset data collected under the Foreign Account Tax Compliance Act (FATCA). Specifically, IRS has had difficulties matching the information reported by foreign financial institutions (FFI) with U.S. taxpayers' tax filings due to missing or inaccurate Taxpayer Identification Numbers provided by FFIs. Further, IRS lacks access to consistent and complete data on foreign financial assets and other data reported in tax filings by U.S. persons, in part, because some IRS databases do not store foreign asset data reported from paper filings. IRS has also stopped pursuing a comprehensive plan to leverage FATCA data to improve taxpayer compliance because, according to IRS officials, IRS moved away from updating broad strategy documents to focus on individual compliance campaigns. Ensuring access to consistent and complete data collected from U.S. persons—and employing a plan to leverage such data—would help IRS better leverage such campaigns and increase taxpayer compliance. Due to overlapping statutory reporting requirements, IRS and the Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN)—both within the Department of the Treasury (Treasury)—collect duplicative foreign financial account and other asset information from U.S. persons. Consequently, in tax years 2015 and 2016, close to 75 percent of U.S. persons who reported information on foreign accounts and other assets on their tax returns also filed a separate form with FinCEN. The overlapping requirements increase the compliance burden on U.S. persons and add complexity that can create confusion, potentially resulting in inaccurate or unnecessary reporting. Modifying the statutes governing the requirements to allow for the sharing of FATCA information for the prevention and detection of financial crimes would eliminate the need for duplicative reporting. This is similar to other statutory allowances for IRS to disclose return information for other purposes, such as for determining Social Security income tax withholding. According to documents GAO reviewed, and focus groups and interviews GAO conducted, FFIs closed some U.S. persons' existing accounts or denied them opportunities to open new accounts after FATCA was enacted due to increased costs, and risks they pose under FATCA reporting requirements. According to Department of State (State) data, annual approvals of renunciations of U.S. citizenship increased from 1,601 to 4,449—or nearly 178 percent—from 2011 through 2016, attributable in part to the difficulties cited above. Treasury previously established joint strategies with State to address challenges U.S. persons faced in accessing foreign financial services. However, it lacks a collaborative mechanism to coordinate efforts with other agencies to address ongoing challenges in accessing such services or obtaining Social Security Numbers. Implementation of a formal means to collaboratively address burdens faced by Americans abroad from FATCA can help federal agencies develop more effective solutions to mitigate such burdens by monitoring and sharing information on such issues, and jointly developing and implementing steps to address them. GAO is making one matter for congressional consideration to address overlap in foreign asset reporting requirements. GAO is making seven recommendations to IRS and other agencies to enhance IRS's ability to leverage FATCA data to enforce compliance, address unnecessary reporting, and better collaborate to mitigate burdens on U.S. persons living abroad. State and Social Security Administration agreed with GAO's recommendations. Treasury and IRS neither agreed nor disagreed with GAO's recommendations."], "all_classes": null, "length": 13388}
{"pred": "\nThis report provides an overview of the history and current state of funding designated as emergency or Overseas Contingency Operations/Global War on Terrorism (OCO/GWOT) since the 9/11 attacks. It covers funding for the Department of Defense (DOD), Department of State and USAID, and the Department of Homeland Security. \n\nSince 2001, Congress has appropriated over $2 trillion in discretionary budget authority for war-related and other international emergency or contingency-designated activities. This includes $1.8 trillion for DOD, $154 billion for State/USAID, and $3 billion for DHS/Coast Guard.\n\nThe report highlights that funding designated as emergency or OCO/GWOT has not declined at the same rate as the number of U.S. troops in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Syria. This is due to the fixed, inelastic costs of infrastructure, support requirements, and in-theater presence to support contingency operations.\n\nCongress has used OCO funding to fund base budget requirements, including in-theater support, security cooperation, and deterrence activities. The Department of Defense has acknowledged that some OCO costs do not belong in the OCO account and should be shifted back to the base budget.\n\nThe report concludes that Congress needs to properly question the Department of Defense budget planners on the future of OCO funding and transition enduring OCO costs to the base budget.\n\n", "answers": ["Congressional interest in Overseas Contingency Operation (OCO) funding has continued as Members debate ways of funding priorities without breaching discretionary spending limits set in law. Since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, Congress has appropriated approximately $2 trillion in discretionary budget authority designated as emergency requirements or for Overseas Contingency Operations/Global War on Terrorism (OCO/GWOT) in support of the broad U.S. government response to the 9/11 attacks and for other related international affairs activities. This figure amounts to approximately 9.4% of total discretionary spending during this period. Congress has used supplemental appropriation acts or designated funding for emergency requirements or OCO/GWOT—or both—in statute. These funds are not subject to limits on discretionary spending in congressional budget resolutions or to the statutory discretionary spending limits established by the Budget Control Act of 2011 (BCA; P.L. 112-125). The Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985 (BBEDCA; P.L. 99-177) allows emergency funding to be excluded from budget control limits. The BCA added the OCO/GWOT designation to the BBEDCA exemption, thereby providing Congress and the President with an alternate way to exclude funding from the BCA spending limits. While there is no overall statutory limit on the amount of emergency or OCO/GWOT spending, both Congress and the President have fundamental roles in determining how much of the spending to provide each fiscal year. Congress must designate any such funding in statute on an account-by-account basis. The President is also required to designate it as such after it is appropriated to be available for expenditure. Debate over what should constitute OCO/GWOT or emergency activities and expenses has shifted over time, reflecting differing viewpoints about the extent, nature, and duration of U.S. military operations in Afghanistan, Iraq, Syria, and elsewhere. Funding designated for OCO/GWOT has also been used to fund base-budget requirements of the DOD and State Department and to prevent or respond to crises abroad, including armed conflict, as well as human-caused and natural disasters. Some defense officials and policymakers argue OCO funding allows for flexible response to contingencies, and provides a \"safety valve\" to the spending caps and threat of sequestration—the automatic cancellation of budget authority largely through across-the-board reductions of nonexempt programs and activities—under the BCA. Critics, however, have described OCO/GWOT as a loophole or \"gimmick\"—morphing from an account for replacing combat losses of equipment, resupplying expended munitions, and transporting troops through war zones, to a \"slush fund\" for activities unrelated to contingency operations. Congress appropriated approximately $103 billion for OCO in FY2017 (8.5% of all discretionary appropriations), $78 billion for OCO in FY2018 (5.5% of all discretionary appropriations), and $68.8 billion for OCO so far in FY2019. Discretionary appropriations for FY2019 are not yet final; a continuing resolution expired December 21, 2018. Following passage of the Bipartisan Budget Act of 2018 (P.L. 115-123), which raised discretionary budget caps for defense and foreign affairs agencies in FY2018 and FY2019, the Administration proposed shifting some OCO funding into the base, or regular, budget. Although Congress has generally not followed Administration requests for reduced funding for foreign affairs and domestic activities and has increased funding for defense, the President has asked cabinet secretaries to propose spending cuts of 5% in FY2020. Such proposals, if requested in a budget submission, may create difficult choices for Congress in FY2020 and FY2021—the final two years of the BCA discretionary spending limits. Congress's decisions on OCO/GWOT designations will affect how much agency funding is available for military operations and foreign affairs activities overseas, how much is subject to the BCA caps, and how much is incorporated into regular budgets and long-term budget projections."], "all_classes": null, "length": 9854}
{"pred": "\nThe report examines the disclosures filed by companies in response to the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission's (SEC) conflict minerals disclosure rule in 2017. The rule requires companies to disclose information on the use of conflict minerals, including tin, tungsten, tantalum, and gold, in their products. The report found that:\n\n- In 2017, 1,165 companies filed conflict minerals disclosures with the SEC, similar to the number of companies that filed in 2016 and 2015.\n- Almost all companies that filed disclosures performed country-of-origin inquiries, with 100% reporting that they conducted such inquiries.\n- An estimated 53% of companies reported that their conflict minerals came from covered countries, compared to 49% in 2016 and 30% in 2014.\n- Almost all companies that conducted due diligence reported that they could not determine the source of the conflict minerals in their products, due to lack of access to suppliers and complex supply chains.\n- Four companies reported that their conflict minerals did not finance or benefit armed groups.\n\nThe report also examined information on sexual violence in the eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo and neighboring countries. The U.S. Department of State and U.S. Agency for International Development provided case-file data on instances of sexual violence in the DRC, and the United Nations documented 267 adult victims and 171 child victims of sexual violence in 2017. The report found that:\n\n- The most recent information on the rate of sexual violence in the eastern DRC and Rwanda is from 2016.\n- Two new population-based surveys related to sexual violence were conducted in Uganda and Burundi in 2016 and 2017, respectively.\n- The Uganda Demographic and Health Survey estimated that 12.7% of women nationwide had experienced sexual violence in the 12-month period preceding the survey.\n\nOverall, the report found that while companies made progress in determining the source of their conflict minerals, they still", "answers": ["Over the past decade, the United States and the international community have sought to improve security in the DRC. In the eastern DRC, armed groups have committed severe human rights abuses, including sexual violence, and reportedly profit from the exploitation of “conflict minerals”— in particular, tin, tungsten, tantalum, and gold, according to the United Nations. Congress included a provision in the 2010 Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act that, among other things, required the SEC to promulgate regulations regarding the use of conflict minerals from the DRC and adjoining countries. The SEC adopted these regulations in 2012. The act also included a provision for GAO to annually assess the SEC regulations' effectiveness in promoting peace and security and report on the rate of sexual violence in the DRC and adjoining countries. In this report, GAO provides information about (1) companies' conflict minerals disclosures filed with the SEC in 2017 compared with disclosures filed in the prior 2 years and (2) the rate of sexual violence in the eastern DRC and adjoining countries published in 2017 and early 2018. GAO analyzed a generalizable random sample of SEC filings and interviewed relevant officials. GAO reviewed U.S., United Nations, and international organizations' reports; interviewed DRC officials, and other stakeholders; and conducted fieldwork in New York at the United Nations headquarters. GAO is not making any recommendations. GAO's review of companies' conflict minerals disclosures filed with the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) in 2017 found that, in general, they were similar to disclosures filed in the prior 2 years. In 2017, 1,165 companies filed conflict minerals disclosures—about the same as in 2016 and 2015. Percentages of companies reporting country-of-origin inquiries in 2017 were also similar to the percentages from those 2 prior years. As a result of the inquiries they conducted, an estimated 53 percent of companies reported in 2017 whether the conflict minerals in their products came from the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) and adjoining countries—similar to the estimated 49 percent in 2016 and 2015 but significantly higher than the estimate of 30 percent in 2014 (see figure). In their 2017 disclosure reports, many companies described actions they took to improve data collection processes, and most companies indicated some challenges in determining the country of origin. Similar to the prior 2 years, almost all companies required to conduct due diligence, as a result of their country-of-origin inquiries, reported doing so. After conducting due diligence to determine the source and chain of custody of any conflict minerals used, an estimated 37 percent of these companies reported in 2017 that they were able to determine that their conflict minerals came from covered countries or from scrap or recycled sources, compared with 39 and 23 percent in 2016 and 2015, respectively. Four companies in GAO's sample declared their products “DRC conflict-free,” and of those, three included the required Independent Private Sector Audit report (IPSA), and one did not. In 2017, 16 companies filed an IPSA; 19 did so in 2016. GAO found information on the rate of sexual violence in the 2017 Uganda and Burundi Demographic and Health Surveys. For Uganda, 22 percent of women and 9 percent of men reported they had experienced sexual violence at least once in their lifetime. For Burundi, 23 percent of women and 6 percent of men reported they had experienced sexual violence at least once in their lifetime. The most recent information on the rate of sexual violence for eastern DRC and Rwanda is from 2016 and is discussed in our previous GAO reports."], "all_classes": null, "length": 3558}
{"pred": "\nThis report summarizes the U.S. Department of State's analysis of nonimmigrant visa (NIV) adjudications for fiscal years 2012 through 2017. The report highlights the following key points:\n\n- The number of NIV applications adjudicated annually peaked in fiscal year 2016 and then decreased in fiscal year 2017.\n\n- The majority of refusals in fiscal year 2017 were due to the applicant's inability to overcome the presumption of their intent to immigrate or meet the visa's eligibility criteria.\n\n- Issuances for E-3 visas nearly doubled due to the applicant's inability to overcome the presumption of their intent to immigrate or meet the visa's eligibility criteria.\n\n- Most refusals in fiscal year 2017 were due to inadequate documentation from the visa applicant, potentially indicating that such applications failed to include necessary documentation for the consular officer to ascertain whether the applicant was eligible to receive a visa at that time.\n\n- The majority of refusals were for tourist and business visitors, followed by students and exchange visitors.\n\n- The number of applications adjudicated for nationals of the top 25 countries of nationality remained relatively consistent over the period.\n\n- NIV applicants can be refused a visa on a number of grounds of inadmissibility or other ineligibility under U.S. immigration law and State policy.\n\n- The Department of State took various executive actions establishing nationality-based entry restrictions for certain categories of foreign nationals from designated countries.\n\n- The President issued Executive Orders 13769 and 13780, which imposed visa entry restrictions on certain countries and included provisions addressing NIV screening and vetting.\n\n- The Presidential Proclamation 9645, Enhancing Vetting Capabilities and Processes for Detecting Attempted Entry Into the United States by Terrorists or Other Public-Safety Threats, restricted entry into the United States of certain categories of foreign nationals from eight countries.\n\n- The Supreme", "answers": ["Previous attempted and successful terrorist attacks against the United States have raised questions about the security of the U.S. government's process for adjudicating NIVs, which are issued to foreign nationals, such as tourists, business visitors, and students, seeking temporary admission into the United States. For example, the December 2015 shootings in San Bernardino, California, led to concerns about NIV screening and vetting processes because one of the attackers was admitted into the United States under a NIV. In 2017, the President issued executive actions directing agencies to improve visa screening and vetting, and establishing nationality-based visa entry restrictions, which the Supreme Court upheld in June 2018. GAO was asked to review NIV screening and vetting. This report examines (1) outcomes and characteristics of adjudicated NIV applications from fiscal years 2012 through 2017, and (2) key changes made to the NIV adjudication process in response to executive actions taken in 2017. GAO analyzed State NIV adjudication data for fiscal years 2012 through 2017, the most recent and complete data available. GAO visited seven consular posts selected based on visa workload and other factors. GAO reviewed relevant executive orders and proclamations, and documents related to implementing these actions. This is a public version of a sensitive report issued in June 2018. Information that DHS, State, and the Office of the Director of National Intelligence deemed sensitive has been removed. The total number of nonimmigrant visa (NIV) applications that Department of State (State) consular officers adjudicated annually peaked at about 13.4 million in fiscal year 2016, and decreased by about 880,000 adjudications in fiscal year 2017. NIV adjudications varied by visa group, country of nationality, and refusal reason: Visa group. From fiscal years 2012 through 2017, about 80 percent of NIV adjudications were for tourists and business visitors. During this time, adjudications for temporary workers increased by about 50 percent and decreased for students and exchange visitors by about 2 percent. Country of nationality. In fiscal year 2017, more than half of all NIV adjudications were for applicants of six countries of nationality: China (2.02 million, or 16 percent), Mexico (1.75 million, or 14 percent), India (1.28 million, or 10 percent), Brazil (670,000, or 5 percent), Colombia (460,000, or 4 percent), and Argentina (370,000, or 3 percent). Refusal reason. State data indicate that over this time period, 18 percent of adjudicated applications were refused; more than 90 percent were because the applicant did not qualify for the visa sought, and a small percentage (0.05 percent) were due to terrorism and security-related concerns. In 2017, two executive orders and a proclamation issued by the President required, among other actions, visa entry restrictions for nationals of certain listed countries of concern, the development of uniform baseline screening and vetting standards, and changes to NIV screening and vetting procedures. GAO's analysis of State data indicates that, out of the nearly 2.8 million NIV applications refused in fiscal year 2017, 1,338 applications were refused due to visa entry restrictions implemented per the executive actions. State, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), and others developed standards for screening and vetting by the U.S. government for all immigration benefits, such as for the requirement for applicants to undergo certain security checks. Further, State sought and received emergency approval from the Office of Management and Budget in May 2017 to develop a new form to collect additional information from some visa applicants, such as email addresses and social media handles."], "all_classes": null, "length": 11506}
{"pred": "\nThe Federal Communications Commission (FCC) collects data on broadband availability through its Form 47 data collection process. However, the report finds that FCC's approach to collecting broadband data accurately captures the ability of Americans living on tribal lands to access broadband Internet services. The report identifies several limitations in FCC's data collection process that lead to overstatements of broadband availability on tribal lands. These include:\n\n1. FCC's definition of availability leads to overstatements of fixed broadband availability on tribal lands by counting an entire census block as served if at least one location has broadband.\n\n2. FCC does not collect data on several factors that affect broadband access, such as affordability and quality of service.\n\n3. FCC does not collect data on service denials, which can affect broadband access.\n\nThe report recommends that FCC develop a formal process to obtain tribal input on the accuracy of provider-submitted broadband data for tribal lands. FCC should also obtain feedback from tribal stakeholders and providers on the effectiveness of FCC's tribal engagement requirements to determine whether changes are needed. FCC should also collect more granular nationwide broadband availability data to address the limitations in its current approach.\n\nIn summary, the report finds that FCC's current approach to collecting broadband data does not accurately reflect the ability of Americans living on tribal lands to access broadband Internet services. FCC should take steps to improve its data collection process to better serve tribal lands and reduce the digital divide.", "answers": ["Broadband furthers economic development, educational attainment, and public health and safety; however, residents of tribal lands have lower levels of broadband access relative to the U.S. population. Congress has prioritized identifying and targeting funds to unserved areas. FCC uses data from broadband providers to develop maps and reports depicting broadband availability in the United States, with specific information on tribal lands. GAO was asked to review FCC's efforts to collect broadband data for tribal lands. This report examines the extent to which: (1) FCC's approach to collecting broadband data accurately captures broadband access on tribal lands and (2) FCC obtains tribal input on the data. GAO interviewed stakeholders from 25 tribal governments or tribally owned providers, and visited nine tribal lands. The selected tribes varied geographically and in levels of broadband availability, among other characteristics. GAO also reviewed FCC's rulemakings on broadband data and interviewed other tribal stakeholders, FCC officials, and 13 non-tribal broadband providers selected to include a diversity of technologies. Provider and tribal interviews were based on non-generalizable samples. The Federal Communications Commission (FCC) collects data on broadband availability from providers, but these data do not accurately or completely capture broadband access on tribal lands. Specifically, FCC collects data on broadband availability; these data capture where providers may have broadband infrastructure. However, FCC considers broadband to be “available” for an entire census block if the provider could serve at least one location in the census block. This leads to overstatements of service for specific locations like tribal lands (see figure). FCC, tribal stakeholders, and providers have noted that this approach leads to overstatements of broadband availability. Because FCC uses these data to measure broadband access, it also overstates broadband access—the ability to obtain service—on tribal lands. Additionally, FCC does not collect information on several factors—such as affordability, quality, and denials of service—that FCC and tribal stakeholders stated can affect the extent to which Americans living on tribal lands can access broadband services. FCC provides broadband funding for unserved areas based on its broadband data. Overstatements of access limit FCC's and tribal stakeholders' abilities to target broadband funding to such areas. For example, some tribal officials stated that inaccurate data have affected their ability to plan their own broadband networks and obtain funding to address broadband gaps on their lands. By developing and implementing methods for collecting and reporting accurate and complete data on broadband access specific to tribal lands, FCC would be better able to target federal broadband funding to tribal areas that need it the most and to more accurately assess FCC's progress toward its goal of increasing all Americans' access to affordable broadband. FCC does not have a formal process to obtain tribal input on the accuracy of provider-submitted broadband data. In the National Broadband Plan , FCC highlighted the need for a targeted approach to improve broadband availability data for tribal lands. As outlined in the plan, such an approach would include working with tribes to ensure that information is accurate and useful. About half of the tribal stakeholders GAO interviewed raised concerns that FCC relies solely on data from providers, and most stated FCC should work with tribes to improve the accuracy of FCC's data. Establishing a formal process to obtain input from tribal governments on the accuracy of provider-submitted broadband data could help improve the accuracy of FCC's broadband data for tribal lands. GAO is making three recommendations to FCC, including that it collect and report data that accurately measure tribal broadband access as well as develop a process to obtain tribal input on the accuracy of the data. FCC agreed with the recommendations."], "all_classes": null, "length": 8882}
{"pred": "\nThis report examines the regulatory burden placed on community banks and credit unions by federal financial regulators. The report found that community banks and credit unions view certain regulations as the most burdensome, including:\n\n1. Mortgage loan disclosure and reporting requirements\n\n2. Anti-money laundering requirements\n\n3. Consumer protection regulations\n\nThe report found that these regulations are complex and require significant compliance efforts from community banks and credit unions. In response, regulators have taken steps to reduce the burden of these regulations, including:\n\n1. Assessing the effectiveness of regulations\n\n2. Conducting retrospective reviews of regulations\n\n3. Identifying opportunities to streamline regulations\n\nHowever, the report found that regulators have not fully assessed the cumulative burden of regulations on community banks and credit unions, and there are opportunities for regulators to coordinate their reviews and streamline regulations. The report recommends that regulators:\n\n1. Assess the effectiveness of regulations\n\n2. Conduct quantitative analyses of regulations\n\n3. Identify opportunities to streamline regulations\n\n4. Coordinate reviews and evaluations\n\nThe report concludes that while regulators have taken steps to reduce the burden of regulations, there is still work to be done to fully assess and address the burden on community banks and credit unions.", "answers": ["In recent decades, many new regulations intended to strengthen financial soundness, improve consumer protections, and aid anti-money laundering efforts were implemented for financial institutions. Smaller community banks and credit unions must comply with some of the regulations, but compliance can be more challenging and costly for these institutions. GAO examined (1) the regulations community banks and credit unions viewed as most burdensome and why, and (2) efforts by depository institution regulators to reduce any regulatory burden. GAO analyzed regulations and interviewed more than 60 community banks and credit unions (selected based on asset size and financial activities), regulators, and industry associations and consumer groups. GAO also analyzed letters and transcripts commenting on regulatory burden that regulators prepared responding to the comments. Interviews and focus groups GAO conducted with representatives of over 60 community banks and credit unions indicated regulations for reporting mortgage characteristics, reviewing transactions for potentially illicit activity, and disclosing mortgage terms and costs to consumers were the most burdensome. Institution representatives said these regulations were time-consuming and costly to comply with, in part because the requirements were complex, required individual reports that had to be reviewed for accuracy, or mandated actions within specific timeframes. However, regulators and others noted that the regulations were essential to preventing lending discrimination and use of the banking system for illicit activity, and they were acting to reduce compliance burdens. Institution representatives also said that the new mortgage disclosure regulations increased compliance costs, added significant time to loan closings, and resulted in institutions absorbing costs when others, such as appraisers and inspectors, changed disclosed fees. The Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB) issued guidance and conducted other outreach to educate institutions after issuing these regulations in 2013. But GAO found that some compliance burdens arose from misunderstanding the disclosure regulations—which in turn may have led institutions to take actions not actually required. Assessing the effectiveness of the guidance for the disclosure regulations could help mitigate the misunderstandings and thus also reduce compliance burdens. Regulators of community banks and credit unions—the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, and the National Credit Union Administration—conduct decennial reviews to obtain industry comments on regulatory burden. But the reviews, conducted under the Economic Growth and Regulatory Paperwork Reduction Act of 1996 (EGRPRA), had the following limitations: CFPB and the consumer financial regulations for which it is responsible were not included. Unlike executive branch agencies, the depository institution regulators are not required to analyze and report quantitative-based rationales for their responses to comments. Regulators do not assess the cumulative burden of the regulations they administer. CFPB has formed an internal group that will be tasked with reviewing regulations it administers, but the agency has not publicly announced the scope of regulations included, the timing and frequency of the reviews, and the extent to which they will be coordinated with the other federal banking and credit union regulators as part of their periodic EGRPRA reviews. Congressional intent in mandating that these regulators review their regulations was that the cumulative effect of all federal financial regulations be considered. In addition, sound practices required of other federal agencies require them to analyze and report their assessments when reviewing regulations. Documenting in plans how the depository institution regulators would address these EGRPRA limitations would better ensure that all regulations relevant to community banks and credit unions were reviewed, likely improve the analyses the regulators perform, and potentially result in additional burden reduction. GAO makes a total of 10 recommendations to CFPB and the depository institution regulators. CFPB should assess the effectiveness of guidance on mortgage disclosure regulations and publicly issue its plans for the scope and timing of its regulation reviews and coordinate these with the other regulators' review process. As part of their burden reviews, the depository institution regulators should develop plans to report quantitative rationales for their actions and addressing the cumulative burden of regulations. In written comments, CFPB and the four depository institution regulators generally agreed with the recommendations."], "all_classes": null, "length": 18098}
{"pred": "\nThe Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) manages grants to communities to help prevent, prepare for, protect against, mitigate the effects of, respond to, and recover from disasters and terrorist attacks. FEMA has a complex grants management environment with many stakeholders, IT systems, and internal and external users. To modernize its grants management systems, FEMA initiated Grants Management Modernization (GMM). GMM aims to streamline and standardize grants management processes across the agency. However, FEMA has not fully implemented leading practices for business process reengineering and IT requirements management. FEMA has partially implemented practices like establishing clear requirements and maintaining traceability, but lacks details on how to evaluate security controls and fully test all security controls. FEMA's estimated costs and schedule are reliable, but GMM's schedule is aggressive and unrealistic. FEMA has partially addressed key cybersecurity practices like selecting and implementing security controls and monitoring security controls on an ongoing basis. FEMA has taken steps to address cybersecurity weaknesses, but lacks details on evaluating security controls and fully testing all security controls. In summary, while FEMA has taken some steps to modernize its grants management systems, it needs to fully implement leading practices, fully test security controls, and address cybersecurity weaknesses to ensure a successful GMM program.", "answers": ["FEMA, a component of DHS, annually awards billions of dollars in grants to help communities prepare for, mitigate the effects of, and recover from major disasters. However, FEMA's complex IT environment supporting grants management consists of many disparate systems. In 2008, the agency attempted to modernize these systems but experienced significant challenges. In 2015, FEMA initiated a new endeavor (the GMM program) aimed at streamlining and modernizing the grants management IT environment. GAO was asked to review the GMM program. GAO's objectives were to (1) determine the extent to which FEMA is implementing leading practices for reengineering its grants management processes and incorporating needs into IT requirements; (2) assess the reliability of the program's estimated costs and schedule; and (3) determine the extent to which FEMA is addressing key cybersecurity practices. GAO compared program documentation to leading practices for process reengineering and requirements management, cost and schedule estimation, and cybersecurity risk management, as established by the Software Engineering Institute, National Institute of Standards and Technology, and GAO. Of six important leading practices for effective business process reengineering and information technology (IT) requirements management, the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) fully implemented four and partially implemented two for the Grants Management Modernization (GMM) program (see table). Specifically, FEMA ensured senior leadership commitment, took steps to assess its business environment and performance goals, took recent actions to track progress in delivering IT requirements, and incorporated input from end user stakeholders. However, FEMA has not yet fully established plans for implementing new business processes or established complete traceability of IT requirements. Until FEMA fully implements the remaining two practices, it risks delivering an IT solution that does not fully modernize FEMA's grants management systems. While GMM's initial May 2017 cost estimate of about $251 million was generally consistent with leading practices for a reliable, high-quality estimate, it no longer reflects current assumptions about the program. FEMA officials stated in December 2018 that they had completed a revised cost estimate, but it was undergoing departmental approval. GMM's program schedule was inconsistent with leading practices; of particular concern was that the program's final delivery date of September 2020 was not informed by a realistic assessment of GMM development activities, and rather was determined by imposing an unsubstantiated delivery date. Developing sound cost and schedule estimates is necessary to ensure that FEMA has a clear understanding of program risks. Of five key cybersecurity practices, FEMA fully addressed three and partially addressed two for GMM. Specifically, it categorized GMM's system based on security risk, selected and implemented security controls, and monitored security controls on an ongoing basis. However, the program had not initially established corrective action plans for 13 medium- and low-risk vulnerabilities. This conflicts with the Department of Homeland Security's (DHS) guidance that specifies that corrective action plans must be developed for every weakness identified. Until FEMA, among other things, ensures that the program consistently follows the department's guidance on preparing corrective action plans for all security vulnerabilities, GMM's system will remain at increased risk of exploits. GAO is making eight recommendations to FEMA to implement leading practices related to reengineering processes, managing requirements, scheduling, and implementing cybersecurity. DHS concurred with all recommendations and provided estimated dates for implementing each of them."], "all_classes": null, "length": 14516}
{"pred": "\nThis report summarizes the history of funding for water infrastructure programs through the Clean Water Act and Safe Drinking Water Act since 1987. The report details how funding has increased over time to address the growing need for water infrastructure projects. Congress has provided funding through the Clean Water State Revolving Fund and Drinking Water State Revolving Fund programs, which have been used to construct sewage treatment plants and other water infrastructure projects. However, funding has been reduced in recent years due to budget cuts and the elimination of certain programs. The report also highlights the trend of providing additional subsidies to disadvantaged communities and the use of the Water Infrastructure Financing and Investment Act to provide loans for water infrastructure projects.", "answers": ["The principal federal program to aid municipal wastewater treatment plant construction is authorized in the Clean Water Act (CWA). Established as a grant program in 1972, it now capitalizes state loan programs through the clean water state revolving loan fund (CWSRF) program. Since FY1972, appropriations have totaled $98 billion. In 1996, Congress amended the Safe Drinking Water Act (SDWA, P.L. 104-182) to authorize a similar state loan program for drinking water to help systems finance projects needed to comply with drinking water regulations and to protect public health. Since FY1997, appropriations for the drinking water state revolving loan fund (DWSRF) program have totaled $23 billion. The U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) administers both SRF programs, which annually distribute funds to the states for implementation. Funding amounts are specified in the State and Tribal Assistance Grants (STAG) account of EPA annual appropriations acts. The combined appropriations for wastewater and drinking water infrastructure assistance have represented 25%-32% of total funds appropriated to EPA in recent years. Prior to CWA amendments in 1987 (P.L. 100-4), Congress provided wastewater grant funding directly to municipalities. The federal share of project costs was generally 55%; state and local governments were responsible for the remaining 45%. The 1987 amendments replaced this grant program with the SRF program. Local communities are now often responsible for 100% of project costs, rather than 45%, as they are required to repay loans to states. The greater financial burden of the act's loan program on some cities has caused some to seek continued grant funding. Although the CWSRF and DWSRF have largely functioned as loan programs, both allow the implementing state agency to provide \"additional subsidization\" under certain conditions. Since its amendments in 1996, the SDWA has authorized states to use up to 30% of their DWSRF capitalization grants to provide additional assistance, such as forgiveness of loan principal or negative interest rate loans, to help disadvantaged communities. America's Water Infrastructure Act of 2018 (AWIA; P.L. 115-270) increased this proportion to 35% while conditionally requiring states to use at least 6% of their capitalization grants for these purposes. Congress amended the CWA in 2014, adding similar provisions to the CWSRF program. In addition, appropriations acts in recent years have required states to use minimum percentages of their allotted SRF grants to provide additional subsidization. Final full-year appropriations were enacted as part of the Consolidated Appropriations Act, FY2019 (P.L. 116-6), on February 15, 2019. The act provided $1.694 billion for the CWSRF and $1.163 billion for the DWSRF program, nearly identical to the FY2018 appropriations. The FY0219 act provided $68 million for the WIFIA program, a $5 million increase from the FY2018 appropriation. Compared to the FY2019 appropriation levels, the Trump Administration's FY2020 budget request proposes to decrease the appropriations for the CWSRF, DWSRF, and WIFIA programs by 34%, 26%, and 63%, respectively."], "all_classes": null, "length": 18229}
{"pred": "\nThe report examines how prices compare for personal care products that are differentiated for men and women. It found that women's versions of personal care products generally sold at a higher average price than men's versions, with the differences being statistically significant in 5 out of 10 product categories. However, the report notes that the factors it controlled for may not fully explain the observed price differences. The report also found that while there are some studies that have found gender-related price differences in other markets, such as mortgages and small business credit, the evidence is limited and the studies have important limitations. The report concludes that while there are some federal laws that prohibit businesses from charging different prices based on gender, few consumer complaints have been received about gender-related price differences. The report recommends that federal agencies monitor consumer complaints and education resources to help consumers identify and address gender-related price differences.", "answers": ["Gender-related price differences occur when consumers are charged different prices for the same or similar goods and services because of factors related to gender. While variation in costs and consumer demand may give rise to such price differences, some policymakers have raised concerns that gender bias may also be a factor. While the Equal Credit Opportunity Act and Fair Housing Act prohibit discrimination based on sex in credit and housing transactions, no federal law prohibits businesses from charging consumers different prices for the same or similar goods targeted to different genders. GAO was asked to review gender-related price differences for consumer goods and services sold in the United States. This report examines, among other things, (1) how prices compared for selected goods and services marketed to men and women, and potential reasons for any price differences; (2) what is known about price differences for men and women for products not differentiated by gender, such as mortgages; and (3) the extent to which federal agencies have identified and addressed any concerns about gender-related price differences. To examine these issues, GAO analyzed retail price data, reviewed relevant academic studies, analyzed federal consumer complaint data, and interviewed federal agency officials, industry experts, and academics. Firms differentiate many consumer products to appeal separately to men and women by slightly altering product attributes like color or scent. Products differentiated by gender may sell for different prices if men and women have different demands or willingness to pay for these product attributes. Of 10 personal care product categories (e.g., deodorants and shaving products) that GAO analyzed, average retail prices paid were significantly higher for women's products than for men's in 5 categories. In 2 categories—shaving gel and nondisposable razors—men's versions sold at a significantly higher price. One category—razor blades--had mixed results based on two price measures analyzed, and two others—disposable razors and mass-market perfumes—showed no significant gender price differences. GAO found that the target gender for a product is a significant factor contributing to price differences identified, but GAO did not have sufficient information to determine the extent to which these gender-related price differences were due to gender bias as opposed to other factors, such as different advertising costs. Though the analysis controlled for several observable product attributes, such as product size and packaging type, all underlying differences in costs and demand for products targeted to different genders could not be fully observed. Studies GAO reviewed found limited evidence of gender price differences for four products or services not differentiated by gender—mortgages, small business credit, auto purchases, and auto repairs. For example, with regard to mortgages, women as a group paid higher average mortgage rates than men, in part due to weaker credit characteristics, such as lower average income. However, after controlling for borrower credit characteristics and other factors, three studies did not find statistically significant differences in borrowing costs between men and women, while one found women paid higher rates for certain subprime loans. In addition, one study found that female borrowers defaulted less frequently than male borrowers with similar credit characteristics, and the study suggested that women may pay higher mortgage rates than men relative to their default risk. While these studies controlled for factors other than gender that could affect borrowing costs, several lacked important data on certain borrower risk characteristics, such as credit scores, which could affect analysis of gender disparities. Also, several studies analyzed small samples of subprime loans that were originated in 2005 or earlier, which limits the generalizability of the results. In their oversight of federal antidiscrimination statutes, the Bureau of Consumer Financial Protection, Federal Trade Commission, and Department of Housing and Urban Development have identified limited consumer concerns based on gender-related pricing differences. GAO's analysis of complaint data received by the three agencies from 2012–2017 found that they had received limited consumer complaints about gender-related price differences. The agencies provide general consumer education resources on discrimination and consumer awareness. However, given the limited consumer concern, they have not identified a need to incorporate additional materials specific to gender-related price differences into their existing consumer education resources."], "all_classes": null, "length": 8377}
{"pred": "\nThe Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) oversees the safety of over 90,000 dams in the United States, including both federal and non-federal entities. FERC has a multi-layered approach to dam safety oversight that includes regular inspections, engineering studies, and relicensing. However, FERC's approach to recording information collected during inspections is inconsistent due to a lack of standard language and procedures. This limits FERC's ability to analyze safety information across its entire portfolio of regulated dams. FERC has not conducted a portfolio-wide analysis to identify common safety deficiencies.\n\nThe report found that FERC generally met its requirements for evaluating dam safety during the relicensing process for the 42 dams reviewed. However, FERC's approach to recording inspection information is inconsistent and lacks standard language and procedures. FERC officials stated that they are working to improve the consistency of recorded information by replacing an outdated system with a new system.\n\nFERC evaluates engineering studies of dam performance to analyze safety. FERC requires licensees to hire a FERC-approved independent consulting engineer to inspect and evaluate high hazard and other applicable dams and submit a report detailing the findings. FERC officials stated that they use a risk-based review process and multiple levels of supervisory review to evaluate the studies.\n\nFERC reviews dam safety information during relicensing to determine if the licensee operated and maintained the dam safely. FERC officials stated that they generally review safety information from past reports, inspections, and studies conducted by FERC, the licensee, and independent consultants. However, FERC's approach to reviewing safety information during relicensing is inconsistent and lacks standard language and procedures.\n\nFERC has a compliance handbook that provides an overall guide to compliance and enforcement of license requirements, including dam safety. FERC works with licensees to resolve compliance issues through informal means before using enforcement tools. FERC has issued one civil penalty for a safety-related hydropower violation since 2013.\n\nFERC licensees and consultants used a variety of tools and datasets to develop engineering", "answers": ["In February 2017, components of California's Oroville Dam failed, leading to the evacuation of nearly 200,000 nearby residents. FERC is the federal regulator of the Oroville Dam and over 2,500 other dams associated with nonfederal hydropower projects nationwide. FERC issues and renews licenses—which can last up to 50 years—to dam operators and promotes safe dam operation by conducting safety inspections and reviewing technical engineering studies, among other actions. GAO was asked to review FERC's approach to overseeing dam safety. This report examines: (1) how FERC collects information from its dam safety inspections and the extent of its analysis, and (2) how FERC evaluates engineering studies of dam performance to analyze safety, among other objectives. GAO analyzed documentation on a non-generalizable sample of 42 dams associated with projects relicensed from fiscal years 2014 through 2017, selected based on geography and hazard classifications, among other factors. GAO also reviewed FERC regulations and documents; and interviewed FERC staff associated with the selected projects and technical consultants, selected based on the frequency and timing of their reviews. The Federal Energy Regulatory Commission's (FERC) staff generally followed established guidance in collecting safety information from dam inspections for the dams GAO reviewed, but FERC has not used this information to analyze dam safety portfolio-wide. For these 42 dams, GAO found that FERC staff generally followed guidance in collecting safety information during inspections of individual dams and key structures associated with those dams. (See figure.) However, FERC lacks standard procedures that specify how and where staff should record safety deficiencies identified. As a result, FERC staff use multiple systems to record inspection findings, thereby creating information that cannot be easily analyzed. Further, while FERC officials said inspections help oversee individual dam's safety, FERC has not analyzed this information to identify any safety risks across its portfolio. GAO's prior work has highlighted the importance of evaluating risks across a portfolio. FERC officials stated that they have not conducted portfolio-wide analyses because officials prioritize the individual dam inspections and response to urgent dam safety incidents. However, following the Oroville incident, a FERC-led initiative to examine dam structures comparable to those at Oroville identified 27 dam spillways with varying degrees of safety concerns, on which FERC officials stated they are working with dam licensees to address. A similar and proactive portfolio-wide approach, based on analysis of common inspection deficiencies across the portfolio of dams under FERC's authority, could help FERC identify safety risks prior to a safety incident. Guidelines recognize that each dam is unique and allow for flexibility and exemptions in its use. FERC staff use the studies to inform other components of their safety approach, including the analysis of dam failure scenarios and their review of safety to determine whether to renew a license. GAO recommends that FERC: (1) develop standard procedures for recording information collected as part of its inspections, and (2) use inspection information to assess safety risks across FERC's portfolio of dams. FERC agreed with GAO's recommendations."], "all_classes": null, "length": 8621}
{"pred": "\nThis report summarizes the key points of a report on the federal child nutrition programs in the United States. The programs provide funding and support to institutions that provide meals and snacks to children outside of the home. The programs include:\n\n1. National School Lunch Program (NSLP) and School Breakfast Program (SBP) for schools and institutions that provide meals to children during the school day.\n\n2. Child and Adult Care Food Program (CACFP) for child care centers, day care homes, and after-school programs.\n\n3. Summer Food Service Program (SFSP) for summer meals.\n\n4. Special Milk Program for schools that sell milk.\n\n5. Fresh Fruit and Vegetable Program for schools that purchase and distribute fresh fruit and vegetables.\n\nThe report describes the eligibility rules, funding, and program features for each program. It also discusses the Healthy, Hunger-Free Kids Act of 2010, which made changes to the nutrition standards for school meals and provided additional funding for technical assistance. The report highlights that the majority of funding goes towards reimbursements for free and reduced-price meals, with a smaller portion for commodity foods. The programs also provide support for after-school meals and snacks.", "answers": ["The \"child nutrition programs\" refer to the U.S. Department of Agriculture's Food and Nutrition Service (USDA-FNS) programs that provide food for children in school or institutional settings. The best known programs, which serve the largest number of children, are the school meals programs: the National School Lunch Program (NSLP) and the School Breakfast Program (SBP). The child nutrition programs also include the Child and Adult Care Food Program (CACFP), which provides meals and snacks in day care and after school settings; the Summer Food Service Program (SFSP), which provides food during the summer months; the Special Milk Program (SMP), which supports milk for schools that do not participate in NSLP or SBP; and the Fresh Fruit and Vegetable Program (FFVP), which funds fruit and vegetable snacks in select elementary schools. Funding: The vast majority of the child nutrition programs account is considered mandatory spending, with trace amounts of discretionary funding for certain related activities. Referred to as open-ended, \"appropriated entitlements,\" funding is provided through the annual appropriations process; however, the level of spending is controlled by benefit and eligibility criteria in federal law and dependent on the resulting levels of participation. Federal cash funding (in the form of per-meal reimbursements) and USDA commodity food support is guaranteed to schools and other providers based on the number of meals or snacks served and participant category (e.g., free meals for poor children get higher subsidies). Participation: The child nutrition programs serve children of varying ages and in different institutional settings. The NSLP and SBP have the broadest reach, serving qualifying children of all ages in school settings. Other child nutrition programs serve more-narrow populations. CACFP, for example, provides meals and snacks to children in early childhood and after-school settings among other venues. Programs generally provide some subsidy for all food served but a larger federal reimbursement for food served to children from low-income households. Administration: Responsibility for child nutrition programs is divided between the federal government, states, and localities. The state agency and type of local provider differs by program. In the NSLP and SBP, schools and school districts (\"school food authorities\") administer the program. Meanwhile, SFSP (and sometimes CACFP) uses a model in which sponsor organizations handle administrative responsibilities for a number of sites that serve meals. Reauthorization: The underlying laws covering the child nutrition programs were last reauthorized in the Healthy, Hunger-Free Kids Act of 2010 (HHFKA, P.L. 111-296, enacted December 13, 2010). This law made significant changes to child nutrition programs, including increasing federal financing for school lunches, expanding access to community eligibility and direct certification options for schools, and expanding eligibility options for home child care providers. The law also required an update to school meal nutrition guidelines as well as new guidelines for food served outside the meal programs (e.g., snacks sold in vending machines and cafeteria a la carte lines). Current Issues: The 114th Congress began but did not complete a 2016 child nutrition reauthorization, and there was no significant legislative activity with regard to reauthorization in the 115th Congress. However, the vast majority of operations and activities continue with funding provided by appropriations laws. Current issues in the child nutrition programs are discussed in CRS Report R45486, Child Nutrition Programs: Current Issues."], "all_classes": null, "length": 8317}
{"pred": "\nThe federal government provides benefits to coal miners affected by coal workers' pneumoconiosis (CWP) through the Black Lung Disability Trust Fund. The fund is primarily financed by an excise tax on coal sold in the US. However, the tax revenue has not been sufficient to cover benefit payments and administrative expenses, resulting in a debt to the Treasury. The excise tax rates have been increased over time, but the debt remains. To address this, Congress could consider increasing the tax on coal, forgiving interest or debt, or reducing benefits. Reducing benefits would lower expenses for the trust fund, but would also reduce the level of support for coal miners. Restricting eligibility for benefits could also help reduce expenses. The report discusses various policy options to improve the financial outlook of the Black Lung Disability Trust Fund.", "answers": ["The federal government pays benefits to coal miners affected by coal workers' pneumoconiosis (CWP, commonly referred to as black lung disease) and other lung diseases linked to coal mining in cases where responsible mine operators are not able to pay. In 2019, the monthly benefit for a miner with no dependents is $660.10. Benefits can be as much as $1,320.10 per month for miners with three or more dependents. Medical benefits are provided separately from disability benefits. Benefit payments and related administrative expenses in cases in which the responsible operators do not pay are paid out of the Black Lung Disability Trust Fund. The primary source of revenue for the trust fund is an excise tax on coal produced and sold domestically. If excise tax revenue is not sufficient to finance Black Lung Program benefits, the trust fund may borrow from the general fund of the Treasury. For 2018, the tax rates on coal were $1.10 per ton of underground-mined coal or $0.55 per ton of surface-mined coal, limited to 4.4% of the sales price. These rates were established in 1986. Starting in 2019, under current law, these tax rates are $0.50 per ton of underground-mined coal or $0.25 per ton of surface-mined coal, limited to 2% of the sales price. These are the rates that were set when the trust fund was established in 1977. The decline in the excise tax rates will likely put additional financial strain on a trust fund that already borrows from the general fund to meet obligations. The decline in domestic coal production, recent increases in the rate of CWP, and bankruptcies in the coal sector also contribute to the financial strain on the trust fund. The Black Lung Disability Trust Fund and associated excise tax on coal were established so that the coal industry, as opposed to taxpayers in general, would bear the burden associated with providing black lung benefits. Throughout its history, the Black Lung Disability Trust Fund has not raised revenues sufficient to meet obligations. As a result, at various points in time, Congress and the President have acted to increase the excise tax on coal, forgive or refinance trust fund debt, and modify black lung benefits eligibility. With the rate of the excise tax on coal reduced in 2019, the 116th Congress may again evaluate options for improving the fiscal condition of the Black Lung Disability Trust Fund, or other issues related to providing federal benefits to miners with black lung disease."], "all_classes": null, "length": 7218}
{"pred": "\nThis report examines the factors that contributed to Puerto Rico's financial condition and high levels of debt. The report identifies three main factors: 1) Puerto Rico's government has operated with persistent deficits and has used debt to cope with deficits, 2) demand for Puerto Rico's debt has been high due to tax exemptions and investment grade bond ratings, and 3) lack of transparency on financial condition. The report also identifies three potential federal actions that could help address these factors: 1) ensure municipal securities issuers provide timely and complete disclosure materials, 2) subject all investment companies in Puerto Rico to the Investment Company Act, and 3) remove the triple tax exemption for Puerto Rico's municipal securities. The report concludes that federal actions could help address the factors that contributed to Puerto Rico's unsustainable debt levels, but notes that any actions would need to be carefully considered and implemented.", "answers": ["Puerto Rico has roughly $70 billion in outstanding debt and $50 billion in unfunded pension liabilities and since August 2015 has defaulted on over $1.5 billion in debt. The effects of Hurricanes Irma and Maria will further affect Puerto Rico's ability to repay its debt, as well as its economic condition. In response to Puerto Rico's fiscal crisis, Congress passed the Puerto Rico Oversight, Management, and Economic Security Act (PROMESA) in 2016, which included a provision for GAO to review Puerto Rico's debt. This report describes the factors that contributed to Puerto Rico's financial condition and levels of debt and federal actions that could address these factors. Consistent with PROMESA, GAO focused on actions that would not increase the federal deficit. To address these objectives, GAO reviewed documents and interviewed officials from the Puerto Rico and federal governments and conducted a review of relevant literature. GAO also interviewed former Puerto Rico officials and experts in Puerto Rico's economy, the municipal securities markets, and state and territorial budgeting, financial management, and debt practices, as well as officials from the Financial Oversight and Management Board for Puerto Rico (created by PROMESA). GAO is not making recommendations based on the federal actions identified because policymakers would need to consider challenges and tradeoffs related to implementation. The Puerto Rico government generally agreed with the factors we identified and provided additional information. GAO incorporated technical comments from SEC as appropriate. The factors that contributed to Puerto Rico's financial condition and levels of debt relate to (1) the Puerto Rico government running persistent annual deficits—where expenses exceed revenues—and (2) its use of debt to cope with deficits. Based on a literature review and interviews with current and former Puerto Rico officials, federal officials, and other relevant experts, GAO identified factors that contributed to Puerto Rico's persistent deficits: The Puerto Rico government's inadequate financial management and oversight practices. For example, the Puerto Rico government frequently overestimated the amount of revenue it would collect and Puerto Rico's agencies regularly spent more than the amounts Puerto Rico's legislature appropriated for a given fiscal year. Policy decisions by Puerto Rico's government. For example, Puerto Rico borrowed funds to balance budgets and insufficiently addressed public pension funding shortfalls. Puerto Rico's prolonged economic contraction. Examples of factors contributing to the contraction include outmigration and the resulting diminished labor force, and the high cost of importing goods and energy. Additional factors enabled Puerto Rico to use debt to finance its deficits, such as high demand for Puerto Rico debt. One cause of high demand was that under federal law, income from Puerto Rico bonds generally receives more favorable tax treatment than income from bonds issued by states and their localities. Based on an assessment of relevant literature and input from current and former Puerto Rico officials, federal officials, and other relevant experts, GAO identified three potential federal actions that may help address some of these factors. GAO also identified considerations for policymakers related to these actions. Modify the tax exempt status for Puerto Rico municipal debt. Making interest income from Puerto Rico bonds earned by investors residing outside of Puerto Rico subject to applicable state and local taxes could lower demand for Puerto Rico debt. However, reduced demand could hinder Puerto Rico's ability to borrow funds for capital investments or liquidity. Apply federal investor protection laws to Puerto Rico. Requiring Puerto Rico investment companies to disclose risks with Puerto Rico bonds and adhere to other requirements could lower demand for the bonds. However, this action could also limit Puerto Rico's ability to borrow funds. Modify the Securities and Exchange Commission's (SEC) authority over municipal bond disclosure requirements. SEC could be allowed to require timely disclosure of materials—such as audited financial statements—associated with municipal bonds. Over the past decade, Puerto Rico often failed to provide timely audited financial statements related to its municipal bonds. Timely disclosure could help investors make informed decisions about investing in municipal bonds. However, a broad requirement could place additional burdens on all U.S. municipal issuers, such as the costs of standardizing reporting."], "all_classes": null, "length": 6356}
{"pred": "\nThe report summarizes the results of an evaluation of the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services' (CMS) program integrity efforts to prevent and detect fraud, waste, and abuse in its Medicare and Medicaid programs. CMS has taken steps to identify fraud risks and implement antifraud control activities, but has not conducted a comprehensive fraud risk assessment to identify the most significant fraud risks facing its programs. The report recommends that CMS:\n\n1. Provide fraud awareness training to all employees to increase vigilance against fraud.\n\n2. Conduct fraud risk assessments for Medicare and Medicaid to identify inherent fraud risks, assess likelihood and impact, and determine fraud risk tolerance.\n\n3. Develop and implement an antifraud strategy based on the fraud risk assessment that includes monitoring and evaluation activities.\n\nCMS has made progress in identifying fraud risks and implementing control activities, but a comprehensive fraud risk assessment and antifraud strategy would help ensure that it is targeting the most significant fraud risks and effectively managing fraud risks across its programs.", "answers": ["CMS, an agency within the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS), provides health coverage for over 145 million Americans through its four principal programs, with annual outlays of about $1.1 trillion. GAO has designated the two largest programs, Medicare and Medicaid, as high risk partly due to their vulnerability to fraud, waste, and abuse. In fiscal year 2016, improper payment estimates for these programs totaled about $95 billion. GAO's Fraud Risk Framework and the subsequent enactment of the Fraud Reduction and Data Analytics Act of 2015 have called attention to the importance of federal agencies' antifraud efforts. This report examines (1) CMS's approach for managing fraud risks across its four principal programs, and (2) how CMS's efforts managing fraud risks in Medicare and Medicaid align with the Fraud Risk Framework. GAO reviewed laws and regulations and HHS and CMS documents, such as program-integrity manuals. It also interviewed CMS officials and a sample of CMS stakeholders, including state officials and contractors. GAO selected states based on fraud risk and other factors, such as geographic diversity. GAO selected contractors based on a mix of companies and geographic areas served. The approach that the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS) has taken for managing fraud risks across its four principal programs—Medicare, Medicaid, the Children's Health Insurance Program (CHIP), and the health-insurance marketplaces—is incorporated into its broader program-integrity approach. According to CMS officials, this broader program-integrity approach can help the agency develop control activities to address multiple sources of improper payments, including fraud. As the figure below shows, CMS views fraud as part of a spectrum of actions that may result in improper payments. CMS's efforts managing fraud risks in Medicare and Medicaid partially align with GAO's 2015 A Framework for Managing Fraud Risks in Federal Programs (Fraud Risk Framework). This framework describes leading practices in four components: commit , assess , design and implement , and evaluate and adapt . CMS has shown commitment to combating fraud in part by establishing a dedicated entity—the Center for Program Integrity—to lead antifraud efforts. Furthermore, CMS is offering and requiring antifraud training for stakeholder groups such as providers, beneficiaries, and health-insurance plans. However, CMS does not require fraud-awareness training on a regular basis for employees, a practice that the framework identifies as a way agencies can help create a culture of integrity and compliance. Regarding the assess and design and implement components, CMS has taken steps to identify fraud risks, such as by designating specific provider types as high risk and developing associated control activities. However, it has not conducted a fraud risk assessment for Medicare or Medicaid, and has not designed and implemented a risk-based antifraud strategy. A fraud risk assessment allows managers to fully consider fraud risks to their programs, analyze their likelihood and impact, and prioritize risks. Managers can then design and implement a strategy with specific control activities to mitigate these fraud risks, as well as an appropriate evaluation approach consistent with the evaluate and adapt component. By developing a fraud risk assessment and using that assessment to create an antifraud strategy and evaluation approach, CMS could better ensure that it is addressing the full portfolio of risks and strategically targeting the most-significant fraud risks facing Medicare and Medicaid. GAO recommends that CMS (1) provide and require fraud-awareness training to its employees, (2) conduct fraud risk assessments, and (3) create an antifraud strategy for Medicare and Medicaid, including an approach for evaluation. HHS concurred with GAO's recommendations."], "all_classes": null, "length": 10615}
{"pred": "\nThe report examines the Rental Assistance Demonstration (RAD) program of the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD). It assesses the physical and financial outcomes of RAD conversions to date, how RAD conversions affected residents and what safeguards were in place to protect them, implementation challenges faced by public housing agencies (PHA), and the extent to which RAD provisions are designed to help preserve the long-term affordability of units. The report found that HUD has not fully developed and implemented procedures to monitor RAD properties for risks to long-term preservation. HUD also has not systematically tracked or analyzed household data on residents in RAD-converted units across existing program databases. The report recommends that HUD prioritize the development and implementation of monitoring procedures to ensure resident safeguards are implemented, collect comprehensive data on financial outcomes upon completion of construction, and determine how it can use available program-wide data and resident logs for analysis of RAD resident protections.", "answers": ["HUD administers the Public Housing program, which provides federally assisted rental units to low-income households through PHAs. In 2010, HUD estimated its aging public housing stock had $25.6 billion in unmet capital needs. To help address these needs, the RAD program was authorized in fiscal year 2012. RAD allows PHAs to move (convert) properties in the public housing program to Section 8 rental assistance programs, and retain property ownership or transfer it to other entities. The conversion enables PHAs to access additional funding, including investor equity, generally not available for public housing properties. GAO was asked to review public housing conversions under RAD and any impact on residents. This report addresses, among other objectives, HUD's (1) assessment of conversion outcomes; (2) oversight of resident safeguards; and (3) provisions to help preserve the long-term affordability of units. GAO analyzed data on RAD conversions through fiscal year 2017; reviewed a sample of randomly selected, nongeneralizable RAD property files; and interviewed HUD officials, PHAs, developers, academics, and affected residents. The Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) put procedures in place to evaluate and monitor the impact of conversion of public housing properties under the Rental Assistance Demonstration (RAD) program. RAD's authorizing legislation requires HUD to assess and publish findings about the amount of private-sector leveraging. HUD uses a variety of metrics to measure conversion outcomes. But, the metric HUD uses to measure private-sector leveraging—the share of private versus public funding for construction or rehabilitation of assisted housing—has limitations. For example, HUD's leveraging ratio counts some public resources as leveraged private-sector investment and does not use final (post-completion) data. As a result, HUD's ability to accurately assess private-sector leveraging is limited. HUD does not systematically use its data systems to track effects of RAD conversions on resident households (such as changes in rent and income, or relocation) or monitor use of all resident safeguards. Rather, since 2016, HUD has required public housing agencies (PHA) or other post-conversion owners to maintain resident logs and collect such information. But the resident logs do not contain historical program information. HUD has not developed a process for systematically reviewing information from its data systems and resident logs on an ongoing basis. HUD has been developing procedures to monitor compliance with some resident safeguards—such as the right to return to a converted property—and begun a limited review of compliance with these safeguards. However, HUD has not yet developed a process for monitoring other safeguards—such as access to other housing voucher options. Federal internal control standards require agencies to use quality information to achieve objectives, and obtain and evaluate relevant and reliable data in a timely manner for use in effective monitoring. Without a comprehensive review of household information and procedures for fully monitoring all resident safeguards, HUD cannot fully assess the effects of RAD on residents. RAD authorizing legislation and the program's use agreements (contracts with property owners) contain provisions intended to help ensure the long-term availability of affordable units, but the provisions have not been tested in situations such as foreclosure. For example, use agreements between HUD and property owners specify affordability and use restrictions that according to the contract would survive a default or foreclosure. HUD officials stated that HUD intends to develop procedures to identify and respond to risks to long-term affordability, including default or foreclosure in RAD properties. However, HUD has not yet done so. According to federal internal control standards, agencies should identify, analyze, and respond to risks related to achieving goals and objectives. Procedures that address oversight of affordability requirements would better position HUD to help ensure RAD conversions comply with program requirements, detect potential foreclosure and other risks, and take corrective actions. GAO makes five recommendations to HUD intended to improve leveraging metrics, monitoring of the use and enforcement of resident safeguards, and compliance with RAD requirements. HUD agreed with our recommendations to improve metrics and build on existing oversight."], "all_classes": null, "length": 12616}
{"pred": "\nThe report examines how 24 federal agencies acquire and manage heavy equipment. The agencies own over 136,000 heavy equipment items, with the Department of Defense owning the most. The agencies acquire heavy equipment through purchases or leases, but do not always conduct lease-versus-purchase analyses to determine the most cost-effective method. The report found that most agencies did not document lease-versus-purchase analyses for their acquisitions. The Air Force, FWS, and NPS did not provide complete data on their leases and rentals. The report recommends that the Air Force develop guidance on when to conduct lease-versus-purchase analyses and the Interior clarify when lease-versus-purchase analyses are required. The Interior also plans to implement a lease-versus-purchase analysis tool. The agencies could improve their management of heavy equipment utilization by collecting and analyzing utilization data. The report found that the agencies lack clarity on when to conduct lease-versus-purchase analyses, which may result in in inefficient spending.", "answers": ["Federal agencies use heavy equipment such as cranes and forklifts to carry out their missions, but there is no government-wide data on federal agencies' acquisition or management of this equipment. GAO was asked to review federal agencies' management of heavy equipment. This report, among other objectives, examines: (1) the number, type, and costs of heavy equipment items that are owned by 20 federal agencies and (2) the heavy equipment that selected agencies recently acquired as well as how they decided whether to purchase or lease this equipment. GAO collected heavy equipment inventory data as of June 2017 from the 24 agencies that have chief financial officers responsible for overseeing financial management. GAO also selected three agencies (using factors such as the heavy equipment fleet's size) and reviewed their acquisitions of and guidance on heavy equipment. These agencies' practices are not generalizable to all acquisitions but provide insight into what efforts these agencies take to acquire thousands of heavy equipment items. GAO also interviewed officials at the three selected agencies. Of the 24 agencies GAO reviewed, 20 reported owning over 136,000 heavy equipment items such as cranes, backhoes, and forklifts, and spending over $7.4 billion (in 2016 dollars) to acquire this equipment. The remaining 4 agencies reported that they do not own any heavy equipment. The three selected agencies GAO reviewed in-depth—the Air Force within the Department of Defense (DOD), and the Fish and Wildlife Service and the National Park Service within the Department of the Interior (Interior)—spent about $360 million to purchase about 3,500 heavy equipment assets in calendar years 2012 through 2016 and over $5 million to lease heavy equipment from fiscal years 2012 through 2016. Officials from all three agencies stated that they consider mission needs and the availability of equipment leases when deciding whether to lease or purchase heavy equipment. Federal regulations provide that agencies should consider whether it is more economical to lease or purchase equipment when acquiring heavy equipment, and federal internal control standards require that management clearly document all transactions in a manner that allows the documentation to be readily available for examination. However, in reviewing selected leases and purchases of heavy equipment from these three agencies, GAO found that officials did not consistently conduct or document lease-versus-purchase analyses. Officials at the Air Force and Interior said that there was a lack of clarity in agency policies about when they were required to conduct and document such analyses. Without greater clarity on when lease-versus-purchase analyses should be conducted and documented, these agencies may not be spending funds on heavy equipment effectively. The Department of the Interior and the Air Force should clarify the circumstances in which lease-versus-purchases analyses for heavy equipment acquisitions are to be conducted and documented. The Departments of the Interior and Defense concurred with these recommendations."], "all_classes": null, "length": 6750}
{"pred": "\nThe report from the Government Accountability Office (GAO) assesses the Department of Defense's (DOD) cost comparison of civilian and contractor personnel. The report found that DOD partially addressed the mandated reporting element to account for the fully-burdened cost of federal civilian and service contractors performing functions at selected installations. DOD identified labor costs associated with federal civilian and service contractors but excluded non-labor costs from its cost calculations. The GAO concludes that DOD did not account for the full cost of federal civilians and service contractors as directed by Congress. The GAO recommends that DOD include all labor and non-labor costs in its cost comparisons to account for the fully-burdened costs of these workforces. The report also assessed DOD's flexible employment authorities for the employment and retention of civilian employees. DOD partially addressed this element by gathering information on flexible hiring authorities but did not include non-labor costs in its cost comparisons. The GAO believes that DOD should include all costs to account for the fully-burdened costs of federal civilians and service contractors.", "answers": ["In addition to more than 2.2 million active duty and reserve personnel, DOD employs about 760,000 federal civilians and more than 560,000 contractors. In the Senate Report 114-49 accompanying a bill for the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2016 included a provision for DOD to issue a report (1) assessing functions performed by federal civilian and service contractor personnel, (2) accounting for the full costs of federal civilian and service contractor personnel performing these functions, (3) comparing these costs, and (4) assessing available hiring and retention authorities for federal civilians. The Senate report also included a provision for GAO to assess DOD's report, which DOD submitted to Congress in April 2017. This report examines the extent to which DOD's report addressed the prescribed congressional elements. GAO reviewed DOD's report and compared it to the prescribed elements, examined documents relevant to DOD's cost estimating and comparison methodology, and interviewed DOD officials, including those in its Office of Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation responsible for the calculations in DOD's report. In response to Congressional direction, the Department of Defense (DOD) issued a report in April 2017 comparing the costs of federal civilian and service contractor personnel at select installations. The report addressed three out of four provision elements and partially addressed one, as discussed below. DOD concluded that neither federal civilians nor service contractors were predominately more or less expensive, with costs being dependent on position, location, and level of seniority. DOD noted that it used a non-probability based sample of personnel for its report, and the results are not generalizable. An assessment of performance of functions being performed by federal civilian and service contractor personnel at six military installations, with four being in the continental United States and two being outside the continental United States. GAO believes that DOD addressed this requirement because it developed a methodology to assess performance of functions performed by federal civilians and service contractors at 17 organizations within nine geographic regions including two locations outside the continental United States. DOD used data from the Defense Civilian Personnel Data System to identify military installations with large reported numbers of federal civilians. DOD determined that personnel need to perform at least 80 percent common tasks to be able to make a comparison. An accounting of the fully-burdened, or full, cost of federal civilian and service contractor personnel performing functions at the selected installations including training, benefits, reimbursable costs, and facility overhead. GAO believes that DOD partially addressed this requirement because while it calculated the labor costs of selected federal civilian and service contractor full-time equivalents performing similar functions for organizations at government-owned facilities, it excluded certain non-labor costs from its calculations. A comparison of the costs of performance of these functions by federal civilians and service contractor personnel at the selected installations. GAO believes that DOD addressed this requirement because it compared calculated costs for selected federal civilians and service contractors performing similar functions at selected installations and included those comparisons in its report. An assessment of the flexible employment authorities for the employment and retention of federal civilian employees. GAO believes that DOD addressed this requirement because it sent questionnaires to DOD hiring officials and human resource professionals to collect information on flexible employment authorities and conducted interviews with these and human resource professionals at the same 17 organizations used for the cost comparison. Based on an analysis of the information collected, DOD's report included several conclusions regarding flexible hiring authorities and made one recommendation. GAO is not making any recommendations; however, DOD non-concurred with GAO's assessment that DOD partially addressed the element to account for the full cost of personnel. GAO believes the assessment is correct as discussed in the report."], "all_classes": null, "length": 4582}
{"pred": "\nThe Department of Homeland Security (DHS) has established policies and processes for managing its major acquisition programs. The policies outline how DHS will acquire systems to meet its missions and achieve its goals. DHS assesses its acquisition programs to determine if they are on track to meet their schedule and cost goals. DHS also reports on the affordability of its acquisition programs to Congress. The report found that while DHS's policies generally reflect key portfolio management practices, there are still challenges in implementing them fully. For example, DHS does not report operations and maintenance funding for individual programs in its FYHSP report to Congress. DHS has taken steps to enhance its policies and processes, including revising its acquisition management and resource allocation policies. However, more work is needed to fully implement key portfolio management practices. The report highlights specific challenges and lessons learned from assessing 28 of DHS's major acquisition programs.", "answers": ["Each year, the DHS invests billions of dollars in a diverse portfolio of major acquisition programs to help execute its many critical missions. DHS's acquisition activities are on GAO's High Risk List, in part, because of management and funding issues. The Explanatory Statement accompanying the DHS Appropriations Act, 2015 included a provision for GAO to review DHS's major acquisitions. This report, GAO's fourth annual review, assesses the extent to which: (1) DHS's major acquisition programs are on track to meet their schedule and cost goals, and (2) DHS has taken actions to enhance its policies and processes to better reflect key practices for effectively managing a portfolio of investments. GAO reviewed 28 acquisition programs, including DHS's largest programs that were in the process of obtaining new capabilities as of April 2017, and programs GAO or DHS identified as at risk of poor outcomes. GAO assessed cost and schedule progress against baselines, assessed DHS's policies and processes against GAO's key portfolio management practices, and met with relevant DHS officials. During 2017, 10 of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) programs GAO assessed that had approved schedule and cost goals were on track to meet those goals. GAO reviewed 28 programs in total, 4 of which were new programs that GAO did not assess because they did not establish cost and schedule goals before the end of calendar year 2017 as planned. The table shows the status of the 24 programs GAO assessed. Reasons for schedule delays or cost increases included technical challenges, changes in requirements, and external factors. Recent enhancements to DHS's acquisition management, resource allocation, and requirements policies largely reflect key portfolio management practices (see table). However, DHS is in the early stages of implementing these policies. GAO identified two areas where DHS could strengthen its portfolio management policies and implementation efforts: DHS's policies do not reflect the key practice to reassess a program that breaches—or exceeds—its cost, schedule, or performance goals in the context of the portfolio to ensure it is still relevant or affordable. Acquisition management officials said that, in practice, they do so based on a certification of funds memorandum—a tool GAO has found to be effective for DHS leadership to assess program affordability—submitted by the component when one of its programs re-baselines in response to a breach. Documenting this practice in policy would help ensure DHS makes strategic investment decisions within its limited budget. DHS is not leveraging information gathered from reviews once programs complete implementation to manage its portfolio of active acquisition programs. DHS's acquisition policy requires programs to conduct post-implementation reviews after initial capabilities are deployed, which is in line with GAO's key practices. Acquisition management officials said they do not consider the results of these reviews in managing DHS's portfolio because the reviews are typically conducted after oversight for a program shifts to the components. Leveraging these results across DHS could enable DHS to address potential issues that may contribute to poor outcomes, such as schedule slips and cost growth, for other programs in its acquisition portfolio. GAO recommends DHS update its acquisition policy to require certification of fund memorandums when programs re-baseline as a result of a breach and assess programs' post-implementation reviews to improve performance across the acquisition portfolio. DHS concurred with GAO's recommendations."], "all_classes": null, "length": 30427}
{"pred": "\nThe report discusses the Navy's readiness challenges and efforts to rebuild readiness following four mishaps in 2017 that resulted in the loss of 17 sailors' lives and significant damage to ships. The Navy has identified 11 recommendations to improve surface fleet readiness, but full implementation will take time and management attention. The Navy has struggled with completing maintenance on time, providing sufficient manning to ships, and training for amphibious operations. The Navy has also experienced persistent challenges in procuring new weapons systems to overcome rapidly advancing threats. The Navy has taken steps to improve training and manning, but more work is needed to fully address the challenges. The report highlights the Navy's efforts to rebuild readiness, but notes that it will take sustained management attention over years to fully address the issues.", "answers": ["The 2018 National Defense Strategy emphasizes that restoring and retaining readiness is critical to success in the emerging security environment. The Navy and Marine Corps are working to rebuild the readiness of their forces while growing and modernizing their aging fleet of ships and aircraft. However, achieving readiness recovery goals will take years as both services continue to be challenged to rebuild readiness amid continued operational demands. This statement provides information on current and future readiness challenges facing (1) the Navy ship and submarine fleet and (2) Navy and Marine Corps aviation. GAO also discusses prior recommendations on Navy and Marine Corps readiness and progress to address them. This statement is based on previously published work since 2015 related to Navy and Marine Corps readiness challenges, including shipyard workforce and capital investment, ship crewing, weapon system sustainment, the fighter pilot workforce, and modernizing force structure. GAO conducted site visits to the Pacific fleet in November 2018 and analyzed updated data, as appropriate. The Navy has taken steps to address training shortfalls in the surface fleet, but faces persistent maintenance and personnel challenges as it seeks to rebuild ship and submarine readiness. While the Navy has corrective actions underway, they will take years to implement. Following ship collisions in 2017, the Navy has taken steps to ensure its crews are trained to standards prior to deployment and made significant progress in those efforts. However, the Navy has struggled to complete ship maintenance—with only 30 percent of maintenance completed on time since fiscal year 2012—leading to thousands of days that ships were unavailable for training and operations (see figure). Additionally, manning shortfalls and experience gaps continue to contribute to high sailor workload and are likely to continue through at least fiscal year 2021. The Navy has developed a plan to improve shipyards and is re-examining its ship manning, among other actions; however, these positive steps have not yet fully addressed GAO's recommendations. Looking to the future, the Navy has indicated that it wants to grow its fleet to meet demands. However, the costs of such growth are not yet known and would likely require resourcing well above currently planned levels. Navy and Marine Corps aircraft availability has been limited due to numerous challenges (see figure). Specifically, the seven aircraft GAO reviewed have generally experienced decreasing availability since fiscal year 2011 and did not meet availability goals in fiscal years 2017 and 2018. The F-35—the future of naval aviation—also has not met availability goals due to part shortages and poor sustainment planning. In September 2018, the Department of Defense established aggressive targets for aircraft availability. While the Navy and Marine Corps are taking actions to improve aircraft availability, including addressing GAO's recommendations, aviation readiness will take many years to recover. GAO has made a total of 45 recommendations in the prior work described in this statement. The Department of Defense concurred with most of them, and has many actions underway, but has not yet fully implemented any. Attention to these recommendations can assist the Navy and the Marine Corps as they seek to rebuild the readiness of their forces."], "all_classes": null, "length": 5894}
{"pred": "\nThe Federal Housing Administration (FHA) is a government agency that insures mortgage lenders against borrower default. FHA insurance protects lenders, not borrowers, in the event of default. FHA provides insurance to lenders to encourage lending for housing and stimulate the economy. FHA insures mortgages with lower down payments and credit scores, making them more accessible to lower- and moderate-income households and first-time homebuyers. FHA insurance is particularly important during economic downturns when private lenders tighten credit. FHA insures mortgages with lower down payments and credit scores, making them more accessible to lower- and moderate-income households and first-time homebuyers. FHA insurance is intended to make lenders more willing to offer affordable mortgages to these borrowers.\n\nFHA insures mortgages with lower down payments and credit scores, making them more accessible to lower- and moderate-income households and first-time homebuyers. FHA insurance is particularly important during economic downturns when private lenders tighten credit. FHA insures mortgages with lower down payments and credit scores, making them more accessible to lower- and moderate-income households and first-time homebuyers. FHA insurance is intended to make lenders more willing to offer affordable mortgages to these borrowers.\n\nFHA insures mortgages with loan terms up to 30 years and negotiable interest rates. FHA requires a minimum credit score of 500 and higher down payments from borrowers with lower credit scores. FHA insures mortgages for purchasing, refinancing, building, repairing, or improving homes. FHA insurance premiums are set as a percentage of the loan amount and vary based on the loan's initial loan-to-value ratio.\n\nFHA's Mutual Mortgage Insurance Fund (MMI Fund) is funded through insurance premiums and proceeds from foreclosed homes. The MMI Fund has historically generated negative credit subsidy, meaning it does not require appropriations to cover costs. However, the MMI Fund receives appropriations for salaries and administrative expenses.\n\nFHA's market share of mort", "answers": ["The Federal Housing Administration (FHA), an agency of the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD), was created by the National Housing Act of 1934. FHA insures private lenders against the possibility of borrowers defaulting on mortgages that meet certain criteria, thereby expanding the availability of mortgage credit beyond what may be available otherwise. If the borrower defaults on the mortgage, FHA is to repay the lender the remaining amount owed. A household that obtains an FHA-insured mortgage must meet FHA's eligibility and underwriting standards, including showing that it has sufficient income to repay a mortgage. FHA requires a minimum down payment of 3.5% from most borrowers, which is lower than the down payment required for many other types of mortgages. FHA-insured mortgages cannot exceed a statutory maximum mortgage amount, which varies by area and is based on area median house prices but cannot exceed a specified ceiling in high-cost areas. (The ceiling is set at $726,525 in high-cost areas in calendar year 2019.) Borrowers are charged fees, called mortgage insurance premiums, in exchange for the insurance. In FY2018, FHA insured over 1 million new mortgages (including both home purchase and refinance mortgages) with a combined principal balance of $209 billion. FHA's share of the mortgage market tends to vary with economic conditions and other factors. In the aftermath of the housing market turmoil that began around 2007 and a related contraction of mortgage lending, FHA insured a larger share of mortgages than it had in the preceding years. Its overall share of the mortgage market increased from about 3% in calendar year 2005 to a peak of 21% in 2009. Since that time, FHA's share of the mortgage market has decreased somewhat, though it remains higher than it was in the early 2000s. In calendar year 2017, FHA's overall share of the mortgage market was about 17%. FHA-insured mortgages, like all mortgages, experienced increased default rates during the housing downturn that began around 2007, leading to concerns about the stability of the FHA insurance fund for single-family mortgages, the Mutual Mortgage Insurance Fund (MMI Fund). In response to these concerns, FHA adopted a number of policy changes in an attempt to limit risk to the MMI Fund. These changes have included raising the fees that it charges and making changes to certain eligibility criteria for FHA-insured loans."], "all_classes": null, "length": 5182}
{"pred": "\nThe report discusses the Gerald R. Ford (CVN-78) class aircraft carrier program and potential oversight issues for Congress. The Navy's proposed FY2019 budget requests $2,34 million for the CVN-78 program, which is part of the Navy's 30-year shipbuilding plan. The Navy's FY2020 budget submission shows the CVN-81 ship as being procured in FY2020, instead of FY2019, which affects the comparison of ship procurement numbers between FY2019 and FY2020. The Navy's approach to building the CVN-78 class has undergone an affordability review and the shipbuilder has made changes to reduce costs. The Navy has implemented cost reduction initiatives and is pursuing further changes to improve cost performance. The Navy is also addressing issues related to the CVN-78 design and material procurement. The CVN-79 construction plan has been revised to leverage additional time to introduce fundamental changes to the carrier procurement approach and build plan. The Navy has set aggressive targets to reduce costs for CVN-79 and follow ships. The report discusses the issue of conducting a shock trial for the CVN-78 class, which has been a matter of disagreement between the Navy and Office of the Secretary of Defense.", "answers": ["CVN-78, CVN-79, CVN-80, and CVN-81 are the first four ships in the Navy's new Gerald R. Ford (CVN-78) class of nuclear-powered aircraft carriers (CVNs). CVN-78 (Gerald R. Ford) was procured in FY2008. The Navy's proposed FY2020 budget estimates the ship's procurement cost at $13,084.0 million (i.e., about $13.1 billion) in then-year dollars. The ship received advance procurement (AP) funding in FY2001-FY2007 and was fully funded in FY2008-FY2011 using congressionally authorized four-year incremental funding. To help cover cost growth on the ship, the ship received an additional $1,394.9 million in FY2014-FY2016 and FY2018 cost-to-complete procurement funding. The ship was delivered to the Navy on May 31, 2017, and was commissioned into service on July 22, 2017. The Navy is currently working to complete construction, testing, and certification of the ship's 11 weapons elevators. CVN-79 (John F. Kennedy) was procured in FY2013. The Navy's proposed FY2020 budget estimates the ship's procurement cost at $11,327.4 million (i.e., about $11.3 billion) in then-year dollars. The ship received AP funding in FY2007-FY2012, and was fully funded in FY2013-FY2018 using congressionally authorized six-year incremental funding. The ship is scheduled for delivery to the Navy in September 2024. CVN-80 (Enterprise) and CVN-81 (not yet named) are being procured under a two-ship block buy contract that was authorized by Section 121(a)(2) of the John S. McCain National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2019 (H.R. 5515/P.L. 115-232 of August 13, 2018). The provision permitted the Navy to add CVN-81 to the existing contract for building CVN-80 after the Department of Defense (DOD) made certain certifications to Congress. DOD made the certifications on December 31, 2018, and the Navy announced the award of the contract on January 31, 2019. Compared to the estimated procurement costs for CVN-80 and CVN-81 in the Navy's FY2019 budget submission, the Navy estimates under its FY2020 budget submission that the two-ship block buy contract will reduce the cost of CVN-80 by $246.6 million and the cost of CVN-81 by $2,637.3 million, for a combined reduction of $2,883.9 million (i.e., about $2.9 billion). Using higher estimated baseline costs for CVN-80 and CVN-81 taken from a December 2017 Navy business case analysis, the Navy estimates under its FY2020 budget submission that the two-ship contract will reduce the cost of CVN-80 by $770.9 million and the cost of CVN-81 by $3,086.3 million, for a combined reduction of $3,857.2 million (i.e., about $3.9 billion). CVN-80 was procured in FY2018. The Navy's proposed FY2020 budget estimates the ship's procurement cost at $12,335.1 million (i.e., about $12.3 billion) in then-year dollars. The ship received AP funding in FY2016 and FY2017, and the Navy plans to fully fund the ship in FY2018-FY2025 using incremental funding authorized by Section 121(c) of P.L. 115-232. The Navy's proposed FY2020 budget requests $1,062.0 million in procurement funding for the ship. The ship is scheduled for delivery to the Navy in March 2028. Prior to the awarding of the two-ship block buy contract, CVN-81 was scheduled to be procured in FY2023. Following the awarding of the two-ship block buy contract, the Navy has chosen to show CVN-81 in its FY2020 budget submission as a ship to be procured in FY2020 (as opposed to a ship that was procured in FY2019). The Navy's FY2020 budget submission estimates the ship's procurement cost at $12,450.7 million (i.e., about $12.5 billion) in then-year dollars. The Navy plans to fully fund the ship beginning in FY2019 and extending beyond FY2026 using incremental funding authorized by Section 121(c) of P.L. 115-232. The Navy's proposed FY2020 budget requests $1,285.0 million in procurement funding for the ship. The ship is scheduled for delivery to the Navy in February 2032. The Navy's FY2020 budget submission proposed to not fund the mid-life nuclear refueling overhaul (called a Refueling Complex Overhaul, or RCOH) for the aircraft carrier CVN-75 (Harry S. Truman), and to instead retire the ship around FY2024 and also deactivate one of the Navy's carrier air wings at about the same time. On April 30, 2019, however, the Administration announced that it was effectively withdrawing this proposal from the Navy's FY2020 budget submission. The Administration now supports funding the CVN-75 RCOH and keeping CVN-75 (and by implication its associated air wing) in service past FY2024. Oversight issues for Congress for the CVN-78 program include the following: DOD's decision to show CVN-81 in its FY2020 budget submission as a ship to be procured in FY2020, instead of a ship that was procured in FY2019; the Navy's decision, as part of its FY2020 budget submission, to not accelerate the scheduled procurement of CVN-82 from FY2028 to an earlier fiscal year; whether to approve, reject, or modify the Navy's FY2020 procurement funding request for the CVN-78 program; the date for achieving the Navy's 12-ship force-level goal for aircraft carriers; cost growth in the CVN-78 program, Navy efforts to stem that growth, and Navy efforts to manage costs so as to stay within the program's cost caps; Navy efforts to complete the construction, testing, and certification of the weapons elevators on CVN-78; additional CVN-78 program issues that were raised in a December 2018 report from the Department of Defense's (DOD's) Director of Operational Test and Evaluation (DOT&E); additional CVN-78 program issues that were raised in a May 2019 Government Accountability Office (GAO) report on DOD weapon systems; whether the Navy should shift at some point from procuring large-deck, nuclear-powered carriers like the CVN-78 class to procuring smaller aircraft carriers."], "all_classes": null, "length": 32726}
{"pred": "\nThe report examines how four federal agencies' risk assessment methodologies align with the Interagency Security Committee's risk management standard for identifying necessary countermeasures. The agencies are Customs and Border Protection, Transportation, Agriculture, and Forest Service. The report found that none of the agencies' methodologies fully aligned with the standard, with some not considering all three factors of risk and not documenting deviations from the standard. The agencies also faced challenges in conducting timely assessments and collecting and analyzing information to monitor their physical security programs. The report recommends that the agencies revise their policies and procedures to align with the standard and incorporate data collection and analysis requirements. The Departments of Homeland Security, Transportation, and Agriculture agreed with the findings and recommendations.", "answers": ["Protecting federal employees and facilities from security threats is of critical importance. Most federal agencies are generally responsible for their facilities and have physical security programs to do so. GAO was asked to examine how federal agencies assess facilities' security risks. This report examines: (1) how selected agencies' assessment methodologies align with the ISC's risk management standard for identifying necessary countermeasures and (2) what management challenges, if any, selected agencies reported facing in conducting physical security assessments and monitoring the results. GAO selected four agencies—CBP, FAA, ARS, and the Forest Service—based on their large number of facilities and compared each agency's assessment methodology to the ISC Standard; analyzed facility assessment schedules and results from 2010 through 2016; and interviewed security officials. GAO also visited 13 facilities from these four agencies, selected based on geographical dispersion and their high risk level. None of the four agencies GAO reviewed—U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP), the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), the Agricultural Research Service (ARS), and the Forest Service—used security assessment methodologies that fully aligned with the Interagency Security Committee's Risk Management Process for Federal Facilities standard (the ISC Standard). This standard requires that methodologies used to identify necessary facility countermeasures—such as fences and closed-circuit televisions—must: 1. Consider all of the undesirable events (i.e., arson and vandalism) identified by the ISC Standard as possible risks to facilities. 2. Assess three factors—threats, vulnerabilities, and consequences—for each of these events and use these three factors to measure risk. All four agencies used methodologies that included some ISC requirements when conducting assessments. CBP and FAA assessed vulnerabilities but not threats and consequences. ARS and the Forest Service assessed threats, vulnerabilities, and consequences, but did not use these factors to measure risk. In addition, the agencies considered many, but not all 33 undesirable events related to physical security as possible risks to their facilities. Agencies are taking steps to improve their methodologies. For example, ARS and the Forest Service now use a methodology that measures risk and plan to incorporate the methodology into policy. Although CBP and FAA have updated their methodologies, their policies do not require methodologies that fully align with the ISC standard. As a result, these agencies miss the opportunity for a more informed assessment of the risk to their facilities. All four agencies reported facing management challenges in conducting physical security assessments or monitoring assessment results. Specifically, CBP, ARS, and the Forest Service have not met the ISC's required time frame of every 3 years for conducting assessments. For example, security specialists have not conducted required reassessments of two ARS and one Forest Service higher-level facilities. While these three agencies have plans to address backlogs, CBP's plan does not balance conducting risk assessments with other competing security priorities, such as updating its policy manual, and ARS and the Forest Service lack a means to monitor completion of future assessments. Furthermore, CBP, ARS, and the Forest Service did not have the data or information systems to monitor assessment schedules or the status of countermeasures at facilities, and their policies did not specify such data requirements. For example, ARS and the Forest Service do not collect and analyze security-related data, such as countermeasures' implementation. FAA does not routinely monitor the performance of its physical security program. Without improved monitoring, agencies are not well equipped to prioritize their highest security needs, may leave facilities' vulnerabilities unaddressed, and may not take corrective actions to meet physical security program objectives. This is a public version of a sensitive report that GAO issued in August 2017. Information that the agencies under review deemed sensitive has been omitted. GAO recommends: (1) that CBP and FAA update policies to require the use of methodologies fully aligned with the ISC Standard; (2) that CBP revise its plan to eliminate the assessments backlog; and (3) that all four agencies improve monitoring of their physical security programs. All four agencies agreed with the respective recommendations."], "all_classes": null, "length": 6755}
{"pred": "\nThe report discusses the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services' (CMS) Payment Error Rate Measurement (PERM) program, which estimates the national Medicaid improper payment rate. CMS developed the PERM to estimate the national Medicaid improper payment rate in accordance with the Improper Payments Information Act of 2002 (IPIA). The PERM measures errors in three components of Medicaid: Fee-for-Service (FFS), managed care, and eligibility. The report finds that the PERM does not account for key program integrity risks in Medicaid managed care, such as unidentified overpayments and unallowable costs. While the PERM improper payment rate for Medicaid managed care is currently 0.3%, this does not necessarily indicate better oversight. The report identifies 27 audits and investigations of Medicaid managed care programs that identified overpayments and unallowable costs totaling $68 million to $137 million. These overpayments and unallowable costs may inflate future capitation rates, leading to higher state and federal spending. The report recommends that CMS consider revising the PERM methodology or focusing additional audit resources on managed care to better account for these risks. CMS has taken steps to improve oversight of Medicaid managed care, but these efforts fall short of ensuring that the agency and states will be able to identify and address overpayments to providers and unallowable costs. The report concludes that a full accounting of program integrity risks in managed care is critical to ensure the integrity of the whole Medicaid program.", "answers": ["The improper payment rate is a sentinel measure of program integrity risks for the Medicaid program. CMS and the states oversee Medicaid, whose size, structure, and diversity make it vulnerable to improper payments. CMS estimates the Medicaid improper payment rate annually through its PERM, which includes an estimate for Medicaid managed care, in which states contract with MCOs to provide services to Medicaid enrollees. GAO was asked to study the PERM methodology for managed care. In this report, GAO examined the extent to which the PERM accounts for program integrity risks in Medicaid managed care, including CMS's and states' oversight. GAO identified program integrity risks reported in 27 federal and state audits and investigations issued between January 2012 and September 2017; reviewed federal regulations and guidance on the PERM and CMS's Focused Program Integrity Reviews; and contacted program integrity officials in the 16 states with a majority of 2016 Medicaid spending for managed care, as well as CMS officials and program integrity experts. The Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services' (CMS) estimate of improper payments for Medicaid managed care has limitations that are not mitigated by the agency's and states' current oversight efforts. One component of the Payment Error Rate Measurement (PERM) measures the accuracy of capitated payments, which are periodic payments that state Medicaid agencies make to managed care organizations (MCO) to provide services to enrollees and to cover other allowable costs, such as administrative expenses. However, the managed care component of the PERM neither includes a medical review of services delivered to enrollees, nor reviews of MCO records or data. Further, GAO's review of the 27 federal and state audits and investigations identified key program risks. Ten of the 27 federal and state audits and investigations identified about $68 million in overpayments and unallowable MCO costs that were not accounted for by PERM estimates; another of these investigations resulted in a $137.5 million settlement. These audits and investigations were conducted over more than 5 years and involved a small fraction of the more than 270 MCOs operating nationwide as of September 2017. To the extent that overpayments and unallowable costs are unidentified and not removed from the cost data used to set capitation rates, they may allow inflated MCO payments and minimize the appearance of program risks in Medicaid managed care. CMS and states have taken steps to improve oversight of Medicaid managed care through updated regulations, focused reviews of states' managed care programs, and federal program integrity contractors' audits of managed care services. However, some of these efforts went into effect only recently, and others are unlikely to address the risks in managed care across all states. Furthermore, these efforts do not ensure the identification and reporting of overpayments to providers and unallowable costs by MCOs. Federal internal control standards call for agency management to identify and respond to risks. Without addressing key risks, such as the extent of overpayments and unallowable costs, CMS cannot be certain that its estimated improper payment rate for managed care (0.3 percent compared with 12.9 percent in Medicaid fee-for-service) accurately reflects program risks. The Administrator of CMS should consider and take steps to mitigate the program risks that are not measured in the PERM, such as overpayments and unallowable costs; such an effort could include actions such as revising the PERM methodology or focusing additional audit resources on managed care. HHS concurred with this recommendation. HHS also provided technical comments, which were incorporated as appropriate."], "all_classes": null, "length": 4469}
{"pred": "\nThe Federal Reserve's (the Fed) responsibilities as the nation's central bank fall into four main categories: monetary policy, provision of emergency liquidity through the lender of last resort function, supervision of certain types of banks and other financial firms for safety and soundness, and provision of payment system services to financial firms and the government. Congress has delegated responsibility for monetary policy to the Fed, but retains oversight responsibilities to ensure that the Fed is adhering to its statutory mandate of \"maximum employment, stable prices, and moderate long-term interest rates.\" The Fed defines stable prices as a longer-run goal of 2% inflation, measured by the Personal Consumption Expenditures (PCE) price index. Monetary policy can be used to stabilize business cycle fluctuations in the short run, while it mainly affects inflation in the long run. The Fed's conventional tool for monetary policy is to target the federal funds rate, which it has lowered to the zero lower bound during the financial crisis. The Fed has since raised rates to maintain a neutral monetary policy stance. The Fed's regulatory responsibilities include bank regulation, prudential regulation of nonbank systemically important financial institutions, and oversight of the payment system. The Fed has focused more on attempting to mitigate systemic risk through its regulations since the financial crisis and has restructured its internal operations to facilitate a macroprudential approach to supervision and regulation.", "answers": ["Congress has delegated responsibility for monetary policy to the Federal Reserve (the Fed), the nation's central bank, but retains oversight responsibilities for ensuring that the Fed is adhering to its statutory mandate of \"maximum employment, stable prices, and moderate long-term interest rates.\" To meet its price stability mandate, the Fed has set a longer-run goal of 2% inflation. The Fed's control over monetary policy stems from its exclusive ability to alter the money supply and credit conditions more broadly. Normally, the Fed conducts monetary policy by setting a target for the federal funds rate, the rate at which banks borrow and lend reserves on an overnight basis. It meets its target through open market operations, financial transactions traditionally involving U.S. Treasury securities. Beginning in 2007, the federal funds target was reduced from 5.25% to a range of 0% to 0.25% in December 2008, which economists call the zero lower bound. By historical standards, rates were kept unusually low for an unusually long time to mitigate the effects of the financial crisis and its aftermath. Starting in December 2015, the Fed has been raising interest rates and expects to gradually raise rates further. The Fed raised rates once in 2016, three times in 2017, and four times in 2018, by 0.25 percentage points each time. In light of increased economic uncertainty and financial volatility, the Fed announced in January 2019 that it would be \"patient\" before raising rates again. The Fed influences interest rates to affect interest-sensitive spending, such as business capital spending on plant and equipment, household spending on consumer durables, and residential investment. In addition, when interest rates diverge between countries, it causes capital flows that affect the exchange rate between foreign currencies and the dollar, which in turn affects spending on exports and imports. Through these channels, monetary policy can be used to stimulate or slow aggregate spending in the short run. In the long run, monetary policy mainly affects inflation. A low and stable rate of inflation promotes price transparency and, thereby, sounder economic decisions. The Fed's relative independence from Congress and the Administration has been justified by many economists on the grounds that it reduces political pressure to make monetary policy decisions that are inconsistent with a long-term focus on stable inflation. But independence reduces accountability to Congress and the Administration, and recent legislation and criticism of the Fed by the President has raised the question about the proper balance between the two. While the federal funds target was at the zero lower bound, the Fed attempted to provide additional stimulus through unsterilized purchases of Treasury and mortgage-backed securities (MBS), a practice popularly referred to as quantitative easing (QE). Between 2009 and 2014, the Fed undertook three rounds of QE. The third round was completed in October 2014, at which point the Fed's balance sheet was $4.5 trillion—five times its precrisis size. After QE ended, the Fed maintained the balance sheet at the same level until September 2017, when it began to very gradually reduce it to a more normal size. The Fed has raised interest rates in the presence of a large balance sheet through the use of two new tools—by paying banks interest on reserves held at the Fed and by engaging in reverse repurchase agreements (reverse repos) through a new overnight facility. In January 2019, the Fed announced that it would continue using these tools to set interest rates permanently, in which case the balance sheet may not get much smaller than its current size of $4 trillion. With regard to its mandate, the Fed believes that unemployment is currently lower than the rate that it considers consistent with maximum employment, and inflation is close to the Fed's 2% goal by the Fed's preferred measure. Even after recent rate increases, monetary policy is still considered expansionary. This monetary policy stance is unusually stimulative compared with policy in this stage of previous expansions, and is being coupled with a stimulative fiscal policy (larger structural budget deficit). Debate is currently focused on how quickly the Fed should raise rates. Some contend the greater risk is that raising rates too slowly at full employment will cause inflation to become too high or cause financial instability, whereas others contend that raising rates too quickly will cause inflation to remain too low and choke off the expansion."], "all_classes": null, "length": 7241}
{"pred": "\nThe report summarizes the results of a performance audit by the Government Accountability Office (GAO) of the federal government's implementation of the Buy American Act. The audit found that while the federal government's procurement of foreign products through exceptions and waivers of the Buy American Act is less than 5% of total procurement spending, it is important that these purchases be consistent with the domestic preferences in the Buy American Act. However, data reporting errors by contracting staff and limitations in the Federal Procurement Data System-Next Generation (FPDS-NG) mean that data on the use of exceptions and waivers are not fully captured. The audit found that agencies have taken varied approaches to providing information to contracting officers to navigate the complexities and nuances associated with applying the different Buy American Act exceptions or trade agreement waivers. The GAO made four recommendations to improve data reporting and implementation of the Buy American Act. The recommendations were accepted by the Departments of Defense, Homeland Security, Veterans Affairs, and the Office of Management and Budget.", "answers": ["The Buy American Act of 1933, as amended, is the main U.S. law promoting domestic purchasing. The Act permits agencies to buy foreign end products only under certain exceptions, such as when domestic items are not available at a reasonable cost. Further, U.S. trade agreements waive the Buy American restrictions for certain products. GAO was asked to review implementation of the Buy American Act. This report assesses the extent to which (1) the federal government procures foreign products through Buy American Act exceptions and waivers; and (2) selected agencies provide training and guidance to implement the Act. GAO reviewed laws, regulations, and policies related to the Buy American Act and analyzed data for fiscal year 2017 from FPDS-NG. GAO also analyzed a non-generalizable sample of 38 contracts from DOD, HHS, DHS, and VA—the agencies with the most obligations for products in fiscal year 2017. The 38 awards selected include a mix of foreign and domestic products, as well as dollars obligated. Finally, GAO interviewed cognizant contracting and policy officials from the selected agencies. According to data reported in the Federal Procurement Data System-Next Generation (FPDS-NG) in fiscal year 2017, foreign end products accounted for less than 5 percent—about $7.8 billion—of federal obligations for products potentially subject to the Buy American Act. Federal agencies procured foreign products using exceptions to Buy American Act requirements, as well as through waivers or when the Buy American Act did not apply, as shown in the figure. The amount of foreign end products purchased could be greater than reported in FPDS-NG, however, due to reporting errors and system limitations. GAO found that 6 of the 38 contracts reviewed from the Departments of Defense (DOD), Health and Human Services (HHS), Homeland Security (DHS), and Veterans Affairs (VA) inaccurately recorded waiver or exception information. FPDS-NG system limitations compound these errors because it does not fully capture Buy American Act data. Among other things, the database does not always enable agencies to report the use of exceptions or waivers on contracts for both foreign and domestic products, reducing data accuracy. The Office of Management and Budget (OMB) is considering strategies to improve Buy American Act data. The four agencies GAO reviewed varied in their approaches to Buy American Act training and guidance. DOD reports that it will have trained more than 18,000 personnel by the end of 2018. DHS reports training almost 1,400 people—approximately 94 percent of its contracting staff—as of April 2018. Some VA courses mention the Act, but none is focused specifically on implementing its requirements. HHS does not have agency-level training or guidance on the Act. GAO found that contracting officers for the contracts it reviewed face challenges implementing Buy American Act requirements. Having specific and targeted Buy American Act guidance and training can better ensure that agencies meet the Act's requirements. GAO is recommending that OMB take steps to improve Buy American Act data and that HHS, DHS, and VA improve agency guidance and training on implementing the Act. All of the agencies either concurred or generally concurred with GAO's recommendations."], "all_classes": null, "length": 9745}
{"pred": "\nThe report examines the progress states and localities are making to implement Next Generation 911 (NG91) and the challenges they have faced. It also describes how federal agencies have addressed state and local implementation challenges and planned next steps. The report found that state and local funding may not be sufficient to support costs associated with transitioning to NG91 equipment and infrastructure. Transitioning from legacy infrastructure to Internet Protocol-based systems presents technical and operational challenges such as interoperability and cybersecurity risks. Federal agencies have taken actions to assist states and localities, including grant resources, a cost study, a grant program, guides on technology standards and procurement practices, examining emerging technology issues, and providing technical assistance. States may face a range of challenges related to evolving roles for state and local 91 authorities that could hinder NG91 implementation. Federal agencies have guides on state and legislative planning, explored NG91 governance implementation issues, and provided recommendations for transitioning from legacy 91 to NG91 networks. The National 91 Program lacks goals and performance measures to assess its activities. The report recommends that the National 91 Program develop specific program goals and performance measures related to NG91 implementation, determine roles and responsibilities of federal agencies participating in the National NG91 Roadmap initiative, and develop an implementation plan to support the completion of the National NG91 Roadmap's national-level tasks.", "answers": ["Each year, millions of Americans call 911 for help during emergencies. However, the nation's legacy 911 system relies on aging infrastructure that is not designed to accommodate modern communications technologies. As a result, states and localities are upgrading to NG911, which offers improved capabilities, such as the ability to process images, audio files, and video. While deploying NG911 is the responsibility of state and local entities, federal agencies also support implementation, led by NHTSA's National 911 Program, which facilitates collaboration among federal, state, and local 911 stakeholders. GAO was asked to review NG911 implementation nationwide. This report examines: (1) state and local progress and challenges in implementing NG911 and (2) federal actions to address challenges and planned next steps. GAO reviewed relevant statutes, regulations, and federal agency reports and plans. GAO also analyzed NHTSA's survey data on state 911 implementation for calendar year 2015, the most recent year for which data were available, and interviewed federal officials, state and local officials from nine states (selected to represent different regions and various phases of NG911 implementation), and officials from industry and advocacy groups. The National Highway Traffic Safety Administration's (NHTSA) National 911 Program's most recent national survey on Next Generation 911 (NG911) implementation indicated that about half of states were in some phase of transition to NG911 in 2015, but that state and local progress varied. Specifically, 10 states reported that all 911 authorities in their state processed calls using NG911 systems; however, 18 states reported having no state or local NG911 transition plans in place—which may indicate these states were in the early phases of planning for the transition to NG911 or had not yet begun. GAO spoke with state and local 911 officials in 9 states, which were in various phases of implementing NG911, and found that none of the 9 selected states were accepting images, audio files, or video. State and local 911 officials identified a number of challenges to implementing NG911. Such challenges are related to funding, evolving technology and operations, and governance. For example, officials in 3 states said that the current funding they collect from telephone service subscribers may not be sufficient to support NG911's transition costs while simultaneously funding the operation of existing 911 systems. Federal agencies—including NHTSA, the National Telecommunications and Information Administration, the Federal Communications Commission, and the U.S. Department of Homeland Security—have responsibilities to support NG911 implementation, such as through coordinating activities and administering grants, and are taking actions to assist state and local entities in addressing challenges to NG911's implementation. Such actions include developing resources, offering technical assistance, and convening stakeholders to explore emerging NG911 issues. For example, as the lead entity for coordinating federal NG911 efforts, NHTSA's National 911 Program is developing resources on NG911 topics, such as federal funding and governance structures. While the National 911 Program is taking steps to facilitate the state and local transition to NG911, the program lacks specific performance goals and measures to assess its progress. Without such goals and measures, it is not clear to what extent the program is effectively achieving its mission. In 2018, the National 911 Program plans to establish an interagency initiative tasked with creating a National NG911 Roadmap. This roadmap is intended to identify next steps for the federal government in supporting the creation of a national, interconnected NG911 system. While the National 911 Program is taking steps to develop a list of national-level tasks as part of its roadmap initiative, the program does not have a plan to identify: (1) roles or responsibilities for federal entities to carry out these tasks or (2) how the program plans to achieve the roadmap's objectives. Collaborating with the appropriate federal agencies to determine federal roles and responsibilities to carry out the roadmap's national-level tasks could reduce barriers to agencies effectively working together to achieve those tasks. Furthermore, developing an implementation plan that details how the roadmap's tasks will be achieved would place the National 911 Program in a better position to effectively lead interagency efforts to implement NG911 nationwide. GAO recommends that NHTSA's National 911 Program develop performance goals and measures and, for the National NG911 Roadmap, determine agencies' roles and responsibilities and develop an implementation plan. NHTSA agreed with GAO's recommendations."], "all_classes": null, "length": 6694}
{"pred": "\nThe Railroad Retirement Board administers retirement, survivor, disability, and unemployment benefits for railroad workers and their families under the Railroad Retirement Act and Railroad Unemployment Insurance Act. The RRA provides retirement, survivor, and disability benefits for railroad workers who have at least 10 years of covered railroad service. Railroad workers with less than 10 years of service may receive benefits from either the RRA or Social Security, depending on their age and years of service. The RRA is primarily funded by payroll taxes, with the remaining funding coming from financial interchanges with Social Security and investment returns. The RRA provides retirement annuities that are similar to Social Security benefits, but more generous in certain situations. Disability benefits are also available for railroad workers who become disabled. Survivor benefits are higher than Social Security benefits because railroad workers' families may receive both RRA and Tier I benefits. Unemployment and sickness benefits are available for railroad workers who are temporarily unable to work due to illness or injury. The RRA also provides for employer surcharges to replenish the Railroad Unemployment Insurance Account if needed. As of 2018, the maximum daily unemployment benefit was $77, reduced by 6.2% due to sequestration. The RRA has seen a decline in the number of railroad workers and beneficiaries since the 1950s, although recent years have seen an increase in railroad employment. The total number of beneficiaries and benefit payments have also increased during this time.", "answers": ["The Railroad Retirement Board (RRB), an independent federal agency, administers retirement, survivor, disability, unemployment, and sickness insurance for railroad workers and their families. During FY2017, the RRB paid nearly $12.5 billion in retirement, disability, and survivor benefits to approximately 548,000 beneficiaries and paid $105.4 million in unemployment and sickness benefits to approximately 28,000 claimants. Of the total $12.5 billion benefit payments in the same fiscal year, 60.0% was paid to retired workers, 8.0% to disabled workers, 14.4% to spouses, and 16.8% to survivors. The Railroad Retirement Act (RRA) authorizes retirement, disability, and survivor benefits for railroad workers and their families. RRA is financed primarily by payroll taxes, financial interchanges from Social Security, and transfers from the National Railroad Retirement Investment Trust (NRRIT). Railroad retirement payroll taxes have two tiers: the Tier I tax is essentially the same as the Social Security payroll tax and the Tier II tax is set each year based on the railroad retirement system's asset balances, benefit payments, and administrative costs. In FY2017, the gross RRA funding was about $12.7 billion. Railroad retirement annuities are also divided into two tiers. Tier I annuities are designed to be nearly equivalent to Social Security benefits and are based on both railroad retirement and Social Security-covered employment. However, Tier I annuities are more generous than Social Security benefits in certain situations. For example, at the age of 60, railroad workers with at least 30 years of covered railroad work may receive unreduced retirement annuities. Tier II annuities are similar to private pensions and based solely on covered railroad service. Tier II annuities are paid in addition to Tier I annuities. Railroad disability annuities may be payable to totally disabled railroad workers who are permanently disabled from all work and occupational disabled workers who are found to be permanently disabled from their regular railroad occupations. Eligible spouses and survivors of railroad workers may receive a certain portion of Tier I and Tier II benefits, but divorced spouses and surviving divorced spouses are eligible for only a certain portion of Tier I benefits. The Railroad Unemployment Insurance Act (RUIA) authorizes unemployment and sickness benefits for railroad workers. RUIA is financed solely by railroad employers, whose contributions are based on the taxable earnings of their employees. Eligibility for railroad unemployment and sickness benefits is based on recent railroad service and earnings. The maximum daily unemployment and sickness benefit payable in the benefit year that began July 1, 2018, is $77, and the maximum benefit for a biweekly claim is $770. Normal benefits are paid for up to 26 weeks in a benefit year. The railroad unemployment and sickness system remains affected by sequestration, as unemployment benefits will continue to be reduced through at least September 30, 2019."], "all_classes": null, "length": 3573}
{"pred": "\nThe report discusses the Department of Veterans Affairs' (VA) efforts to modernize its health information system, VistA. VA has pursued four modernization initiatives since 20010: HealtheVet, iEHR, VistA Evolution, and EHRM. The modernization efforts have been plagued by delays, cost overruns, and unmet goals. VA has recently announced plans to acquire the same electronic health record system used by the Department of Defense (DOD) to replace VistA Evolution. VA has obligated over $1 billion in contracts for the two modernization initiatives, with 15 key contractors responsible for development, project management, and operations and maintenance. VA has begun planning for the transition from VistA Evolution to EHRM but remains early in its efforts. VA must continue to execute its plans effectively to minimize program risks and guide the latest electronic health record modernization initiative to a successful outcome. VA also needs to improve its data center consolidation and optimization, incremental system development, and software licensing management to better manage its IT investments.", "answers": ["The use of IT is crucial to helping VA effectively serve the nation's veterans and, each year, the department spends billions of dollars on its information systems and assets. However, VA has faced challenges spanning a number of critical initiatives related to modernizing its major systems. To improve all major federal agencies' acquisitions and hold them accountable for reducing duplication and achieving cost savings, in December 2014 Congress enacted federal IT acquisition reform legislation (commonly referred to as the Federal Information Technology Acquisition Reform Act , or FITARA). GAO was asked to summarize its previous and ongoing work regarding VA's history of efforts to modernize VistA, including past use of contractors, and the department's recent effort to acquire a commercial electronic health record system to replace VistA. GAO was also asked to provide an update on VA's progress in key FITARA-related areas, including (1) data center consolidation and optimization, (2) incremental system development practices, and (3) software license management. VA generally agreed with the information upon which this statement is based. For nearly two decades, the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) has undertaken multiple efforts to modernize its health information system—the Veterans Health Information Systems and Technology Architecture (known as VistA). Two of VA's most recent efforts included the Integrated Electronic Health Record (iEHR) program, a joint program with the Department of Defense (DOD) intended to replace separate systems used by VA and DOD with a single system; and the VistA Evolution program, which was to modernize VistA with additional capabilities and a better interface for all users. VA has relied extensively on assistance from contractors for these efforts. VA obligated over $1.1 billion for contracts with 138 contractors during fiscal years 2011 through 2016 for iEHR and VistA Evolution. Contract data showed that the 15 key contractors that worked on both programs accounted for $741 million of the funding obligated for system development, project management, and operations and maintenance to support the two programs (see figure). VA recently announced that it intends to change its VistA modernization approach and acquire the same electronic health record system that DOD is implementing. With respect to key FITARA-related areas, the department has reported progress on consolidating and optimizing its data centers, although this progress has fallen short of targets set by the Office of Management and Budget. VA has also reported $23.61 million in data center-related cost savings, yet does not expect to realize further savings from additional closures. In addition, VA's Chief Information Officer (CIO) certified the use of adequate incremental development for 10 of the department's major IT investments; however, VA has not yet updated its policy and process for CIO certification as GAO recommended. Finally, VA has issued a software licensing policy and has generated an inventory of its software licenses to inform future investment decisions. GAO has made multiple recommendations to VA aimed at improving the department's IT management. VA has generally agreed with the recommendations and begun taking responsive actions."], "all_classes": null, "length": 5865}
{"pred": "\nThe report discusses the potential impact of climate change on migration and displacement. It notes that climate change may exacerbate existing tensions and conflicts, particularly in regions with already fragile governments. It highlights examples of how climate change is affecting migration trends in various parts of the world, including the Marshall Islands, Syria, and Greenland. The report also notes that while climate change is a driver of migration, it is often indirectly linked to other factors like economic and political instability. The report concludes that assessing the impact of climate change on migration is complex and debated, and that the US government has reduced some of its climate change-related activities in recent years. The report recommends that the US government improve its assessment of climate change's impact on migration and resilience to better address the issue.", "answers": ["The effects of climate change, combined with other factors, may alter human migration trends across the globe, according to the International Organization for Migration. For example, climate change can increase the frequency and intensity of natural disasters, causing populations to move from an area. Climate change can also intensify slow-onset disasters, such as drought, crop failure, or sea level rise, potentially altering longer-term migration trends. GAO was asked to review how U.S. agencies address climate change as a potential driver of global migration. For State, USAID, and DOD, this report (1) describes executive branch actions related to climate change and migration from fiscal years 2014 through 2018; (2) examines the extent to which the agencies discussed the potential effects of climate change on migration in their plans and risk assessments; and (3) describes agency activities on the issue. GAO analyzed documents on administration priorities; reviewed agency plans, risk assessments, and documentation of agency activities; and interviewed agency officials. From fiscal years 2014 through 2018, a variety of executive branch actions related to climate change—such as executive orders and strategies—affected the Department of State (State), the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), and the Department of Defense (DOD), including their activities that could potentially address the nexus of climate change and migration. For example, a fiscal year 2016 presidential memorandum—rescinded in 2017—required agencies to develop implementation plans to identify the potential impact of climate change on human mobility, among other things. In general, however, climate change as a driver of migration was not a focus of the executive branch actions. For example, a fiscal year 2014 executive order—also rescinded in 2017—requiring agencies to prepare for the impacts of climate change did not highlight migration as a particular concern. State, USAID, and DOD have discussed the potential effects of climate change on migration in agency plans and risk assessments. For example, State and USAID required climate change risk assessments when developing country and regional strategies, and a few of the strategies reviewed by GAO identified the nexus of climate change and migration as a risk. However, State changed its approach in 2017, no longer providing missions with guidance on whether and how to include climate change risks in their integrated country strategies. In doing so, State did not include in its 2018 guidance to the missions any information on how to include climate change risks, should the missions choose to do so. Without clear guidance, State may miss opportunities to identify and address issues related to climate change as a potential driver of migration. The three agencies have been involved in climate change related activities but none were specifically focused on the nexus with global migration. For example, USAID officials said that the agency's adaptation efforts, such as its Pastoralist Areas Resilience Improvement through Market Expansion project in Ethiopia, were the most likely to include activities, such as enhancing resilience, that can indirectly address the issue of climate change as a driver of migration. GAO recommends that State provide missions with guidance that clearly documents its process for climate change risk assessments for country strategies. In commenting on a draft of this report, State indicated that it would update its integrated country strategy guidance and will specifically note that missions have the option to provide additional information on climate resilience and related topics."], "all_classes": null, "length": 14011}
{"pred": "\nThe report discusses the history and current use of the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA) and the National Emergencies Act (NEA). IEEPA was enacted in 1977 to limit the President's emergency powers granted by the Trading with the Enemy Act (TWEA). The NEA was enacted in 1976 to limit the President's emergency powers granted by TWEA. The report describes how the President has used IEEPA to impose economic sanctions in response to emergencies, including national emergencies declared under the NEA. The number of national emergencies declared under IEEPA has increased over time, with most targeting non-geographically specific groups and individuals. The report also describes how courts have reviewed IEEPA actions, finding that they are constitutional as long as they are based on an \"unusual and extraordinary threat\" and are exercised in a way that is \"intelligible\" and \"limited.\" The report concludes that while Congress has not explicitly disapproved of the President's use of IEEPA, the ambiguity in the statute provides flexibility for the President to address emergencies with dispatch. However, Congress may consider amending IEEPA to provide more oversight and term limits.", "answers": ["The International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA) provides the President broad authority to regulate a variety of economic transactions following a declaration of national emergency. IEEPA, like the Trading with the Enemy Act (TWEA) from which it branched, sits at the center of the modern U.S. sanctions regime. Changes in the use of IEEPA powers since the act's enactment in 1977 have caused some to question whether the statute's oversight provisions are robust enough given the sweeping economic powers it confers upon the President upon declaration of a state of emergency. Over the course of the twentieth century, Congress delegated increasing amounts of emergency power to the President by statute. The Trading with the Enemy Act was one such statute. Congress passed TWEA in 1917 to regulate international transactions with enemy powers following the U.S. entry into the First World War. Congress expanded the act during the 1930s to allow the President to declare a national emergency in times of peace and assume sweeping powers over both domestic and international transactions. Between 1945 and the early 1970s, TWEA became a critically important means to impose sanctions as part of U.S. Cold War strategy. Presidents used TWEA to block international financial transactions, seize U.S.-based assets held by foreign nationals, restrict exports, modify regulations to deter the hoarding of gold, limit foreign direct investment in U.S. companies, and impose tariffs on all imports into the United States. Following committee investigations that discovered that the United States had been in a state of emergency for more than 40 years, Congress passed the National Emergencies Act (NEA) in 1976 and IEEPA in 1977. The pair of statutes placed new limits on presidential emergency powers. Both included reporting requirements to increase transparency and track costs, and the NEA required the President to annually assess and extend, if appropriate, the emergency. However, some experts argue that the renewal process has become pro forma. The NEA also afforded Congress the means to terminate a national emergency by adopting a concurrent resolution in each chamber. A decision by the Supreme Court, in a landmark immigration case, however, found the use of concurrent resolutions to terminate an executive action unconstitutional. Congress amended the statute to require a joint resolution, significantly increasing the difficulty of terminating an emergency. Like TWEA, IEEPA has become an important means to impose economic-based sanctions since its enactment; like TWEA, Presidents have frequently used IEEPA to restrict a variety of international transactions; and like TWEA, the subjects of the restrictions, the frequency of use, and the duration of emergencies have expanded over time. Initially, Presidents targeted foreign states or their governments. Over the years, however, presidential administrations have increasingly used IEEPA to target individuals, groups, and non-state actors such as terrorists and persons who engage in malicious cyber-enabled activities. As of March 1, 2019, Presidents had declared 54 national emergencies invoking IEEPA, 29 of which are still ongoing. Typically, national emergencies invoking IEEPA last nearly a decade, although some have lasted significantly longer--the first state of emergency declared under the NEA and IEEPA, which was declared in response to the taking of U.S. embassy staff as hostages by Iran in 1979, may soon enter its fifth decade. IEEPA grants sweeping powers to the President to control economic transactions. Despite these broad powers, Congress has never attempted to terminate a national emergency invoking IEEPA. Instead, Congress has directed the President on numerous occasions to use IEEPA authorities to impose sanctions. Congress may want to consider whether IEEPA appropriately balances the need for swift action in a time of crisis with Congress' duty to oversee executive action. Congress may also want to consider IEEPA's role in implementing its influence in U.S. foreign policy and national security decision-making."], "all_classes": null, "length": 14753}
{"pred": "\nThe report summarizes the findings of an investigation into the security of the United States' pipeline systems. The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) is responsible for overseeing the security of pipelines. The report found several areas where TSA's pipeline security program could be improved:\n\n1. TSA does not have a defined process for reviewing and updating its pipeline security guidelines on a regular basis. This makes it difficult for TSA to ensure that its guidelines reflect the latest known standards and best practices for physical and cybersecurity.\n\n2. TSA's pipeline security guidelines lack clarity on key terms used in determining critical facilities. This makes it difficult for pipeline operators to apply the guidelines uniformly.\n\n3. TSA lacks a strategic workforce plan to ensure it has the necessary skills and personnel to conduct security reviews and assessments.\n\n4. TSA's pipeline risk assessment tool does not include up-to-date data on threat, vulnerability, and consequence. This makes it difficult for TSA to prioritize security reviews based on relative risk.\n\n5. TSA does not fully document the data sources, assumptions, and judgments used in its pipeline risk assessment. This makes it difficult for stakeholders to interpret the results.\n\n6. TSA does not incorporate data on natural hazards and cybersecurity threats into its pipeline risk assessment.\n\n7. TSA's pipeline security guidelines do not include metrics to measure the effectiveness of its security efforts. This makes it difficult for TSA to evaluate progress and adjust its security program.\n\n8. TSA's pipeline risk assessment does not account for pipeline physical and cyber vulnerabilities. This makes it difficult for TSA to prioritize security reviews based on vulnerability.\n\n9. TSA does not fully consider cross-sector interdependencies in its pipeline risk assessment. This makes it difficult to prioritize security efforts based on the potential impact of a pipeline disruption.\n\nIn summary, the report found that TSA's pipeline security program lacks a defined process for reviewing and updating its guidelines, clarity on key terms, a strategic workforce plan, and metrics to measure effectiveness. This makes it difficult for TSA to prioritize security efforts and ensure that pipelines are secure.", "answers": ["More than 2.7 million miles of pipeline transport and distribute oil, natural gas, and other hazardous products throughout the United States. Interstate pipelines run through remote areas and highly populated urban areas, and are vulnerable to accidents, operating errors, and malicious physical and cyber-based attack or intrusion. The energy sector accounted for 35 percent of the 796 critical infrastructure cyber incidents reported to DHS from 2013 to 2015. Several federal and private entities have roles in pipeline security. TSA is primarily responsible for the oversight of pipeline physical security and cybersecurity. GAO was asked to review TSA's efforts to assess and enhance pipeline security and cybersecurity. This report examines, among other objectives: (1) the guidance pipeline operators reported using to address security risks and the extent that TSA ensures its guidelines reflect the current threat environment; (2) the extent that TSA has assessed pipeline systems' security risks; and (3) the extent TSA has assessed its effectiveness in reducing pipeline security risks. GAO analyzed TSA documents, such as its Pipeline Security Guidelines ; evaluated TSA pipeline risk assessment efforts; and interviewed TSA officials, 10 U.S. pipeline operators—selected based on volume, geography, and material transported—and representatives from five industry associations. Pipeline operators reported using a range of guidelines and standards to address physical and cybersecurity risks, including the Department of Homeland Security's (DHS) Transportation Security Administration's (TSA) Pipeline Security Guidelines , initially issued in 2011. TSA issued revised guidelines in March 2018 to reflect changes in the threat environment and incorporate most of the principles and practices from the National Institute of Standards and Technology's Framework for Improving Critical Infrastructure Cybersecurity . However, TSA's revisions do not include all elements of the current framework and TSA does not have a documented process for reviewing and revising its guidelines on a regular basis. Without such a documented process, TSA cannot ensure that its guidelines reflect the latest known standards and best practices for physical security and cybersecurity, or address the dynamic security threat environment that pipelines face. Further, GAO found that the guidelines lack clear definitions to ensure that pipeline operators identify their critical facilities. GAO's analysis showed that operators of at least 34 of the nation's top 100 critical pipeline systems (determined by volume of product transported) deemed highest risk had identified no critical facilities. This may be due, in part, to the guidelines not clearly defining the criteria to determine facilities' criticality. To assess pipeline security risks, TSA conducts pipeline security reviews—Corporate Security Reviews and Critical Facility Security Reviews—to assess pipeline systems' vulnerabilities. However, GAO found that the number of TSA security reviews has varied considerably over the last several years, as shown in the table on the following page. TSA officials stated that staffing limitations have prevented TSA from conducting more reviews. Staffing levels for TSA's Pipeline Security Branch have varied significantly since fiscal year 2010 with the number of staff ranging from 14 full-time equivalents in fiscal years 2012 and 2013 to 1 in 2014. Further, TSA does not have a strategic workforce plan to help ensure it identifies the skills and competencies—such as the required level of cybersecurity expertise—necessary to carry out its pipeline security responsibilities. By establishing a strategic workforce plan, TSA can help ensure that it has identified the necessary skills, competencies, and staffing. GAO also identified factors that likely limit the usefulness of TSA's risk assessment methodology for prioritizing pipeline system reviews. Specifically, TSA has not updated its risk assessment methodology since 2014 to reflect current threats to the pipeline industry. Further, its sources of data and underlying assumptions and judgments regarding certain threat and vulnerability inputs are not fully documented. In addition, the risk assessment has not been peer reviewed since its inception in 2007. Taking steps to strengthen its risk assessment, and initiating an independent, external peer review would provide greater assurance that TSA ranks relative risk among pipeline systems using comprehensive and accurate data and methods. TSA has established performance measures to monitor pipeline security review recommendations, analyze their results, and assess effectiveness in reducing risks. However, these measures do not possess key attributes—such as clarity, and having measurable targets—that GAO has found are key to successful performance measures. By taking steps to ensure that its pipeline security program performance measures exhibit these key attributes, TSA could better assess its effectiveness at reducing pipeline systems' security risks. Pipeline Security Branch officials also reported conducting security reviews as the primary means for assessing the effectiveness of TSA's efforts to reduce pipeline security risks. However, TSA has not tracked the status of Corporate Security Review recommendations for the past 5 years. Until TSA monitors and records the status of these reviews' recommendations, it will be hindered in its efforts to determine whether its recommendations are leading to significant reduction in risk. GAO makes 10 recommendations to TSA to improve its pipeline security program management (many are listed on the next page), and DHS concurred. GAO recommends, among other things, that the TSA Administrator take the following actions: implement a documented process for reviewing, and if deemed necessary, for revising TSA's Pipeline Security Guidelines at defined intervals; clarify TSA's Pipeline Security Guidelines by defining key terms within its criteria for determining critical facilities; develop a strategic workforce plan for TSA's Security Policy and Industry Engagement‘s Surface Division; update TSA's pipeline risk assessment methodology to include current data to ensure it reflects industry conditions and threats; fully document the data sources, underlying assumptions and judgments that form the basis of TSA's pipeline risk assessment methodology; take steps to coordinate an independent, external peer review of TSA's pipeline risk assessment methodology; ensure the Security Policy and Industry Engagement‘s Surface Division has a suite of performance measures which exhibit key attributes of successful performance measures; and enter information on Corporate Security Review recommendations and monitor and record their status."], "all_classes": null, "length": 15361}
{"pred": "\nThe report discusses the U.S. Department of Defense's (DOD) global defense posture and its impact on military operations overseas. DOD has established processes to plan and manage its global defense posture, but it has not fully implemented these processes when funding initiatives through its Overseas Contingency Operations (OCO) budget. This has resulted in a lack of prioritization and cost estimates for posture initiatives funded through OCO. The European Reassurance Initiative (ERI) has been funded through OCO, which does not directly affect the military services' base budgets. As a result, DOD has not established priorities for ERI initiatives relative to those funded through the base budget, and it lacks an understanding of the relative importance of ERI initiatives. The report recommends that DOD prioritize ERI initiatives relative to base-budget funded initiatives, develop estimates for sustainment costs, and provide Congress with cost projections. The report also notes that DOD has identified $4.5 billion in funding for ERI initiatives through OCO, but the processes used to develop the OCO budget do not provide adequate planning and oversight for enduring initiatives.", "answers": ["In response to Russia's annexation of Crimea in March 2014, the President announced the ERI, to reassure allies in Europe of U.S. commitment to their security. This initiative has been funded using OCO appropriations, which Congress provides in addition to DOD's base budget appropriations. The Joint Explanatory Statement accompanying the Continuing Appropriations and Military Construction, Veterans Affairs, and Related Agencies Appropriations Act, 2017, included a provision for GAO to review matters related to ERI. In this report, we (1) describe changes in ERI's objectives, funding under ERI, and DOD's posture in Europe since 2014 and (2) evaluate the extent to which DOD's planning processes for posture initiatives funded under ERI prioritize those initiatives, estimate their long-term costs, and communicate their estimated costs to Congress. GAO analyzed DOD strategy documentation, budget and cost analysis guidance, budget justification materials, and cost and obligations data. GAO also interviewed knowledgeable officials within the Office of the Secretary of Defense, U.S. European Command, the military services, and the State Department. Since 2014, the Department of Defense (DOD) has expanded the European Reassurance Initiative's (ERI) objectives, increased its funding, and planned enhancements to European posture. DOD expanded ERI's objectives from the short-term reassurance of allies and partners to include deterring Russian aggression in the long term and developing the capacity to field a credible combined force should deterrence fail. With respect to funding, DOD will have requested approximately $4.5 billion for ERI's posture enhancements through the end of fiscal year 2017 (about $3.2 billion for fiscal year 2017 alone), and in July 2016 EUCOM identified funding needs for future posture initiatives. The expansion of ERI's objectives has contributed to DOD's enhancing its posture in Europe. Specifically, DOD has increased the size and duration of Army combat unit deployments, planned to preposition Army equipment in Eastern Europe, added new enduring locations (e.g., locations that DOD expects to access and use to support U.S. security interests for the foreseeable future), improved infrastructure, and negotiated new agreements with European nations. As of April 2017, DOD was considering further force enhancements under ERI as part of the department's ERI budget request. DOD also was reviewing whether new enduring locations to support ERI were needed and was considering other improvements to existing infrastructure. DOD's process for planning ERI has not established priorities among posture initiatives funded under ERI relative to those in its base budget, nor estimated long-term sustainment costs for some posture initiatives funded under ERI, nor communicated future costs to Congress. ERI is being planned using a separate process from DOD's established processes and is funded from DOD's overseas contingency operations (OCO) appropriations. GAO found several weaknesses: Lack of prioritization : DOD establishes priorities among ERI posture initiatives but has not evaluated them against base budget initiatives using its posture management process. As a result, DOD lacks an understanding of the relative importance of ERI initiatives and may be investing in projects that it will not continue should OCO funding become unavailable. Lack of sustainment costs : EUCOM and the military services have not fully estimated the long-term costs to sustain equipment and construction funded under ERI. Based on DOD's approach for calculating rough order sustainment costs, GAO determined that these costs could be substantial. DOD officials said that GAO correctly applied DOD's approach for estimating sustainment costs, but noted that actual costs may be lower, because the military services may not fully fund sustainment. In the absence of comprehensive estimates, DOD has been limited in its ability to assess affordability and plan for future costs. Not communicating future costs : DOD limits Congress's visibility into the resources needed to implement ERI and achieve its objectives because it does not include future costs in its ERI budget request. This is a public version of a classified report issued in August 2017. Information on specific posture planning, guidance, and budget estimates that DOD deemed to be classified have been omitted from this report. GAO recommends that DOD prioritize ERI posture initiatives against initiatives in its base budget, develop cost estimates for sustaining initiatives, and communicate future costs to Congress. DOD partially concurred with GAO's recommendations. GAO continues to believe that these recommendations are warranted."], "all_classes": null, "length": 5106}
{"pred": "\nThe report examines how the federal government and states oversee Medicaid spending on long-term care services provided in assisted living facilities. The federal government requires states to cover certain services provided by assisted living facilities, but does not provide funding for room and board. States have flexibility to establish multiple programs to cover assisted living services, but the federal government monitors states' compliance with requirements. States have varying approaches to monitoring and oversight of assisted living services, including delegating administrative responsibilities to other agencies. The federal government has taken steps to improve monitoring of beneficiary health and welfare in home and community-based services programs, but lacks clear guidance on reporting deficiencies and requirements for critical incident reporting. The report recommends that the federal government provide clearer guidance on reporting deficiencies and require states to report information on critical incidents to better monitor beneficiary health and welfare.", "answers": ["The number of individuals receiving long term care services from Medicaid in community residential settings is expected to grow. These settings, which include assisted living facilities, provide a range of services that allow aged and disabled beneficiaries, who might otherwise require nursing home care, to remain in the community. State Medicaid programs and CMS, the federal agency responsible for overseeing the state programs, share responsibility for ensuring that beneficiaries' health and welfare is protected. GAO was asked to examine state and federal oversight of assisted living services in Medicaid. This report (1) describes state spending on and coverage of these services, (2) describes how state Medicaid agencies oversee the health and welfare of beneficiaries in these settings, and (3) examines the extent that CMS oversees state Medicaid agency monitoring of assisted living services. GAO surveyed all state Medicaid agencies and interviewed officials in a nongeneralizeable sample of three states with varied oversight processes for their assisted living programs. GAO reviewed regulations and guidance, and interviewed CMS officials. State Medicaid agencies in 48 states that covered assisted living services reported spending more than $10 billion (federal and state) on assisted living services in 2014. These 48 states reported covering these services for more than 330,000 beneficiaries through more than 130 different programs. Most programs were operated under Medicaid waivers that allow states to target certain populations, limit enrollment, or restrict services to certain geographic areas. With respect to oversight of their largest assisted living programs, state Medicaid agencies reported varied approaches to overseeing beneficiary health and welfare, particularly in how they monitored critical incidents involving beneficiaries receiving assisted living services. State Medicaid agencies are required to protect beneficiary health and welfare and operate systems to monitor for critical incidents—cases of potential or actual harm to beneficiaries such as abuse, neglect, or exploitation. Twenty-six state Medicaid agencies could not report to GAO the number of critical incidents that occurred in assisted living facilities, citing reasons including the inability to track incidents by provider type (9 states), lack of a system to collect critical incidents (9 states), and lack of a system that could identify Medicaid beneficiaries (5 states). State Medicaid agencies varied in what types of critical incidents they monitored. All states identified physical, emotional, or sexual abuse as a critical incident. A number of states did not identify other incidents that may indicate potential harm or neglect such as medication errors (7 states) and unexplained death (3 states). State Medicaid agencies varied in whether they made information on critical incidents and other key information available to the public. Thirty-four states made critical incident information available to the public by phone, website, or in person, while another 14 states did not have such information available at all. Oversight of state monitoring of assisted living services by the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS), an agency within the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS), is limited by gaps in state reporting. States are required to annually report to CMS information on deficiencies affecting beneficiary health and welfare for the most common program used to provide assisted living services. However, states have latitude in what they consider a deficiency. States also must describe their systems for monitoring critical incidents, but CMS does not require states to annually report data from their systems. Under federal internal control standards, agencies should have processes to identify information needed to achieve objectives and address risk. Without clear guidance on reportable deficiencies and no requirement to report critical incidents, CMS may be unaware of problems. For example, CMS found, after an in-depth review in one selected state seeking to renew its program, that the state lacked an effective system for assuring beneficiary health and welfare, including reporting insufficient information on the number of unexpected or suspicious beneficiary deaths. The state had not reported any deficiencies in annual reports submitted to CMS in 5 prior years. GAO recommendations to CMS include clarifying state requirements for reporting program deficiencies and requiring annual reporting of critical incidents. HHS concurred with GAO's recommendations to clarify deficiency reporting and stated that it would consider annual reporting requirements for critical incidents after completing an ongoing review."], "all_classes": null, "length": 6063}
{"pred": "\nThe report summarizes the rail safety oversight programs of the Federal Railroad Administration (FRA) and the Federal Transit Administration (FTA). FRA oversees safety of railroads operating on the general system, while FTA oversees safety of rail transit systems. FRA has extensive railroad safety regulations, while FTA is in the process of implementing new rail transit safety regulations. FRA's risk-based approach to distributing inspection resources is a strength, while FTA lacks guidance on developing risk-based inspection programs. FRA has clear enforcement authority, while FTA lacks a method to evaluate the effectiveness of states' enforcement practices. FRA's use of compliance agreements and performance-based regulations is promising. FTA's National Public Transportation Safety Plan identifies issue areas that may require federal regulations. FRA's National Inspection Plan provides a data-driven approach to distributing inspection resources. FRA's flexibility in inspectors' discretion may be inconsistent with the risk-based model. FTA's approach to rail transit safety oversight is improving, but it lacks guidance on developing risk-based inspection programs and evaluating states' enforcement practices. FRA's enforcement tools are effective, but the effectiveness of FTA's civil penalties is difficult to quantify. FTA's requirement for states to have enforcement authorities is a strength, but it lacks a method to evaluate the effectiveness of states' enforcement. The report makes two recommendations for FTA to improve its rail transit safety oversight program: develop guidance on risk-based inspection programs and develop a method to monitor the effectiveness of states' enforcement.", "answers": ["In 2012 and 2015, DOT was provided with additional authority to oversee the safety of rail transit. Within DOT, FTA is now implementing this authority. The DOT's Office of Inspector General has reported, though, that FTA faces challenges in carrying out its enhanced safety oversight. FRA, also in DOT, has long carried out safety oversight of freight, intercity passenger, and commuter railroads. GAO was asked to review various rail safety and oversight issues, including the differences between FRA's and FTA's rail safety oversight programs. This report examines (1) key characteristics of FRA's and FTA's rail safety oversight programs and (2) strengths and limitations of FRA's and FTA's rail safety oversight programs. GAO assessed FRA's and FTA's information about rail safety oversight activities against guidance from the Office of Management and Budget, leading practices developed by the transit industry, and federal standards for internal control. GAO also interviewed stakeholders, including rail operators chosen based on mode, size, and location. The Department of Transportation's (DOT) Federal Railroad Administration (FRA) and Federal Transit Administration (FTA) carry out different approaches to rail safety oversight. FRA has a more centralized safety oversight program for railroads, while FTA's program for oversight of rail transit safety largely relies on state safety agencies to monitor and enforce rail transit safety, as established in federal statute. Key characteristics of both programs include: (1) safety regulations, (2) inspections and other oversight activities, and (3) enforcement mechanisms to ensure that safety deficiencies are addressed (see figure). There are strengths and limitations to FRA's and FTA's approaches to their safety oversight missions, including how the two agencies develop safety regulations, conduct inspections, and carry out enforcement. The National Transportation Safety Board has reported, and stakeholders GAO spoke with generally agreed, that strengths of FRA's rail safety oversight program include its safety regulations, its risk-based inspection program, and its enforcement authorities. FRA also has potential limitations in its oversight framework, though, such as difficulty evaluating the effectiveness of its enforcement mechanisms. FTA has made some progress implementing changes to the rail transit safety program. However, FTA has not provided all the necessary guidance and support to states' safety agencies to ensure they develop appropriate and effective rail transit safety inspection programs. In particular, FTA has not provided states with guidance on how to develop and implement risk-based inspection programs. Though FTA has said that it will develop such guidance, it does not have a plan or timeline to do so. Without guidance from FTA on how to develop and carry out risk-based inspections, state safety agencies may not allocate their limited resources efficiently, and important safety issues may go undetected. In addition, FTA has not developed a process or methodology to evaluate whether state safety agency enforcement authorities and practices are effective. Without clear evidence that state safety agencies' enforcement is effective, states and FTA may not be able to compel rail transit operators to remedy safety deficiencies. As a result, deficiencies may remain for long periods, potentially contributing to safety incidents. GAO recommends that FTA (1) create a plan, with timeline, for developing risk-based inspection guidance for state safety agencies, and (2) develop and communicate a method for how FTA will monitor whether state safety agencies' enforcement practices are effective. DOT agreed with our recommendations. DOT, NTSB, and WMATA provided technical comments that we incorporated as appropriate."], "all_classes": null, "length": 8086}
{"pred": "\nThe report summarizes the Commercial Crew Program's progress in developing crew transportation systems for the International Space Station. The program has made progress but faces delays and risks. NASA has not fully shared information with Congress about potential delays and contingency plans. The program's certification process assesses safety but has inconsistent approaches and lacks a clear articulation of risk tolerance. The program's management structure burdens the safety technical authority with dual roles, limiting independence. Recommendations are made to improve NASA's management and oversight of the program.", "answers": ["In 2014, NASA awarded two firm-fixed-price contracts to Boeing and SpaceX, worth a combined total of up to $6.8 billion, to develop crew transportation systems and conduct initial missions to the ISS. In February 2017, GAO found that both contractors had made progress, but their schedules were under mounting pressure. The contractors were originally required to provide NASA all the evidence it needed to certify that their systems met its requirements by 2017. A House report accompanying H.R. 5393 included a provision for GAO to review the progress of NASA's human exploration programs. This report examines the Commercial Crew Program, including (1) the extent to which the contractors have made progress towards certification and (2) how NASA's certification process addresses safety of the contractors' crew transportation systems. GAO analyzed contracts, schedules, and other documentation and spoke with officials from NASA, the Commercial Crew Program, Boeing, SpaceX, and two of NASA's independent review bodies that provide oversight. Both of the Commercial Crew Program's contractors, Boeing and Space Exploration Technologies Corporation (SpaceX), are making progress finalizing designs and building hardware for their crew transportation systems, but both contractors continue to delay their certification milestone (see figure). Certification is the process that the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) will use to ensure that each contractor's system meets its requirements for human spaceflight for the Commercial Crew Program. Further delays are likely as the Commercial Crew Program's schedule risk analysis shows that the certification milestone is likely to slip. The analysis identifies a range for each contractor, with an earliest and latest possible completion date, as well as an average. The average certification date was December 2019 for Boeing and January 2020 for SpaceX, according to the program's April 2018 analysis. Since the Space Shuttle was retired in 2011, the United States has been relying on Russia to carry astronauts to and from the International Space Station (ISS). Additional delays could result in a gap in U.S. access to the space station as NASA has contracted for seats on the Russian Soyuz spacecraft only through November 2019. NASA is considering potential options, but it does not have a contingency plan for ensuring uninterrupted U.S. access. NASA's certification process addresses the safety of the contractors' crew transportation systems through several mechanisms, but there are factors that complicate the process. One of these factors is the loss of crew metric that was put in place to capture the probability of death or permanent disability to an astronaut. NASA has not identified a consistent approach for how to assess loss of crew. As a result, officials across NASA have multiple ways of assessing the metric that may yield different results. Consequently, the risk tolerance level that NASA is accepting with loss of crew varies based upon which entity is presenting the results of its assessment. Federal internal controls state that management should define risk tolerances so they are clear and measurable. Without a consistent approach for assessing the metric, the agency as a whole may not clearly capture or document its risk tolerance with respect to loss of crew. GAO is making five recommendations, including that NASA develop a contingency plan for ensuring a U.S. presence on the ISS and clarify how it will determine its risk tolerance for loss of crew. NASA concurred with three recommendations; partially concurred on the recommendation related to loss of crew; and non-concurred with a recommendation to report its schedule analysis to Congress. GAO believes these recommendations remain valid, as discussed in the report."], "all_classes": null, "length": 9763}
{"pred": "\nThe report discusses the appointment processes for leaders of eight legislative branch agencies and entities: the Government Accountability Office, the Library of Congress, the Office of the Architect of the Capitol, the U.S. Capitol Police, the Congressional Budget Office, the Congressional Research Service, and the Office of Compliance. The leaders of these agencies are appointed in different ways, with some appointed by the President with the advice and consent of the Senate, while others are appointed by Congress or the Librarian of Congress. The report examines legislation introduced in the 115th Congress to alter the appointment processes for some of these positions, including the Register of Copyrights. The report provides information on the current appointment processes, terms of office, salaries, and most recent appointments for each agency, as well as summarized in Table 1.", "answers": ["The leaders of the legislative branch agencies and entities—the Government Accountability Office (GAO), the Library of Congress (LOC), the Congressional Research Service (CRS), the Government Publishing Office (GPO, formerly Government Printing Office), the Office of the Architect of the Capitol (AOC), the U.S. Capitol Police (USCP), the Congressional Budget Office (CBO), and the Office of Compliance—are appointed in a variety of manners. Four agencies are led by a person appointed by the President, with the advice and consent of the Senate; two are appointed by Congress; one is appointed by the Librarian of Congress; and one is appointed by a board of directors. Congress has periodically examined the procedures used to appoint these officers with the aim of protecting the prerogatives of, and ensuring accountability to, Congress within the framework of the advice and consent appointment process established in Article II, Section 2 of the Constitution. This report contains information on the legislative branch agency heads' appointment processes, length of tenures (if terms are set), reappointment or removal provisions (if any), salaries and benefits, and most recent appointments. This report also briefly addresses legislation considered, but not enacted, in the 115th Congress to change the appointment process for the Register of Copyrights."], "all_classes": null, "length": 2992}
{"pred": "\nThe report discusses various issues related to banking and financial regulation in the United States. It covers the following topics:\n\n1. Safety and soundness regulation: Banks are subject to prudential regulations to ensure they are profitable without being excessively risky and vulnerable to failure. Regulations include capital requirements, risk-weighted ratios, and the Volcker Rule.\n\n2. Consumer protection: Banks are subject to consumer compliance regulations to ensure they comply with relevant consumer protection and fair lending laws. The Consumer Financial Protection Bureau has rulemaking, supervisory, and enforcement authorities.\n\n3. Large bank regulation: Large banks are subject to enhanced prudential regulations, stress tests, and resolution regime to make it easier to wind down in the event of failure.\n\n4. Fintech regulation: Companies that perform bank-like activities may be eligible for a national bank charter to operate under the federal regulatory regime.\n\n5. Market trends: The report discusses trends such as the migration of financial activity from banks to nonbanks, the increasing capabilities of fintech, and the impact of rising interest rates.\n\nIn summary, the report discusses various regulatory issues related to banking and financial regulation in the United States, including prudential regulations, consumer protection, large bank regulation, fintech regulation, and market trends.", "answers": ["Regulation of the banking industry has undergone substantial changes over the past decade. In response to the 2007-2009 financial crisis, many new bank regulations were implemented pursuant to the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010 (Dodd-Frank Act; P.L. 111-203) or under the existing authorities of bank regulators to address apparent weaknesses in the regulatory regime. While some observers view those changes as necessary and effective, others argued that certain regulations were unjustifiably burdensome. To address those concerns, the Economic Growth, Regulatory Relief, and Consumer Protection Act of 2018 (P.L. 115-174) relaxed certain regulations. Opponents of that legislation argue it unnecessarily pared back important safeguards, but proponents of deregulation argue additional pare backs are needed. Meanwhile, a variety of economic and technological trends continue to affect banks. As a result, the 116th Congress faces many issues related to banking, including the following: Safety and Soundness. Banks are subject to regulations designed to reduce the likelihood of bank failures. Examples include requirements to hold a certain amount of capital (which enables a bank to absorb losses without failing) and the so-called Volcker Rule (a ban on banks' proprietary trading). In addition, anti-money laundering requirements aim to reduce the likelihood banks will execute transactions involving criminal proceeds. Banks are also required to take steps to avoid becoming victims of cyberattacks. The extent to which these regulations (i) are effective, and (ii) appropriately balance benefits and costs is a matter of debate. Consumer Protection, Fair Lending, and Access to Banking. Certain laws are designed to protect consumers and ensure that lenders use fair lending practices. The Consumer Financial Protection Bureau has authorities to regulate for consumer protection. No consensus exists on whether current regulations strike an appropriate balance between protecting consumers while ensuring access to credit and justifiable compliance costs. In addition, whether Community Reinvestment Act regulations as currently implemented effectively and efficiently encourage banks to provide services in their areas of operation is an open question. Large Banks and \"Too Big To Fail.\" Regulators also regulate for systemic risks, such as those associated with very large and complex financial institutions that may contribute to systemic instability. Dodd-Frank Act provisions include enhanced prudential regulation for certain large banks and changes to resolution processes in the event one fails. In addition, bank regulators imposed additional capital requirements on certain large, complex banks. Subsequently, some argued that certain of these additional regulations were too broadly applied and overly stringent. In response, Congress reduced the applicability of the Dodd-Frank measures and regulators have proposed changes to the capital rules. Whether relaxing these rules will provide needed relief to these banks or unnecessarily pare back important safeguards is a debated issue. Community Banks. The number of small or \"community\" banks has declined substantially in recent decades. No consensus exists on the degree to which regulatory burden, market forces, and the removal of regulatory barriers to interstate branching and banking are causing the decline. What Companies Should Be Eligible for Bank Charters. To operate legally as a bank, an institution must hold a charter granted by a state or federal government. Traditionally, these are held by companies generally focused on and led by people with experience in finance. However, recently companies with a focus on technology are interested in having legal status as a bank, either through a charter from the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency or a state-level industrial loan company charter. Policymakers disagree over whether allowing these companies to operate as banks would create appropriately regulated providers of financial services or inappropriately extend government-backed bank safety nets and disadvantage existing banks. Recent Market and Economic Trends. Changing economic forces also pose issues for the banking industry. Some observers argue that increases in regulation could drive certain financial activities into a relatively lightly regulated \"shadow banking\" sector. Innovative financial technology may alter the way certain financial services are delivered. If interest rates rise, it could create opportunities and risks. Such trends could have implications for how the financial system performs and influence debates over appropriate banking regulations."], "all_classes": null, "length": 12828}
{"pred": "\nThe report provides an overview of Colombia's history, conflict, peace process, and current situation. Colombia has endured a long and complex conflict that has caused significant human suffering and economic instability. The country has made progress in recent years, including the signing of a peace agreement with the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) in 2017. However, challenges remain, including the implementation of the peace agreement, drug trafficking, and economic inequality. The United States has provided significant aid to Colombia to support its security and stability efforts, including counternarcotics programs. However, some members of Congress have expressed concerns about human rights abuses and the effectiveness of U.S. assistance. Colombia's relationship with the United States remains important for trade and investment, and the U.S. continues to provide aid to support Colombia's transition to peace.", "answers": ["A key U.S. ally in the Latin American region, Colombia endured an internal armed conflict for half a century. Drug trafficking fueled the violence by funding both left-wing and right-wing armed groups. Some analysts feared Colombia would become a failed state in the late 1990s, but the Colombian government devised a new security strategy, known as Plan Colombia, to counter the insurgencies. Originally designed as a 6-year program, Plan Colombia ultimately became a 17-year U.S.-Colombian bilateral effort. The partnership focused initially on counternarcotics and later on counterterrorism; it then broadened to include sustainable development, human rights, trade, regional security, and many other areas of cooperation. Between FY2000 and FY2016, the U.S. Congress appropriated more than $10 billion to help fund Plan Colombia and its follow-on programs. For FY2018, Congress appropriated $391.3 million in foreign aid for Colombia, including assistance to promote peace and end the conflict. President Juan Manuel Santos (2010-2018) made concluding a peace accord with the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC)—the country's largest leftist guerrilla organization—his government's primary focus. Following four years of formal peace negotiations, Colombia's Congress ratified the FARC-government peace accord in November 2016. During a U.N.-monitored demobilization effort in 2017, approximately 11,000 FARC disarmed and demobilized. This figure included FARC who had been held in prison for crimes of rebellion and those making up FARC militias, who were accredited by the Colombian government as eligible to demobilize. On August 7, 2018, Iván Duque, a senator from the conservative Democratic Center party, was inaugurated to a four-year presidential term. Duque, who also worked at the Inter-American Development Bank in Washington, DC, and is Colombia's youngest president in a century, campaigned as a critic of the peace accord with the FARC. His party objected to specific measures concerning justice and political representation. Some observers maintain that his election has generated uncertainty for implementation of the accord. Shortly after taking office, Duque suspended peace talks with the National Liberation Army (ELN), the country's second-largest rebel group, which had begun under President Santos. Since the ratification of the peace accord, Colombia's long-term strategy has evolved from defeating insurgents to post-conflict stabilization. Many considered Plan Colombia and its successor strategies a remarkable advance, given the country's improvements in security and economic stability. Nevertheless, recent developments have called into question Colombia's progress. The FARC's demobilization has triggered open conflict among armed actors (including FARC dissidents and transnational criminal groups), which seek to control drug cultivation and trafficking, illegal mining, and other illicit businesses that the demobilized FARC abandoned. The ongoing lack of governance in remote rural areas recalls the conditions that originally gave rise to the FARC and other armed groups. Many observers continue to raise concerns about the country's human-rights conditions, sharp increases in coca cultivation and cocaine production, and problems stemming from the failing authoritarian government of neighboring Venezuela, which shares a nearly 1,400-mile border with Colombia. Venezuela's humanitarian crisis has set in motion an exodus of migrants, many of whom have sought temporary residence (or extended stays) in Colombia. Political upheaval has added yet more uncertainty after the United States and many other Western Hemisphere and European nations, including Colombia, called for a democratic transition in Venezuela and recognized the president of the Venezuelan National Assembly, Juan Guaidó, as the country's interim president in January 2019. The U.S.-Colombia Trade Promotion Agreement went into force in May 2012. The United States remains Colombia's top trade partner. After several years of annual growth exceeding 4%, one of the steadiest expansion rates in the region, Colombia grew by an estimated 2.7% in 2018. The FARC-government peace accord is projected to cost more than $40 billion to implement over 15 years, adding to the polarization over the controversial peace process. For additional background, see CRS In Focus IF10817, Colombia's 2018 Elections, CRS Report R44779, Colombia's Changing Approach to Drug Policy, CRS Report R42982, Colombia's Peace Process Through 2016, and CRS Report RL34470, The U.S.-Colombia Free Trade Agreement: Background and Issues."], "all_classes": null, "length": 17045}
{"pred": "\nThe Commercial Space Launch Act Amendments of 198 established the foundation for the current U.S. policy to potentially provide federal payment for a portion of claims by third parties for injury, damage, or loss that results from a commercial launch or reentry accident. The act also provided for, among other things, government protection against some losses—referred to as indemnification—while still minimizing the cost to taxpayers. The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) issues licenses for commercial launches and reentries by U.S. companies, and requires launch companies to purchase insurance coverage for third-party damages that result from a launch or reentry accident. The FAA's methodology for calculating the Maximum Potential Loss (MPL) for each license includes three elements: estimating the number of casualties, estimating the cost of casualties, and deriving estimated property damage costs from estimated casualty costs. However, the FAA has not fully addressed several requirements mandated by the Commercial Space Launch Act. Specifically:\n\n1) The FAA has not re-evaluated the probability thresholds used to divide the risk of loss between launch companies and the federal government. \n\n2) The FAA has not evaluated the cost impact of implementing an updated MPL methodology on the direct costs to launch companies and the federal government.\n\n3) The FAA has not consulted with the commercial space sector and insurance providers in evaluating its MPL methodology.\n\n4) The FAA has not updated the cost of a casualty, a key component of the methodology, since 1988.\n\nThe GAO recommends that the FAA:\n\n1) Fulfill the CSLCA mandate to ensure a balance of risk between the federal government and launch companies by re-examining the current probability thresholds.\n\n2) Evaluate the cost impact of implementing an updated MPL methodology on the direct costs of launch companies and the federal government.\n\n3) Fulfill the CSLCA mandate to evaluate its MPL methodology in consultation with the commercial space sector and insurance providers.\n\n4) Establish an estimated completion date for developing and implementing a plan to establish guidance on the most appropriate MPL methodologies and tools to use for each launch.\n\n", "answers": ["The federal government shares liability risks with the commercial space launch industry for accidents that result in damages to third parties or federal property. This arrangement requires space launch companies to have a specific amount of insurance to cover these damages. The government is potentially liable for damages above that amount, up to a cap GAO estimated to be $3.1 billion in 2017, subject to appropriations in advance. CSLCA, enacted in 2015, directed the Department of Transportation, of which FAA is a part, to evaluate its MPL methodology and, if necessary, develop a plan to update that methodology. The act also included a provision requiring GAO to assess FAA's evaluation and any actions needed to update the methodology. This report discusses the extent to which (1) FAA's evaluation report addresses the requirements in CSLCA and (2) FAA has addressed previously identified weaknesses in the MPL methodology. GAO reviewed documents and interviewed FAA on its loss methodology evaluation and actions to address weaknesses. The Federal Aviation Administration's (FAA) report evaluating its maximum probable loss (MPL) methodology did not fully address the evaluation and consultation requirements specified by the U.S. Commercial Space Launch Competitiveness Act (CSLCA). Balance of Risk. CSLCA required FAA to include ensuring that the federal government is not exposed to greater indemnification costs and that launch companies are not required to purchase more insurance coverage than necessary as a result of FAA's MPL methodology. FAA said that it ensured this balance by improving its methodology, but it did not reevaluate its probability thresholds after revising its methodology. These thresholds are used to divide the risk of loss between launch companies and the government. Impact on Costs. The act required FAA to consider the costs to both the industry and the federal government of implementing an updated methodology. FAA's report discussed the impact on indirect costs, such as data collection, but did not discuss direct costs: insurance premiums for launch companies and indemnification liability for the federal government. Consultation. The act also required FAA to consult with the commercial space sector and insurance providers in evaluating its MPL methodology in accordance with the preceding requirements. While the agency consulted with some stakeholders, these consultations were limited in scope. FAA officials said they have not been able to take the actions needed to fully satisfy the mandated elements because of issues such as resource limitations and the lack of available data. However, by not resolving these issues, FAA lacks assurance that launch companies are not purchasing more insurance than needed or that the federal government is not being exposed to greater indemnification costs than expected. FAA has addressed two of three previously identified weaknesses in its MPL methodology but has not yet dealt with the remaining weakness. Specifically, the agency has revised its methodology for estimating the number of potential casualties for a launch and changed the factor it uses to derive estimated property damage from estimated casualties. However, FAA has not updated the amount used for the cost of an individual casualty. GAO recommended in a March 2017 report (GAO-17-366) that FAA update this amount. Not doing so could understate the amount of insurance launch companies are required to purchase, exposing the federal government to excess risk. GAO also determined that while FAA has two tools and methods it can use in making its MPL estimates, it does not have guidance on determining which are most appropriate for a given launch scenario. For example, one tool is more comprehensive but also labor intensive to use, while the other is inappropriate for certain launch scenarios and could result in misleading MPL amounts. Officials said they have begun to create such guidance but do not have an estimated completion date. Without such guidance, FAA cannot ensure that the most appropriate MPL methodology is used for each launch. FAA should fully address mandated requirements in evaluating its MPL—probability thresholds, direct costs, and stakeholder consultations— and establish an estimated completion date for developing guidance on tools and methods to use for specific launch scenarios. The Department of Transportation concurred with the recommendations, and provided technical comments."], "all_classes": null, "length": 4125}
{"pred": "\nThe Coast Guard operates a large fleet of aircraft and boats to carry out its missions, including marine safety, defense readiness, and national security. However, the agency faces challenges in managing its data to assess performance and plan for future acquisitions. The report highlights several areas where the Coast Guard could improve its data management:\n\n1. Complete mission data: The Coast Guard does not have complete data on the population of commercial fishing vessels, which hinders its ability to assess accident, injury, and fatality trends. The agency is working to develop additional data fields to capture more information.\n\n2. Realistic asset performance data: The Coast Guard's strategic allocations of assets are based on unrealistic assumptions about asset performance, which does not reflect actual asset condition and unscheduled maintenance. The agency is working to incorporate field unit input to make more realistic asset allocation decisions.\n\n3. Performance goal data: The Coast Guard's performance goals are not reliable due to limitations in data reporting. The agency is working to assess the extent of data reliability limitations and update documents as needed.\n\n4. Transparency of data: The Coast Guard's Annual Performance Report has not been publicly released since 2011 due to a previous DHS decision. The agency is working to make future reports publicly available to provide greater transparency.\n\n5. Capital planning transparency: The Coast Guard's 5-year capital investment plan does not consistently reflect current cost estimates or tradeoffs made in the budget cycle. The agency is working to develop a comprehensive portfolio review and long-term acquisition plan to better plan for future acquisitions.\n\nIn summary, the Coast Guard faces challenges in managing its data to assess performance and plan for future acquisitions. The agency is working to improve data completeness, accuracy, and transparency to better carry out its missions.", "answers": ["The Coast Guard, a component of DHS, serves as the principal federal agency responsible for maritime safety, security, and environmental stewardship in U.S. ports and waterways. To ensure that the Coast Guard is effectively fulfilling its missions, agency managers must have accurate information and base decisions on sound analyses for effective program management. This statement discusses Coast Guard actions needed to (1) improve the quality of data used for program management and (2) improve the transparency of its data for reporting on mission performance and planning. This statement is based on relevant products GAO issued from June 2014 through December 2017 on Coast Guard strategic planning and management issues, as well as related recommendation follow-up conducted through February 2018. GAO reviewed applicable laws, regulations, policies and guidance. GAO also interviewed Coast Guard officials responsible for administering these programs and obtained information on how they used data to inform decisionmaking. GAO interviewed a range of stakeholders, including federal and industry officials. GAO's prior work recommended multiple actions to improve the Coast Guard's program management by improving the quality of data it uses to manage and report on its mission performance. Specifically, GAO recommended actions such as collecting more complete data and clarifying the data limitations to facilitate more effective program management. For example, in December 2017, GAO found that more information is needed to calculate vessel safety statistics that could enhance the Coast Guard's knowledge about accident, injury, and fatality trends involving commercial fishing vessels. Having more complete information could be useful to carrying out its marine safety mission, and GAO recommended, among other things, that the Coast Guard ensure that data collected during commercial fishing vessel incident investigations is accurately captured. In 2018, the Coast Guard reported taking initial steps to capture more accurate data. GAO's prior work also identified areas where the Coast Guard could improve the transparency of the data it uses for reporting on its mission performance as well its capital planning purposes. For example, in an October 2017 report on performance goals, GAO found the Coast Guard's Annual Performance Report (APR) has not been released publicly since 2011. Consequently, there has not been full visibility over performance across all of the Coast Guard's missions. Coast Guard officials stated that a decision by Department of Homeland Security (DHS) leadership to limit the number of performance goals shared publicly had deterred the Coast Guard from public release of its APR. GAO recommended that APRs be available on the Coast Guard's website; the Coast Guard plans to publicly release future APRs. In addition, previous GAO reports found that the Coast Guard's annual 5-year capital investment plan, which projects acquisition funding needs for the upcoming 5 years, did not consistently reflect current total cost estimates or the effects of tradeoffs made as part of the annual budget cycle. GAO made recommendations to help the Coast Guard plan for future acquisitions and the difficult trade off decisions it will face given funding constraints. The Coast Guard agreed, but it is unclear when it will complete the 20-year plan. GAO is not making new recommendations in this statement but has made them to the Coast Guard and DHS in the past on improving its program management through, among other things, better quality and more transparent data. DHS and the Coast Guard agreed with these recommendations and reported actions or plans to address them."], "all_classes": null, "length": 2542}
{"pred": "\nThe report describes the various federal programs, requirements, procurement officers, and procurement offices involved in promoting federal contracting and subcontracting with small businesses. The Small Business Act authorizes the SBA to administer various programs to help small businesses overcome the challenges of competing for federal contracts. The SBA administers several types of programs to help small businesses win federal contracts and expand their economic impact. These include loan guarantees, mentor-protégé programs, and subcontracting plans. The SBA also monitors federal agency compliance with small business contracting goals and provides training to small businesses. The report highlights the following key points:\n\n- The SBA has various programs to help small businesses win federal contracts, including loan guarantees, mentor-protégé programs, and subcontracting plans.\n\n- Federal agencies are required to set aside contracts for small businesses and provide subcontracting plans to ensure small businesses have an equitable opportunity to compete.\n\n- The SBA monitors federal agency compliance with small business contracting goals and provides training to small businesses.\n\n- The federal government generally meets its small business contracting goals, but has difficulty meeting the goals for HUBZone and WOSBs.\n\n- The SBA is focusing additional efforts on promoting the HUBZone program due to difficulties meeting the 3% goal for HUBZone small businesses.\n\nIn summary, the report describes the various programs and requirements in place to help small businesses compete for federal contracts and expand their economic impact. While the federal government generally meets its small business contracting goals, there are challenges in meeting the goals for certain types of small businesses. The SBA is focusing additional efforts on the HUBZone program to address these challenges.", "answers": ["Congress has broad authority to impose requirements upon the federal procurement process, that is, the process whereby agencies obtain goods and services from the private sector. One way in which Congress has exercised this authority is by adopting measures to promote contracting and subcontracting between \"small businesses\" and federal agencies. These measures, among other things, declare a congressional policy of ensuring that a \"fair proportion\" of federal contract and subcontract dollars is awarded to small businesses; establish government-wide and agency-specific goals for the percentage of federal contract and subcontract dollars awarded to small businesses; establish an annual Small Business Goaling Report to measure progress in meeting these goals; generally require federal agencies, under specified circumstances, to reserve contracts that have an anticipated value greater than the micro-purchase threshold (currently $10,000), but not greater than the simplified acquisition threshold (currently $250,000) exclusively for small businesses; authorize federal agencies, under specified circumstances, to set aside contracts that have an anticipated value greater than the simplified acquisition threshold exclusively for small businesses; authorize federal agencies to make sole source awards to small businesses when the award could not otherwise be made (e.g., only a single source is available, under urgent and compelling circumstances); authorize federal agencies to set aside contracts for, or grant other contracting preference to, specific types of small businesses (e.g., 8(a) small businesses, HUBZone small businesses, women-owned small businesses (WOSBs) and service-disabled veteran-owned small businesses (SDVOSBs)); and task the Small Business Administration (SBA) and other federal procurement officers with reviewing and restructuring proposed procurements to maximize opportunities for small business participation. Small business contracting programs generally have strong bipartisan support. However, that does not mean that these programs face no opposition, or that issues have not been raised concerning the impact and operations of specific programs. For example, small business advocates note that implementing regulations in the Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) narrow the reach (and impact) of some small business contracting preferences by excluding specific types of contracts, such as those listed in the Federal Supply Schedules, from FAR requirements pertaining to small business contracting. Advocates want the federal government to enact policies that reduce or eliminate such exclusions. Critics have questioned some of these programs' effectiveness, in terms of both promoting small business opportunities to win federal contracts and promoting a more diversified, robust economy. Many observers judge the relative success or failure of federal efforts to enhance small business contracting opportunities by whether federal government and individual federal agencies meet the predetermined procurement goals in the annual Small Business Goaling Report. In recent years, the federal government has generally succeeded in meeting the government-wide goals of awarding 23% of the total value of all small business eligible prime contract awards to small businesses, 5% to small disadvantaged businesses (SDBs), and 3% to SDVOSBs. It has had difficulty meeting the goals of 5% to WOSBs and 3% to HUBZone small businesses. The Small Business Goaling Report is the most convenient measure available to compare federal small business contracting performance over time, but it has limitations. For example, the SBA excludes some contracts from the report in its determination of what is \"small business eligible\" and some federal procurement activities are not included because they are not recorded in the Federal Procurement Data System—Next Generation. It also does not evaluate the effect these contracts have on small businesses, industry competitiveness, or the overall economy."], "all_classes": null, "length": 9547}
{"pred": "\nThe Land and Water Conservation Fund (LWCF) Act of 1965 was established to promote outdoor recreation and improve the health of Americans by providing funds for land acquisition and grants to states. The fund receives revenue from oil and gas leases on the Outer Continental Shelf and federal motorboat fuel taxes, but the majority of the revenue goes unappropriated. Congress appropriates a portion of the funds each year through the discretionary appropriations process. The LWCF has been used to fund various purposes beyond land acquisition and grants to states, including facility maintenance, ecosystem restoration, and habitat conservation. Since FY2008, the majority of appropriations for other purposes have gone to the Forest Legacy Program and Cooperative Endangered Species Conservation grants. The LWCF has provided over $2.7 billion for other purposes since FY198, with the majority going to the Forest Service and Fish and Wildlife Service. The appropriations have varied widely over the years, with some years providing over $400 million and others providing less than $100 million. The LWCF Act does not specify which purposes should be funded from the fund, so the President and Congress have discretion in deciding how to allocate the funds.", "answers": ["The Land and Water Conservation Fund (LWCF) Act of 1965 (P.L. 88-578) created the LWCF in the Treasury as a funding source to implement the outdoor recreation goals set out by the act. The LWCF Act authorizes the fund to receive $900 million annually, with the monies available only if appropriated by Congress (i.e., discretionary appropriations). The fund also receives mandatory appropriations under the Gulf of Mexico Energy Security Act of 2006 (GOMESA). The level of annual appropriations for the LWCF has varied since the origin of the fund in FY1965. The LWCF Act outlines uses of the fund for federal and state purposes. Of the total made available through appropriations or deposits under GOMESA, not less than 40% is to be used for \"federal purposes\" and not less than 40% is to be used to provide \"financial assistance to states.\" The act lists the federal purposes for which the President is to allot LWCF funds \"unless otherwise allotted in the appropriation Act making them available.\" These purposes primarily relate to acquisition of lands and waters (and interests therein) by the federal government. With regard to state purposes, the act authorizes a matching grant program to states for outdoor recreation purposes. Throughout the LWCF's history, appropriations acts typically have provided funds for land acquisition and outdoor recreational grants to states. Beginning in FY1998, appropriations also have been provided each year (except FY1999) to fund other purposes related to natural resources. The extent to which the LWCF should be used for purposes other than federal land acquisition and outdoor recreation grants to states, and which other purposes should be funded from the LWCF, continue to be the subject of legislation and debate in Congress. In the past few decades, Presidents have sought LWCF funds for a variety of other purposes. Congress chooses which if any of these requests to fund, and has chosen programs not sought by the President for a particular year. Among other programs, appropriations have been provided for facility maintenance of the land management agencies, ecosystem restoration, the Historic Preservation Fund, the Payments in Lieu of Taxes program, the Forest Legacy Program, State and Tribal Wildlife Grants (under the Fish and Wildlife Service), the Cooperative Endangered Species Conservation Fund, U.S. Geological Survey science and cooperative programs, and Bureau of Indian Affairs Indian Land and Water Claim Settlements. Since FY1998, a total of $2.7 billion has been appropriated for other purposes, of a total LWCF appropriation of $18.9 billion over the history of the fund. The Fish and Wildlife Service and the Forest Service have received the largest shares of the total appropriations for other purposes, about $1.4 billion (53%) and $1.0.billion (38%), respectively, from FY1998 to FY2019. Several agencies shared the remaining $0.2 billion (9%) of the appropriations. Both the dollar amounts and the percentages of annual LWCF appropriations for other purposes have varied widely since FY1998. The dollar amounts have ranged from $0 in FY1999 to $456.0 million in FY2001. The percentage of annual funds provided for other purposes ranged from 0% in FY1999 to a high of 59% in both FY2006 and FY2007. In some years, the appropriation for other purposes was significantly less than the Administration requested. For instance, for FY2008, the George W. Bush Administration sought $313.1 million; the appropriation was $101.3 million. The appropriation for other purposes last exceeded $100.0 million in FY2010, and most recently was $93.3 million, in FY2019. Prior to FY2008, several other purposes typically were funded each year from LWCF. Since FY2008, funds have been appropriated annually only for grants under two programs: Forest Legacy and Cooperative Endangered Species Conservation Fund. These two programs and a third grant program—State and Tribal Wildlife Grants—have received more than three-quarters ($2.1 billion, 79%) of the total appropriation for other purposes since FY1998."], "all_classes": null, "length": 2138}
{"pred": "\nThe report examines the Navy's readiness challenges, particularly in the areas of maintenance, training, and manning. The Navy has experienced four significant mishaps at sea since January 2017, resulting in damage to ships and loss of 17 sailors. Three of the mishaps occurred in ships homeported overseas in Japan. The Navy has doubled the percentage of ships homeported overseas since 2006, but this has come at a cost. Ships homeported overseas have higher operational and support costs and do not have dedicated training and maintenance periods, leading to difficulty keeping crews fully trained and ships maintained. The Navy's Surface Force Readiness Manual states that high operational tempo and frequent tasking of ships homeported overseas requires ships to be prepared to execute complex operations. However, the Navy has not conducted an assessment of the long-term costs and risks associated with its reliance on overseas homeporting. The Navy has also made changes to its process for determining the size and composition of ship crews, which may be creating readiness and safety risks. The Navy's guidance on manpower requirements does not reassess these factors periodically, which could lead to inaccurate crew sizing. The Navy has implemented an optimized fleet response plan to improve readiness, but has faced challenges in completing maintenance on time. The Navy's shipyards face capacity and equipment limitations, which hinder their ability to support maintenance schedules. The Navy has extended its time frame for readiness recovery to 2021 but has not developed specific benchmarks or interim goals. The report recommends that the Navy assess the risks associated with overseas basing, reassess sailor workload, manage investments in shipyards, and implement sound planning and sustained management to address its readiness challenges. The Navy should also prioritize readiness rebuilding efforts and demonstrate progress in addressing its maintenance, training, and other challenges.", "answers": ["Since January 2017, the Navy has suffered four significant mishaps at sea that resulted in serious damage to its ships and the loss of 17 sailors. Three of these incidents involved ships homeported in Japan. In response to these incidents, the Chief of Naval Operations ordered an operational pause for all fleets worldwide, and the Vice Chief of Naval Operations directed a comprehensive review of surface fleet operations, stating that these tragic incidents are not limited occurrences but part of a disturbing trend in mishaps involving U.S. ships. This statement provides information on the effects of homeporting ships overseas, reducing crew size on ships, and not completing maintenance on time on the readiness of the Navy and summarizes GAO recommendations to address the Navy's maintenance, training, and other challenges. In preparing this statement, GAO relied on work it has published since 2015 related to the readiness of ships homeported overseas, sailor training and workload issues, maintenance challenges, and other issues. GAO updated this information, as appropriate, based on Navy data. GAO's prior work shows that the Navy has increased deployment lengths, shortened training periods, and reduced or deferred maintenance to meet high operational demands, which has resulted in declining ship conditions and a worsening trend in overall readiness. The Navy has stated that high demand for presence has put pressure on a fleet that is stretched thin across the globe. Some of the concerns that GAO has highlighted include: Degraded readiness of ships homeported overseas: Since 2006, the Navy has doubled the number of ships based overseas. Overseas basing provides additional forward presence and rapid crisis response, but GAO found in May 2015 that there were no dedicated training periods built into the operational schedules of the cruisers and destroyers based in Japan. As a result, the crews of these ships did not have all of their needed training and certifications. Based on updated data, GAO found that, as of June 2017, 37 percent of the warfare certifications for cruiser and destroyer crews based in Japan—including certifications for seamanship—had expired. This represents more than a fivefold increase in the percentage of expired warfare certifications for these ships since GAO's May 2015 report. The Navy has made plans to revise operational schedules to provide dedicated training time for overseas-based ships, but this schedule has not yet been implemented. Crew size reductions contribute to sailor overwork and safety risks: GAO found in May 2017 that reductions to crew sizes the Navy made in the early 2000s were not analytically supported and may now be creating safety risks. The Navy has reversed some of those changes but continues to use a workweek standard that does not reflect the actual time sailors spend working and does not account for in-port workload—both of which have contributed to some sailors working over 100 hours a week. Inability to complete maintenance on time: Navy recovery from persistently low readiness levels is premised on adherence to maintenance schedules. However, in May 2016, GAO found that the Navy was having difficulty completing maintenance on time. Based on updated data, GAO found that, in fiscal years 2011 through 2016, maintenance overruns on 107 of 169 surface ships (63 percent) resulted in 6,603 lost operational days (i.e., the ships were not available for training and operations). Looking to the future, the Navy wants to grow its fleet by as much as 30 percent but continues to face challenges with manning, training, and maintaining its existing fleet. These readiness problems need to be addressed and will require the Navy to implement GAO's recommendations—particularly in the areas of assessing the risks associated with overseas basing, reassessing sailor workload and the factors used to size ship crews, managing investments to modernize and improve the efficiency of the naval shipyards, and applying sound planning and sustained management attention to its readiness rebuilding efforts. In addition, continued congressional oversight will be needed to ensure that the Navy demonstrates progress in addressing its maintenance, training, and other challenges. GAO made 14 recommendations in prior work cited in this statement. The Department of Defense generally concurred with all of them but has implemented only 1. Continued attention is needed to ensure that these recommendations are addressed, such as the Navy assessing the risks associated with overseas basing and reassessing sailor workload and factors used in its manpower requirements process."], "all_classes": null, "length": 3534}
{"pred": "\nThis report analyzes the economic and policy implications of digital economy taxes, or \"digital economy taxes\" (DSTs). DSTs are taxes on revenue generated by digital economy businesses, rather than corporate profits. The report argues that DSTs are not structured as taxes on corporate profits, but rather as turnover taxes that do not take into account costs or net profits earned by taxable firms. As a result, they have different economic effects than corporate income taxes.\n\nThe report discusses the following key points:\n\n1) DSTs are not structured as taxes on corporate profits. They are structured as turnover taxes that do not take into account costs or profits earned by taxpayers. \n\n2) DSTs have different economic effects than corporate income taxes. They introduce distortions in various markets by reducing the financial return to capital in digital economy industries or by raising the cost of goods and services intermediated through digital platforms. Investment in affected markets would be expected to decrease.\n\n3) DSTs create unequal economic treatment between similarly situated firms inside and outside of the digital economy. Firms outside of the digital economy can earn just as much global or local revenue as firms taxed under DSTs without being subject to an additional layer of tax on their revenue.\n\n4) DSTs present several administrative challenges to both the public and private sectors. Lawmakers and revenue-collecting agencies will have to clarify exactly what types of activities are subject to tax and which parties bear the statutory burden of paying tax.\n\n5) DSTs could violate restrictions on tariffs under the rules of the World Trade Organization.\n\nThe report concludes that while DSTs may be motivated by concerns about digital economy firms not paying their fair share of taxes, they are not structured as taxes on profits and have different economic effects. As a result, they may not be effective in achieving their policy goals and could create distortions in various markets.", "answers": ["Several countries, primarily in Europe, and the European Commission have proposed or adopted taxes on revenue earned by multinational corporations (MNCs) in certain \"digital economy\" sectors from activities linked to the user-based activity of their residents. These proposals have generally been labeled as \"digital services taxes\" (DSTs). For example, beginning in 2019, Spain is imposing a DST of 3% on online advertising, online marketplaces, and data transfer service (i.e., revenue from sales of user activities) within Spain. Only firms with €750 million in worldwide revenue and €3 million in revenues with users in Spain are to be subject to the tax. In 2020, the UK plans to implement a 3% DST that would apply only to businesses whose revenues exceed £25 million per year and groups that generate global revenues from search engines, social media platforms, and online marketplaces in excess of £500 million annually. The UK labels its DST as an \"interim\" solution until international tax rules are modified to allow countries to tax the profits of foreign MNCs if they have a substantial enough \"digital presence\" based on local users. The member states of the European Commission are also actively considering such a rule. These policies are being considered and enacted against a backdrop of ongoing, multilateral negotiations among members and nonmembers of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD). These negotiations, prompted by discussions of the digital economy, could result in significant changes for the international tax system. Proponents of DSTs argue that digital firms are \"undertaxed.\" This sentiment is driven in part by some high-profile tech companies that reduced the taxes they paid by assigning ownership of their income-producing intangible assets (e.g., patents, marketing, and trade secrets) to affiliate corporations in low-tax jurisdictions. Proponents of DSTs also argue that the countries imposing tax should be entitled to a share of profits earned by digital MNCs because of the \"value\" to these business models made by participation of their residents through their content, reviews, purchases, and other contributions. Critics of DSTs argue that the taxes target income or profits that would not otherwise be subject to taxation under generally accepted income tax principles. U.S. critics, in particular, see DSTs as an attempt to target U.S. tech companies, especially as minimum thresholds are high enough that only the largest digital MNCs (such as Google, Facebook, and Amazon) will be subject to these specific taxes. DSTs are structured as a selective tax on revenue (akin to an excise tax) and not as a tax on corporate profits. A tax on corporate profits taxes the return to investment in the corporate sector. Corporate profit is equal to total revenue minus total cost. In contrast, DSTs are \"turnover taxes\" that apply to the revenue generated from taxable activities regardless of costs incurred by a firm. Additionally, international tax rules do not allow countries to tax an MNC's cross-border income solely because their residents purchase goods or services provided by that firm. Rather, ownership of assets justifies a country to be allocated a share of that MNC's profits to tax. Under these rules and their underlying principles, the fact that a country's residents purchase digital services from an MNC is not a justification to tax the MNC's profits. DSTs are likely to have the economic effect of an excise tax on intermediate services. The economic incidence of a DST is likely to be borne by purchasers of taxable services (e.g., companies paying digital economy firms for advertising, marketplace listings, or user data) and possibly consumers downstream from those transactions. As a result, economic theory and the general body of empirical research on excise taxes predict that DSTs are likely to increase prices in affected markets, decrease quantity supplied, and reduce investment in these sectors. Compared to a corporate profits tax—which, on balance, tends to be borne by higher-income shareholders—DSTs are expected to be more regressive forms of raising revenue, as they affect a broad range of consumer goods and services. Certain design features of DSTs could also create inequitable treatment between firms and increase administrative complexity. For example, minimum revenue thresholds could be set such that primarily large, foreign (and primarily U.S.) corporations are subject to tax. Requirements to identify the location of users could also introduce significant costs on businesses. This report traces the emergence of DSTs from multilateral tax negotiations in recent years, addresses various purported policy justifications of DSTs, provides an economic analysis of their effects, and raises several issues for Congress."], "all_classes": null, "length": 12505}
{"pred": "\nThis report discusses how the Supreme Court has applied the First Amendment to commercial disclosure requirements. The Court has generally held that commercial speech is less protected than other speech, and government actions that compel speech are subject to stricter scrutiny. However, the Court has not articulated a clear standard for evaluating commercial disclosure requirements under the First Amendment.\n\nThe report identifies three levels of scrutiny that courts may apply to commercial disclosure requirements:\n\n1. Zauderer review: This is the most lenient standard, applying to requirements that compel factual and uncontroversial information about the goods or services provided by the speaker. The requirement must be \"reasonably related\" to the government's interest in preventing deception of consumers.\n\n2. Central Hudson review: This is the standard applied to commercial speech that is not incidental to a broader regulatory scheme. The government must prove that its interest is \"substantial,\" and the regulation \"directly advances\" that interest and is not more extensive than necessary.\n\n3. Strict scrutiny: This is the highest standard, applying to content-based restrictions on speech. The government must prove that the restriction furthers a compelling interest and is narrowly tailored to achieve that interest.\n\nThe report discusses how the Supreme Court has applied these standards in various cases, including United Foods, Milavetz, and NIFLA. The Court has generally held that commercial disclosure requirements that compel factual and uncontroversial information are constitutional under Zauderer review. However, the Court has also applied Central Hudson review and strict scrutiny in some cases where the disclosure requirements were not eligible for Zauderer review.\n\nThe report concludes that the Supreme Court's approach to evaluating commercial disclosure requirements is evolving, with a trend towards more skepticism towards restrictions on commercial speech. The Court may apply stricter scrutiny to content-based commercial disclosure requirements, especially if they are not incidental to a broader regulatory scheme. However, the exact standard of review remains unclear.", "answers": ["Federal law contains a wide variety of disclosure requirements, including food labels, securities registrations, and disclosures about prescription drugs in direct-to-consumer advertising. These disclosure provisions require commercial actors to make statements that they otherwise might not, compelling speech and implicating the Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment. Nonetheless, while commercial disclosure requirements may regulate protected speech, that fact in and of itself does not render such provisions unconstitutional. The Supreme Court has historically allowed greater regulation of commercial speech than of other types of speech. Since at least the mid-1970s, however, the Supreme Court has been increasingly protective of commercial speech. This trend, along with other developments in First Amendment law, has led some commentators to question whether the Supreme Court might apply a stricter test in assessing commercial disclosure requirements in the near future. Nonetheless, governing Supreme Court precedent provides that disclosure requirements generally receive lesser judicial scrutiny when they compel only commercial speech, as opposed to noncommercial speech. In National Institute of Family and Life Advocates v. Becerra, a decision released in June 2018, the Supreme Court explained that it has applied a lower level of scrutiny to compelled disclosures under two circumstances. First, the Supreme Court has sometimes upheld laws that regulate commercial speech if the speech regulation is part of a larger regulatory scheme that is focused on conduct and only incidentally burdens speech. If a law is properly characterized as a regulation of conduct, rather than speech, then it may be subject to rational basis review, a deferential standard that asks only whether the regulation is a rational way to address the problem. However, it can be difficult to distinguish speech from conduct, and the Supreme Court has not frequently invoked this doctrine to uphold laws against First Amendment challenges. Second, the Supreme Court has sometimes applied a lower level of scrutiny to certain commercial disclosure requirements under the authority of a 1985 case, Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel. In Zauderer, the Court upheld a disclosure requirement after noting that the challenged provision compelled only \"factual and uncontroversial information about the terms under which . . . services will be available.\" The Court said that under the circumstances, the service provider's First Amendment rights were sufficiently protected because the disclosure requirement was \"reasonably related\" to the government's interest \"in preventing deception of consumers.\" Lower courts have generally interpreted Zauderer to mean that if a commercial disclosure provision requires only \"factual and uncontroversial information\" about the goods or services being offered, it should be analyzed under rational basis review. If a commercial disclosure requirement does not qualify for review under Zauderer, then it will most likely be analyzed under the intermediate standard that generally applies to government actions that regulate commercial speech. Some legal scholars have argued that recent Supreme Court case law suggests the Court may subject commercial disclosure provisions to stricter scrutiny in the future, either by limiting the factual circumstances under which these two doctrines apply or by creating express exceptions to these doctrines. If a court applies a heightened level of scrutiny, it may require the government to present more evidence of the problem it is seeking to remedy and stronger justifications for choosing a disclosure requirement to achieve its purposes."], "all_classes": null, "length": 9534}
{"pred": "\nThe report examines the capabilities and gaps of the Afghan National Defense and Security Forces (ANDSF) in operating and maintaining equipment purchased by the United States. The United States has invested nearly $84 billion in Afghan security since 20010 but faces challenges in developing a self-sustaining ANDSF. While the ANDSF has improved in some areas, it still relies heavily on coalition assistance. The report identifies six key equipment types purchased by the United States for the ANDSF: MD-530 helicopters, Mobile Strike Force Vehicles (MSFVs), radios, and more. For each equipment type, the report analyzes the amount authorized for procurement, inventory, average lifespan, and training requirements. The report finds that the ANDSF has improved in some areas but still faces significant capability gaps, particularly in logistics, force management, and analyzing and integrating intelligence. The United States lacks reliable information on the ability of the conventional forces to operate and maintain U.S.-purchased equipment, which limits its ability to evaluate the success of its train, advise, and equip efforts. The report recommends that the Secretary of Defense develop and implement options to collect reliable information on the ANDSF conventional forces' ability to operate and maintain U.S.-purchased equipment.", "answers": ["Developing independently capable ANDSF is a key component of U.S. and coalition efforts to create sustainable security and stability in Afghanistan under the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)-led Resolute Support mission. The United States is the largest contributor of funding and personnel to Resolute Support, providing and maintaining ANDSF equipment, along with training, advising, and assistance to help the ANDSF effectively use and sustain the equipment in the future. House Report 114-537 included a provision for GAO to review the ANDSF's capability and capacity to operate and sustain U.S.-purchased weapon systems and equipment. This report addresses (1) what has been reported about ANDSF capabilities and capability gaps and (2) the extent to which DOD has information about the ANDSF's ability to operate and maintain U.S.-purchased equipment. To conduct this work, GAO analyzed DOD and NATO reports and documents, examined three critical equipment types, and interviewed DOD officials in the United States and Afghanistan. This is a public version of a sensitive report issued in September 2018. Information that DOD deemed sensitive has been omitted. Since the Resolute Support mission began in 2015, the Afghan National Defense and Security Forces (ANDSF) have improved some fundamental capabilities, such as high-level operational planning, but continue to rely on U.S. and coalition support to fill several key capability gaps, according to Department of Defense (DOD) reporting. DOD has initiatives to address some ANDSF capability gaps, such as a country-wide vehicle maintenance and training effort, but DOD reports it does not expect the ANDSF to develop and sustain independent capabilities in some areas, such as logistics, for several years. While DOD has firsthand information on the abilities of the Afghan Air Force and Special Security Forces to operate and maintain U.S.-purchased equipment, it has little reliable information on the equipment proficiency of conventional ANDSF units. U.S. and coalition advisors are embedded at the tactical level for the Air Force and Special Security Forces, enabling DOD to directly assess those forces' abilities. However, the advisors have little direct contact with conventional ANDSF units on the front lines. As a result, DOD relies on those units' self-assessments of tactical abilities, which, according to DOD officials, can be unreliable. GAO's analysis of three critical equipment types illustrated the varying degrees of DOD's information (see figure above). For example, DOD provided detailed information about the Air Force's ability to operate and maintain MD-530 helicopters and the Special Security Forces' ability to operate and maintain Mobile Strike Force Vehicles; however, DOD had limited information about how conventional forces operate and maintain radios and Mobile Strike Force Vehicles. DOD's lack of reliable information on conventional forces' equipment operations and maintenance abilities adds to the uncertainty and risk in assessing the progress of DOD efforts in Afghanistan. GAO recommends that DOD develop options for collecting reliable information on conventional ANDSF units' ability to operate and maintain U.S.-purchased equipment. DOD concurred with this recommendation."], "all_classes": null, "length": 4887}
{"pred": "\nThe report summarizes the results of a review of how states implement the Child Abuse Prevention and Treatment Act (CAPTA) requirements related to substance-affected infants. CAPTA requires states to have policies and procedures to address the needs of infants exposed to substance abuse during pregnancy or birth. The report finds that states have faced challenges implementing the new CAPTA requirements, particularly regarding health care providers notifying CPS of substance-affected infants and developing plans of safe care for these infants. States reported that ACF has not provided clear guidance on these requirements, leading to confusion and non-compliance. The report recommends that HHS provide additional guidance and technical assistance to states to help them better understand and implement the CAPTA requirements.", "answers": ["Under CAPTA, states perform a range of prevention activities, including addressing the needs of infants born with prenatal drug exposure. The number of children under the age of 1 entering foster care increased by about 15 percent from fiscal years 2012 through 2015. Child welfare professionals attribute the increase to the opioid epidemic. GAO was asked to examine the steps states are taking to implement CAPTA requirements on substance-affected infants and related amendments enacted in 2016. This report examines (1) the extent to which states have adopted policies and procedures to notify CPS of substance-affected infants; (2) state efforts to develop plans of safe care, and associated challenges; and (3) steps HHS has taken to help states implement the provisions. To obtain this information, GAO surveyed state CPS directors in all 50 states and the District of Columbia and reached a 100 percent response rate. GAO also visited 3 states (Kentucky, Massachusetts, and Pennsylvania); reviewed relevant documents such as federal laws and regulations, and HHS guidance; and interviewed HHS officials. GAO did not assess states' compliance with CAPTA requirements. All states reported adopting, to varying degrees, policies and procedures regarding health care providers notifying child protective services (CPS) about infants affected by opioids or other substances. Under the Child Abuse Prevention and Treatment Act (CAPTA), as amended, governors are required to provide assurances that the states have laws or programs that include policies and procedures to address the needs of infants affected by prenatal substance use. This is to include health care providers notifying CPS of substance-affected infants. In response to GAO's survey, 42 states reported having policies and procedures that require health care providers to notify CPS about substance-affected infants and 8 states reported having policies that encourage notification. The remaining 1 state has a policy requiring health care providers to assess the needs of mothers and infants and if they conclude that infants are at risk for abuse or neglect, CPS is notified. In response to GAO's survey, 49 states reported that their CPS agency has policies to develop a plan of safe care; 2 reported not having such a requirement. Under CAPTA, states are required to develop a plan of safe care for substance-affected infants. Although not defined in law, a plan of safe care generally entails an assessment of the family's situation and a plan for connecting families to appropriate services to stabilize the family and ensure the child's safety and well-being. States reported that plans typically address the infant's safety needs, immediate medical needs, and the caregiver's substance use treatment needs. However, officials in the 3 states GAO visited noted challenges, including uncertainty about what to include in plans and the level of intervention needed for infants at low risk of abuse or neglect. The Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) has provided technical assistance and guidance to states to implement these CAPTA requirements. Most states reported in GAO's survey that additional guidance and assistance would be very or extremely helpful for addressing their challenges. Nevertheless, HHS officials told GAO that the agency does not anticipate issuing additional written guidance, but that states can access technical assistance through their regional offices and the National Center on Substance Abuse and Child Welfare—a resource center funded by HHS. However, of the 37 states that reported on the helpfulness of the assistance they have received, 19 said it was only moderately helpful to not helpful. States offered suggestions for improving the assistance, such as developing substance abuse training materials for staff and holding video conferences with other states to share information. In October 2017, HHS officials explained that some states have submitted plans that include details on how they are addressing the CAPTA requirements. HHS officials reported that some of the plans submitted to date indicated that states are not meeting the requirements and those states have been asked to develop program improvement plans. Without more specific guidance and assistance to enhance states' understanding of CAPTA requirements and better address known challenges such as the ones described in this report, states may miss an opportunity to provide more effective protections and services for the children and families most in need. GAO recommends that HHS provide additional guidance and technical assistance to states to address known challenges and enhance their understanding of requirements. HHS did not concur with the recommendation. As discussed in the report, GAO continues to believe that added guidance would benefit states."], "all_classes": null, "length": 8623}
{"pred": "\nThe report examines the extent to which implementing partners of the Department of State (State) and the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) experience banking access challenges that affect their implementation of humanitarian assistance projects. The report found that many implementing partners experienced banking access challenges, including delays in transferring funds, denials of funds transfers, and account closures. However, most partners were able to mitigate these challenges through various actions. However, some partners noted that banking access challenges had adversely affected or posed a potential risk to project implementation. USAID's efforts to address these challenges have been limited due to a lack of communication within the agency and with external entities. The report recommends that USAID take steps to collect information on banking access challenges faced by its partners and communicate this information within the agency and with external entities.", "answers": ["Since 2012, the United States has provided approximately $36 billion in humanitarian assistance to save lives and alleviate human suffering. Much of this assistance is provided in areas plagued by conflict or other issues that increase the risk of financial crimes. The World Bank and others have reported that humanitarian assistance organizations face challenges in accessing banking services that could affect project implementation. GAO was asked to review the possible effects of decreased banking access for nonprofit organizations on the delivery of U.S. humanitarian assistance. In this report, GAO examines (1) the extent to which State and USAID partners experienced banking access challenges, (2) USAID partners' reporting on such challenges, and (3) actions U.S. agencies have taken to help address such challenges. GAO selected four high-risk countries—Syria, Somalia, Haiti, and Kenya—based on factors such as their inclusion in multiple financial risk-related indices, and selected a non-generalizable sample of 18 projects in those countries. GAO reviewed documentation and interviewed U.S. officials and the 18 partners for the selected projects. Implementing partners (partners) for 7 of 18 Department of State (State) and U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) humanitarian assistance projects that GAO selected noted encountering banking access challenges, such as delays or denials in transferring funds overseas. Of those 7 projects, 1 partner told us that banking access challenges adversely affected its project and 2 additional partners told us that the challenges had the potential for adverse effects. Moreover, the majority of partners (15 out of 18) for the 18 projects noted experiencing banking access challenges on their global portfolio of projects over the previous 5 years. USAID's partners' written reports do not capture potential risks posed by banking access challenges because USAID generally does not require most partners to report in writing any challenges that do not affect implementation. Six of the 7 projects that encountered challenges were USAID-funded. Of those 6 USAID projects, 5 partners told us that these challenges did not rise to the threshold of affecting project implementation that would necessitate reporting, and 1 did not report challenges although its project was adversely affected. Additionally, GAO's review of about 1,300 USAID partner reports found that the few instances where challenges were mentioned lacked sufficient detail for GAO to determine their type, severity, or origin. Without information on banking access challenges that pose potential risks to project implementation, USAID is not aware of the full extent of risks to achieving its objectives. The Department of the Treasury (Treasury) and State have taken various actions to help address banking access challenges encountered by nonprofit organizations (NPO), but USAID's efforts have been limited. Treasury's efforts have focused on engagement between NPOs and U.S. agencies, while State has issued guidance on the topic to its embassies and designated an office to focus on these issues. In contrast, USAID lacks a comparable office, and NPOs stated that it is difficult to find USAID staff to engage with on this topic. Further, GAO found that awareness of specific challenges was generally limited to USAID staff directly overseeing the project. Without communicating these challenges to relevant parties, USAID may not be aware of all risks to agency objectives and may not be able to effectively engage with external entities on efforts to address these challenges. GAO recommends that USAID should take steps to (1) collect information on banking access challenges experienced by USAID's partners and (2) communicate that information both within USAID and with external entities, such as other U.S. agencies and partners. USAID concurred with our recommendations."], "all_classes": null, "length": 9618}
{"pred": "\nThe report examines the Exceptional Family Member Program (EFMP) of the US Department of Defense, which provides support to military families with special needs. The program has three components: identification and enrollment, assignment coordination, and family support. The report finds that while each Service has its own EFMP, there are wide variations in the level of support provided to families with special needs. For example, some Services do not develop and maintain a services plan for each family with special needs, and some do not provide legal assistance. The report recommends that the Office of Special Needs (OSN) assess the extent to which each Service is providing sufficient resources and developing services plans for families with special needs, and that OSN develop common performance metrics for assignment coordination and family support. OSN also lacks a systematic process to evaluate the results of the Services' monitoring activities. The report concludes that without standardized procedures, some families with special needs may not receive the assistance they require, particularly when they relocate.", "answers": ["Military families with special medical and educational needs face unique challenges because of their frequent moves. To help assist these families, DOD provides services plans, which document the support a family member requires. The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2017 included a provision for GAO to review the Services' EFMPs, including DOD's oversight of these programs. This report examines the extent to which (1) each Service provides family support and (2) the Services monitor and DOD evaluates assignment coordination and family support. GAO analyzed DOD and Service-specific EFMP guidance and documents; analyzed fiscal year 2016 EFMP data (the most recent available); visited seven military installations, selected for their large numbers of military-connected students; and interviewed officials responsible for implementing each Service's EFMP, as well as officials in OSN that administer DOD's EFM policy. The support provided to families with special needs through the Department of Defense's (DOD) Exceptional Family Member Program (EFMP) varies widely for each branch of Military Service. Federal law requires DOD's Office of Special Needs (OSN) to develop a uniform policy that includes requirements for (1) developing and updating a services plan for each family with special needs and (2) resources, such as staffing, to ensure an appropriate number of family support providers. OSN has developed such a policy, but DOD relies on each Service to determine its compliance with the policy. However, Army and Navy officials said they have not received feedback from OSN about the extent to which their Service-specific guidance complies. Federal internal control standards call for developing clear policies to achieve agency goals. In addition, DOD's most recent annual reports to Congress do not indicate the extent to which each Service provides services plans or allocates sufficient resources for family support providers. According to GAO's analysis, the Military Services have developed relatively few services plans, and there is wide variation in the number of family support providers employed, which raises questions about potential gaps in services for families with special needs (see table). Each Service uses various mechanisms to monitor how servicemembers are assigned to installations (assignment coordination) and obtain family support, but DOD has not established common performance measures to assess these activities. DOD has taken steps to better support families with special needs, according to the DOD officials GAO interviewed. For example, DOD established a working group to identify gaps in services. However, OSN officials said that DOD lacks common performance measures for assignment coordination and family support because the Services have not reached consensus on what those measures should be. In addition, OSN does not have a process to systematically evaluate the results of the Services' monitoring activities. Federal internal control standards call for assessing performance over time and evaluating the results of monitoring activities. Without establishing common performance measures and assessing monitoring activities, DOD will be unable to fully determine the effect of its efforts to better support families with special needs and the adequacy of the Services' EFMPs as required by federal law. GAO makes a total of three recommendations to DOD. DOD should assess and report to Congress on the extent to which each Service provides sufficient family support personnel and services plans, develop common performance metrics for assignment coordination and family support, and evaluate the results of the Services' monitoring activities. DOD agreed with these recommendations and plans to develop performance metrics for assignment coordination and develop plans to evaluate the Services' monitoring activities."], "all_classes": null, "length": 6288}
{"pred": "\nThe James Webb Space Telescope (JWST) is a large deployable space telescope designed to study the universe in infrared light. The JWST project has experienced significant delays and cost growth, with its latest replan estimating a $9.7 billion life-cycle cost. The project has encountered numerous technical and workmanship issues during integration and testing, including problems with the sunshield, spacecraft, and propulsion system. To address these issues, NASA has implemented additional oversight and management practices, including award fees to incentivize contractors to improve performance. The project has also conducted audits to identify potential embedded design flaws and quality control issues. However, the project still faces challenges mitigating risks and meeting its cost and schedule commitments. To better assess the project's progress, NASA should conduct a Joint Cost and Schedule Confidence Level (JCL) analysis prior to its system integration review. This would provide NASA with a more accurate assessment of the project's cost and schedule risks and help inform resource decisions.", "answers": ["JWST, a large, deployable telescope, is one of NASA's most complex projects and top priorities. The project has delayed its planned launch three times since September 2017 due to problems discovered in testing. In June 2018, NASA approved new cost and schedule estimates for JWST. Since the project established its cost and schedule baselines in 2009, the project's costs have increased by 95 percent and the launch date has been moved back by 81 months. Conference Report No. 112-284, accompanying the Consolidated and Further Continuing Appropriations Act, 2012, included a provision for GAO to assess the project annually and report on its progress. This is the seventh report. This report assesses (1) the considerations NASA took into account when updating the project's cost and schedule commitments and (2) the extent to which NASA has taken steps to improve oversight and performance of JWST, among other issues. GAO reviewed relevant NASA policies, analyzed NASA and contractor data, and interviewed NASA and contractor officials. In June 2018, the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) revised the cost and schedule commitments for the James Webb Space Telescope (JWST) to reflect known technical challenges, as well as provide additional time to address unanticipated challenges. For example, the revised launch readiness date of March 2021 included 5.5 months to address a design issue for the cover of the sunshield (see image). The purpose of the sunshield is to protect the telescope's mirrors and instruments from the sun's heat. NASA found that hardware on the cover came loose during testing in April 2018. The new cost estimate of $9.7 billion is driven by the schedule extension, which requires keeping the contractor's workforce on board longer than expected. Before the project enters its final phase of integration and test, it must conduct a review to determine if it can launch within its cost and schedule commitments. As part of this review, the project is not required to update its joint cost and schedule confidence level analysis—an analysis that provides the probability the project can meet its cost and schedule commitments—but government and industry cost and schedule experts have found it is a best practice to do so. Such analysis would provide NASA officials with better information to support decisions on allocating resources, especially in light of the project's recent cost and schedule growth. NASA has taken steps to improve oversight and performance of JWST, and identified the JWST project manager as responsible for monitoring the continued implementation of these changes. Examples of recent changes include increasing on-site presence at the contractor facility and conducting comprehensive audits of design processes. Sustaining focus on these changes through launch will be important if schedule pressures arise later and because of past challenges with communications. GAO will follow up on the project's monitoring of these improvements in future reviews. GAO recommends NASA update the project's joint cost and schedule confidence level analysis. NASA concurred with the recommendation made in this report."], "all_classes": null, "length": 5967}
{"pred": "\nThe report discusses current issues and challenges in the child nutrition programs of the USDA Food and Nutrition Service, including the nutrition standards for school meals and competitive foods, sourcing foods domestically, summer meals, congregate feeding, unpaid meal costs, and paid lunch equity. The report provides an overview of recent legislative proposals and efforts to address these issues. The nutrition standards for school meals have been modified over time, with changes to milk, whole grain, and sodium requirements. Some stakeholders advocate for maintaining the standards while others argue that implementation challenges are easing with time. The Community Eligibility Provision provides free meals to all students in schools with high proportions of eligible students, but has created data issues for other federal programs. Unpaid meal costs and lunch shaming practices have also been raised as issues. The report highlights recent legislative proposals and efforts to address these issues, including the Anti-Lunch Shaming Act of 2017. The report concludes by noting that child nutrition reauthorization efforts in Congress have been limited in recent years.", "answers": ["The term child nutrition programs refers to several U.S. Department of Agriculture Food and Nutrition Service (USDA-FNS) programs that provide food for children in institutional settings. These include the school meals programs—the National School Lunch Program and School Breakfast Program—as well as the Child and Adult Care Food Program, Summer Food Service Program, Special Milk Program, and Fresh Fruit and Vegetable Program. The most recent child nutrition reauthorization, the Healthy, Hunger-Free Kids Act of 2010 (HHFKA; P.L. 111-296), made a number of changes to the child nutrition programs. In some cases, these changes spurred debate during the law's implementation, particularly in regard to updated nutrition standards for school meals and snacks. On September 30, 2015, some of the authorities created by the HHFKA expired. Efforts to reauthorize the child nutrition programs in the 114th Congress, while not completed, considered several related issues and prompted further discussion about the programs. There were no substantial reauthorization attempts in the 115th Congress. Current issues discussed in this report include the following: Nutrition standards for school meals and snacks. The HHFKA required USDA to update the nutrition standards for school meals and other foods sold in schools. USDA issued final rules on these standards in 2012 and 2016, respectively. Some schools had difficulty implementing the nutrition standards, and USDA and Congress have taken actions to change certain parts of the standards related to whole grains, sodium, and milk. Offerings in the Fresh Fruit and Vegetable Program (FFVP). There have been debates recently over whether the FFVP should include processed and preserved fruits and vegetables, including canned, dried, and frozen items. Currently, statute permits only fresh offerings. \"Buy American\" requirements for school meals. The school meals programs' authorizing laws require schools to source foods domestically, with some exceptions, under Buy American requirements. Efforts both to tighten and loosen these requirements have been made in recent years. The enacted 2018 farm bill (P.L. 115-334) instructed USDA to \"enforce full compliance\" with the Buy American requirements and report to Congress within 180 days of enactment. Congregate feeding in summer meals. Under current law, children must consume summer meals on-site. This is known as the \"congregate feeding\" requirement. Starting in 2010, Congress funded demonstration projects, including the Summer Electronic Benefit Transfer (EBT) demonstration, to test alternatives to congregate feeding in summer meals. Congress has increased funding for Summer EBT in recent appropriations cycles and there have been discussions about whether to continue or expand the program. Implementation of the Community Eligibility Provision (CEP). The HHFKA created CEP, an option for qualifying schools, groups of schools, and school districts to offer free meals to all students. Because income-based applications for school meals are no longer required in schools adopting CEP, its implementation has created data issues for federal and state programs relying on free and reduced-price lunch eligibility data. Unpaid meal costs and \"lunch shaming.\" The issue of students not paying for meals and schools' handling of these situations has received increasing attention. Some schools have adopted what some term as \"lunch shaming\" practices, including throwing away a student's selected hot meal and providing a cold meal alternative when a student does not pay. Congress and USDA have taken actions recently to reduce instances of student nonpayment and stigmatization. Paid lunch pricing. One result of new requirements in the HHFKA was price increases for paid (full price) lunches in many schools. Attempts have been made—some successfully—to loosen these \"paid lunch equity\" requirements in recent years."], "all_classes": null, "length": 5157}
{"pred": "\nThe report examines the Central States Pension Fund (CSPF), a multiemployer pension plan for trucking industry workers. CSPF has been underfunded since 1982 and has struggled to recover due to various factors. The report identifies several key factors that contributed to CSPF's financial challenges:\n\n1. Investment losses and insufficient employer contributions. CSPF's investment returns have been lower than expected, leading to an unfunded liability. Employers have not been able to increase contributions due to financial hardship.\n\n2. Withdrawal liability. CSPF has experienced withdrawals from employers, which has resulted in unpaid withdrawal liability.\n\n3. Longer amortization periods. CSPF has been granted longer amortization periods to fund its liabilities, which increases the risk of plan underfunding.\n\n4. Riskier investments. CSPF has invested in riskier assets to try to meet funding targets, but this has increased the risk of losses.\n\n5. Plan terms. CSPF's collective bargaining agreements limit employer contributions beyond what they agreed to.\n\n6. Regulatory environment. CSPF operates under ERISA and PBGC oversight, which has created challenges for multiemployer plans.\n\nThe report recommends several actions to address CSPF's financial challenges:\n\n1. Increase employer contributions.\n\n2. Improve investment returns.\n\n3. Reduce withdrawal liability.\n\n4. Shorten amortization periods.\n\n5. Adopt more conservative investment strategies.\n\n6. Improve plan governance and oversight.\n\nIn summary, CSPF faces significant financial challenges due to various factors. Addressing these issues will be critical to improving the funded status of the plan and ensuring the solvency of the Central States Pension Fund.", "answers": ["Multiemployer plans are collectively bargained pension agreements often between labor unions and two or more employers. CSPF is one of the nation's largest multiemployer defined benefit pension plans, covering about 385,000 participants. Since 1982, the plan has operated under a court-enforceable consent decree which, among other things, requires that the plan's assets be managed by independent parties. Within 7 years, CSPF estimates that the plan's financial condition will require severe benefit cuts. GAO was asked to review the events and factors that led to the plan's critical financial status and how its investment outcomes compare to similar plans. GAO describes (1) what is known about the factors that contributed to CSPF's critical financial condition; (2) what has been CSPF's investment policy, and the process for setting and executing it, since the consent decree was established; and (3) how CSPF's investments have performed over time, particularly compared to similar pension plans. GAO reviewed relevant federal laws and regulations; interviewed CSPF representatives, International Brotherhood of Teamsters officials and members, federal officials, and knowledgeable industry stakeholders; reviewed CSPF documentation including investment policy statements and board of trustee meeting minutes; and analyzed investment returns and fees from required, annual pension plan filings and from consultant benchmarking reports. The Central States, Southeast and Southwest Areas Pension Fund (CSPF) was established in 1955 to provide pension benefits to trucking industry workers, and is one of the largest multiemployer plans. According to its regulatory filings, CSPF had less than half the estimated funds needed to cover plan liabilities in 1982 at the time it entered into a court-enforceable consent decree that provides for oversight of certain plan activities. Since then, CSPF has made some progress toward achieving its targeted level of funding; however, CSPF has never been more than 75 percent funded and its funding level has weakened since 2002, as shown in the figure below. Stakeholders GAO interviewed identified numerous factors that contributed to CSPF's financial condition. For example, stakeholders stated that changes within the trucking industry as well as a decline in union membership contributed to CSPF's inability to maintain a healthy contribution base. CSPF's active participants made up about 69 percent of all participants in 1982, but accounted for only 16 percent in 2016. The most dramatic change in active participants occurred in 2007 when the United Parcel Service, Inc. (UPS) withdrew from the plan. At that time, UPS accounted for about 30 percent of the plan's active participants (i.e. workers). In addition, the market declines of 2001 to 2002 and 2008 had a significant negative impact on the plan's long-term investment performance. Stakeholders noted that while each individual factor contributed to CSPF's critical financial condition, the interrelated nature of the factors also had a cumulative effect on the plan's financial condition. Both CSPF's investment policy and the process for setting and executing it have changed several times since the consent decree was established in 1982. The original consent decree gave an independent asset manager—called a named fiduciary—exclusive authority to set and change the plan's investment policies and manage plan assets, and prohibited CSPF trustees from managing assets or making investment decisions. Initially, the named fiduciaries sold the troubled real estate assets acquired during the pre-consent decree era. Subsequent changes include the following: In 1993, the named fiduciaries started to increase investment in equities, and their policies continued to direct that asset allocations be weighted toward equities until early 2017. Between 2003 and 2010, the court approved three plan decisions to move a total of 50 percent of CSPF's assets into passively-managed accounts (passive management typically seeks to match the performance of a specific market index and reduce investment fees). An early-2017 investment policy change precipitated by CSPF's deteriorating financial condition will continue to move plan assets into fixed income investments ahead of projected insolvency, or the date when CSPF is expected to have insufficient assets to pay promised benefits when due. As a result, assets will be gradually transitioned from “return-seeking assets”—such as equities and emerging markets debt—to high-quality investment grade debt and U.S. Treasury securities with intermediate and short-term maturities. The plan is projected to become insolvent on January 1, 2025. CSPF officials and named fiduciary representatives said these changes are intended to reduce the plan's exposure to market risk and volatility, and provide participants greater certainty prior to projected insolvency. GAO found that CSPF's investment returns and expenses were generally in line with similarly sized institutional investors and with demographically similar multiemployer pension plans. For example, GAO's analysis of returns using the peer group measure used by CSPF known as the Wilshire Associates' Trust Universe Comparison Service (TUCS), showed that CSPF's annual investment returns since 1995 were above the median about as many times as they were below. Similarly, comparing CSPF's returns to a peer group of similar multiemployer defined benefit plans using federally required annual reports found that CSPF's annual investment returns were in line with those of its peers. Specifically, CSPF's annual returns were above the median nine times and below it six times—and CSPF's overall (dollar-weighted) average annual return from 2000 through 2014 was close to that of the peer median average return of 4.8 percent. In addition, GAO found that CSPF's investment fees and other administrative expenses have also been in line with other large multiemployer plans. For example: CSPF's investment fees as a percentage of assets were about 9 percent lower than the median of large defined benefit multiemployer plans over the 2000 through 2014 period—though much of that difference is accounted for by a relative reduction in investment fees since 2007. CSPF's investment fees as a percentage of assets were, on average, about 34 basis points (or 0.34 percent). CSPF's administrative expenses related to the day-to-day operations of the plan have also been in line with other large multiemployer plans. CSPF's administrative expenses per participant were below the median for large defined benefit multiemployer plans for 12 of the 15 years over the 2000 through 2014 period. As of 2014, CSPF's administrative expense was $98 per participant, which is about 16 percent less than the median for large defined benefit multiemployer plans. GAO is not making recommendations in this report."], "all_classes": null, "length": 15605}
{"pred": "\nThe Veterans Access, Choice, and Accountability Act of 2014 provided up to $10 billion in funding for veterans to obtain health care services from community providers through the Choice Program when veterans faced long wait times, lengthy travel distances, or other challenges accessing care at VA medical facilities. The temporary authority and funding for the Choice Program was separate from other existing programs through which VA has the option to purchase care from community providers. The VA modified its contracts with two TPAs in 2014 to add administrative responsibilities associated with the Choice Program. For the Choice Program, each TPA is responsible for establishing networks of community providers, scheduling appointments, and paying claims. VA's contracts with the TPAs do not include a payment timeliness requirement. However, VA has taken steps to improve payment timeliness, including implementing a new system and updating its processes for paying TPA invoices. Despite these efforts, VA has not fully addressed delays associated with authorizations for care. VA has taken steps to educate community providers in order to help prevent claims processing issues, but providers have reported poor customer service when attempting to resolve claims payment issues. VA has included customer service requirements in its RFP for the Veterans Community Care Program contracts, and plans to monitor data on provider calls under the contracts. GAO recommends that VA monitor data on SAR approval time frames and collect data and monitor compliance with the Choice Program contractual requirements for customer service for community providers. VA concurred with the recommendations and stated it is taking steps to address them.", "answers": ["Questions have been raised about the lack of timeliness of TPAs' payments to community providers under the Choice Program and how this may affect the willingness of providers to participate in the program as well as in the forthcoming Veterans Community Care Program. You asked GAO to review issues related to the timeliness of TPAs' payments to community providers under the Choice Program. This report examines, among other things, (1) the length of time TPAs have taken to pay community providers' claims and factors affecting timeliness of payments, and (2) actions taken by VA and the TPAs to reduce the length of time TPAs take to pay community providers for Choice Program claims. GAO reviewed TPA data on the length of time taken to pay community provider claims from November 2014 through June 2018, the most recent data available at the time of GAO's review. GAO also reviewed documentation, such as the contracts between VA and its TPAs, and interviewed VA and TPA officials. In addition, GAO interviewed a non-generalizable sample of 15 community providers, selected based on their large Choice Program claims volume, to learn about their experiences with payment timeliness. The Department of Veterans Affairs' (VA) Veterans Choice Program (Choice Program) was created in 2014 to address problems with veterans' timely access to care at VA medical facilities. The Choice Program allows eligible veterans to obtain health care services from providers not directly employed by VA (community providers), who are then reimbursed for their services through one of the program's two third-party administrators (TPA). GAO's analysis of TPA data available for November 2014 through June 2018 shows that the length of time the TPAs took to pay community providers' clean claims each month varied widely—from 7 days to 68 days. VA and its TPAs identified several key factors affecting timeliness of payments to community providers under the Choice Program, including VA's untimely payments to TPAs, which in turn extended the length of time TPAs took to pay community providers' claims; and inadequate provider education on filing claims. VA has taken actions to address key factors that have contributed to the length of time TPAs have taken to pay community providers. For example, VA updated its payment system and related processes to pay TPAs more quickly. According to VA data, as of July 2018, VA was paying at least 90 percent of the TPAs' invoices within 7 days. In addition, VA and the TPAs have taken steps to improve provider education to help providers resolve claims processing issues. However, 9 of the 15 providers GAO interviewed said they continue to experience lengthy telephone hold times. According to VA and TPA officials, steps have been taken to improve the customer service offered to community providers. However, VA officials do not collect data on or monitor TPA compliance with customer service requirements—such as calls being answered within 30 seconds or less—for provider calls because they said they are not enforcing the requirements and are allowing TPAs to prioritize calls from veterans. Without collecting data and monitoring compliance, VA does not have information on challenges providers may face when contacting TPAs to resolve payment issues. GAO is making two recommendations, including that VA should collect data on and monitor compliance with its requirements pertaining to customer service for community providers. VA concurred with GAO's recommendations and described steps it will take to implement them."], "all_classes": null, "length": 5443}
{"pred": "\nThe report summarizes the results of an audit of the Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority's (WMATA) capital planning and expenditure practices. The audit found that WMATA has not fully implemented its new capital planning process, which was developed in response to weaknesses identified in its previous process. The new process lacks policies and procedures for ranking and selecting projects for funding in the annual capital budget and capital improvement program. Additionally, WMATA has not developed performance measures to assess the effectiveness of its capital investments and the capital planning process. The audit also found that WMATA has not developed a plan to obtain complete information on its asset inventory and condition assessments. The track preventive maintenance program, which aims to reduce track defects and fires, lacks a comprehensive risk assessment and a formal program management plan. The report recommends that WMATA establish policies and procedures for the new capital planning process, develop performance measures, obtain complete asset inventory and condition assessments, and conduct a comprehensive risk assessment of the track preventive maintenance program.", "answers": ["Safety incidents in recent years on WMATA's rail system have raised questions about its processes for performing critical maintenance and replacing capital assets. WMATA initiated a new preventive maintenance program for its rail track in 2017, and is currently implementing a new capital planning process. GAO was asked to examine issues related to WMATA's capital funding and maintenance practices. This report examines: (1) how WMATA spent its capital funds from fiscal years 2011 through 2017, (2) how WMATA's new capital planning process addresses weaknesses it identified in the prior process, and (3) WMATA's progress toward its track preventive maintenance program's goals and how the program aligns with leading program management practices. GAO analyzed WMATA's financial and program information, interviewed officials of WMATA, the Federal Transit Administration, and five transit agencies selected for similarities to WMATA. GAO compared WMATA's capital planning process and track maintenance program with leading practices. From fiscal years 2011 through 2017, the Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority (WMATA) spent almost $6 billion on a variety of capital assets, with the largest share spent on improving its rail and bus fleet (see figure). Over this period, WMATA's capital spending was, on average, about $845 million annually. WMATA's new capital planning process could address some weaknesses it identified in the prior process. WMATA established a framework for quantitatively prioritizing capital needs (investments to a group of related assets) over a 10-year period. However, WMATA has not established documented policies and procedures for implementing the new process, such as those for selecting specific projects for funding in its annual capital budget. WMATA is currently using its new capital planning process to make fiscal year 2020 investment decisions. WMATA has proposed a fiscal year 2020 capital budget of $1.4 billion. Without documented policies and procedures for implementing the new planning process, WMATA's stakeholders do not have reasonable assurance that WMATA is following a sound process for making investment decisions. WMATA has made significant progress toward its track preventive maintenance program's goals, which are to reduce both track-defect and electrical-fire incidents by 50 percent in fiscal year 2019 compared with 2017. In fiscal year 2018, WMATA met its goal for reducing track defect incidents and reduced electrical fire incidents by 20 percent. However, in designing the program, WMATA did not fully assess risks. For example, WMATA did not quantitatively assess the impact of track defects or electrical fires on its ability to provide service, nor did it consider other risks such as non-electrical track fires, which represent about 30 percent of all fires on the system, or other factors, such as resources or track time. Without a comprehensive risk assessment, WMATA lacks reasonable assurance that the program is designed to address risks affecting the safety of the rail system or other risks that could hinder the new program's success. GAO is making five recommendations, including that WMATA establish documented policies and procedures for the new capital planning process and conduct a comprehensive risk assessment for the track preventive maintenance program. WMATA described actions planned or underway to address GAO's recommendations. GAO believes the recommendations should be fully implemented, as discussed in the report."], "all_classes": null, "length": 10886}
{"pred": "\nThe report provides an overview of the World Trade Organization (WTO) and its role in promoting global trade and economic cooperation. The WTO was established in 1995 as an international organization to replace the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and has since expanded its rulemaking to cover new areas such as services, intellectual property rights, and investment. The WTO has three main functions: administering the rules of the trading system, establishing new rules through negotiations, and resolving trade disputes between member states. The WTO has faced challenges in recent years, including the inability to reach consensus on new multilateral agreements, the growing use of protectionist trade policies by developed and developing countries, and the rise of digital trade and state-owned enterprises. The United States has expressed skepticism over the value of the WTO and has taken unilateral actions to raise tariffs, which has raised concerns about the WTO's effectiveness and credibility. The report discusses the WTO's core principles, agreements, and negotiating processes, as well as current issues and challenges facing the organization. It also outlines potential policy issues for Congress to consider, including oversight hearings, updating negotiating objectives, and establishing criteria for developing country status. The future of the WTO remains uncertain, but there is growing recognition that the current system is unsustainable and that new compromises and reforms are needed to address emerging trade issues.", "answers": ["Historically, the United States' leadership of the global trading system has ensured the United States a seat at the table to shape the international trade agenda in ways that both advance and defend U.S. interests. The evolution of U.S. leadership and the global trade agenda remain of interest to Congress, which holds constitutional authority over foreign commerce and establishes trade negotiating objectives and principles through legislation. Congress has recognized the World Trade Organization (WTO) as the \"foundation of the global trading system\" within trade promotion authority (TPA) and plays a direct legislative and oversight role over WTO agreements. The statutory basis for U.S. WTO membership is the Uruguay Round Agreements Act (P.L. 103-465), and U.S. priorities and objectives for the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT)/WTO have been reflected in various TPA legislation since 1974. Congress also has oversight of the U.S. Trade Representative and other agencies that participate in WTO meetings and enforce WTO commitments. The WTO is a 164-member international organization that was created to oversee and administer multilateral trade rules, serve as a forum for trade liberalization negotiations, and resolve trade disputes. The United States was a major force behind the establishment of the WTO in 1995, and the rules and agreements resulting from multilateral trade negotiations. The WTO encompassed and succeeded the GATT, established in 1947 among the United States and 22 other countries. Through the GATT and WTO, the United States, with other countries, sought to establish a more open, rules-based trading system in the postwar era, with the goal of fostering international economic cooperation and raising economic prosperity worldwide. Today, 98% of global trade is among WTO members. The WTO is a consensus and member-driven organization. Its core principles include nondiscrimination (most favored nation treatment and national treatment), freer trade, fair competition, transparency, and encouraging development. These are enshrined in a series of WTO trade agreements covering goods, agriculture, services, intellectual property rights, and trade facilitation, among other issues. Some countries, including China, have been motivated to join the WTO not just to expand access to foreign markets but to spur domestic economic reforms, help transition to market economies, and promote the rule of law. The WTO Dispute Settlement Understanding (DSU) provides an enforceable means for members to resolve disputes over WTO commitments and obligations. The WTO has processed more than 500 disputes, and the United States has been an active user of the dispute settlement system. Supporters of the multilateral trading system consider the dispute settlement mechanism an important success of the system. At the same time, some members, including the United States, contend it has procedural shortcomings and has exceeded its mandate in deciding cases. Many observers are concerned that the effectiveness of the WTO has diminished since the collapse of the Doha Round of multilateral trade negotiations, which began in 2001, and believe the WTO needs to adopt reforms to continue its role as the foundation of the global trading system. To date, WTO members have been unable to reach consensus for a new comprehensive multilateral agreement on trade liberalization and rules. While global supply chains and technology have transformed international trade and investment, global trade rules have not kept up with the pace of change. Many countries have turned to negotiating free trade agreements (FTAs) outside the WTO as well as plurilateral agreements involving subsets of WTO members rather than all members. At the latest WTO Ministerial conference in December 2017, no major deliverables were announced. Several members committed to make progress on ongoing talks, such as fisheries subsidies and e-commerce, while other areas remain stalled. While many were disappointed by the limited progress, in the U.S. view, the outcome signaled that \"the impasse at the WTO was broken,\" paving the way for groups of like-minded countries to pursue new work in other key areas. Certain WTO members have begun to explore aspects of reform and future negotiations. Potential reforms concern the administration of the organization, its procedures and practices, and attempts to address the inability of WTO members to conclude new agreements. Proposed DS reforms also attempt to improve the working of the dispute settlement system, particularly the Appellate Body—the seven-member body that reviews appeals by WTO members of a panel's findings in a dispute case. Some U.S. frustrations with the WTO are not new and many are shared by other trading partners, such as the European Union. At the same time, the Administration's overall approach has spurred new questions regarding the future of U.S. leadership and U.S. priorities for improving the multilateral trading system. Concerns have emphasized that the Administration's recent actions to unilaterally raise tariffs under U.S. trade laws and to possibly impede the functioning of the dispute settlement system might undermine the credibility of the WTO system. A growing question of some observers is whether the WTO would flounder for lack of U.S. leadership, or whether other WTO members like the EU and China taking on larger roles would continue to make it a meaningful actor in the global trade environment. The growing debate over the role and future direction of the WTO may be of interest to Congress. Important issues it may address include how current and future WTO agreements affect the U.S. economy, the value of U.S. membership and leadership in the WTO, whether new U.S. negotiating objectives or oversight hearings are needed to address prospects for new WTO reforms and rulemaking, and the relevant authorities and impact of potential U.S. withdrawal from the WTO on U.S. economic and foreign policy interests."], "all_classes": null, "length": 21561}
{"pred": "\nThe report examines how six federal agencies estimate improper payments in their programs. The Improper Payments Elimination and Reduction Act of 20110 (IPIA) requires agencies to take steps to identify and estimate improper payments. The report finds that while agencies have developed improper payment estimates, their processes vary and may not fully address key risks of improper payments. Specifically:\n\n- The Department of Defense's Military Pay improper payment estimate does not test for eligibility of servicemembers for special pay or allowances.\n- The Office of Personnel Management's Retirement program estimate does not test for underpayments in older claims.\n- The Internal Revenue Service's Earned Income Tax Credit improper payment estimate excludes recovered overpayments.\n\nThe report recommends that the Office of Management and Budget develop guidance on how agencies test to identify improper payments and clarify the treatment of nonresponse cases during improper payment testing. The report also recommends that agencies assess their processes to estimate improper payments to determine if they effectively address key risks of improper payments. The report is available on the GAO website.", "answers": ["Improper payments—which include payments that should not have been made or were made in an incorrect amount—are a long-standing, significant problem in the federal government, estimated at almost $141 billion for fiscal year 2017. Executive branch agencies are required to annually estimate improper payments for certain programs. Estimation of improper payments is key to understanding the extent of the problem and to developing effective corrective actions. Relevant laws and guidance provide agencies flexibility in developing estimates. This report describes agencies' processes to estimate improper payments in selected programs for fiscal year 2017 and the extent to which certain differences in these processes can affect the usefulness of the resulting estimates. GAO selected 10 programs across six agencies with the largest reported program outlays in fiscal years 2015 and 2016. For these programs, GAO reviewed relevant laws and guidance, analyzed agencies' policies and procedures, and interviewed officials at relevant agencies and OMB staff. The six agencies GAO reviewed reported taking various approaches related to key components of estimating improper payments—shown in the figure below—for 10 selected programs, which collectively reported outlays of over $2.5 trillion for fiscal year 2017. Sample selection. Eight of the 10 programs GAO reviewed reported using statistically valid approaches, and the remaining 2 reported using alternative methodologies approved by the Office of Management and Budget (OMB). The sampled data elements varied, including payments, medical claims, and tax returns. The age of the data used to develop fiscal year 2017 improper payment estimates also varied, ranging from calendar year 2013 to fiscal year 2017. Identification of improper payments. Some of the six agencies reported using processes designed specifically to estimate improper payments, whereas others reported leveraging existing reviews. These agencies' policies and procedures include a review of aspects of eligibility, except for those related to the Department of Defense's (DOD) Military Pay and the Office of Personnel Management's (OPM) Retirement overpayments. DOD and OPM have not fully assessed whether their estimation processes effectively consider key program risks. OMB guidance does not specifically address how agencies are to test to identify improper payments, such as using a risk-based approach to help ensure that key risks of improper payments are addressed. The six agencies also varied in the treatment of insufficient documentation, both in identifying and in reporting the root causes of improper payments. For the agencies that contact entities outside the agency to estimate improper payments, the treatment of nonresponse differed, with one agency including nonresponses as improper payments and another generally excluding the nonresponse cases from review. Although OMB guidance states that agencies should treat cases of insufficient documentation as improper payments, it does not specifically address the treatment of nonresponse cases. Calculation of the improper payment estimate. The six agencies generally reported using law and OMB guidance to calculate improper payment estimates for the selected programs, except for the Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC). The Internal Revenue Service (IRS) removed overpayments that were recovered when developing its estimate. OMB guidance requires agencies to include recovered amounts in their estimates. Removing these overpayments understates the EITC improper payment estimate and may limit IRS's ability to develop corrective actions to prevent improper payments. GAO recommends that OMB develop guidance on treatment of nonresponse cases and testing to identify improper payments, that DOD and OPM assess their estimation processes, and that IRS revise its methodology to not exclude recovered payments from its estimate. All of the agencies either agreed or partially agreed with the specific recommendations to them. GAO believes that the actions are warranted, as discussed in the report."], "all_classes": null, "length": 4147}
{"pred": "\nThe report examines the reliability of Transition Assistance Program (TAP) data on participation levels and factors affecting Coast Guard servicemembers' participation. The Coast Guard lacks policies and procedures governing reliable data collection, including when data should be entered and by whom. The Coast Guard does not track the timeliness of participation or access to additional 2-day classes. The Coast Guard plans to adopt DOD's TAP-IT Enterprise System, which could help improve data reliability. The Coast Guard recommends:\n\n1. Issuing an updated Commandant Instruction that establishes policies and procedures to improve data reliability and completeness.\n\n2. Monitoring participation within prescribed time frames.\n\n3. Monitoring participation in additional 2-day classes.\n\n4. Defining roles and responsibilities of personnel administering the program.\n\n5. Sharing data with unit and installation commanders.\n\n6. Sharing data with DOD and other interagency partners.\n\n7. Establishing performance goals with measurable targets.\n\nThe Coast Guard lacks reliable data on participation levels, which hinders its ability to monitor TAP implementation and ensure servicemembers receive the required training. Improving data reliability will help the Coast Guard meet VOW Act requirements and provide a complete picture of TAP implementation across all five military services.", "answers": ["Thousands of Coast Guard servicemembers have left the military and transitioned into civilian life, and some of these new veterans may face significant challenges, such as finding and maintaining employment. To help them prepare, federal law mandated that DHS provide separating Coast Guard servicemembers with counseling, employment assistance, and information on veterans' benefits through TAP. GAO was asked to examine TAP implementation. This review analyzes (1) the reliability of TAP data on participation levels for Coast Guard servicemembers and the factors that affect participation, and (2) the Coast Guard's performance measures and monitoring efforts related to TAP. GAO interviewed Coast Guard headquarters staff; surveyed 12 Coast Guard installations that conduct TAP (100 percent response rate); collected and reviewed participation data for reliability; and interviewed TAP managers from three installations selected for size and location, and 25 Coast Guard servicemembers at one location. (For a companion report on TAP implementation for separating and retiring servicemembers in other military services, see GAO-18-23 .) The United States Coast Guard (Coast Guard), which is overseen by the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), lacks complete or reliable data on participation in the Transition Assistance Program (TAP), designed to assist servicemembers returning to civilian life. According to senior Coast Guard officials, a major reason why data are not reliable is the lack of an up-to-date Commandant Instruction that specifies when to record TAP participation data. Consequently, the data are updated on an ad-hoc basis and may not be timely or complete, according to officials. Federal internal control standards call for management to use quality information to achieve the entity's objectives. Until the Coast Guard issues an up-to-date Commandant Instruction that establishes policies and procedures to improve the reliability and completeness of TAP data, it will lack quality information to gauge the extent to which it is meeting TAP participation requirements in the VOW to Hire Heroes Act of 2011. According to GAO's survey of Coast Guard installations, various factors affected participation, such as servicemembers serving at geographically remote locations or separating from the Coast Guard rapidly. TAP officials and Coast Guard servicemembers GAO interviewed said commanders and direct supervisors sometimes pulled servicemembers out of TAP class or postponed participation because of mission priorities. TAP managers also said they rely on delivering TAP online because many Coast Guard servicemembers are stationed remotely. The Coast Guard cannot effectively measure performance to ensure key TAP requirements are met because it lacks reliable data and does not monitor compliance with several TAP requirements. Further, the Coast Guard has not established a formal performance goal against which it can measure progress, although federal internal control standards stipulate that management should consider external requirements—such as the laws with which the entity is required to comply—to clearly define objectives in specific and measurable terms. Establishing a goal could help the Coast Guard define expected performance. In addition, the Coast Guard does not monitor TAP requirements regarding the timeliness of servicemembers' TAP participation or their access to additional 2-day classes. Consequently, it cannot know whether servicemembers are starting TAP early enough to complete the program or those who elected to attend additional 2-day classes were able to do so before separation or retirement, as required by the Act. Finally, the Coast Guard lacks an up-to-date Commandant Instruction that establishes the roles and responsibilities of Coast Guard staff in implementing TAP. Federal internal control standards stipulate that management should assign responsibility and delegate authority to key roles throughout the entity. Issuing an up-to-date Commandant Instruction that defines roles and responsibilities would clarify who is ultimately responsible for ensuring Coast Guard servicemembers attend TAP, thereby facilitating accountability. GAO is making seven recommendations, including that the Coast Guard issue a new Commandant Instruction establishing data collection policies, set TAP performance goals, monitor timeliness and access, and define roles and responsibilities. DHS agreed with all of GAO's recommendations."], "all_classes": null, "length": 5657}
{"pred": "\nThe report discusses the federal government's approach to researching the health effects of low-level radiation exposure. According to the National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine, there is no clear threshold below which low levels of radiation are not harmful. However, federal agencies generally follow the advice of scientific advisory bodies and use the linear no-threshold model, which assumes that the risk of cancer increases with every incremental increase in radiation exposure. This model is used to set dose limits for workers and the public. However, there is uncertainty about the health effects of very low levels of radiation exposure, particularly from non-US populations like atomic bomb survivors. Federal agencies have funded research on the health effects of low-level radiation, but there is no collaborative mechanism to determine research priorities. The Department of Energy, which has primary responsibility under the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 for research related to radiation protection, is in the best position to lead an interagency coordination mechanism to address shared research priorities. However, the Department of Energy disagreed with the recommendation to develop such a mechanism, stating that other agencies also have legal mandates and budget authorities to research low-level radiation exposure. The report recommends that the Department of Energy lead the development of an appropriate mechanism to coordinate research priorities.", "answers": ["This testimony summarizes the information contained in GAO's September 2017 report, entitled Low-Dose Radiation: Interagency Collaboration on Planning Research Could Improve Information on Health Effects ( GAO-17-546 ). The Department of Energy (DOE), Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC), Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), and Food and Drug Administration generally used the advice of scientific advisory bodies to develop and apply radiation protection requirements and guidance for workers and the public in the radiation exposure settings that GAO reviewed. These settings were: (1) the operation and decommissioning of nuclear power plants; (2) the cleanup of sites with radiological contamination; (3) the use of medical equipment that produces radiation; and (4) accidental or terrorism-related exposure to radiation. Specifically, the agencies relied on the advice of three scientific advisory bodies that supported the use of a model that assumes the risk of cancer increases with every incremental radiation exposure. Accordingly, the agencies have set regulatory dose limits and issued guidance to confine exposure to levels that reduce the risk of cancer, while recognizing that scientific uncertainties occur in estimating cancer risks from low-dose radiation. For example, NRC requires nuclear power plants to consider measures for limiting workers' exposure below NRC's regulatory dose limit, such as by using robots for maintenance work in radiation areas. GAO identified seven federal agencies that funded research on low-dose radiation's health effects. In fiscal years 2012 to 2016, DOE, NRC, EPA, and four other federal agencies obligated about $210 million for such research . Although the agencies have collaborated on individual projects on radiation's health effects, they have not established a collaborative mechanism to set research priorities. GAO's previous work has shown that federal agencies can use such mechanisms to implement interagency collaboration to develop and coordinate sound science policies. In the past, DOE took a leading role in this area because DOE provided stable funding and advocated for greater coordination on research on low-dose radiation's health effects. However, since fiscal year 2012, DOE has phased out funding for one of its main research programs in this area. This has created a void in coordination efforts among federal agencies, and no other agency has stepped forward to fill this void. Because of DOE's prior experience as a leader in this area of research and its research responsibility under the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, it could play an important role in helping federal agencies establish a coordinating mechanism for low-dose radiation research. Dollars are in millions and have not been adjusted for inflation Source: GAO analysis of agency data. | GAO-17-546"], "all_classes": null, "length": 2125}
{"pred": "\nThe report discusses the Community Reinvestment Act of 19777 (CRA) and how it affects bank lending and investment activity. The CRA requires banks to meet the credit needs of their local communities, particularly low- and moderate-income areas. Banks receive CRA credits or points for engaging in qualifying activities such as mortgage, consumer, and business lending; community investments; and low-cost services that benefit LMI areas and entities. The CRA examinations evaluate banks' ability to meet local credit needs. However, it is difficult to determine whether banks' financial decisions are motivated by CRA incentives or profit incentives. Banks may receive CRA credits for activities that have profit potential, but regulators require all loans to be prudently underwritten. The report discusses how the CRA has been debated regarding its effectiveness in in incentivizing banks to lend to LMI customers. Some argue that the CRA may encourage banks to forgo more profitable lending opportunities in non-targeted neighborhoods. Others argue that the CRA has not been strictly enforced enough to encourage banks to increase financial services in LMI areas. The report concludes by summarizing recent policy discussions regarding modernizing the CRA.", "answers": ["The Community Reinvestment Act (CRA; P.L. 95-128, 12 U.S.C. §§2901-2908) addresses how banking institutions meet the credit needs of the areas they serve, particularly in low- and moderate-income (LMI) neighborhoods. The federal banking regulatory agencies—the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC), and the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC)—currently implement the CRA. The regulators issue CRA credits, or points, where banks engage in qualifying activities—such as mortgage, consumer, and business lending; community investments; and low-cost services that would benefit LMI areas and entities—that occur with a designated assessment area. These credits are then used to issue each bank a performance rating. The CRA requires these ratings be taken into account when banks apply for charters, branches, mergers, and acquisitions among other things. The CRA, which was enacted in 1977, was subsequently revised in 1989 to require public disclosure of bank CRA ratings to establish a four-tiered system of descriptive performance levels (i.e., Outstanding, Satisfactory, Needs to Improve, or Substantial Noncompliance). In 1995, the CRA examination was customized to account for differences in bank sizes and business models. In 2005, the bank size definitions were revised and indexed to the Consumer Price Index. The 2005 amendments also expanded opportunities for banks to earn CRA credit for public welfare investments (such as providing housing, services, or jobs that primarily benefit LMI individuals). Qualifying activities under the CRA have evolved to include consumer and business lending, community investments, and low-cost services that would benefit LMI areas and entities. Congressional interest in the CRA stems from various perceptions of its effectiveness. Some have argued that, by encouraging lending in LMI neighborhoods, the CRA may also encourage the issuance of higher-risk loans to borrowers likely to have repayment problems (under the presumption that low-income is correlated with lower creditworthiness), which can translate into losses for lenders. Others are concerned that the CRA is not generating sufficient incentives to increase credit availability to qualified LMI borrowers, which may impede economic recovery for some, particularly following the 2007-2009 recession. This report informs the congressional debate concerning the CRA's effectiveness in incentivizing bank lending and investment activity to LMI borrowers. After a discussion of the CRA's origins, it presents the CRA's examination process and bank activities that are eligible for consideration of CRA credits. Next, it discusses the difficulty of determining the CRA's influence on bank behavior. For example, the CRA does not specify the quality and quantity of CRA-qualifying activities, meaning that compliance with the CRA does not require adherence to lending quotas or benchmarks. In the absence of benchmarks, determining the extent to which CRA incentives have influenced LMI credit availability relative to other factors is not straightforward. Banks also face a variety of financial incentives—for example, capital requirements, the prevailing interest rate environment, changes in tax laws, and technological innovations—that influence how much (or how little) they lend to LMI borrowers. Because multiple financial profit incentives and CRA incentives tend to exist simultaneously, it is difficult to determine the extent to which CRA incentives have influenced LMI credit availability relative to other factors."], "all_classes": null, "length": 7111}
{"pred": "\nThe report summarizes the results of an audit of the Department of Veterans Affairs' (VA) misconduct and disciplinary procedures. The audit found that VA has 12 information systems to track misconduct and disciplinary actions, but these systems are not fully reliable for a department-wide assessment due to missing or incomplete data. VA does not have a method to evaluate the implementation of records-management practices outside of those being conducted by VHA and VBA. VA's use of multiple retention periods for adverse action files, and in some cases the lack of adherence to OPM and NARA guidance in defining a specific retention period for these files, results in inconsistent retention of these files across VA. The OIG receives allegations of employee misconduct from VA employees, the OSC, members of Congress, the public, and other stakeholders. VA does not have a comprehensive and reliable information system to track misconduct and disciplinary actions department-wide. The audit identified several areas for improvement, including:\n\n- VA should standardize data fields to allow for analysis of misconduct department-wide.\n- VA should establish a method to evaluate the implementation of records management practices outside of those being conducted by VHA and VBA.\n- VA should have a comprehensive and reliable information system to track misconduct and disciplinary actions department-wide.\n- VA should provide training to VA employees on the proper handling of misconduct allegations.\n- VA should have a standardized process for investigating and adjudicating misconduct cases.\n\nThe audit found that VA's information systems lack completeness and compatibility, making it difficult to analyze misconduct and disciplinary actions department-wide. VA's use of multiple retention periods for adverse action files and lack of adherence to OPM and NARA guidance in defining a specific retention period for these files also makes it difficult to maintain consistent records. The audit identified several areas for improvement to address these issues and improve VA's misconduct and disciplinary procedures.", "answers": ["VA provides services and benefits to veterans through hospitals and other facilities nationwide. Misconduct by VA employees can have serious consequences for some veterans, including poor quality of care. GAO was asked to review employee misconduct across VA. This report reviews the extent to which VA (1) collects reliable information associated with employee misconduct and disciplinary actions, (2) adheres to documentation-retention procedures when adjudicating cases of employee misconduct, (3) ensures allegations of misconduct involving senior officials are reviewed according to VA investigative standards and these officials are held accountable, and (4) has procedures to investigate whistle-blower allegations of misconduct; and the extent to which (5) data and whistle-blower testimony indicate whether retaliation for disclosing misconduct occurs at VA. GAO analyzed 12 information systems across VA to assess the reliability of misconduct data, examined a stratified random sample of 544 misconduct cases from 2009 through 2015, analyzed data and reviewed cases pertaining to senior officials involved in misconduct, reviewed procedures pertaining to whistle-blower investigations, and examined a nongeneralizable sample of whistle-blower disclosures from 2010 to 2014. The Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) collects data related to employee misconduct and disciplinary actions, but fragmentation and data-reliability issues impede department-wide analysis of those data. VA maintains six information systems that include partial data related to employee misconduct. For example, VA's Personnel and Accounting Integrated Data system collects information on disciplinary actions that affect employee leave and pay, but the system does not collect information on other types of disciplinary actions. The system also does not collect information such as the offense or date of occurrence. GAO also identified six other information systems that various VA administrations and program offices use to collect specific information regarding their respective employees' misconduct and disciplinary actions. GAO's analysis of all 12 information systems found data-reliability issues—such as missing data, lack of identifiers, and lack of standardization among fields. Without collecting reliable misconduct and disciplinary action data on all cases department-wide, VA's reporting and decision making on misconduct are impaired. VA inconsistently adhered to its guidance for documentation retention when adjudicating misconduct allegations, based on GAO's review of a generalizable sample of 544 out of 23,622 misconduct case files associated with employee disciplinary actions affecting employee pay. GAO estimates that VA would not be able to account for approximately 1,800 case files. Further, GAO estimates that approximately 3,600 of the files did not contain required documentation that employees were adequately informed of their rights during adjudication procedures—such as their entitlement to be represented by an attorney. The absence of files and associated documentation suggests that individuals may not have always received fair and reasonable due process as allegations of misconduct were adjudicated. Nevertheless, VA's Office of Human Resource Management does not regularly assess the extent to which files and documentation are retained consistently with applicable requirements. VA did not consistently ensure that allegations of misconduct involving senior officials were reviewed according to investigative standards and these officials were held accountable. For example, based on a review of 23 cases of alleged misconduct by senior officials that the VA Office of Inspector General (OIG) referred to VA facility and program offices for additional investigation, GAO found VA frequently did not include sufficient documentation for its findings, or provide a timely response to the OIG. In addition, VA was unable to produce any documentation used to close 2 cases. Further, OIG policy does not require the OIG to verify the completeness of investigations, which would help ensure that facility and program offices had met the requirements for investigating allegations of misconduct. Regarding senior officials, VA did not always take necessary measures to ensure they were held accountable for substantiated misconduct. As the figure below shows, GAO found that the disciplinary action proposed was not taken for 5 of 17 senior officials with substantiated misconduct. As a result of June 2017 legislation, a new office within VA—the Office of Accountability and Whistleblower Protection—will be responsible for receiving and investigating allegations of misconduct involving senior officials. VA has procedures for investigating whistle-blower complaints, but the procedures allow the program office or facility where a whistle-blower has reported misconduct to conduct the investigation. According to the OIG, it has the option of investigating allegations of misconduct, or exercising a “right of first refusal” whereby it refers allegations of misconduct to the VA facility or program office where the allegation originated. VA does not have oversight measures to ensure that all referred allegations of misconduct are investigated by an entity outside the control of the facility or program office involved in the misconduct, to ensure independence. As a result, GAO found instances where managers investigated themselves for misconduct, presenting a conflict of interest. Data and whistle-blower testimony indicate that retaliation may have occurred at VA. As the table below shows, individuals who filed a disclosure of misconduct with the Office of Special Counsel (OSC) received disciplinary action at a much higher rate than the peer average for the rest of VA in fiscal years 2010–2014. Additionally, GAO's interviews with six VA whistle-blowers who claim to have been retaliated against provided anecdotal evidence that retaliation may be occurring. These whistle-blowers alleged that managers in their chain of command took several untraceable actions to retaliate against the whistle-blowers, such as being denied access to computer equipment necessary to complete assignments. GAO makes numerous recommendations to VA to help enhance its ability to address misconduct issues (several of the recommendations are detailed on the following page). GAO recommends, among other things, that the Secretary of Veterans Affairs develop and implement guidance to collect complete and reliable misconduct and disciplinary-action data department-wide; such guidance should include direction and procedures on addressing blank fields, lack of personnel identifiers, and standardization among fields; direct applicable facility and program offices to adhere to VA's policies regarding misconduct adjudication documentation; direct the Office of Human Resource Management to routinely assess the extent to which misconduct-related files and documents are retained consistently with applicable requirements; direct the Office of Accountability and Whistleblower Protection (OAWP) to review responses submitted by facility or program offices to ensure evidence produced in senior-official case referrals demonstrates that the required elements have been addressed; direct OAWP to issue written guidance on how OAWP will verify whether appropriate disciplinary action has been implemented; and develop procedures to ensure (1) whistle-blower investigations are reviewed by an official independent of and at least one level above the individual involved in the allegation, and (2) VA employees who report wrongdoing are treated fairly and protected against retaliation. GAO also recommends, among other things, that the VA OIG revise its policy and require verification of evidence produced in senior-official case referrals. VA concurred with nine recommendations and partially concurred with five. In response, GAO modified three of the recommendations. The VA OIG concurred with one recommendation and partially concurred with the other. GAO continues to believe that both are warranted."], "all_classes": null, "length": 22296}
{"pred": "\nThe Federal Communications Commission (FCC) is an independent federal agency with five members appointed by the President and confirmed by the Senate. The FCC regulates interstate and international communications by radio, television, wire, satellite, and cable. The agency has five commissioners who are appointed for five-year terms, with the President designating one as chairman. The FCC has five bureaus and ten offices that carry out its day-to-day functions. The commission has four strategic goals: closing the digital divide, promoting innovation, protecting consumers and public safety, and reforming its processes. The FCC collects regulatory fees to offset its costs and has a budget that is funded through regulatory fees rather than an appropriation. The FCC has a public interest mandate to regulate communications to benefit the public, but its interpretation of this mandate has changed over time depending on the political priorities of the commission. The FCC's strategic goals have changed under different chairmen, reflecting different regulatory philosophies. The FCC has faced controversy over its net neutrality rules and has restructured its offices to reflect its current priorities. The FCC has not introduced any legislation to change its public interest standard, leaving it up to the agency to define it.", "answers": ["The Federal Communications Commission (FCC) is an independent federal agency established by the Communications Act of 1934 (1934 Act, or \"Communications Act\"). The agency is charged with regulating interstate and international communications by radio, television, wire, satellite, and cable. The mission of the FCC is to make available for all people of the United States, \"without discrimination on the basis of race, color, religion, national origin, or sex, a rapid, efficient, Nationwide, and worldwide wire and radio communication service with adequate facilities at reasonable charges.\" The FCC operates under a public interest mandate first laid out in the 1927 Radio Act (P.L. 632, 69th Congress), but how this mandate is applied depends on how \"the public interest\" is interpreted. Some regulators seek to protect and benefit the public at large through regulation, while others seek to achieve the same goals through the promotion of market efficiency. Additionally, Congress granted the FCC wide latitude and flexibility to revise its interpretation of the public interest standard to reflect changing circumstances and the agency has not defined it in more concrete terms. These circumstances, paired with changes in FCC leadership, have led to significant changes over time in how the FCC regulates the broadcast and telecommunications industries. The FCC is directed by five commissioners appointed by the President and confirmed by the Senate for five-year terms. The President designates one of the commissioners as chairperson. Three commissioners may be members of the same political party of the President and none can have a financial interest in any commission-related business. The current commissioners are Ajit Pai (Chair), Michael O'Rielly, Brendan Carr, Jessica Rosenworcel, and Geoffrey Starks. The day-to-day functions of the FCC are carried out by 7 bureaus and 10 offices. The current basic structure of the FCC was established in 2002 as part of the agency's effort to better reflect the industries it regulates. The seventh bureau, the Public Safety and Homeland Security Bureau, was established in 2006. The bureaus process applications for licenses and other filings, manage non-federal spectrum, analyze complaints, conduct investigations, develop and implement regulatory programs, and participate in hearings, among other things. The offices provide support services. Bureaus and offices often collaborate when addressing FCC issues. Beginning in the 110th Congress, the FCC has been funded through the House and Senate Financial Services and General Government (FSGG) appropriations bill as a single line item. Previously, it was funded through what is now the Commerce, Justice, Science appropriations bill, also as a single line item. Since 2009 the FCC's budget has been derived from regulatory fees collected by the agency rather than through a direct appropriation. The fees, often referred to as \"Section (9) fees,\" are collected from license holders and certain other entities. The FCC is authorized to review the regulatory fees each year and adjust them to reflect changes in its appropriation from year to year. Most years, appropriations language prohibits the use by the commission of any excess collections received in the current fiscal year or any prior years. For FY2020, the FCC has requested $335,660,000 in budget authority from regulatory fee offsetting collections. The FCC also requested $132,538,680 in budget authority for the spectrum auctions program."], "all_classes": null, "length": 3388}
{"pred": "\nThe report discusses the history and current state of emergency powers in the United States. Emergency powers are granted to the President through the Constitution and statutory law. The President has the authority to exercise emergency powers in times of crisis or exigency, but the extent of this authority is contingent upon the President's interpretation of their office. There are statutory grants of power for emergency conditions that are available to the President, but they remain dormant until activated by a formal declaration of a national emergency. The National Emergencies Act of 1976 provides procedures for declaring and regulating national emergencies. The report details the history of emergency powers, including the exercise of emergency powers by past Presidents, and the development of statutory emergency powers. The report also discusses the National Emergencies Act and how it has been used by various Presidents. The act provides for the President to declare a national emergency and activate standby statutory provisions. The act also provides for congressional regulation of emergency declarations. The report concludes that while emergency powers have become more circumscribed through statutory expression, there is still room for improvement and reform in this policy area.", "answers": ["The President of the United States has available certain powers that may be exercised in the event that the nation is threatened by crisis, exigency, or emergency circumstances (other than natural disasters, war, or near-war situations). Such powers may be stated explicitly or implied by the Constitution, assumed by the Chief Executive to be permissible constitutionally, or inferred from or specified by statute. Through legislation, Congress has made a great many delegations of authority in this regard over the past 230 years. There are, however, limits and restraints upon the President in his exercise of emergency powers. With the exception of the habeas corpus clause, the Constitution makes no allowance for the suspension of any of its provisions during a national emergency. Disputes over the constitutionality or legality of the exercise of emergency powers are judicially reviewable. Both the judiciary and Congress, as co-equal branches, can restrain the executive regarding emergency powers. So can public opinion. Since 1976, the President has been subject to certain procedural formalities in utilizing some statutorily delegated emergency authority. The National Emergencies Act (50 U.S.C. §§1601-1651) eliminated or modified some statutory grants of emergency authority, required the President to formally declare the existence of a national emergency and to specify what statutory authority activated by the declaration would be used, and provided Congress a means to countermand the President's declaration and the activated authority being sought. The development of this regulatory statute and subsequent declarations of national emergency are reviewed in this report."], "all_classes": null, "length": 4981}
{"pred": "\nThe US Postal Service (USPS) has a growing sector of competitive products, including packages and mail, that it delivers for businesses and individuals. In fiscal year 2017, revenue from these products increased by 28% to $4.9 billion. USPS aims to remain competitive in the delivery market and uses scanning to track these products. USPS scans competitive products at multiple points in the mail flow, including when they arrive at post offices and when they are delivered to customers. However, USPS has not adopted any specific internal control standards for its operational internal control activities, such as scanning competitive products. This lack of standards may limit USPS's ability to improve its scanning procedures and address scanning issues. USPS has developed standard operating procedures for scanning, but these are not always consistent and may not be easily accessible to employees. USPS has missed some scans and encountered scanning issues, which could affect its ability to deliver competitive products accurately. To address these issues, GAO recommends that USPS identify and adopt internal control standards for its operational internal control activities, improve communication of scanning procedures, and create standard operating procedures for managers to address inaccurate scans. USPS agreed with the recommendations and committed to completing corrective actions by November 2018.", "answers": ["USPS's competitive products have become increasingly important, comprising about 28 percent of USPS's total revenue. USPS scans these packages at various points throughout the postal network. When scans are inaccurate or missing, questions are raised about the veracity of USPS's data on scanning performance and can lead to customer complaints. GAO was asked to review USPS's scanning policies and procedures. In this report, GAO (1) describes USPS's scanning performance and (2) examines how USPS ensures accurate scanning. GAO reviewed USPS's policies and procedures and assessed them against internal control standards; interviewed officials from USPS and five high-volume mailers; and conducted site visits to six post offices in two USPS districts that represented a range of volume, number of routes, and performance. Mail products over which the United States Postal Service (USPS) does not exercise market dominance, such as many of its packages, are called competitive products. These items are scanned throughout the mail delivery system to track their progress (see figure). USPS data show that these products are almost always scanned. For example, USPS data showed that for the first three quarters of fiscal year 2018; all but one of USPS's 67 districts met their scanning goals. Additionally, mailers that account for a high volume of USPS's competitive products told GAO that they believed USPS was generally scanning products correctly. However, a small percentage of missed or inaccurate scans occur. For example, a report from one USPS district showed that for one week, 0.73 percent of the products delivered were missing a scan and that for the fiscal year to date almost 155,000 competitive products were missing a delivery scan. USPS has designed and implemented procedures and activities to help ensure accurate scanning, but some limitations could contribute to scanning errors. For example, USPS has not based its operational procedures for scanning on any internal control standards. USPS officials said the procedures were based on USPS's unique responsibilities, management experience, and sound business practices, but the officials could not identify specific standards or a framework that they followed as the basis for the procedures. USPS officials said they did not believe any internal controls standards applied to these procedures. By not basing procedures on standards, USPS may miss opportunities to improve how it achieves its mission to scan and measure the performance of competitive products. Additionally, USPS's scanning procedure documents, such as for outlining specific delivery scanning steps, are not always consistent, and USPS relies on more informal methods, such as meetings with employees to communicate changes. Thus, employees may not have accurate procedures available to them. Finally, USPS lacks procedures to help managers identify and address incorrect scans, address customer complaints or otherwise address scanning irregularities. For example, USPS's guidance for managers is limited to a list of bullet-points that do not detail the steps managers should follow to resolve scanning irregularities. In addition, this list has not been updated since 2005. Without consistent or detailed procedures, USPS's employees and managers may not scan items accurately or find information needed to resolve scanning issues—a situation that could hinder USPS's ability to reduce inaccurate or missing scans for these important mail products. GAO recommends that USPS: (1) identify and adopt internal control standards for its operational activities such as for scanning of competitive products; (2) improve the communication of procedures for scanning competitive products; and, (3) create procedures for supervisors on how to address inaccurate scans and resolve scanning issues. USPS agreed to explore addressing the first recommendation and agreed with the other two recommendations."], "all_classes": null, "length": 5486}
{"pred": "\nThe National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) has several major space telescope projects in development, including WFIRST, TESS, and JWST. These projects have different costs and phases of development, with WFIRST currently undergoing an independent review to address cost growth concerns. NASA has implemented measures to manage cost and schedule performance, including establishing adequate cost and schedule reserves, regularly updating project life cycle cost estimates, and enhancing oversight of contractors. However, challenges remain, particularly in the integration and test phase where unforeseen issues can arise. NASA has also experienced significant cost and schedule delays with JWST, which has led to a $8 billion cap on its development costs and a revised life cycle cost estimate. To minimize these issues, NASA should continue to enhance its cost and schedule management practices, including regularly updating project life cycle cost estimates and enhancing oversight of contractors. NASA should also prioritize its scarce resources to maximize the impact of its science program.", "answers": ["Acquisition management has been a long-standing challenge at NASA, although GAO has reported on improvements the agency has made in recent years. Three space telescope projects are the key enablers for NASA to achieve its astrophysics' science goals, which include seeking to understand the universe. In its fiscal year 2018 budget request, NASA asked for about $697 million for these three projects, which represents over 50 percent of NASA's budget for its astrophysics' major projects. In total, these projects represent an expected investment of at least $12.4 billion. This statement reflects preliminary observations on (1) the current status and cost of NASA's major telescope projects and (2) lessons learned that can be applied to NASA's management of its telescope projects. This statement is based on ongoing work on JWST and ongoing work on the status of NASA's major projects. Both reports are planned to be published in Spring 2018. This statement is also based on past GAO reports on JWST and NASA's acquisitions of major projects, and NASA input. The National Aeronautics and Space Administration's (NASA) current portfolio of major space telescopes includes three projects that vary in cost, complexity, and phase of the acquisition life cycle. GAO's ongoing work indicates that these projects are each making progress in line with their phase of the acquisition cycle but also face some challenges. For example, the current launch date for the James Webb Space Telescope (JWST) project reflects a 57-60-month delay from the project's original schedule. GAO's preliminary observations indicate this project still has significant integration and testing to complete, with very little schedule reserve remaining to account for delays. Therefore, additional delays beyond the delay of up to 8 months recently announced are likely, and funding available under the $8 billion Congressional cost cap for formulation and development may be inadequate. There are a number of lessons learned from its acquisitions that NASA could consider to increase the likelihood of successful outcomes for its telescope projects, as well as for its larger portfolio of projects, such as its human spaceflight projects. For example, twice in the history of the JWST program, independent reviews found that the program was not holding adequate cost and schedule reserves. GAO has found that NASA has not applied this lesson learned to all of its large projects, and similar outcomes to JWST have started to emerge. For example, NASA did not incorporate this lesson with its human spaceflight programs. In July 2016 and April 2017, GAO found that these programs were holding inadequate levels of cost and schedule reserves to cover unexpected cost increases or delays. In April 2017, GAO recommended that NASA reassess the date of the programs' first test flight. NASA concurred and, in November 2017, announced a launch delay of up to 19 months. GAO is not making any recommendations in this statement, but has made recommendations in prior reports to strengthen NASA's acquisition management of its major projects. NASA has generally agreed with GAO's recommendations and taken steps to implement them."], "all_classes": null, "length": 4085}
{"pred": "\nThe Small Business Administration's Surety Bond Guarantee Program was established in 1971 to help small businesses compete for federal contracts by providing surety bonds. The program guarantees up to $6.5 million of a contractor's obligations, with the guarantee rate ranging from 80% to 90%. The program has experienced fluctuations in the number and amount of bonds guaranteed over the years, with recent increases likely due to improving economic conditions. The program has faced challenges in attracting surety companies to participate, with some companies citing administrative burdens and low profit margins. In 2013, the program's bond limit was increased to $6.5 million and up to $10 million if a federal contracting officer certifies that such a guarantee is necessary. The program has experienced a net positive cash flow in recent years and has averaged a default rate of 3-5%. The program has 28 participating sureties and 80% of its bonds are issued through the Prior Approval Program. The program's guarantee rate was increased in 2017 for the Preferred Surety Bond Guarantee Program to not exceed 90% of losses. There have been proposals to merge the Prior Approval and Preferred Surety Bond Guarantee Programs into a single program with streamlined application requirements. The program's size and guarantee rates have been debated, with some arguing that a federal program is necessary to supplement the private market but others questioning the need for the program.", "answers": ["The Small Business Administration's (SBA's) Surety Bond Guarantee Program is designed to increase small businesses' access to federal, state, and local government contracting, as well as private-sector contracts, by guaranteeing bid, performance, and payment bonds for small businesses that cannot obtain surety bonds through regular commercial channels. The program guarantees individual contracts of up to $6.5 million, and up to $10 million if a federal contracting officer certifies that such a guarantee is necessary. The SBA's guarantee currently ranges from 80% to 90% of the surety's loss if a default occurs. In FY2018, the SBA guaranteed 10,800 bid and final surety bonds with a total contract value of nearly $6.5 billion. A surety bond is a three-party instrument between a surety (who agrees to be responsible for the debt or obligation of another), a contractor, and a project owner. The agreement binds the contractor to comply with the contract's terms and conditions. If the contractor is unable to successfully perform the contract, the surety assumes the contractor's responsibilities and ensures that the project is completed. Surety bonds encourage project owners to contract with small businesses that may not have the credit history or prior experience of larger businesses and may be at greater risk of failing to comply with the contract's terms and conditions. Surety bonds are important to small businesses interested in competing for federal contracts because the federal government requires prime contractors—prior to the award of a federal contract exceeding $150,000 for the construction, alteration, or repair of any building or public work of the United States—to furnish a performance bond issued by a surety satisfactory to the contracting officer in an amount that the officer considers adequate to protect the government. P.L. 112-239, the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2013, increased the program's bond limit to $6.5 million, or up to $10 million if a federal contracting officer certifies that such a guarantee is necessary. The limit had been $2 million since 2000, with a temporary increase from February 17, 2009, through September 30, 2010, to $5 million, and up to $10 million if a federal contracting officer certified in writing that such a guarantee was necessary. Advocates of raising the program's bond limit argued that doing so would increase contracting opportunities for small businesses and bring the limit more in line with limits of other small business programs, such as the 8(a) Minority Small Business and Capital Ownership Development Program and the Historically Underutilized Business Zone (HUBZone) Program. Opponents argued that raising the limit could lead to higher amounts being guaranteed by the SBA and, as a result, increase the risk of program losses. This report examines the program's origin and development, including (1) the decision to supplement the original Prior Approval Program with the Preferred Surety Bond Guarantee Program that initially provided a lower guarantee rate (not to exceed 70%) than the Prior Approval Program (not to exceed 80% or 90%, depending on the size of the contract and the type of small business) in exchange for allowing preferred sureties to issue SBA-guaranteed surety bonds without the SBA's prior approval; (2) P.L. 114-92, the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2016, which increased the Preferred Surety Bond Guarantee Program's guarantee rate from not to exceed 70% to not to exceed 90% of losses; and (3) the decision to increase the program's bond limit."], "all_classes": null, "length": 8920}
{"pred": "\nThe report examines lobbyists' compliance with the Lobbying Disclosure Act of 1995, as amended. The LDA requires lobbyists to register with the Secretary of the Senate and the Clerk of the House and file quarterly reports disclosing their lobbying activities. The report found that:\n\n- 87.2% of newly registered lobbyists filed their first quarterly report within the same quarter as their registration.\n- Most lobbyists provided documentation for income and expenses for sampled reports from 2010 through 2017. However, in recent years there has been some variation in the estimated percentage of reports with documentation.\n- 25% of reports did not round reported income or expenses according to the guidance.\n- Lobbyists for an estimated 93% of LD-2 reports filed year-end 2016 for all lobbyists listed political contributions on the report as required.\n- USAO officials stated that they have sufficient personnel resources and authority under the LDA to enforce reporting requirements. However, the number of assigned personnel has decreased due to attrition.\n\nThe report also identified challenges to compliance, such as difficulty rounding income and expenses, and provided recommendations for improving compliance. The U.S. Attorney's Office for the District of Columbia (USAO) received 3,213 referrals from both the Secretary of the Senate and the Clerk of the House for failure to comply with LD-2 reporting requirements. Most of these referrals were resolved through lobbyists filing reports or terminating their registrations.\n\nIn summary, the report found that while most lobbyists complied with the LDA reporting requirements, there were some issues with rounding income and expenses and documentation. USAO had sufficient resources and authority to enforce the LDA but faced challenges due to personnel shortages.", "answers": ["The LDA, as amended, requires lobbyists to file quarterly disclosure reports and semiannual reports on certain political contributions. The law also includes a provision for GAO to annually audit lobbyists' compliance with the LDA. GAO's objectives were to (1) determine the extent to which lobbyists can demonstrate compliance with disclosure requirements, (2) identify challenges to compliance that lobbyists report, and (3) describe the resources and authorities available to USAO in its role in enforcing LDA compliance, and the efforts USAO has made to improve enforcement. This is GAO's 11th report under the provision. GAO reviewed a stratified random sample of 98 quarterly disclosure LD-2 reports filed for the third and fourth quarters of calendar year 2016 and the first and second quarters of calendar year 2017. GAO also reviewed two random samples totaling 160 LD-203 reports from year-end 2016 and midyear 2017. This methodology allowed GAO to generalize to the population of 45,818 disclosure reports with $5,000 or more in lobbying activity, and 30,594 reports of federal political campaign contributions. GAO also met with officials from USAO to obtain status updates on its efforts to focus resources on lobbyists who fail to comply. GAO is not making any recommendations in this report. GAO provided a draft of this report to the Department of Justice for review and comment. The Department of Justice provided technical comments, which GAO incorporated as appropriate. For the 2017 reporting period, most lobbyists provided documentation for key elements of their disclosure reports to demonstrate compliance with the Lobbying Disclosure Act of 1995, as amended (LDA). For lobbying disclosure (LD-2) reports and political contributions (LD-203) reports filed during the third and fourth quarter of 2016 and the first and second quarter of 2017, GAO estimates that 87 percent of lobbyists filed reports as required for the quarter in which they first registered; the figure below describes the filing process and enforcement; 99 percent of all lobbyists who filed (up from 83 percent in 2016) could provide documentation for income and expenses; and 93 percent filed year-end 2016 LD-203 reports as required. These findings are generally consistent with prior reports GAO issued for the 2010 through 2016 reporting periods. However, in recent years GAO's findings showed some variation in the estimated percentage of reports with supporting documentation. For example, an estimated increase in lobbyists who could document expenses is notable in 2017 and represents a statistically significant increase from 2016. As in GAO's other reports, some lobbyists were still unclear about the need to disclose certain previously held covered positions, such as paid congressional internships or certain executive agency positions. GAO estimates that 15 percent of all LD-2 reports may not have properly disclosed previously held covered positions. On the other hand, over the past several years of reporting on lobbying disclosure, GAO found that most lobbyists in the sample rated the terms associated with LD-2 reporting as “very easy” or “somewhat easy” to understand. The U.S. Attorney's Office for the District of Columbia (USAO) stated it has sufficient resources and authority to enforce compliance with the LDA. USAO continued its efforts to bring lobbyists into compliance by reminding them to file reports or by applying civil penalties."], "all_classes": null, "length": 6271}
{"pred": "\nThe Small Business Administration (SBA) administers several programs to support small businesses, including loan guarantee and venture capital programs, contracting programs, direct loan programs for businesses, homeowners, and renters to aid in their recovery from natural disasters, and small business management and technical assistance training programs. Congress has increased its interest in these programs in recent years, particularly small businesses as a means to stimulate economic activity and create jobs. The SBA's appropriations for these programs have varied significantly since 2000, with some programs experiencing large increases during economic downturns. The SBA's appropriations for salaries and expenses have increased from $176.49 million in 2000 to $267.5 million in 2019, exceeding inflation. The SBA's business loan administration appropriations have not kept pace with inflation. The SBA's Office of Advocacy has received increased appropriations, exceeding inflation. The SBA's entrepreneurial development noncredit programs, including Small Business Development Centers, Microloan Technical Assistance program, Women Business Centers, SCORE, and other programs, have also received increased appropriations. However, some programs, such as the Program for Investment in Microentrepreneurs, have experienced funding fluctuations. The SBA's Office of Veterans Business Development and HUBZone program have received increased appropriations in recent years. The SBA's Entrepreneurial Development Initiative and Growth Accelerator initiatives have received less funding. Overall, the SBA's appropriations have varied significantly over time, with some programs experiencing large increases during economic downturns.", "answers": ["This report examines the Small Business Administration's (SBA's) appropriations (new budget authority, minus rescissions and sequestration) over time, focusing on developments and trends since FY2000. It also provides total available funding (which includes carryover from the prior fiscal year, carryover into the next fiscal year, account transfers, rescissions, and sequestration) and, for entrepreneurial development noncredit programs, actual and anticipated expenditures for comparative purposes. SBA appropriations, as a whole, have varied significantly from year to year since FY2000 and across all three of the agency's major spending categories: disaster assistance, business loan credit subsidies, and \"other programs,\" a category that includes salaries and expenses, business loan administration, the Office of Inspector General, the Office of Advocacy, and entrepreneurial development programs. Overall, the SBA's appropriations have ranged from a high of $2.359 billion in FY2018 to a low of $571.8 million in FY2007. Much of this volatility is due to significant variation in appropriations for disaster assistance, which ranged from a high of $1.7 billion in FY2006 to a low of $0 in FY2009. This variation can be attributed primarily to supplemental appropriations provided to address disaster needs arising from the impact of major hurricanes, such as Hurricanes Katrina and Sandy, and more recently, Hurricanes Harvey, Irma, and Maria. The SBA's appropriations for business loan credit subsidies have also varied since FY2000, ranging from a high of $319.7 million in FY2013 ($337.3 million before sequestration and rescission) to a low of $1.3 million in FY2006 and FY2007. This variation is due to the impact of changing economic conditions on the SBA's guaranteed loan portfolios. During good economic times, revenue from SBA fees and collateral liquidation is typically sufficient to cover the costs of purchasing guaranteed loans that have defaulted. During and immediately following recessions, however, that revenue is typically insufficient to cover the costs of purchasing guaranteed loans that have defaulted. The SBA's appropriations for other programs, as a collective, have also varied since FY2000, ranging from a high of $1.6253 billion in FY2010 to a low of $455.6 million in FY2007. This variation is primarily due to congressional response to changing economic conditions. For example, Congress approved significant, temporary increases in appropriations for the SBA's other programs spending category in FY2009 and FY2010. Overall, since FY2000, appropriations for other programs have increased at a pace that exceeds inflation. This report provides appropriations for all five major components of the other programs spending category, including the SBA's entrepreneurial development programs. The SBA's appropriations for FY1954 through FY1999 are provided in the Appendix."], "all_classes": null, "length": 4967}
{"pred": "\nThe Black Lung Disability Trust Fund provides cash assistance and medical benefits to coal miners with black lung disease. The fund is financed by coal taxes paid by mine operators. The fund has a large debt due to past borrowing from the Treasury's general fund. The fund's revenue has consistently fallen short of expenses, resulting in debt. The fund's debt is expected to continue to grow due to declining coal production. The fund's debt is projected to reach $10 billion by 2040. The fund's revenue is expected to decrease due to the scheduled 2019 tax rate decrease. The fund will likely need to borrow from the Treasury's general fund to cover debt repayments. Options to reduce the fund's debt include adjusting the coal tax, forgiving interest, and forgiving debt. However, implementing these options could affect the coal industry or general taxpayers. The fund's debt forgiveness needs vary depending on the coal tax rate. Forgiving all debt would require an average tax of $0.47 per ton of coal. The fund's debt forgiveness needs are sensitive to assumptions about future beneficiaries and coal production. The fund's simulations suggest that forgiving interest will not eliminate debt by 2050. The fund's borrowing will likely continue to increase from 2019 to 2050. The fund's options to balance its finances include adjusting the coal tax, forgiving interest, and forgiving debt. However, implementing these options could have varying impacts on the coal industry and general taxpayers.", "answers": ["With revenue of about $450 million in fiscal year 2017, the Trust Fund paid about $184 million in benefits to more than 25,000 coal miners and eligible dependents. However, the Trust Fund also borrowed about $1.3 billion from the Treasury's general fund in fiscal year 2017 to cover its debt repayment expenditures. Adding to this financial challenge, the coal tax that supports the Trust Fund is scheduled to decrease by about 55 percent beginning in 2019. GAO was asked to review the financial positon of the Trust Fund and identify options to improve it. This report examines (1) factors that have challenged the financial position of the Trust Fund since its inception and (2) the extent to which Trust Fund debt may change through 2050, and selected options that could improve its future financial position. GAO reviewed Trust Fund financial data from fiscal years 1979 through 2017. GAO also interviewed officials from the Departments of Labor, Treasury, Health and Human Services (HHS) and representatives of coal industry and union groups. Using assumptions, such as the about 55 percent coal tax decrease and moderately declining coal production, GAO simulated the extent to which Trust Fund debt may change through 2050. GAO also simulated how selected options, such as forgiveness of debt, could improve finances. The options simulated are not intended to be exhaustive. Further, GAO is not endorsing any particular option or combination of options. GAO provided a draft of this report to DOL, Treasury, and HHS. The agencies provided technical comments, which were incorporated as appropriate. Multiple factors have challenged Black Lung Disability Trust Fund (Trust Fund) finances since it was established about 40 years ago. Its expenditures have consistently exceeded its revenues, interest payments have grown, and actions taken that were expected to improve Trust Fund finances did not completely address its debt. When necessary to make expenditures, the Trust Fund borrows with interest from the Department of the Treasury's (Treasury) general fund. Because Trust Fund expenditures have consistently exceeded revenue, it has borrowed almost every year since 1979, its first complete fiscal year, and as a result debt and interest payments increased. Legislative actions were taken over the years including (1) raising the rate of the coal tax that provides Trust Fund revenues and (2) forgiving debt. For example, the Energy Improvement and Extension Act of 2008 provided an appropriation toward Trust Fund debt forgiveness; about $6.5 billion was forgiven, according to Department of Labor (DOL) data (see figure). However, coal tax revenues were less than expected due, in part, to the 2008 recession and increased competition from other energy sources, according to DOL and Treasury officials. As a result, the Trust Fund continued to borrow from Treasury's general fund from fiscal years 2010 through 2017 to cover debt repayment expenditures. GAO's simulation suggests that Trust Fund borrowing will likely increase from fiscal years 2019 through 2050 due, in part, to the coal tax rate decrease of about 55 percent that will take effect in 2019 and declining coal production. The simulation estimates that Trust Fund borrowing may exceed $15 billion by 2050 (see figure). However, various options, such as adjusting the coal tax and forgiving interest or debt, could reduce future borrowing and improve the Trust Fund's financial position. For example, maintaining the current coal tax rates and forgiving debt of $2.4 billion could, under certain circumstances, balance the Trust Fund by 2050, whereby revenue would be sufficient to cover expenditures. However, a coal industry representative said that maintaining or increasing the coal tax would burden the coal industry, particularly at a time when coal production has been declining. Further, Treasury officials noted that the costs associated with forgiving Trust Fund interest or debt would be paid by taxpayers."], "all_classes": null, "length": 5783}
{"pred": "\nThe report examines how federal agencies assess whether personal property is needed and how they dispose of unneeded personal property. Five federal agencies were selected based on their recent experiences with space reduction efforts and the amount of personal property declared excess. The report found that while agencies have policies and procedures for managing personal property, they do not systematically assess property for continued need. This can lead to agencies retaining unneeded property and missing opportunities to realize cost savings. Agencies also face challenges disposing of property during space reduction projects due to timing issues and lack of inventory of non-accountable property. The report recommends that the Director of OMB provide guidance to agencies on managing personal property, emphasizing the requirement to continuously review and identify unneeded personal property.", "answers": ["The federal government owns billions of dollars of personal property—such as office furniture, scientific equipment, and industrial machinery. By law, each agency is required to follow GSA's disposal process so that an agency's unneeded property can be used by other agencies or certain non-federal entities. Since 2012, agencies have reduced their office and warehouse space due to government-wide initiatives, a reduction that in turn has required agencies to dispose of some affected personal property. GAO was asked to review how federal agencies identify and dispose of unneeded personal property. This report examines (1) how selected agencies assess whether personal property is needed and (2) how these agencies dispose of unneeded property and how, if at all, space reduction efforts have affected disposals. GAO reviewed federal statutes and regulations, and selected five agencies—EPA, Forest Service, GSA, HUD, and IRS—mainly based on space reduction results and goals. GAO reviewed these agencies' property disposal data for 2012 through 2016 and interviewed headquarters and field staff about their property management and disposal processes. The five agencies GAO reviewed—the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), Forest Service, General Services Administration (GSA), Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD), and Internal Revenue Service (IRS)—generally do not have policies or processes for identifying unneeded personal property, such as office furniture, on a proactive basis. Instead, officials from these agencies said they typically identified unneeded property as a result of a “triggering event,” such as an office space reduction. Executive agencies are required by law to continuously review property under their control to identify unneeded personal property and then dispose of it promptly. Without such policies or processes, agencies may not be routinely identifying unneeded property that could be used elsewhere, and efforts to maximize federal personal property use and minimize unnecessary storage costs may not be effective. GSA has issued regulations establishing a government-wide disposal process for unneeded personal property. However, according to GSA officials, the agency lacks the authority to promulgate regulations or formal guidance on management of in-use agency property, and there is no government-wide guidance to agencies on identifying unneeded personal property. Agencies are required to have internal control activities—such as policies and procedures—for reasonable assurance of efficient operations and minimal resource waste, and the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) provides guidance to agencies on implementing such activities. Guidance from OMB that emphasizes agencies' internal control responsibilities could help ensure that agencies are proactively and regularly identifying property that is no longer needed. The selected agencies reported little difficulty in following GSA's personal property disposal process, reporting over 37,000 items as unneeded property in fiscal years 2012 through 2016. This property was disposed of through transfers to other agencies, donations to authorized recipients, sales, or discarding. When disposing of personal property from space reduction projects at locations GAO visited, agencies also reported using GSA's process (see figure). Overall, agencies said they have not experienced major challenges with disposing of personal property from space reduction efforts. This lack of challenges could be because projects are geographically dispersed and spread over several years. OMB should provide guidance to executive agencies on managing their personal property, emphasizing that agencies' policies or processes should reflect the requirement to continuously review and identify unneeded personal property. OMB did not comment on GAO's recommendation."], "all_classes": null, "length": 6529}
{"pred": "\nThe U.S. government engages with other countries in the Western Hemisphere through various inter-American organizations, including the Organization of American States (OAS), Pan American Health Organization (PAHO), Inter-American Institute for Cooperation on Agriculture (IICA), and the Pan-American Institute of Geography and History (PAIGH). These organizations help promote democracy, health, security, and development in the region. The U.S. government provides voluntary contributions to these organizations, which are managed by the four U.S. agencies reviewed in the report: State, USAID, HHS, and USDA. The report found that while the strategic goals of the inter-American organizations align with U.S. strategic goals, the U.S. agencies did not consistently include all key monitoring provisions in their assistance agreements with the organizations. Specifically, USDA and State did not include all monitoring provisions in their agreements. USAID and HHS did include all key monitoring provisions. The report recommends that USAID ensure it has full documentation of required monitoring activities in its agreements with inter-American organizations, and USDA ensure it includes all key monitoring provisions. The U.S. agencies also lacked full documentation of monitoring activities for some of the agreements reviewed. The report concludes that monitoring the implementation of U.S. assistance agreements and fully documenting the results of such monitoring are key management controls to ensure U.S. funds are used appropriately and effectively.", "answers": ["The United States is a member of the OAS, PAHO, IICA, and PAIGH, which promote democracy, health care, agricultural development, and scientific exchange. GAO was asked to review U.S. assistance to these four organizations. In this report, GAO (1) assesses the extent to which the organizations' strategic goals align with those of U.S. agencies; (2) examines how the organizations oversee the use of their funds and the extent to which U.S. agencies have supported those efforts; (3) assesses the extent to which U.S. agencies included key monitoring provisions as part of assistance agreements; and (4) assesses the extent to which U.S. agencies had documentation of monitoring activities, including those called for by these provisions. GAO analyzed documents and interviewed officials from State, USAID, HHS, USDA, and the organizations. GAO also analyzed a nongeneralizable sample of 12 of the 60 assistance agreements that were awarded by State, USAID, HHS, and USDA to OAS, PAHO, and IICA and were active during calendar years 2014 through 2016. For each agency, GAO selected three agreements with the lowest, median, and highest dollar value. GAO found that strategic goals of the Organization of American States (OAS), the Pan American Health Organization (PAHO), the Inter-American Institute for Cooperation on Agriculture (IICA), and the Pan-American Institute of Geography and History (PAIGH) are predominantly aligned with the strategic goals of the Department of State (State), the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS), and the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA). For example, IICA's strategic goals of a productive agricultural sector, enhancing agricultural development, and food security are aligned with USDA's foreign assistance goals. State, USAID, HHS, and USDA fund activities in the form of assistance agreements (e.g., grants and cooperative agreements) with OAS, PAHO, and IICA, which in 2016 totaled $32 million. According to agency officials, the agencies employ mechanisms to ensure that these agreements align with U.S. strategic goals. OAS, PAHO, IICA, and PAIGH have established mechanisms for overseeing their use of funds, such as external auditors, internal audit boards, and anti-fraud and ethics policies. State and USDA have directly supported these mechanisms. For example, State engaged in the selection process for OAS's Inspector General. GAO's review of 12 selected assistance agreements found that USDA included no financial or performance monitoring provisions in one of its agreements and that State did not include two key monitoring provisions in one of its agreements, called for by applicable guidance. GAO found that the remaining 10 agreements it reviewed contained all key monitoring provisions and that State has since taken corrective action. GAO found that U.S. agencies did not have full documentation of 18 of the 42 monitoring activities required by the 12 assistance agreements GAO reviewed (see table). For example, USDA did not have full documentation, such as for financial reports, of any of its 10 required monitoring activities and USDA officials did not explain their lack of documentation. USAID officials explained that their lack of full documentation was due, in part, to grant officers not always following their document management policies. State and HHS have since taken corrective action. If an agency does not have full documentation of monitoring activities, it may lack information needed to make appropriate budgetary and programmatic decisions. GAO recommends that (1) USDA ensure inclusion of all monitoring provisions as part of agreements and (2) USAID and USDA ensure full documentation of monitoring activities. USDA and USAID concurred with GAO's recommendations."], "all_classes": null, "length": 5123}
{"pred": "\nThe report from the Government Accountability Office (GAO) discusses the impact of e-commerce on the market for counterfeit goods. According to the analysis, the rise of e-commerce has led to a shift from \"underground\" or secondary markets to primary markets, where counterfeiters try to deceive consumers into purchasing fake goods they believe are authentic. This has resulted in changes in how counterfeit goods are sold, such as exploiting online marketplaces to gain legitimacy and setting prices close to authentic goods. The GAO purchased counterfeit products from third-party sellers on five popular e-commerce websites and found that 20% of the items were counterfeit. The report highlights the risks associated with counterfeit goods, including health and safety hazards, and notes that law enforcement agencies face challenges distinguishing between legitimate and counterfeit goods due to the sophistication of counterfeits. The GAO recommends that Customs and Border Protection (CBP) evaluate its IPR enforcement efforts and share more information with rights holders and e-commerce websites to enhance IPR protection. CBP concurred with the recommendations.", "answers": ["This testimony summarizes the information contained in GAO's January 2018 report, entitled Intellectual Property: Agencies Can Improve Efforts to Address Risks Posed by Changing Counterfeits Market , ( GAO-18-216 ). Changes in the market for counterfeit goods entering the United States pose new challenges for consumers, the private sector, and U.S. agencies that enforce intellectual property rights (IPR). Specifically, growth in e-commerce has contributed to a shift in the sale of counterfeit goods in the United States, with consumers increasingly purchasing goods online and counterfeiters producing a wider variety of goods that may be sold on websites alongside authentic products. For example, 20 of 47 items GAO purchased from third-party sellers on popular consumer websites were counterfeit, according to testing by the products' rights holders (see table), highlighting potential risks to consumers. The changes in the market for counterfeit goods can also pose challenges to the private sector—for example, the challenge of distinguishing counterfeit from authentic goods listed for sale online—and complicate the enforcement efforts of U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) and U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE). CBP and ICE engage in a number of activities to enhance IPR enforcement; however, while ICE has assessed some of its efforts, CBP has taken limited steps to do so. CBP's and ICE's IPR enforcement activities broadly include detecting imports of potentially IPR-infringing goods, conducting special operations at U.S. ports, engaging with international partners, and undertaking localized pilot programs or port-led initiatives. CBP and ICE have collected some performance data for each of the eight activities GAO reviewed, and ICE has taken some steps to understand the impact of its efforts. However, CBP has conducted limited evaluation of its efforts to enhance IPR enforcement. Consequently, CBP may lack information needed to ensure it is investing its resources in the most efficient and effective activities. CBP and ICE generally collaborate on IPR enforcement, but according to private sector representatives, restrictions on CBP's information sharing limit private sector enforcement efforts. GAO found that CBP and ICE have undertaken efforts that align with selected key practices for interagency collaboration, such as participating in developing a national IPR enforcement strategy and agreeing on roles and responsibilities. However, sharing additional information about seized items with rights-holding companies and e-commerce websites could improve enforcement, according to private sector representatives. CBP officials said they share information to the extent allowed under current regulations, but CBP has not completed an assessment of what, if any, additional information would be beneficial to share with private sector entities. Without such an assessment, CBP will not know if sharing additional information requires regulatory or legal changes."], "all_classes": null, "length": 2313}
{"pred": "\nThis report provides information on the Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) block grant program. It covers topics such as funding, spending, caseloads, work requirements, and benefit levels. The report states that TANF is funded through a combination of federal and state funds, with the bulk of funding going to the 50 states, District of Columbia, Puerto Rico, Guam, and American Indian tribes. States are required to spend a minimum amount of their own funds on TANF programs, known as the maintenance of effort (MOE) requirement. The report shows that TANF spending has declined over time, with the real value of the block grant declining by 33%. TANF is used for various benefits and services, including basic assistance, child care, work-related activities, and tax credits. States have flexibility in using unspent funds and can reserve unused funds without time limit. The report also discusses the composition of the assistance caseload, which has shifted over time, with a decline in families headed by unemployed adults and an increase in families with employed adults. The maximum monthly TANF cash benefit varies by state, with lower benefits paid in the South. States are required to have 50% of their caseload meet work participation standards, but penalties can be forgiven if they have \"reasonable cause\" or develop a corrective compliance plan. The report also shows that states' work participation rates have increased since 2007, but mostly due to new programs for working parents rather than an increase in recipients in regular TANF programs. Only two states did not meet the all-families or two-parent work participation standards in FY2017.", "answers": ["The Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) block grant funds a wide range of benefits and services for low-income families with children. TANF was created in the 1996 welfare reform law (P.L. 104-193). This report responds to some frequently asked questions about TANF; it does not describe TANF rules (see, instead, CRS Report RL32748, The Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) Block Grant: A Primer on TANF Financing and Federal Requirements, by Gene Falk). TANF Funding and Expenditures. TANF provides fixed funding for the 50 states, the District of Columbia, the territories, and American Indian tribes. The basic block grant totals $16.5 billion per year. States are also required in total to contribute, from their own funds, at least $10.3 billion annually under a maintenance-of-effort (MOE) requirement. Though TANF is best known for funding cash assistance payments for needy families with children, the block grant and MOE funds are used for a wide variety of benefits and activities. In FY2017, expenditures on basic assistance totaled $7.1 billion—23% of total federal TANF and MOE dollars. Basic assistance is often—but not exclusively—paid as cash. In addition to funding basic assistance, TANF also contributes funds for child care and services for children who have been, or are at risk of being, abused and neglected. Some states also count expenditures in prekindergarten programs toward the MOE requirement. The TANF Assistance Caseload. A total of 1.2 million families, composed of 3.1 million recipients, received TANF- or MOE-funded assistance in September 2018. The bulk of the \"recipients\" were children—2.3 million in that month. The assistance caseload is heterogeneous. The type of family once thought of as the \"typical\" assistance family—one with an unemployed adult recipient—accounted for 32% of all families on the rolls in FY2016. Additionally, 31% of cash assistance families had an employed adult, while 38% of all TANF families were \"child-only\" and had no adult recipient. Child-only families include those with disabled adults receiving Supplemental Security Income (SSI), adults who are nonparents (e.g., grandparents, aunts, uncles) caring for children, and families consisting of citizen children and ineligible noncitizen parents. Cash Assistance Benefits. TANF cash benefit amounts are set by states. In July 2017, the maximum monthly benefit for a family of three ranged from $1,021 in New Hampshire to $170 in Mississippi. Only New Hampshire (at 60% of the federal poverty guidelines) had a maximum TANF cash assistance amount for this sized family in excess of 50% of poverty-level income. Work Requirements. TANF's main federal work requirement is actually a performance measure that applies to the states. States determine the work rules that apply to individual recipients. TANF law requires states to engage 50% of all families and 90% of two-parent families with work-eligible individuals in work activities, though these standards can be reduced by \"credits.\" Therefore, the effective standards states face are often less than the 50% or 90% targets, and vary by state. In FY2017, states achieved, on average, an all-family participation rate of 53.0% and a two-parent rate of 69.5%. In FY2017, two jurisdictions did not meet the all-family participation standard: Nevada and Guam. This is a reduction from FY2012, when 16 states did not meet that standard. In FY2017, nine jurisdictions did not meet the two-parent standard. States that do not meet work standards are at risk of being penalized by a reduction in their block grant."], "all_classes": null, "length": 3000}
{"pred": "\nThe Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) implemented the 2018 Clinical Laboratory Fee Schedule (CLFS) to set payment rates for laboratory tests based on private-payer rates. CMS collected data from laboratories on private-payer rates to set payment rates for individual tests and panel tests. However, not all laboratories reported data, and CMS did not estimate how much data was missing. CMS used the data it collected to set payment rates for 2018 through 2020, but the payment rates were reduced by 10% per year. CMS estimated that collecting additional data could increase Medicare expenditures by 3-9%. CMS stopped bundling payment rates for panel tests without billing codes and instead paid for each component test individually. This could increase expenditures by $10.1 billion. CMS should take steps to collect all data from laboratories required to report, estimate how incomplete data would affect payment rates, and revise payment rates as soon as practicable to avoid paying more than necessary. CMS should use bundled payment rates for panel tests with billing codes to avoid excess payments.", "answers": ["Medicare paid $7.1 billion for 433 million laboratory tests in 2017. These tests help health care providers prevent, diagnose, and treat diseases. PAMA included a provision for GAO to review CMS's implementation of new payment rates for these tests. This report addresses, among other objectives, (1) how CMS developed the new payment rates; (2) challenges CMS faced in setting accurate payment rates and what factors may have mitigated these challenges; and (3) the potential effect of the new payment rates on Medicare expenditures. GAO analyzed 2016 Medicare claims data (the most recent data available when GAO started its work and the year on which new payment rates were based) and private-payer data CMS collected. GAO also interviewed CMS and industry officials. The Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS) within the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) revised the Clinical Laboratory Fee Schedule (CLFS) for 2018, establishing new Medicare payment rates for laboratory services. Prior to 2018, these rates were based on historical laboratory fees and were typically higher than the rates paid by private payers. The Protecting Access to Medicare Act of 2014 (PAMA) required CMS to develop a national fee schedule for laboratory tests based on private-payer data. To revise the rates, CMS collected data on private-payer rates from approximately 2,000 laboratories and calculated median payment rates, weighted by volume. GAO found that the median private-payer rates were lower than Medicare's maximum payment rates in 2017 for 88 percent of tests. CMS is gradually phasing in reductions to Medicare payment rates, limited annually at 10 percent over a 3-year period (2018 through 2020), as outlined in PAMA. CMS relied on laboratories to determine whether they met data reporting requirements, but agency officials told GAO that CMS did not receive data from all laboratories required to report. CMS did not estimate the amount of data it should have received from laboratories that were required to report but did not. CMS took steps to exclude inaccurate private-payer data and estimated how collecting certain types and amounts of additional private-payer data could affect Medicare expenditures. However, it is not known whether CMS's estimates reflect the actual risk of incomplete data resulting in inaccurate Medicare payment rates. GAO found that PAMA's phased in reductions to new Medicare payment rates likely mitigated this risk of inaccurate Medicare payment rates from 2018 through 2020. However, GAO found that collecting incomplete data could have a larger effect on the accuracy of Medicare payment rates in future years when PAMA allows for greater payment-rate reductions. CMS's implementation of the new payment rates could lead Medicare to pay billions of dollars more than is necessary and result in CLFS expenditures increasing from what Medicare paid prior to 2018 for two reasons. First, CMS used the maximum Medicare payment rates in 2017 as a baseline to start the phase in of payment-rate reductions instead of using actual Medicare payment rates. This resulted in excess payments for some laboratory tests and, in some cases, higher payment rates than those Medicare previously paid, on average. GAO estimated that Medicare expenditures from 2018 through 2020 may be $733 million more than if CMS had phased in payment-rate reductions based on the average payment rates in 2016. Second, CMS stopped paying a bundled payment rate for certain panel tests (groups of laboratory tests generally performed together), as was its practice prior to 2018, because CMS had not yet clarified its authority to do so under PAMA, according to officials. CMS is currently reviewing whether it has the authority to bundle payment rates for panel tests to reflect the efficiency of conducting a group of tests. GAO estimated that if the payment rate for each panel test were unbundled, Medicare expenditures could increase by as much as $10.3 billion from 2018 through 2020 compared to estimated Medicare expenditures using lower bundled payment rates for panel tests. GAO recommends that the Administrator of CMS (1) collect complete private-payer data from all laboratories required to report or address the estimated effects of incomplete data, (2) phase in payment-rate reductions that start from the actual payment rates rather than the maximum payment rates Medicare paid prior to 2018, and (3) use bundled rates for panel tests. HHS concurred with GAO's first recommendation, neither agreed nor disagreed with the other two, and has since issued guidance to help address the third. GAO believes CMS should fully address these recommendations to prevent Medicare from paying more than is necessary."], "all_classes": null, "length": 6322}
{"pred": "\nThis report provides an overview of banking preemption in the United States. Banking preemption refers to the power of federal law to supersede or displace state laws regarding banking activities. The report discusses the following:\n\n1. General principles of federal preemption: Federal law can preempt state law when it grants national banks the power to engage in specific activities that state law prohibits or significantly interferes with. The Supreme Court has identified two general ways in which federal law can preempt state law: \n\na. Field preemption: When a federal law provides a comprehensive scheme of regulation that leaves no room for state law, it preempts state laws that interfere with the federal law's purpose.\n\nb. Conflict preemption: When state law significantly interferes with the ability of national banks to exercise their federal powers, it is preempted.\n\n2. History of banking preemption: The dual banking system in the US was established in 1863 and 1864 when Congress granted national banks the power to issue national banknotes and exercise certain federal powers. The National Bank Act and the Supreme Court's decisions in Barnett Bank and Marquette National Bank of Minneapolis v. First Omaha Services Corporation established the principle of preemption.\n\n3. Preemption rules: The Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC) has promulgated rules that interpret the National Bank Act and identify categories of state laws that are preempted. The Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act codified the Barnett Bank standard for preemption.\n\n4. Current issues:\n\na. Non-bank financial companies may benefit from banks' ability to export maximum interest rates. Courts have rejected this doctrine in some cases.\n\nb. The OCC has proposed rules to extend preemption to FinTech companies that engage in banking activities.\n\nc. Banks may be subject to state laws regarding marijuana businesses despite federal criminalization. Congress has proposed legislation to provide a \"safe harbor\" for banks serving these businesses.\n\nIn summary, banking preemption is an important aspect of the US banking system, allowing national banks to exercise their federal powers without interference from state law. However", "answers": ["Banks play a critical role in the United States economy, channeling money from savers to borrowers and facilitating productive investment. While the nature of lawmakers' interest in bank regulation has shifted over time, most bank regulations fall into one of three general categories. First, banks must abide by a variety of safety-and-soundness requirements designed to minimize the risk of their failure and maintain macroeconomic stability. Second, banks must comply with consumer protection rules intended to deter abusive practices and provide consumers with complete information about financial products and services. Third, banks are subject to various reporting, recordkeeping, and anti-money laundering requirements designed to assist law enforcement in investigating criminal activity. The substantive content of these requirements remains the subject of intense debate. However, the division of regulatory authority over banks between the federal government and the states plays a key role in shaping that content. In some cases, federal law displaces (or \"preempts\") state bank regulations. In other cases, states are permitted to supplement federal regulations with different, sometimes stricter requirements. Because of its substantive implications, federal preemption has recently become a flashpoint in debates surrounding bank regulation. In the American \"dual banking system,\" banks can apply for a national charter from the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC) or a state charter from a state's banking authority. A bank's choice of chartering authority is also a choice of primary regulator, as the OCC serves as the primary regulator of national banks and state regulatory agencies serve as the primary regulators of state-chartered banks. However, the Federal Reserve and the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) also play an important role in bank regulation. The Federal Reserve supervises all national banks and state-chartered banks that become members of the Federal Reserve System (FRS), while the FDIC supervises all state banks that do not become members of the FRS. This complex regulatory architecture has resulted in a \"symbiotic system\" with both federal regulation of state banks and state regulation of national banks. In the modern dual banking system, national banks are often subject to generally applicable state laws, and state banks are subject to both generally applicable federal laws and regulations imposed by their federal regulators. The evolution of this system during the 20th century caused the regulation of national banks and state banks to converge in a number of important ways. However, despite this convergence, federal preemption provides national banks with certain unique advantages. In Barnett Bank of Marion County, N.A. v. Nelson, the Supreme Court held that the National Bank Act (NBA) preempts state laws that \"significantly interfere\" with the powers of national banks. The Court has also issued two decisions on the preemptive scope of a provision of the NBA limiting states' \"visitorial powers\" over national banks. Finally, OCC rules have taken a broad view of the preemptive effects of the NBA, limiting the ways in which states can regulate national banks. Courts, regulators, and legislators have recently confronted a number of issues involving banking preemption and related federalism questions. Specifically, Congress has considered legislation that would overturn a line of judicial decisions concerning the circumstances in which non-banks can benefit from federal preemption of state usury laws. The OCC has also announced its intention to grant national bank charters to certain financial technology (FinTech) companies—a decision that is currently being litigated. Finally, Congress has recently turned its attention to the banking industry's response to state efforts to legalize and regulate marijuana."], "all_classes": null, "length": 8713}
{"pred": "\nThe report provides background information and issues for Congress regarding the John Lewis (TAO-205) class oiler shipbuilding program. The Navy's proposed FY2020 budget requests the procurement of the fifth and sixth ships in the program. Issues for Congress include whether to approve, reject, or modify the Navy's FY2020 procurement funding request for the program, the number of oilers the Navy will require in coming years to support its operations, and whether to encourage or direct the Navy to build TAO-205s with more ship self-defense equipment than currently planned. The Navy's TAO-205 class ships are designed to transfer fuel to Navy surface ships at sea, providing other supplies as well. The Navy plans to procure 20 TAO-205s, but the number of oilers required depends on the types and operational patterns of Navy ships and aircraft. The program has encountered some delays due to a flooding incident at a graving dock. The Navy has implemented a block buy contract to reduce procurement costs, but Congress may consider whether the Navy has accurately priced the work it is requesting. The Navy has not assessed the effects of widely distributed operations on logistics force requirements, which could affect the number of oilers needed. The Navy has identified the need for more ship self-defense equipment, but this would increase costs. Congress has approved funding for the first five TAO-205s and the Navy plans to compete a new contract for the remaining 12 ships.", "answers": ["The Navy began procuring John Lewis (TAO-205) class oilers in FY2016, and a total of four have been procured through FY2019, including two in FY2019. The first six ships are being procured under a block buy contract that was authorized by Section 127 of the FY2016 National Defense Authorization Act (S. 1356/P.L. 114-92 of November 25, 2015). The Navy wants to procure a total of 20 TAO-205s. The Navy's proposed FY2020 budget requests the procurement of the fifth and sixth ships in the program. The Navy estimates the combined procurement cost of the two ships at $1,056.3 million, or an average of $528.1 million each. The two ships have received $75.0 million in prior-year advance procurement (AP) funding, and the Navy's proposed FY2020 budget requests the remaining $981.2 million in procurement funding needed to complete the two ships' estimated combined procurement cost. The Navy's proposed FY2020 budget also requests $73.0 million in AP funding for TAO-205s to be procured in future fiscal years, and $3.7 million in cost-to-complete procurement funding to cover cost growth on TAO-205s procured in prior fiscal years, bringing the total FY2020 procurement funding request for the TAO-205 program (aside from outfitting and post-delivery costs) to $1,057.9 million. Issues for Congress include the following: whether to approve, reject, or modify the Navy's FY2020 procurement funding request for the TAO-205 program; the number of oilers the Navy will require in coming years to support its operations; and whether to encourage or direct the Navy to build TAO-205s with more ship self-defense equipment than currently planned by the Navy."], "all_classes": null, "length": 3373}
{"pred": "\nThe federal government employs over two million workers in the United States, U.S. territories, and foreign countries. The majority work in the competitive service of the executive branch. The competitive service consists of all civil service positions in the executive branch except for certain positions that are excepted from the competitive service by statute or by the President. The competitive service includes non-executive branch positions and positions in the District of Columbia government that are specifically included in the competitive service by statute. Applicants for competitive service positions must take an examination administered by the Office of Personnel Management (OPM) to be eligible for appointment. The competitive service includes several types of appointments, including career-conditional, term, temporary, and probationary appointments. Employees in the competitive service are generally paid according to the General Schedule and maintain certain notice and appeal rights for adverse personnel actions. The excepted service consists of positions that are not in the competitive service or the Senior Executive Service (SES). Positions in the excepted service may be designated by statute or by OPM and are not subject to competitive examination. The SES is a separate regulatory structure for high-level government administrators who manage major programs and projects within most federal agencies. SES members are appointed through a merit-based competitive hiring process and maintain different pay rates and removal protections than employees in the competitive service.", "answers": ["According to the Office of Personnel Management (OPM), the federal workforce consists of an estimated two million civilian employees. Federal law categorizes these employees into three types of service—the competitive service, the excepted service, and the Senior Executive Service (SES)—that may be distinguished by different selection, compensation, and other standards. Title 5 of the U.S. Code (Title 5) contains most of the standards governing federal employment, and OPM is generally responsible for implementing these requirements. The competitive service largely consists of all civil service positions in the executive branch, other than (1) positions excepted from the competitive service by statute; (2) positions appointed by the President and confirmed by the Senate; and (3) the SES. Traditionally, OPM has administered examinations for entrance into the competitive service. These examinations are meant to be \"practical in character\" and relate to \"matters that fairly test the relative capacity and fitness of the applicants for the appointment sought.\" Title 5 also authorizes OPM to prescribe rules allowing agencies to hire candidates directly under specified circumstances. The excepted service includes designated civil service positions that are not in the competitive service or the SES and are not subject to competitive examination. OPM maintains authority to exempt a position from the competitive service when it determines that an appointment through competitive examination is not practicable, or the recruitment of students or recent graduates would be better achieved through alternate recruitment and assessment processes. The pay structure for the competitive service and the excepted service is similar. Both services are typically paid in accordance with the General Schedule, a schedule of annual basic pay rates that consists of 15 grades, designated \"GS-1\" through \"GS-15.\" This fixed pay scale is generally designed to reflect, among other things, equal pay for substantially equal work within a local pay area. Additionally, the competitive service and the excepted service generally have similar notice and appeal rights for adverse personnel actions. For example, before a removal, a suspension for more than 14 days, a reduction in grade or pay, or a furlough of 30 days or less, the agency must provide at least 30 days' advance written notice to the affected employee. The employee must also be given a reasonable time to respond to the notice and provide affidavits and other evidence to support the answer. Some adverse actions may also be appealed to the Merit Systems Protection Board (MSPB or Board), an independent, quasi-judicial agency that reviews and adjudicates specified personnel actions taken against qualifying federal employees. The SES is a corps of some 7,000 high-level government administrators who manage major programs and projects within most federal agencies. In these leadership roles, SES members may serve as a link between top-level political appointees of an agency and career civil servants within the agency. The SES is governed by a regulatory structure separate from the competitive and excepted services. While SES members are primarily career appointees chosen through a merit-based competitive hiring process, others are noncareer, limited term or limited emergency appointees (commonly political appointees) selected by agency leadership. To shield certain SES roles from political influence, some SES positions (career reserved positions) must be filled with career appointees, and Title 5 limits the number of noncareer and limited term appointees that may serve in SES positions. The SES pay structure is distinct from the rest of the civil service. Title 5 specifies that SES members are paid within a particular range based on an executive's individual performance or contribution to agency performance (or both), as measured under a performance appraisal system. In addition, Title 5 articulates special conditions and procedures for removing, suspending, or taking other adverse actions against a member of the SES. For example, career SES appointees who have successfully completed a one-year probationary period may be removed or subject to adverse action only for specified reasons, including misconduct and substandard performance. Career appointees must receive advance written notice of these actions, and an opportunity to appeal the action. In comparison, noncareer, limited term, and limited emergency appointees are generally not subject to the same protections and may be removed from the SES at any time."], "all_classes": null, "length": 2697}
{"pred": "\nThis report provides background information and issues for Congress regarding China's actions in the South China Sea (SCS) and East China Sea (ECS). It focuses on maritime territorial disputes involving China and its neighbors. The issue for Congress is how the United States should respond to China's actions in the SCS and ECS—particularly China's island-building and base-construction activities in the Spratly Islands in the SCS—and to China's strengthening position in the SCS. A key element of the U.S. response is an appropriate strategy—and an appropriate amount of resources—for countering China's \"salami-slicing\" strategy or gray zone operations for gradually strengthening its position in the SCS. The report highlights China's expansive interpretation of jurisdictional authority beyond territorial seas and airspace, which causes friction with U.S. forces and treaty allies operating in international waters and airspace in the region. It also notes that China's actions have led to increased tensions and unsafe incidents at sea. The report concludes that China's legal position on whether coastal states have a right under UNCLOS to regulate the activities of foreign military forces in their EEZs could substantially affect U.S. naval operations not only in the SCS and ECS but around the world.", "answers": ["China's actions in recent years in the South China Sea (SCS)—particularly its island-building and base-construction activities at sites that it occupies in the Spratly Islands—have heightened concerns among U.S. observers that China is rapidly gaining effective control of the SCS, an area of strategic, political, and economic importance to the United States and its allies and partners, particularly those in the Indo-Pacific region. U.S. Navy Admiral Philip Davidson, in his responses to advance policy questions from the Senate Armed Services Committee for an April 17, 2018, hearing to consider his nomination to become Commander, U.S. Pacific Command (PACOM), stated that \"China is now capable of controlling the South China Sea in all scenarios short of war with the United States.\" Chinese control of the SCS—and, more generally, Chinese domination of China's near-seas region, meaning the SCS, the East China Sea (ECS), and the Yellow Sea—could substantially affect U.S. strategic, political, and economic interests in the Indo-Pacific region and elsewhere. China is a party to multiple territorial disputes in the SCS and ECS, including, in particular, disputes with multiple neighboring countries over the Paracel Islands, Spratly Islands, and Scarborough Shoal in the SCS, and with Japan over the Senkaku Islands in the ECS. Up through 2014, U.S. concern over these disputes centered more on their potential for causing tension, incidents, and a risk of conflict between China and its neighbors in the region, including U.S. allies Japan and the Philippines and emerging partner states such as Vietnam. While that concern remains, particularly regarding the potential for a conflict between China and Japan involving the Senkaku Islands, U.S. concern since 2014 (i.e., since China's island-building activities in the Spratly Islands were first publicly reported) has shifted increasingly to how China's strengthening position in the SCS may be affecting the risk of a U.S.-China crisis or conflict in the SCS and the broader U.S.-Chinese strategic competition. In addition to territorial disputes in the SCS and ECS, China is involved in a dispute, particularly with the United States, over whether China has a right under international law to regulate the activities of foreign military forces operating within China's exclusive economic zone (EEZ). The position of the United States and most other countries is that while international law gives coastal states the right to regulate economic activities (such as fishing and oil exploration) within their EEZs, it does not give coastal states the right to regulate foreign military activities in the parts of their EEZs beyond their 12-nautical-mile territorial waters. The position of China and some other countries (i.e., a minority group among the world's nations) is that UNCLOS gives coastal states the right to regulate not only economic activities, but also foreign military activities, in their EEZs. The dispute appears to be at the heart of multiple incidents between Chinese and U.S. ships and aircraft in international waters and airspace since 2001, and has potential implications not only for China's EEZs, but for U.S. naval operations in EEZs globally, and for international law of the sea. A key issue for Congress is how the United States should respond to China's actions in the SCS and ECS—particularly its island-building and base-construction activities in the Spratly Islands—and to China's strengthening position in the SCS. A key oversight question for Congress is whether the Trump Administration has an appropriate strategy—and an appropriate amount of resources for implementing that strategy—for countering China's \"salami-slicing\" strategy or gray zone operations for gradually strengthening its position in the SCS, for imposing costs on China for its actions in the SCS and ECS, and for defending and promoting U.S. interests in the region."], "all_classes": null, "length": 40508}
{"pred": "\nThe report examines how the Department of Defense (DOD) labs have used selected legislative authorities to foster innovation and efficiency and identify what barriers impede their use. It identifies and describes governance models used by selected DOD-sponsored federally funded research centers and university affiliated research centers. The report found that DOD lab directors have used the following authorities to flexibly fund projects, propose alternative and innovative methods, directly hire personnel, and expand critical science and technology purchases:\n\n- Laboratory Initiated Research Authority to fund projects in four allowable categories\n- Laboratory Enhancement Pilot Program to propose alternative and innovative methods\n- Direct Hire Authority to directly hire personnel\n- Micro-purchase Authority to expand critical science and technology purchases\n\nThe report found that while DOD labs have used these authorities, there are barriers to their full use, including:\n\n- Navy lab directors have limited ability to fund lab recapitalization and revitalization projects using the laboratory initiated research authority due to restrictions in the FAR\n- Navy lab directors have limited ability to use the laboratory initiated research authority within the Capital Investment Program\n- Army lab directors have limited ability to use the laboratory initiated research authority due to policy restrictions\n- Air Force Research Laboratory officials have limited ability to charge customers a fixed percentage fee on provided science and technology activities due to accounting system issues\n\nThe report recommends that the Air Force assess the potential costs and benefits of implementing accounting system improvements, the Navy clarify its use of the laboratory initiated research authority within the Capital Investment Program, and the Army assess its existing policy for laboratory initiated research authority and determine whether to implement changes to eliminate disincentives.", "answers": ["Congress created several authorities that provide DOD research labs with ways to increase efficiency and foster innovation. Senate report 114-255 contained a provision for GAO to study governance models used by federal labs. This report evaluates DOD labs' use of authorities to foster innovation and efficiency. GAO selected four authorities that recent work on best practices for science and technology management and expedited defense lab hiring have shown to be the most crucial for supporting innovation; administered a survey to 44 lab directors to gain insight into their use of the authorities; interviewed key lab officials and contractors; and reviewed relevant policies and guidance. Congress has provided the Department of Defense's (DOD) research labs with several authorities to enhance management and operations. Four authorities that GAO examined provide lab directors with greater ability to make their own decisions regarding the funding of projects, hiring, lab management, and purchasing of equipment or services. 1. Laboratory initiated research authority. This authority, as implemented, provides labs with a means to fund new science and technology projects that they consider a priority. Labs may use a percentage of all funds available to the lab and are permitted to charge customers of the lab a percentage fee of the costs for activities performed by the lab for the customer. 2. Direct hire authority. This authority enables labs to compete with private industry for high-quality talent. For example, it provides for streamlined hiring of applicants with relevant advanced degrees, or students enrolled in science, technology, engineering, and mathematics programs. 3. Laboratory enhancement pilot program authority. This authority generally allows lab directors to propose alternative methods that might lead to more effective lab management, and waive certain policies or procedures that might affect implementation of these methods. 4. Micro-purchase authority. This authority raises the threshold for small purchases for DOD research lab activities from $3,500 to $10,000 to facilitate acquisitions. While labs have used these authorities, their use has sometimes been limited, particularly with the laboratory initiated research authority. DOD lab directors at Air Force, Navy, and Army cited several obstacles that impede wider use of that authority, specifically: Air Force: Financial management officials at the Air Force stated that the service's accounting system does not currently have an automated capability to transfer the allowable percentage fee of costs to a central account at the Air Force Research Laboratory. This lack of capability, officials noted, creates a significant administrative burden related to charging these fees. Navy: In fiscal year 2017, Navy labs invested $7.3 million in lab infrastructure projects, compared to $32.9 million and $53.7 million at the Air Force and Army, respectively. Navy lab officials told us that they were restricted in their use of infrastructure funds available under the laboratory initiated research authority due to a lack of clear guidance as to whether and how to use this authority within the Capital Investment Program of the Navy Working Capital Fund. Army: The Army requires its labs to use a similar percentage of funds from two sources: (1) what it refers to as directly appropriated funds and (2) funds labs charge for customer activities. Some Army lab directors reported assessing a lower rate on customer funds than allowed so as not to drive customers away. The labs then generally charge a lower than desired rate on their directly appropriated funds, which further constrains the total funding available to them. GAO is making three recommendations to enhance DOD's use of laboratory initiated research authority, including that the Air Force assess potential accounting system improvements, the Navy clarify how labs can use the authority for infrastructure improvements, and the Army assess its policy to determine whether changes are needed to remove disincentives for labs to use the authority. DOD concurred with the recommendations."], "all_classes": null, "length": 11171}
{"pred": "\nThe report provides a summary of federal assistance programs available to individuals, states, territories, and local governments after major disasters. The programs are authorized by the Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act and other legislation. The programs include:\n\n1. Individual Assistance (IA) - provides financial assistance to disaster survivors.\n\n2. Disaster Legal Services (DLS) - provides free legal services to low-income individuals.\n\n3. Disaster Case Management (DCM) - partners with disaster survivors to develop and implement disaster recovery plans.\n\n4. Public Assistance (PA) Grant Program - provides grants to states and local governments for disaster response and recovery.\n\n5. Hazard Mitigation Grant Program - provides grants to states for hazard mitigation measures.\n\n6. Pre-Disaster Mitigation Grant Program - provides grants for cost-effective hazard mitigation activities.\n\n7. Community Disaster Loan (CDL) - provides loans to local governments for essential services.\n\n8. Oil Spill Liability Trust Fund - compensates parties affected by oil spills.\n\n9. Small Business Administration (SBA) Disaster Loans - provides loans to businesses and nonprofits.\n\n10. National Flood Insurance Program - provides flood insurance to communities.\n\nThe report also notes that general assistance programs, such as Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) and Medicaid, may also be available to disaster survivors.\n\nThe programs have different eligibility requirements, funding sources, and time limitations. Congress and the Administration may modify or extend program funding as needed.\n\nThe report provides contact information for CRS analysts and program specialists who can provide more information on the programs.", "answers": ["This report is designed to assist Members of Congress and their staff as they address the needs of their states, communities, and constituents after a disaster. It includes a summary of federal programs that provide federal disaster assistance to individual survivors, states, territories, local governments, and nongovernmental entities following a natural or man-made disaster. A number of federal agencies provide financial assistance through grants, loans, and loan guarantees to assist in the provision of critical services, such as temporary housing, counseling, and infrastructure repair. The programs summarized in this report fall into two broad categories. First, there are programs specifically authorized for use during situations occurring because of a disaster. Most of these programs are administered by the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA). Second are general assistance programs that in some instances may be used either in disaster situations or to meet other needs unrelated to a disaster. Many federal agencies, including the Departments of Health and Human Services (HHS) and Housing and Urban Development (HUD), administer programs that may be included in the second category. The programs in the report are primarily organized by recipient: individuals, state and local governments, nongovernmental entities, or businesses. These programs address a variety of short-term needs, such as food and shelter, and long-term needs, such as the repair of public utilities and public infrastructure. The report also includes a list of Congressional Research Service (CRS) reports on disaster assistance as well as relevant federal agency websites that provide information on disaster responses, updates on recovery efforts, and resources on federal assistance programs. This report will be updated as significant legislative or administrative changes occur."], "all_classes": null, "length": 5189}
{"pred": "\nThe report examines how the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) reviews and assures that states accurately report their Medicaid expenditures. CMS requires states to report expenditures quarterly, but allows states to adjust past reporting for up to 2 years after the expenditure was made. CMS reviews these reports to determine if the expenditures are allowable and consistent with Medicaid requirements. CMS uses quarterly reviews and focused financial management reviews to identify errors and compliance issues. However, CMS has identified weaknesses in how it allocates resources for oversight, including inconsistent variance analyses and sampling of Medicaid expansion expenditures. CMS has resolved over $5 billion in errors through these reviews, but the increasing complexity of expenditure reporting has occurred as resources have decreased. CMS has identified compliance issues through focused financial management reviews, but has not conducted a comprehensive risk assessment to determine if resources are adequate. GAO recommends that CMS complete a comprehensive risk assessment, clarify when variance analyses are required, and revise the sampling methodology for Medicaid expansion expenditures to better target high-risk areas. HHS concurred with the recommendations.", "answers": ["Medicaid has grown by over 50 percent over the last decade, with about $370 billion in federal spending in fiscal year 2017. CMS is responsible for assuring that expenditures—reported quarterly by states—are consistent with Medicaid requirements and matched with the correct amount of federal funds. CMS's review of reported expenditures has become increasingly complex due to variation in states' Medicaid programs and an increasing number of different matching rates. GAO was asked to examine CMS's oversight of state-reported Medicaid expenditures. In this report, GAO examined how CMS assures that (1) expenditures are supported and consistent with requirements; and (2) the correct federal matching rates were applied to expenditures subject to a higher match. GAO also examined the financial impact of resolved errors. GAO reviewed documentation for the most recently completed quarterly reviews by 3 of CMS's 10 regional offices for six states that varied by Medicaid program expenditures and design. GAO also reviewed policies, procedures, and data on resolved errors; and interviewed CMS and state officials. GAO assessed CMS's oversight processes against federal standards for internal control. The Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS), which oversees Medicaid, has various review processes in place to assure that expenditures reported by states are supported and consistent with Medicaid requirements. The agency also has processes to review that the correct federal matching rates were applied to expenditures receiving a higher than standard federal matching rate, which can include certain types of services and populations. These processes collectively have had a considerable federal financial benefit, with CMS resolving errors that reduced federal spending by over $5.1 billion in fiscal years 2014 through 2017. However, GAO identified weaknesses in how CMS targets its resources to address risks when reviewing whether expenditures are supported and consistent with requirements. CMS devotes similar levels of staff resources to review expenditures despite differing levels of risk across states. For example, the number of staff reviewing California's expenditures—which represent 15 percent of federal Medicaid spending—is similar to the number reviewing Arkansas' expenditures, which represents 1 percent of federal Medicaid spending. CMS cancelled in-depth financial management reviews in 17 out of 51 instances over the last 5 years. These reviews target expenditures considered by CMS to be at risk of not meeting program requirements. CMS told GAO that resource constraints contributed to both weaknesses. However, the agency has not completed a comprehensive assessment of risk to (1) determine whether oversight resources are adequate and (2) focus on the most significant areas of risk. Absent such an assessment, CMS is missing an opportunity to identify errors in reported expenditures that could result in substantial savings to the Medicaid program. GAO also found limitations in CMS's processes for reviewing expenditures that receive a higher federal matching rate. Internal guidance for examining variances in these expenditures was unclear, and not all reviewers in the three CMS regional offices GAO reviewed were investigating significant variances in quarter-to-quarter expenditures. Review procedures for expenditures for individuals newly eligible for Medicaid under the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act were not tailored to different risk levels among states. For example, in its reviews of a sample of claims for this population, CMS reviewed claims for the same number of enrollees—30—in California as for Arkansas, even though California had 10 times the number of newly eligible enrollees as Arkansas. Without clear internal guidance and better targeting of risks in its review procedures for expenditures receiving higher matching rates, CMS may overpay states. GAO is making three recommendations, including that CMS improve its risk-based targeting of oversight efforts and resources, and clarify related internal guidance. The Department of Health and Human Services concurred with these recommendations."], "all_classes": null, "length": 5872}
{"pred": "\nThe report provides an overview of Egypt's current political and economic situation. Egypt's President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi has consolidated power since taking office in 2014, cracking down on dissent and opposition. He has also implemented economic reforms to reduce debt and increase foreign investment. However, the country still faces challenges such as high inflation, unemployment, and a large budget deficit. Egypt's military plays a significant role in the economy and has been accused of human rights abuses. Egypt has also been involved in regional conflicts, including the war in Libya and the fight against terrorism in the Sinai Peninsula. The country has also received foreign aid from the US, but human rights concerns have led some to call for restrictions on aid. The US has also provided military assistance to Egypt, but Egypt's military is seen as inadequate to counter terrorist groups.", "answers": ["Historically, Egypt has been an important country for U.S. national security interests based on its geography, demography, and diplomatic posture. Egypt controls the Suez Canal, which is one of the world's most well-known maritime chokepoints, linking the Mediterranean and Red Seas. Egypt, with its population of more than 100 million people, is by far the most populous Arabic-speaking country. Although it may not play the same type of leading political or military role in the Arab world as it has in the past, Egypt may retain some \"soft power\" by virtue of its history, media, and culture. Cairo plays host both to the 22-member Arab League and Al Azhar University, which claims to be the oldest continuously operating university in the world and has symbolic importance as a leading source of Islamic scholarship. Additionally, Egypt's 1979 peace treaty with Israel remains one of the most significant diplomatic achievements for the promotion of Arab-Israeli peace. While people-to-people relations remain cold, the Israeli and Egyptian governments have increased their cooperation against Islamist militants and instability in the Sinai Peninsula and Gaza Strip. Personnel moves and possible amendments to the Egyptian constitution highlight apparent efforts by President Sisi to consolidate power with the help of political allies, including colleagues from Egypt's security establishment. President Sisi has come under repeated international criticism for an ongoing government crackdown against various forms of political dissent and freedom of expression. The Egyptian government has defended its human rights record, asserting that the country is under pressure from terrorist groups seeking to destabilize Arab nation-states. The Trump Administration has tried to normalize ties with the Sisi government that were generally perceived as strained under President Obama. In January 2019, U.S. Secretary of State Michael Pompeo delivered a major policy speech at the American University in Cairo, where he stated, \"And as we seek an even stronger partnership with Egypt, we encourage President Sisi to unleash the creative energy of Egypt's people, unfetter the economy, and promote a free and open exchange of ideas.\" The United States has provided significant military and economic assistance to Egypt since the late 1970s. Successive U.S. Administrations have justified aid to Egypt as an investment in regional stability, built primarily on long-running cooperation with the Egyptian military and on sustaining the 1979 Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty. All U.S. foreign aid to Egypt (or any recipient) is appropriated and authorized by Congress. Since 1946, the United States has provided Egypt with over $83 billion in bilateral foreign aid (calculated in historical dollars—not adjusted for inflation). Annual appropriations legislation includes several conditions governing the release of these funds. All U.S. military aid to Egypt finances the procurement of weapons systems and services from U.S. defense contractors. For FY2019, Congress has appropriated $1.4 billion in total bilateral assistance for Egypt, the same amount it provided in FY2018. For FY2020, the President is requesting a total of $1.382 billion in bilateral assistance for Egypt. Nearly all of the U.S. funds for Egypt come from the FMF account (military aid). In November 2018, the U.S. Defense Department notified Congress of a major $1 billion sale of defense equipment to Egypt, consisting of 10 AH-64E Apache Attack Helicopters, among other things. Beyond the United States, President Sisi has broadened Egypt's international base of support to include several key partners, including the Arab Gulf states, Israel, Russia, and France. In the last five years, as French-Egyptian ties have improved, Egypt has purchased major air and naval defense systems from French defense companies."], "all_classes": null, "length": 8280}
{"pred": "\nThe report discusses the concept of \"hosted payloads\" where a government payload is integrated onto a commercial satellite. The government payload owner pays for only a portion of the satellite development and shared launch and ground systems costs, which can result in cost savings. Commercial satellites tend to take less time from concept development to launch than DOD systems, which can achieve on-orbit capability more quickly. Hosted payloads can also increase resilience by distributing capabilities across multiple satellites. However, matching a government payload with a commercial host satellite poses logistical challenges due to size, weight, power, and spectrum constraints. DOD has limited information on the costs and benefits of hosted payloads, which contributes to resistance to using this approach. The Hosted Payload Office within the Air Force Space and Missile Systems Center is developing tools to help match properties between government payloads and commercial satellites. However, DOD offices have realized cost and schedule benefits from using hosted payloads, and there may be additional opportunities for hosted payloads in upcoming space systems. DOD needs to centralize knowledge and data on hosted payloads to better inform decisions on using this approach.", "answers": ["Each year, DOD spends billions of dollars to develop, produce, and field large, complex satellites. For such satellite systems, a single adversary attack or on-orbit failure can result in the loss of billions of dollars of investment and significant loss of vital capabilities. As DOD plans new space systems and addresses an increasingly contested space environment, it has the opportunity to consider different acquisition approaches. One such approach is to integrate a government sensor or payload onto a commercial host satellite. House Armed Services Committee report 115-200, accompanying a bill for the Fiscal Year 2018 National Defense Authorization Act, included a provision for GAO to review DOD's use of commercially hosted payloads. This report (1) determines the extent to which DOD uses commercially hosted payloads and (2) describes and assesses factors that affect their use. GAO reviewed DOD policies, documentation, and planning documents, and interviewed a wide range of DOD and civil government officials, and commercial stakeholders. GAO and others have found that using commercial satellites to host government sensors or communications packages—called payloads—may be one way DOD can achieve on-orbit capability faster and more affordably. Using hosted payloads may also help facilitate a proliferation of payloads on orbit, making it more difficult for an adversary to defeat a capability. Since 2009, DOD has used three commercially hosted payloads, with three more missions planned or underway through 2022 (see figure below). DOD estimates that it has achieved cost savings of several hundred million dollars from using commercially hosted payloads to date, and expects to realize additional savings and deliver faster capabilities on orbit from planned missions. Cost savings can result from sharing development, launch, and ground system costs with the commercial host company. Among the factors that affect DOD's use of hosted payloads are a perception among some DOD officials that matching government payloads to commercial satellites is too difficult; and limited, fragmented knowledge on how to mitigate various challenges GAO found that further opportunities to use hosted payloads may emerge as DOD plans new and follow-on space systems in the coming years. However, DOD's knowledge on using hosted payloads is fragmented, in part because programs are not required to share information. In 2011, the Air Force created a Hosted Payload Office to provide expertise and other tools to facilitate matching government payloads with commercial hosts. However, GAO found that DOD programs using hosted payloads are not required and generally do not provide cost and technical data, or lessons learned, to the Hosted Payload Office, or another central office for analysis. Requiring programs that use hosted payloads agency-wide to provide this information to a central location would better position DOD to make informed decisions when considering acquisition approaches for upcoming space system designs. GAO recommends that DOD require programs using commercially hosted payloads to contribute resulting data to a central location. In implementing this recommendation, DOD should assess whether the Air Force's Hosted Payload Office is the appropriate location to collect and analyze the data. DOD concurred with the recommendation."], "all_classes": null, "length": 5576}
{"pred": "\nThe report examines trends in the technology workforce from 2005 to 2015 and assesses efforts by the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) and the Department of Labor's Office of Federal Contract Compliance Programs (OFCCP) to oversee technology companies and technology contractors' compliance with equal employment opportunity and affirmative action requirements. Key findings include:\n\n- Technology workers comprised a smaller proportion of the general workforce, with women, Black, and Hispanic workers comprising a smaller proportion of the technology workforce compared to their representation in the general workforce.\n\n- Technology workers within the technology sector had lower representation of women, Black, and Hispanic workers compared to their representation in the general workforce.\n\n- Technology companies within the technology sector had lower representation of women, Black, and Hispanic workers compared to their representation in the general workforce.\n\n- OFCCP's regulations require covered federal contractors to take proactive steps to ensure equal employment opportunity. OFCCP annually conducts routine evaluations of selected federal contractors, which includes those in the technology sector, for compliance with federal nondiscrimination and affirmative action requirements. However, OFCCP does not currently use industry codes in its investigations data, which limits its ability to analyze charges by industry sector and conduct sector-related analyses.\n\n- EEOC officials acknowledged limitations in its ability to analyze charges by industry sector due to lack of industry codes in its investigations data.\n\n- OFCCP's current approach to compliance reviews has not changed in over 50 years, despite changes in the structure and locations of technology companies' work.\n\n- OFCCP plans to incorporate information on disparities by industry into its process for selecting contractors for compliance evaluations, but has not fully assessed its planned methods.\n\n- The report makes six recommendations to improve oversight of federal contractors, including requiring contractors to set placement goals for each minority group in their Affirmative Action Programs.\n\nIn summary, the report highlights trends in the technology workforce and limitations in the efforts of EEOC and OFCCP to oversee compliance with equal employment opportunity and affirmative action requirements for technology companies and technology contractors.", "answers": ["Technology companies are a major source of high-paying U.S. jobs, but some have questioned the sector's commitment to equal employment opportunity. EEOC provides federal oversight of nondiscrimination requirements by investigating charges of discrimination, and OFCCP enforces federal contractors' compliance with affirmative action requirements. GAO was asked to review workforce trends in the technology sector and federal oversight. This report examines (1) trends in the gender, racial, and ethnic composition of the technology sector workforce; and (2) EEOC and OFCCP oversight of technology companies' compliance with equal employment and affirmative action requirements. GAO analyzed workforce data from the American Community Survey for 2005-2015 and EEOC Employer Information Reports for 2007-2015, the latest data available during our analysis. GAO analyzed OFCCP data on compliance evaluations for fiscal years 2011-2016. GAO interviewed agency officials, researchers, and workforce, industry, and company representatives. The estimated percentage of minority technology workers increased from 2005 to 2015, but GAO found that no growth occurred for female and Black workers, whereas Asian and Hispanic workers made statistically significant increases (see figure). Further, female, Black, and Hispanic workers remain a smaller proportion of the technology workforce—mathematics, computing, and engineering occupations—compared to their representation in the general workforce. These groups have also been less represented among technology workers inside the technology sector than outside it. In contrast, Asian workers were more represented in these occupations than in the general workforce. Stakeholders and researchers GAO interviewed identified several factors that may have contributed to the lower representation of certain groups, such as fewer women and minorities graduating with technical degrees and company hiring and retention practices. Both the U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) and the Department of Labor's Office of Federal Contract Compliance Programs (OFCCP) have taken steps to enforce equal employment and affirmative action requirements in the technology sector, but face limitations. While EEOC has identified barriers to recruitment and hiring in the technology sector as a strategic priority, when EEOC conducts investigations, it does not systematically record the type of industry, therefore limiting sector-related analyses to help focus its efforts. EEOC has plans to determine how to add missing industry codes but has not set a timeframe to do this. In addition, OFCCP's regulations may hinder its ability to enforce contractors' compliance because OFCCP directs contractors to set placement goals for all minorities as a group rather than for specific racial/ethnic groups. OFCCP also has not made changes to its establishment-based approach to selecting entities for review in decades, even though changes have occurred in how workplaces are structured. Without taking steps to address these issues, OFCCP may miss opportunities to hold contractors responsible for complying with affirmative action and nondiscrimination requirements. GAO makes 6 recommendations, including that EEOC develop a timeline to improve industry data collection and OFCCP take steps toward requiring more specific minority placement goals by contractors and assess key aspects of its selection approach. EEOC neither agreed nor disagreed with its recommendation, and OFCCP stated the need for regulatory change to alter placement goal requirements. GAO continues to believe actions are needed, as discussed in the report."], "all_classes": null, "length": 11390}
{"pred": "\nThe report discusses the CHIP-IN Act, which authorizes the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) to accept donations for construction projects. The VA Office of Construction and Facilities Management (CFM) has established a pilot program to test the donation approach. The report finds that while the pilot program has made progress, there are several areas where VA needs to improve its design and implementation. Specifically:\n\n1. VA has not yet defined and documented clear objectives for the pilot program. This makes it difficult to determine how to make decisions about scalability and evaluate the pilot's effectiveness. \n\n2. VA has not developed an assessment methodology and evaluation plan to measure the pilot's success. This limits the information available to make decisions about scaling the program.\n\n3. VA has not defined roles and responsibilities for the pilot program, which makes it difficult to identify and secure donors.\n\n4. VA has not dedicated sufficient resources to implement the pilot program. This limits the pilot's effectiveness.\n\nGAO recommends that VA:\n\n1. Ensure that internal stakeholders agree to and document clear, measurable objectives for the pilot program.\n\n2. Develop an assessment methodology and evaluation plan linked to the pilot's objectives.\n\n3. Define roles and responsibilities for the pilot program and identify available resources.\n\n4. Dedicate sufficient resources to implement the pilot program.\n\nVA concurred with the recommendations and stated that it has begun or is planning to take actions to address them.", "answers": ["VA has pressing infrastructure needs. The Communities Helping Invest through Property and Improvements Needed for Veterans Act of 2016 (CHIP-IN Act) authorized VA to accept donated real property—such as buildings or facility construction or improvements—through a pilot program. VA has initiated one project in Omaha, Nebraska, through a partnership with a donor group. VA can accept up to five donations through the pilot program, which is authorized through 2021. The CHIP-IN Act includes a provision for GAO to report on donation agreements. This report (1) examines the extent to which the VA's pilot design aligns with leading practices and (2) discusses what VA has learned from the pilot to date. GAO reviewed VA documents, including plans for the pilot program, and visited the Omaha pilot project. GAO interviewed VA officials, the Omaha donor group, and three non-federal entities that responded to VA's request seeking donors. GAO compared implementation of VA's pilot to leading practices for pilot design, organizational transformation, and cross-functional teams. The Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) is conducting a pilot program, called CHIP-IN, that allows VA to partner with non-federal entities and accept real property donations from them as a way to help address VA's infrastructure needs. Although VA signed its first project agreement under the program in April 2017, VA has not yet established a framework for effective design of the pilot program. Specifically, VA's pilot program design is not aligned with four of five leading practices for designing a well-developed and documented pilot program. VA has begun to implement one leading practice by improving its efforts to communicate with relevant stakeholders, such as including external stakeholders in key meetings. However, the VA offices involved have not agreed upon and documented clear, measurable objectives for the pilot program, which is a leading practice. Further, VA has not developed an assessment methodology or an evaluation plan that would help inform decisions about whether or how the pilot approach could be expanded. While VA officials said they intend to develop these items as tasks for the newly formed CHIP-IN steering committee, they have no timeline for doing so. Without clear objectives and assessment and evaluation plans, VA and Congress may have difficulty determining whether the pilot approach is an effective way to help address VA's infrastructure needs. To date, the CHIP-IN pilot suggests that donation partnerships could improve construction projects, but identifying donors and establishing a team for the pilot program have presented challenges. Officials from VA and the donor group for the first pilot project—an ambulatory care center in Omaha, Nebraska—said they are completing the project faster than if it had been a standard federal construction project, while achieving potential cost savings by using private sector practices. However, VA officials said it is challenging to find partners to make large donations with no financial return, and VA's lack of marketing and philanthropic development experience exacerbates that challenge. VA and the donor group agreed that a dedicated team of individuals with relevant expertise could facilitate the pilot's implementation. The new CHIP-IN steering committee could serve this purpose, but it lacks documented roles and responsibilities. Establishing a team with clear roles and responsibilities and identifying both available and needed staff resources could assist VA in partnering with additional donors and creating new opportunities to meet veterans' needs. GAO is recommending that VA: (1) establish pilot program objectives, (2) develop an assessment methodology and an evaluation plan, and (3) document roles and responsibilities and identify available and needed staff resources. VA concurred with GAO's recommendations."], "all_classes": null, "length": 6691}
{"pred": "\nThe report examines HUD's efforts to make housing lead-safe through its lead hazard control grant programs and two largest rental assistance programs serving families with children. HUD competitively awards grants to state and local jurisdictions to make housing lead-safe. The report found that HUD has not fully documented or evaluated its grant processes, lacks goals and performance measures to assess its lead efforts, and has limited coverage of on-site compliance reviews. HUD also has not requested authority to amend the inspection standard for the Housing Choice Voucher program to identify lead paint hazards. The report recommends that HUD:\n\n1) Ensure that grant processes are fully documented and evaluated.\n\n2) Periodically evaluate grant processes and procedures.\n\n3) Develop a plan to mitigate and address risks within HUD's lead paint compliance monitoring processes.\n\n4) Develop procedures to address PHA noncompliance with lead paint regulations.\n\n5) Request authority to amend the inspection standard for the Housing Choice Voucher program.\n\n6) Develop performance goals and measures to cover the full range of HUD's lead efforts.\n\n7) Evaluate the effectiveness of the Lead Safe Housing and Lead Disclosure Rules.\n\n8) Complete statutory reporting requirements.\n\nHUD generally agreed with the recommendations but noted considerations for implementing them. The report highlights areas where HUD could improve its efforts to identify and address lead paint hazards and protect children in low-income housing from lifelong health problems.", "answers": ["Lead paint in housing is the most common source of lead exposure for U.S. children. HUD awards grants to state and local governments to reduce lead paint hazards in housing and oversees compliance with lead paint regulations in its rental assistance programs. The 2017 Consolidated Appropriations Act, Joint Explanatory Statement, includes a provision that GAO review HUD’s efforts to address lead paint hazards. This report examines HUD’s efforts to (1) incorporate statutory requirements and other relevant federal standards in its lead grant programs, (2) monitor and enforce compliance with lead paint regulations in its rental assistance programs, (3) adopt federal health guidelines and environmental standards for its lead grant and rental assistance programs, and (4) measure and report on the performance of its lead efforts. GAO reviewed HUD documents and data related to its grant programs, compliance efforts, performance measures, and reporting. GAO also interviewed HUD staff and some grantees. The Department of Housing and Urban Development’s (HUD) lead grant and rental assistance programs have taken steps to address lead paint hazards, but opportunities exist for improvement. For example, in 2016, HUD began using new tools to monitor how public housing agencies comply with lead paint regulations. However, HUD could further improve efforts in the following areas: Lead grant programs. While its recent grant award processes incorporate statutory requirements on applicant eligibility and selection criteria, HUD has not fully documented or evaluated these processes. For example, HUD’s guidance is not sufficiently detailed to ensure consistent and appropriate grant award decisions. Better documentation and evaluation of HUD’s grant program processes could help ensure that lead grants reach areas at risk of lead paint hazards. Further, HUD has not developed specific time frames for using available local-level data to better identify areas of the country at risk for lead paint hazards, which could help HUD target its limited resources. Oversight. HUD does not have a plan to mitigate and address risks related to noncompliance with lead paint regulations by public housing agencies. We identified several limitations with HUD’s monitoring efforts, including reliance on public housing agencies’ self-certifying compliance with lead paint regulations and challenges identifying children with elevated blood lead levels. Additionally, HUD lacks detailed procedures for addressing noncompliance consistently and in a timely manner. Developing a plan and detailed procedures to address noncompliance with lead paint regulations could strengthen HUD’s oversight of public housing agencies. Inspections. The lead inspection standard for the Housing Choice Voucher program is less strict than that of the public housing program. By requesting and obtaining statutory authority to amend the standard for the voucher program, HUD would be positioned to take steps to better protect children in voucher units from lead exposure as indicated by analysis of benefits and costs. Performance assessment and reporting. HUD lacks comprehensive goals and performance measures for its lead reduction efforts. In addition, it has not complied with annual statutory reporting requirements, last reporting as required on its lead efforts in 1997. Without better performance assessment and reporting, HUD cannot fully assess the effectiveness of its lead efforts. GAO makes nine recommendations to HUD including to improve lead grant program and compliance monitoring processes, request authority to amend its lead inspection standard in the voucher program, and take additional steps to report on progress. HUD generally agreed with eight of the recommendations. HUD disagreed that it should request authority to use a specific, stricter inspection standard. GAO revised this recommendation to allow HUD greater flexibility to amend its current inspection standard as indicated by analysis of the benefits and costs."], "all_classes": null, "length": 12091}
{"pred": "\nThe report assesses how well the GPRA Modernization Act has been implemented to address key governance challenges in the federal government. It reviews various aspects of GPRAMA implementation, including cross-agency priority goals, agency priority goals, and related data-driven reviews. The report finds that while some progress has been made, there are still opportunities for improvement. For example, OMB has removed the priority designation of CAP goals and APGs, which has stopped related data-driven reviews and quarterly updates of progress on Performance.gov until new priority goals are published. The report recommends that OMB update Performance.gov to explain that quarterly reporting on the fiscal year 2014-2017 CAP goals and fiscal year 2016-2017 APGs was suspended and provide the location of final progress updates for these goals. OMB should also revise and publicly issue guidance on implementing the federal program inventory and expanding the use of data-driven performance reviews. The report also recommends that OMB consider using a systematic approach, such as the information architecture framework, to help ensure that GPRAMA requirements and past recommendations are addressed.", "answers": ["Full implementation of GPRAMA could facilitate efforts to reform the federal government and make it more effective. GPRAMA includes a provision for GAO to review the act's implementation. This report assesses how GPRAMA implementation has affected the federal government's progress in resolving key governance challenges in (1) addressing cross-cutting issues, (2) ensuring performance information is useful and used, (3) aligning daily operations with results, and (4) building a more transparent and open government. To address these objectives, GAO reviewed statutory requirements, OMB guidance, and GAO's recent work related to GPRAMA implementation and the key governance challenges. GAO also interviewed OMB staff and surveyed a stratified random sample of 4,395 federal managers from 24 agencies on various performance and management topics. With a 67 percent response rate, the survey results are generalizable to the government-wide population of managers. The Office of Management and Budget (OMB) and agencies have made some progress in more fully implementing the GPRA Modernization Act (GPRAMA), but GAO's work and 2017 survey of federal managers highlight numerous areas where improvements are needed. Cross-cutting issues: Various GPRAMA provisions are aimed at addressing cross-cutting issues, such as cross-agency and agency priority goals and related data-driven reviews of progress towards those goals. To ensure alignment with the current administration's priorities, OMB's 2017 guidance removed the priority status of those goals, which stopped quarterly data-driven reviews and related public progress reports until new goals are published. OMB plans to resume implementation of these provisions in February 2018. GPRAMA also requires OMB and agencies to implement an inventory of federal programs, which could help decision makers better identify and manage fragmentation, overlap, and duplication. OMB and agencies implemented the inventory once, in May 2013. In October 2014, GAO found several issues limited the usefulness of that inventory. Since then, OMB has postponed updating the inventory, citing among other reasons the passage of subsequent laws. OMB has yet to develop a systematic approach for resuming implementation of the inventory and specific time frames for doing so. A systematic approach to developing the inventory could help ensure it provides useful information for decision makers and the public. Performance information: Survey results show federal managers generally reported no improvements in their use of performance information in decision making for various management activities, or practices that can enhance such use, since GAO's 2013 survey. For example, the use of performance information to streamline programs to reduce duplicative activities (an estimated 33 percent in 2017) is statistically significantly lower relative to 2013 (44 percent). In contrast, managers who were familiar with and whose programs were subject to quarterly data-driven reviews reported that those reviews were used to make progress toward agency priority goals. Identifying and sharing practices to expand the use of such reviews—for other performance goals and at lower levels within agencies—could lead to increased use of performance information. Daily operations: Agencies have made progress in developing results-oriented cultures but need to take additional actions. GAO's past work found that high-performing organizations use performance management systems to help individuals connect their daily activities to organizational goals. In 2017, about half of federal managers reported using performance information when setting expectations with employees (no change from GAO's last survey in 2013). Transparent and open government: GAO's past work identified a number of needed improvements to Performance.gov, the central government-wide website required by GPRAMA. The site is to provide quarterly updates on priority goals in effect through September 2017, but those updates stopped in December 2016. According to OMB, the existing information for cross-agency priority goals is the final update, and agencies should publish final updates on their priority goals in annual performance reports. Performance.gov does not provide users with this information, thereby limiting the transparency and accessibility of those results. In addition to following through on plans to resume implementation of key GPRAMA provisions, GAO recommends that OMB (1) consider a systematic approach to developing the program inventory, (2) revise guidance to provide specific time frames for inventory implementation, (3) identify and share practices for expanding the use of data-driven reviews, and (4) update Performance.gov to explain that reporting on priority goals was suspended and provide the location of final progress updates. OMB staff agreed with these recommendations."], "all_classes": null, "length": 20579}
{"pred": "\nThe Colorado River Basin covers over 24,000 square miles and flows through seven states and Mexico. The Bureau of Reclamation plays a prominent role in managing the basin's water resources. The Colorado River Compact of 1921 divided the river's water between the Upper and Lower Basins, with the Lower Basin receiving 7.5 million acre-feet annually. The compact also required the Upper Basin states to deliver 75 million acre-feet to the Lower Basin over a 10-year period. The compact has been amended several times, including the 1963 Arizona v. California decision that gave Arizona priority over California's water use. The 194 U.S.-Mexico Water Treaty established water allocations for the two countries. The 2007 Interim Guidelines for Lower Basin Shortages and Coordinated Operations for Lake Powell and Lake Mead were developed to address drought conditions. Drought has led to the development of Drought Contingency Plans for the Upper and Lower Basins, which authorize additional water conservation measures. The plans aim to reduce water use to prevent Lake Mead from falling below critical levels. Congress has played a role in funding and overseeing Colorado River facilities and programs, including the 2007 Interim Guidelines and Drought Contingency Plans. Congress may continue to fund and approve Indian water rights settlements and new infrastructure projects in the basin. The overall hydrology and management of the Colorado River Basin remains a concern for Congress.", "answers": ["The Colorado River Basin covers more than 246,000 square miles in seven U.S. states (Wyoming, Colorado, Utah, New Mexico, Arizona, Nevada, and California) and Mexico. Pursuant to federal law, the Bureau of Reclamation (part of the Department of the Interior) manages much of the basin's water supplies. Colorado River water is used primarily for agricultural irrigation and municipal and industrial (M&I) uses, but it also is important for power production, fish and wildlife, and recreational uses. In recent years, consumptive uses of Colorado River water have exceeded natural flows. This causes an imbalance in the basin's available supplies and competing demands. A drought in the basin dating to 2000 has raised the prospect of water delivery curtailments and decreased hydropower production, among other things. In the future, observers expect that increasing demand for supplies, coupled with the effects of climate change, will further increase the strain on the basin's limited water supplies. River Management The Law of the River is the commonly used shorthand for the multiple laws, court decisions, and other documents governing Colorado River operations. The foundational document of the Law of the River is the Colorado River Compact of 1922. Pursuant to the compact, the basin states established a framework to apportion the water supplies between the Upper and Lower Basins of the Colorado River, with the dividing line between the two basins at Lee Ferry, AZ (near the Utah border). The Upper and Lower Basins each were allocated 7.5 million acre-feet (MAF) annually under the Colorado River Compact; an additional 1.5 MAF in annual flows was made available to Mexico under a 1944 treaty. Future agreements and court decisions addressed numerous other issues (including intrastate allocations of flows), and subsequent federal legislation provided authority and funding for federal facilities that allowed users to develop their allocations. A Supreme Court ruling also confirmed that Congress designated the Secretary of the Interior as the water master for the Lower Basin, a role in which the federal government manages the delivery of all water below Hoover Dam. Reclamation and basin stakeholders closely track the status of two large reservoirs—Lake Powell in the Upper Basin and Lake Mead in the Lower Basin—as an indicator of basin storage conditions. Under recent guidelines, dam releases from these facilities are tied to specific water storage levels. For Lake Mead, the first tier of \"shortage,\" under which Arizona's and Nevada's allocations would be decreased, would be triggered if Lake Mead's January 1 elevation is expected to fall below 1,075 feet above mean sea level. As of early 2019, Reclamation projected that there was a 69% chance of a shortage condition at Lake Mead in 2020; there was also a lesser chance of Lake Powell reaching critically low levels. Improved hydrology in early 2019 may decrease the chances of shortage in the immediate future. Drought Contingency Plans Despite previous efforts to alleviate future shortages, the basin's hydrological outlook has generally worsened in recent years. After several years of negotiations, in early 2019 Reclamation and the basin states transmitted to Congress additional plans to alleviate stress on basin water supplies. These plans, known as the drought contingency plans (DCPs) for the Upper and Lower Basins, were authorized by Congress in April 2019 in the Colorado River Drought Contingency Plan Authorization Act (P.L. 116-14). The DCPs among other things obligate Lower Basin states to additional water supply cutbacks at specified storage levels (i.e., cutbacks beyond previous curtailment plans), commit Reclamation to additional water conservation efforts, and coordinate Upper Basin operations to protect Lake Powell storage levels and hydropower generation. Congressional Role Congress plays a multifaceted role in federal management of the Colorado River basin. Congress funds and oversees management of basin facilities, including operations and programs to protect and restore endangered species. It has also enacted and continues to consider Indian water rights settlements involving Colorado River waters and development of new water storage facilities in the basin. In addition, Congress has approved funding to mitigate water shortages and conserve basin water supplies and has enacted new authorities to combat drought and its effects on basin water users (i.e., the DCPs and other related efforts)."], "all_classes": null, "length": 7367}
{"pred": "\nThe report examines the extent to which government-wide data on collections of fees, fines, and penalties are publicly available and useful for congressional oversight. The following criteria were used to assess the availability and usefulness of data: clear and accessible presentation, complete, accurate, and useful for the purpose of congressional oversight. The following sources were reviewed: Analytical Perspectives, the Budget Appendix, the Public Budget Database, and the Combined Statement of Receipts, Outlays, and Balances. The report found that while some data elements are included in these sources, there are no sources that consistently report data elements related to fees, fines, and penalties that could inform congressional oversight. The report recommends that OMB make more disaggregated data on fees, fines, and penalties available to the public. OMB should describe in the Public Budget Database User's Guide that budget authority is reported net of offsetting collections. The report concludes that government-wide reporting of fees, fines, and penalties could increase transparency and facilitate oversight, but would require time and resources.", "answers": ["Congress has authorized federal agencies to collect hundreds of billions of dollars annually in fees, fines, and penalties. These collections can fund a variety of programs, including programs related to national security, and the protection of natural resources. Data on collections are important for congressional oversight and to provide transparency in agencies' use of federal resources. GAO was asked to review the availability of government-wide data on fees, fines, and penalties. This report examines (1) the extent to which data on collections of fees, fines, and penalties are publically available and useful for the purpose of congressional oversight; and (2) the benefits and challenges to government-wide reporting of fees, fines, and penalties. GAO assessed government-wide fee, fine, and penalty data against criteria for availability and usefulness based on multiple sources, including prior GAO work and input from staff of selected congressional committees. GAO interviewed OMB staff, Treasury officials, and representatives of organizations with expertise in federal budget issues and reviewed prior GAO work to identify benefits and challenges of reporting these data. There are no comprehensive, government-wide data at the level of detail that identifies specific fees, fines, or penalties. The Office of Management and Budget (OMB) and the Department of the Treasury (Treasury) report data that include these collections at the budget account level, which generally covers a set of agency activities or programs. OMB and Treasury also report some summary data for budgeting and financial management purposes. In the Budget of the U.S. Government , for example, OMB data showed government-wide fees totaled just over $335 billion in fiscal year 2017. These reports, however, are not designed to inventory or analyze fee, fine, or penalty collections and have significant limitations for that purpose. Although OMB collects more disaggregated data on fees, fines, and penalties, it does not make the data publicly available. OMB uses the disaggregated data in its OMB MAX database—such as the agency and account—to compile reported totals, such as the government-wide fees total in the Budget of the U.S. Government . Until OMB makes more disaggregated data publicly available, Congress has limited information on collections by agency to inform oversight and decision-making. OMB's government-wide total of fees includes collections that are not fees and excludes some fee collections. The total includes all collections for accounts in which fees make up at least half of the account's collections and excludes all others. OMB does not direct agencies to regularly review and update the accounts included in the total. Therefore, if accounts' makeups change such that fee collections drop below, or rise above, the 50 percent threshold, accounts may have incorrect fee designations and the total may be inaccurate. Further, OMB does not disclose the limitation that the total may exclude some fees and include other collections that are not fees. As a result, some users of the data are likely unaware of the potential for the total fees to be overestimated or underestimated. Further, no source of government-wide data consistently reports data elements on fees, fines, and penalties that could help inform congressional oversight. Generally, congressional staff told us that additional data, such as amounts of specific penalties, would increase transparency and facilitate oversight. These data could help Congress identify trends in collections and significant changes that could be an indication of an agency's performance. While reporting government-wide fee, fine, and penalty data provides benefits, there are trade-offs in terms of the time and federal resources it would take to develop and implement a process for agencies to report these data. The level of federal investment would vary depending on factors, such as the number of data elements included and the level of detail reported. Developing a comprehensive and accessible data source would provide greater benefits, but would likely be resource intensive. Alternatively, incorporating a small number of data elements that Congress identifies as most useful for oversight into ongoing government-wide reporting efforts could incrementally improve transparency and information for oversight and decision-making, with fewer resources. GAO is making four recommendations to enhance OMB reporting on fees, fines, and penalties, including making disaggregated data publically available, updating instructions to federal agencies to review accounts designated as containing fees, and disclosing limitations in data reported. OMB did not provide comments."], "all_classes": null, "length": 8704}
{"pred": "\nThe Small Business Administration (SBA) administers programs to support small businesses, including loan guaranty programs to encourage lenders to provide loans to small businesses that might not otherwise obtain financing on reasonable terms. The SBA's 7(a) loan guaranty program is the agency's flagship program. In FY2018, the SBA approved 60,353 7(a) loans totaling $25.4 billion. The average approved loan amount was $42,401. Borrowers may use 7(a) loan proceeds to establish a new business or to assist in the operation, acquisition, or expansion of an existing business. Lenders must have certain eligibility requirements, credit policies, and procedures to participate in the program. The SBA provides documentation and requirements for lenders to process 7(a) loans. The SBA also has specialized programs like the SBAExpress, Export Express, and Community Advantage programs that offer streamlined and expedited loan procedures for particular groups of borrowers. The SBA has authorized lenders to make loans to veterans under the SBAExpress program and has waived certain fees for veterans. The SBA has also discontinued the Patriot Express Pilot Program. The report discusses the history and purpose of the 7(a) program, the SBA's loan guaranty programs, and the specialized programs. The SBA has faced challenges in measuring the effectiveness of its programs in creating jobs.", "answers": ["The Small Business Administration (SBA) administers several programs to support small businesses, including loan guaranty programs designed to encourage lenders to provide loans to small businesses \"that might not otherwise obtain financing on reasonable terms and conditions.\" The SBA's 7(a) loan guaranty program is considered the agency's flagship loan program. Its name is derived from Section 7(a) of the Small Business Act of 1953 (P.L. 83-163, as amended), which authorizes the SBA to provide business loans and loan guaranties to American small businesses. In FY2018, the SBA approved 60,353 7(a) loans totaling nearly $25.4 billion. The average approved 7(a) loan amount was $420,401. Proceeds from 7(a) loans may be used to establish a new business or to assist in the operation, acquisition, or expansion of an existing business. This report discusses the rationale provided for the 7(a) program; the program's borrower and lender eligibility standards and program requirements; and program statistics, including loan volume, loss rates, use of proceeds, borrower satisfaction, and borrower demographics. It also examines issues raised concerning the SBA's administration of the 7(a) program, including the oversight of 7(a) lenders and the program's lack of outcome-based performance measures. The report also surveys congressional and presidential actions taken in recent years to enhance small businesses' access to capital. For example, Congress approved legislation during the 111th Congress to provide more than $1.1 billion to temporarily subsidize the 7(a) and 504/Certified Development Companies (504/CDC) loan guaranty programs' fees and temporarily increase the 7(a) program's maximum loan guaranty percentage to 90% (funding was exhausted on January 3, 2011); raise the 7(a) program's gross loan limit from $2 million to $5 million; and establish an alternative size standard for the 7(a) and 504/CDC loan programs. The SBA waived the up-front, one-time loan guaranty fee for smaller 7(a) loans from FY2014 through FY2018; and is waiving the annual service fee for 7(a) loans of $150,000 or less made to small businesses located in a rural area or a HUBZone and reducing the up-front one-time guaranty fee for these loans from 2.0% to 0.6667% of the guaranteed portion of the loan in FY2019. The SBA has also waived the up-front, one-time loan guaranty fee for veteran loans under the SBAExpress program (up to $350,000) since January 1, 2014; and reduced the up-front, one-time loan guaranty fee on non-SBAExpress 7(a) loans to veterans from FY2015 through FY2018. P.L. 114-38, the Veterans Entrepreneurship Act of 2015, provided statutory authorization and made permanent the veteran's fee waiver under the SBAExpress program, except during any upcoming fiscal year for which the President's budget, submitted to Congress, includes a cost for the 7(a) program, in its entirety, that is above zero. Congress also approved legislation that increased the 7(a) program's authorization limit from $18.75 billion (on disbursements) in FY2014 to $23.5 billion in FY2015, $26.5 billion in FY2016, $27.5 billion in FY2017, $29.0 billion in FY2018, and $30 billion in FY2019. P.L. 115-189, the Small Business 7(a) Lending Oversight Reform Act of 2018, among other provisions, codified the SBA's Office of Credit Risk Management; required that office to annually undertake and report the findings of a risk analysis of the 7(a) program's loan portfolio; created a lender oversight committee within the SBA; authorized the Director of the Office of Credit Risk Management to undertake informal and formal enforcement actions against 7(a) lenders under specified conditions; redefined the credit elsewhere requirement; and authorized the SBA Administrator, starting in FY2019 and after providing at least 30 days' notice to specified congressional committees, to increase the amount of 7(a) loans not more than once during any fiscal year to not more than 115% of the 7(a) program's authorization limit. The Appendix provides a brief description of the 7(a) program's SBAExpress, Export Express, and Community Advantage programs."], "all_classes": null, "length": 14118}
{"pred": "\nThe report summarizes the results of an evaluation of the USDA's Summer Food Service Program (SFSP) conducted by the Government Accountability Office (GAO). The SFSP provides free meals to children in low-income areas during summer months when school is not in session. The report finds that:\n\n- The SFSP provided 149 million meals to children in fiscal year 2016, an increase from 113 million meals in fiscal year 2007.\n\n- The majority of states face challenges with meal site availability, limited options in rural areas, and limited awareness of summer meal sites among children and families.\n\n- FNS has taken steps to address these challenges by providing flexibilities in how meals are delivered to children and streamlining options for sponsors participating in multiple child nutrition programs. However, FNS lacks clarity concerning the circumstances under which it grants flexibilities in areas of violence and crime.\n\n- FNS does not collect data on the number of children participating in the SFSP, instead relying on states' estimates of participation.\n\n- The report recommends that FNS improve its estimate of children's participation by focusing on addressing data reliability issues and communicating clearly to states about flexibilities granted in areas of violence and crime.\n\n- FNS should evaluate and report annually on its use of waivers and demonstration projects to grant states and sponsors flexibility in areas of violence and crime.\n\n- FNS should disseminate information about existing flexibilities to states to streamline administrative requirements for sponsors participating in multiple nutrition programs.", "answers": ["The SFSP, a federal nutrition assistance program, is intended to provide food to children in low-income areas during periods when area schools are closed for vacation. In the last decade, federal expenditures for SFSP have increased as the program has expanded, according to USDA data. GAO was asked to review the SFSP. This report examines (1) what is known about SFSP participation, (2) other programs that help feed low-income children over the summer, and (3) challenges, if any, in providing summer meals to children and the extent to which USDA provides assistance to address these challenges. GAO reviewed relevant federal laws, regulations, and guidance; analyzed USDA's SFSP data for fiscal years 2007 through 2016; surveyed state agencies responsible for administering the SFSP in 50 states and the District of Columbia; visited a nongeneralizable group of 3 states and 30 meal sites, selected based on Census data on child poverty rates and urban and rural locations; analyzed meal site data from the 3 states; and interviewed USDA, state and national organization officials, and SFSP providers, including sponsors and site operators. Nationwide, the total number of meals served to children in low-income areas through the Summer Food Service Program (SFSP) increased from 113 to 149 million (about 32 percent) from fiscal year 2007 through 2016. The U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) directs states to use the number of meals served, along with other data, to estimate the number of children participating in the SFSP. However, participation estimates have been calculated inconsistently from state to state and year to year. In 2017, USDA took steps to improve the consistency of participation estimates, noting they are critical for informing program implementation and strategic planning. However, GAO determined that the method USDA directs states to use will continue to provide unreliable estimates of participation, hindering USDA's ability to use them for these purposes. Other federal and nonfederal programs help feed low-income children over the summer to some extent, according to states GAO surveyed and SFSP providers and others GAO interviewed. For example, in July 2016, USDA data indicate about 26 million meals were served through a separate federal program that allows school meal providers to serve summer meals. Some children also received summer meals through nonfederal programs operated by faith-based organizations and foodbanks, though GAO's state survey and interviews with providers and national organizations indicate the reach of such efforts is limited. States and SFSP providers reported challenges with meal sites, participation, and program administration; USDA has taken steps to address these areas. Specifically, in GAO's survey, a majority of states reported challenges with availability and awareness of meal sites, as well as limited program participation and administrative capacity. National, state, and local officials have taken steps to address these issues, such as increasing outreach and offering activities to attract participation. In addition, 17 states in GAO's survey and providers in the states GAO visited reported a challenge with ensuring meal sites are in safe locations. To address this safety issue, USDA has granted some states and sponsors flexibility from the requirement that children consume meals on-site. However, USDA has not broadly communicated the circumstances it considers when granting this flexibility. Further, some states and sponsors that have requested this flexibility reported difficulty obtaining data to show these circumstances exist, hampering their ability to ensure safe meal delivery. GAO is making four recommendations, including that USDA improve estimates of children's participation in SFSP and communicate the circumstances it considers when granting flexibilities to ensure safe meal delivery. USDA generally agreed with GAO's recommendations."], "all_classes": null, "length": 11048}
{"pred": "\nThe report discusses the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services' (CMS) efforts to combat fraud in its Medicare program. CMS has identified some fraud risks in Medicare, but has not conducted a comprehensive fraud risk assessment to determine the full range of fraud risks facing the program. CMS has established monitoring and evaluation mechanisms to assess its program-integrity activities, but has not developed a risk-based antifraud strategy to guide its design and implementation of new antifraud activities. CMS has taken steps to identify fraud risks, but has not assessed the likelihood and impact of fraud risks or determined fraud risk tolerance across all parts of Medicare. CMS has some control activities in place to identify fraud risks in Medicare, but has not developed a risk-based antifraud strategy to guide its design and implementation of new antifraud activities. The report recommends that CMS conduct fraud risk assessments for Medicare and Medicaid to include respective fraud risk profiles and plans for regularly updating the assessments and profiles. CMS should also develop a risk-based antifraud strategy that describes existing fraud control activities and any new fraud control activities to address residual fraud risks.", "answers": ["Medicare covered over 58 million people in 2017 and has wide-ranging impact on the health-care sector and the overall U.S. economy. However, the billions of dollars in Medicare outlays as well as program complexity make it susceptible to improper payments, including fraud. Although there are no reliable estimates of fraud in Medicare, in fiscal year 2017 improper payments for Medicare were estimated at about $52 billion. Further, about $1.4 billion was returned to Medicare Trust Funds in fiscal year 2017 as a result of recoveries, fines, and asset forfeitures. In December 2017, GAO issued a report examining how CMS managed its fraud risks overall and particularly the extent to which its efforts in the Medicare and Medicaid programs aligned with GAO's Framework. This testimony, based on that report, discusses the extent to which CMS's management of fraud risks in Medicare aligns with the Framework. For the report, GAO reviewed CMS policies and interviewed officials and external stakeholders. In its December 2017 report, GAO found that the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services' (CMS) antifraud efforts for Medicare partially align with GAO's 2015 A Framework for Managing Fraud Risks in Federal Programs (Framework). The Fraud Reduction and Data Analytics Act of 2015 required OMB to incorporate leading practices identified in this Framework in its guidance to agencies on addressing fraud risks. Consistent with the Framework, GAO determined that CMS had demonstrated commitment to combating fraud by creating a dedicated entity to lead antifraud efforts; the Center for Program Integrity (CPI) serves as this entity for fraud, waste, and abuse issues in Medicare. CMS also promoted an antifraud culture by, for example, coordinating with internal stakeholders to incorporate antifraud features into new program design. To increase awareness of fraud risks in Medicare, CMS offered and required training for stakeholder groups such as providers of medical services, but it did not offer or require similar fraud-awareness training for most of its workforce. CMS took some steps to identify fraud risks in Medicare; however, it had not conducted a fraud risk assessment or designed and implemented a risk-based antifraud strategy for Medicare as defined in the Framework. CMS identified fraud risks through control activities that target areas the agency designated as higher risk within Medicare, including specific provider types, such as home health agencies. Building on earlier steps and conducting a fraud risk assessment, consistent with the Framework, would provide the detailed information and insights needed to create a fraud risk profile, which, in turn, is the basis for creating an antifraud strategy. CMS established monitoring and evaluation mechanisms for its program-integrity control activities that, if aligned with an antifraud strategy, could enhance the effectiveness of fraud risk management in Medicare. For example, CMS used return-on-investment and savings estimates to measure the effectiveness of its Medicare program-integrity activities. In developing an antifraud strategy, consistent with the Framework, CMS could include plans for refining and building on existing methods such as return-on-investment, to evaluate the effectiveness of all of its antifraud efforts. In its December 2017 report, GAO made three recommendations, namely that CMS (1) require and provide fraud-awareness training to its employees; (2) conduct fraud risk assessments; and (3) create an antifraud strategy for Medicare, including an approach for evaluation. The Department of Health and Human Services agreed with these recommendations and reportedly is evaluating options to implement them. Accordingly, the recommendations remain open."], "all_classes": null, "length": 5746}
{"pred": "\nThe Social Security Administration (SSA) faces challenges in its management of IT systems and operations. The SSA's Office of the Deputy Commissioner for Systems is responsible for developing, overseeing, and maintaining the agency's IT systems. However, SSA has long been challenged in its management of IT. In 2016, the agency requested $132 million in its budget to modernize its IT environment. The agency's Disability Case Processing System is a high-priority IT spending initiative, but the agency has reported difficulty in carrying out this initiative due to software quality and poor system performance. The SSA has implemented 14 of 15 recommendations from GAO to improve its IT management in areas such as data center consolidation, incremental development, IT acquisitions, and software licenses. However, the agency still needs to fully address the role of its CIO in five key management areas, including leadership and accountability, strategic planning, workforce, budgeting, investment management, and information security. GAO recommends that SSA fully address these weaknesses in its policies to improve its IT management.", "answers": ["SSA delivers services that touch the lives of almost every American, and relies heavily on IT resources to do so. Its systems support a range of activities, such as processing Disability Insurance payments, to calculating and withholding Medicare premiums, and issuing Social Security numbers and cards. For fiscal year 2018, the agency planned to spend approximately $1.6 billion on IT. GAO has previously reported that federal IT projects have often failed, in part, due to a lack of oversight and governance. Given the challenges that federal agencies, including SSA, have encountered in managing IT acquisitions, Congress and the administration have taken steps to improve federal IT, including enacting federal IT acquisition reform legislation and issuing related guidance. This statement summarizes GAO's previously reported findings regarding SSA's management of IT acquisitions and operations. In developing this testimony, GAO summarized findings from its reports issued in 2011 through 2018, and information on SSA's actions in response to GAO's recommendations. The Social Security Administration (SSA) has improved its management of information technology (IT) acquisitions and operations by addressing 14 of the 15 recommendations that GAO has made to the agency. For example, Incremental development . The Office of Management and Budget (OMB) has emphasized the need for agencies to deliver IT investments in smaller increments to reduce risk and deliver capabilities more quickly. In November 2017, GAO reported that agencies, including SSA, needed to improve their certification of incremental development. As a result, GAO recommended that SSA's CIO (1) report incremental development information accurately, and (2) update its incremental development policy and processes. SSA implemented both recommendations. Software licenses . Effective management of software licenses can help avoid purchasing too many licenses that result in unused software. In May 2014, GAO reported that most agencies, including SSA, lacked comprehensive software license policies. As a result, GAO made six recommendations to SSA, to include developing a comprehensive software licenses policy and inventory. SSA implemented all six recommendations. However, SSA's IT management policies have not fully addressed the role of its CIO. Various laws and related guidance assign IT management responsibilities to CIOs in six key areas. In August 2018, GAO reported that SSA had fully addressed the role of the CIO in one of the six areas (see table). Specifically, SSA's policies fully addressed the CIO's role in the IT leadership and accountability area by requiring the CIO to report directly to the agency head, among other things. In contrast, SSA's policies did not address or minimally addressed the IT workforce and IT strategic planning areas. For example, SSA's policies did not include requirements for the CIO to annually assess the extent to which personnel meet IT management skill requirements or to measure how well IT supports agency programs. GAO recommended that SSA address the weaknesses in the remaining five key areas. SSA agreed with GAO's recommendation and stated that the agency plans to implement the recommendation by the end of this month. GAO has made 15 recommendations to SSA to improve its management of IT acquisitions and operations from 2011 through 2018, and 1 recommendation to improve its CIO policies. While SSA has implemented nearly all of them, it would be better positioned to overcome longstanding IT management challenges when it addresses the CIO's role in its policies."], "all_classes": null, "length": 3733}
{"pred": "\nThe federal government collects fees and charges from businesses and households to fund various activities. Choosing to raise funds through user fees instead of taxes has administrative and economic consequences. Many fees are linked to business-like activities that provide a service or benefit in return for payment. Some fees are closely tied to regulatory or judicial activities. The Office of Personnel Management charges other federal agencies fees to cover background investigations. For many agencies, fees and charges amount to a small portion of their budgets. User fees from the public totaled $31 billion in FY2017, about 10% of total federal receipts. Fees and charges generally result from voluntary choices, such as entering a national park. The collection of fees may reflect fluctuations in economic conditions, complicating government operations. Some are concerned that funding arrangements may bypass regular congressional scrutiny and dilute Congress's power of the purse. The Government Accountability Office defines a user fee as a fee assessed to users for goods or services provided by the federal government. The Office of Management and Budget defines the term user charge to include transactions not normally considered fees. OMB designates whether each account receives collections associated with user charges. The U.S. Treasury issues detailed information on offsetting collections and offsetting receipts. However, a comprehensive and authoritative list of federal fees is not publicly available. The benefit principle suggests linking fees to the benefits enjoyed by users to promote fairness and efficiency. However, setting fees at levels that match the incremental cost of providing benefits can be difficult where demand is irregular or unpredictable. OMB guidelines outline principles for designing user fees. Some agencies negotiate with regulated industries over fee levels. The economic suitability of the benefit principle depends on whether the benefit is meaningfully shared among a broader group. In some cases, the linkage between fees and benefits is not apparent. Some observers have raised concerns that agencies that rely more heavily on user fees may prioritize the interests of paying customers over the broader public interest.", "answers": ["The federal government collects various fees from businesses and households. Choosing to raise public funds via user fees, as opposed to other means such as taxes, has important administrative and economic consequences. Many fees stem from \"business-like activities,\" in which the government provides a service or benefit in return for payment. For example, many national parks charge entry fees, which then help fund maintenance projects. Such fees and charges that result from voluntary choices, such as entering a national park, are distinguished from taxes—which stem from the government's sovereign power to compel payments. The Government Accountability Office (GAO) defines a user fee as a \"fee assessed to users for goods or services provided by the federal government. User fees generally apply to federal programs or activities that provide special benefits to identifiable recipients above and beyond what is normally available to the public.\" User fees and charges have several advantages as a means of financing public activities. They are voluntary, they connect the burden of financing activities to those who directly benefit from them, and can help decentralize decisionmaking by bypassing centralized allocation of resources. Some have expressed concerns that user fee arrangements may bypass regular congressional scrutiny and dilute Congress's power of the purse. Collections of fees and charges may also be more sensitive to economic fluctuations, which could complicate financing of programs dependent on those revenue streams. Many user fees or charges are classified as offsetting collections, which are deposited into expenditure accounts. Offsetting collections can be used to offset agency spending and typically require no further congressional approval to use. Other fees and charges are classified as offsetting receipts, which are collected into revenue accounts and typically require congressional authorization to be spent. User fees and charges can be classified as discretionary or mandatory spending, depending on how they are legally authorized. The levels and administration of some fees are specified in detailed statutory text, while other fees are created under broader agency authorities. Certain agencies, such as the Food and Drug Administration (FDA), have increased their reliance on user fees in past decades. Some critics have raised concerns that increased reliance on user fees could shift incentives facing those agencies. Some legislative proposals, such as H.R. 850 introduced in the 115th Congress, would limit or eliminate most exceptions and require most fees and charges to be deposited in the U.S. Treasury General Fund. Congress could fund agencies and activities now funded in whole or in part via user fees directly through the annual appropriations process. Such proposals would mark a departure from past practice. Statutory text governing many fees has evolved over many years and involves substantive policy decisions, often related to the industry or programmatic concerns. A general change in funding from user fees and charges to annual appropriations would likely shift the division of responsibilities between authorizing committees and appropriations committees. Congress may also enhance its oversight of agencies reliant on user fees by requiring more timely and detailed financial reports as well as more precise and systematic explanations of linkages between those fees and associated programs. Congress could also ask for greater transparency in fiscal data. While the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) and the U.S. Treasury Bureau of the Fiscal Service provide extensive data on user fees and charges, it is difficult to conduct governmentwide analyses using publicly available sources. Congress could mandate more detailed and more easily accessed data on user fees and charges. Additional funding may be needed to develop the capacity to issue those data."], "all_classes": null, "length": 4022}
{"pred": "\nThe report discusses the history and current state of the Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) process in the US. The BRAC process was established in 197 to limit the President's authority to close or realign military installations without congressional approval. Congress passed legislation in 198 to require the Secretary of Defense to submit recommendations for closures or realignments to an independent commission, which would then review and approve or reject the list. The BRAC process has been modified over the years to include requirements for objective criteria and public input. The 2005 BRAC round was particularly complex and resulted in overestimated savings. Congress has since expressed concerns about the cost and complexity of BRAC rounds and has proposed legislation to constrain the Secretary's authority. The current administration has declined to propose a new BRAC round and is working to improve its infrastructure accounting processes. The primary purpose of continuing BRAC appropriations is to fund environmental cleanup and caretaker functions at closed bases. Congress has inserted language into recent defense bills to disallow the use of funds for a new BRAC round. The 2019 National Defense Authorization Act authorizes new in-state BRAC authorities, but the Department of Defense has stated it does not intend to use these.", "answers": ["Since 1977, statutory thresholds have effectively constrained the President's ability to close or realign major military installations in the United States. Congress has instead periodically granted temporary authorities—known as a Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC)—that have established independent commissions for the review and approval of basing changes submitted by the Secretary of Defense. These unique and transient authorities last expired on April 16, 2006. There have been five rounds of base closures: 1988, 1991, 1993, 1995, and 2005. Though Congress has periodically adjusted the BRAC process to account for lessons learned, the modern framework has remained generally consistent with earlier rounds, and includes establishment of an independent commission; reliance on objective and uniform criteria; Government Accountability Office (GAO) review and certification of Department of Defense (DOD) data; deliberations designed to be transparent that include open hearings, solicitation of feedback, installation visits, and data available for public review; and requirement that the final list of closure and realignment recommendations be accepted or rejected in their entirety. Congress has defined BRAC selection criteria in statute, thus requiring the Secretary to prioritize military value over cost savings. Additionally, Congress has required the Secretary to align the Department's recommendations with a comprehensive 20-year force structure plan. The commission may modify, reject, or add recommendations during its review before forwarding a final list to the President. After receiving the Commission's list of recommendations, the President may either accept the report in its entirety or seek to modify it by indicating disapproval and returning it to the commission for further evaluation. If the President accepts the commission's recommendations, they are forwarded to Congress. BRAC implementation begins by default unless Congress rejects the recommendations in their entirety within 45 days by enacting a joint resolution. During the implementation phase, DOD is required to initiate closures and realignments within two years and complete all actions within six years. The BRAC process represents a legislative compromise between the executive and legislative branches wherein each shares power in managing the closure and realignment of military bases. The imposition of an independent, third-party mediator was intended to insulate base closings from political considerations by both branches that had complicated similar actions in the past. This report provides background on the development of BRAC, describes its major elements and milestones, and outlines issues frequently cited in the context of new rounds, such as potential savings."], "all_classes": null, "length": 5035}
{"pred": "\nThe report provides an overview of the Higher Education Act (HEA) provisions that affect an institution's eligibility for participation in Title IV student aid programs. It describes the general eligibility criteria for institutions and programs, the program integrity triad, and additional requirements that apply to specific types of institutions. Institutions must meet basic eligibility criteria, including offering at least one eligible program, and satisfy the program integrity triad, which includes state authorization, accreditation by an accrediting agency recognized by ED, and eligibility and certification by ED. The report discusses several issues related to institutional eligibility, including Program Participation Agreements, campus safety policies and crime reporting required under the Clery Act, the return of Title IV funds, and distance education. To be eligible to participate in HEA Title IV student aid programs, institutions must meet several criteria, including requirements related to programs offered, student enrollment, institutional operations, and the length of academic programs. The HEA sets forth three requirements to ensure program integrity in postsecondary education, known as the program integrity triad. The triad is state authorization, accreditation by an accrediting agency recognized by ED, and eligibility and certification by ED. The report concludes by summarizing the 50% rules that affect correspondence courses and the delay in implementation of state authorization requirements for institutions offering postsecondary distance or correspondence education.", "answers": ["Title IV of the Higher Education Act (HEA) authorizes programs that provide financial assistance to students to assist them in obtaining a postsecondary education at certain institutions of higher education (IHEs). These IHEs include public, private nonprofit, and proprietary institutions. For students attending such institutions to be able to receive Title IV assistance, an institution must meet basic criteria, including offering at least one eligible program of education (e.g., programs leading to a degree or preparing a student for gainful employment in a recognized occupation). In addition, an IHE must satisfy the program integrity triad, under which it must be licensed or otherwise legally authorized to operate in the state in which it is physically located, accredited or preaccredited by an agency recognized for that purpose by the Department of Education (ED), and certified by ED as eligible to participate in Title IV programs. These requirements are intended to provide a balance between consumer protection, quality assurance, and oversight and compliance in postsecondary education providers participating in Title IV student aid programs. An IHE must also fulfill a variety of other related requirements, including those that relate to institutional recruiting practices, student policies and procedures, and the administration of the Title IV student aid programs. Finally, additional criteria may apply to an institution depending on its control or the type of educational programs it offers. For example, proprietary institutions must meet HEA requirements that are otherwise inapplicable to public and private nonprofit institutions, including deriving at least 10% of their revenues from non-Title IV funds (also known as the 90/10 rule). While an institution is ineligible to participate in Title IV programs if more than 50% of its courses are offered by correspondence or if 50% or more of its students are enrolled in correspondence courses. This report first describes the types of institutions eligible to participate in Title IV programs and discusses the program integrity triad. It then discusses additional issues related to institutional eligibility, including program participations agreements, required campus safety policies and crime reporting, and distance and correspondence education."], "all_classes": null, "length": 8147}
{"pred": "\nThe report describes USDA's planned approach for responding to a Foot-and-Mouth Disease (FMD) outbreak. It identifies 11 challenge areas that USDA would face in pursuing its FMD response goals:\n\n1. Surveillance - detecting the first cases of FMD in an outbreak - which could take time due to lack of active surveillance and limited diagnostic testing capacity.\n\n2. Diagnosis - USDA would face challenges in diagnosing FMD due to lack of validated diagnostic tests and limited resources to collect samples and perform diagnostic testing in a large outbreak.\n\n3. Information management - USDA would face challenges in managing information during an outbreak, including incompatible data systems and lack of documentation.\n\n4. Biosecurity - USDA would face challenges in implementing biosecurity measures due to lack of sufficient biosecurity on some premises.\n\n5. Vaccination - USDA would face challenges in obtaining and using vaccine in a response effort due to limited supply, scientific, procedural, and infrastructure challenges related to vaccine production.\n\n6. Traceability - USDA would face challenges in tracing the locations and movements of infected and susceptible animals during an outbreak.\n\nTo mitigate these challenges, USDA has identified dozens of corrective actions, but has not consistently followed its procedures for prioritizing and monitoring these actions. The report recommends that USDA follow its SOP to prioritize and monitor corrective actions to ensure it is allocating its limited resources effectively.", "answers": ["FMD is a highly contagious viral disease that causes painful lesions on the hooves and mouths of some livestock, making it difficult for them to stand or eat, thus greatly reducing meat and milk production. The United States has not had an FMD outbreak since 1929, but FMD is present in much of the world. An FMD outbreak in the United States could have serious economic impacts, in part because trade partners would likely halt all imports of U.S. livestock and livestock products until the disease was eradicated. These imports were valued at more than $19 billion in 2017. GAO was asked to review USDA's efforts to prepare for an FMD outbreak. This report examines (1) USDA's planned approach for responding to an FMD outbreak; (2) challenges USDA would face in pursuing its response goals; and (3) how USDA identifies, prioritizes, and monitors corrective actions to mitigate the challenges. GAO observed a USDA FMD preparedness exercise; reviewed agency documents and nongeneralizable questionnaire responses from 29 respondents from federal and state government, livestock industries, and universities; and interviewed officials from federal and state governments and representatives of livestock industries and universities. The U.S. Department of Agriculture's (USDA) planned approach for responding to an outbreak of foot-and-mouth disease (FMD) includes several strategies. These strategies generally rely on killing infected and susceptible animals, vaccinating uninfected animals, or a combination of both approaches. USDA would implement one or more of the strategies, depending on factors such as the outbreak's size and the resources available, according to agency documents. USDA would likely face significant challenges in pursuing its response goals of detecting, controlling, and containing FMD quickly; eradicating FMD while seeking to stabilize industry and the economy; and facilitating continuity of commerce in uninfected animals. GAO identified challenges in 11 areas—including allocating a limited supply of FMD vaccine—based on its review of USDA documents, responses to GAO's questionnaire, and interviews with agency officials and others with expertise on FMD. According to USDA, the agency may not have a sufficient supply of FMD vaccine to control more than a small outbreak because of limited resources to obtain vaccine. As shown below, the current vaccine supply would be sufficient to protect about 14 percent of Texas's cattle or about 4 percent of Iowa's swine; these states' cattle and swine populations are the nation's largest. The Agriculture Improvement Act of 2018 includes a provision to increase the FMD vaccine supply. USDA has identified dozens of corrective actions to mitigate the challenges of responding to an FMD outbreak, as called for in USDA procedures, but has not prioritized these corrective actions or monitored their completion, as also called for in its procedures. USDA has identified the corrective actions through exercises simulating FMD outbreaks, surveys, and lessons learned from other foreign animal disease outbreaks. However, USDA has not completed all of the corrective actions, including actions related to vaccination. Agency officials stated that they have not completed such corrective actions because they have been responding to outbreaks of other animal diseases and have limited resources. Without following agency procedures to prioritize and monitor corrective actions, USDA cannot ensure that it is allocating its resources to the most beneficial actions to prepare for a possible FMD outbreak. GAO is recommending that USDA follow its procedures to prioritize and monitor the completion of corrective actions that the agency has identified for FMD preparedness. USDA agreed with these recommendations, and described actions it will take to implement them."], "all_classes": null, "length": 11771}
{"pred": "\nThe report discusses the efforts of the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) to expand access to medication-assisted treatment (MAT) for opioid use disorders. HHS has implemented five key efforts to increase access to MAT, including grant programs that provide funding to states and health centers to increase their capacity to provide MAT and recovery support services. These efforts include:\n\n1) Targeted Capacity Expansion: Medication Assisted Treatment – Prescription Drug and Opioid Addiction (MAT-PDOA) grant program, which provides funding to states to increase their capacity to provide MAT and recovery support services.\n\n2) Substance Abuse Service Expansion Supplement to Health Centers grant program, which provides funding to health centers to improve and expand their delivery of substance abuse services, including MAT.\n\n3) Increasing Access to Medication-Assisted Treatment in Rural Primary Care Practices grant program, which funds demonstration projects to expand access to MAT in primary care practices in rural areas.\n\n4) State Targeted Response to the Opioid Crisis grants, which provide funding to states to increase access to treatment services for opioid use disorders, including MAT.\n\n5) Expanding access to waivers for practitioners to prescribe buprenorphine outside of an opioid treatment program (OTP).\n\nHHS has not yet established performance measures with targets to evaluate the effectiveness of these efforts. The report recommends that HHS establish performance measures with targets related to expanding access to MAT for opioid use disorders and establish timeframes for its evaluation approach. HHS concurred with these recommendations.", "answers": ["The misuse of prescription opioid pain relievers and illicit opioids, such as heroin, has contributed to increases in overdose deaths. According to the most recent Centers for Disease Control and Prevention data, in 2015 over 52,000 people died of drug overdose deaths, and about 63 percent of them involved an opioid. For those who are addicted to or misuse opioids, MAT has been shown to be an effective treatment. GAO was asked to review HHS and other efforts related to MAT for opioid use disorders. This report (1) describes HHS's key efforts to expand access to MAT, (2) examines HHS's evaluation, if any, of its efforts to expand access to MAT, and (3) describes efforts by selected stakeholders (states, private health insurers, and national associations) to expand access to MAT. GAO gathered information from HHS officials as well as a non-generalizable selection of 15 stakeholders selected based on their MAT expansion activities, among other factors. GAO also assessed HHS's evaluation plans using internal control standards for defining objectives and evaluating results. In an effort to reduce the prevalence of opioid misuse and the fatalities associated with it, the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) established a goal to expand access to medication-assisted treatment (MAT). MAT is an approach that combines behavioral therapy and the use of certain medications, such as methadone and buprenorphine. HHS has implemented five key efforts since 2015 that focus on expanding access to MAT for opioid use disorders—four grant programs that focus on expanding access to MAT in various settings (including rural primary care practices and health centers) and regulatory changes that expand treatment capacity by increasing patient limits for buprenorphine prescribers and allowing nurse practitioners and physician assistants to prescribe buprenorphine. Some of the grant awards were made in 2015, while others were made as recently as May 2017. (See figure.) As of August 2017, efforts under all the grant programs were ongoing. Grant recipients can use funding to undertake a range of activities, such as hiring and training providers and supporting treatments involving MAT. In addition, certain providers and grant recipients are required to develop plans for preventing MAT medications from being diverted for nonmedical purposes. HHS officials told GAO that as of August 2017, the department was in the process of finalizing its plans to evaluate its efforts to address the opioid epidemic. In September 2016, HHS awarded a contract to conduct the evaluation. HHS officials told GAO that they are still working with the contractor to finalize the evaluation approach and that it will focus on whether HHS's efforts to address the opioid epidemic have been implemented as intended. HHS officials said that in the future, HHS may also evaluate whether, or to what extent, its efforts have been effective in expanding access to MAT, in addition to evaluating implementation. While HHS has some of the information that could be used in a future evaluation of the effectiveness of its efforts to expand access to MAT, it has not adopted specific performance measures with targets specifying the magnitude of the increases HHS hopes to achieve through its efforts to expand access to MAT, and by when. For example, HHS has not established a long-term target specifying the percentage increase in the number of prescriptions for buprenorphine HHS would like to achieve, which would help to show whether efforts by HHS and others are resulting in a sufficient number of prescriptions for MAT medications. HHS has also not chosen a specific method of measuring treatment capacity or established targets associated with it, which would help determine whether a sufficient number of providers are becoming available to evaluate and treat patients who may benefit from MAT. Without specifying these performance measures and associated targets, HHS will not have an effective means to determine whether its efforts are helping to expand access to MAT or whether new approaches are needed. Gauging this progress is particularly important given the large gap identified nationwide between the total number of individuals who could benefit from MAT and the limited number who can currently access it based on provider availability. In addition, GAO also found that as of August 2017, HHS had not finalized its approach for its planned evaluation activities, including timeframes. Without timeframes for the evaluation's activities, HHS increases the risk that the evaluation will not be completed as expeditiously as possible. In addition to HHS efforts to expand access to MAT, officials from selected states, private health insurers, and national associations reported using several efforts to expand patients' access to MAT for opioid use disorders. For example, several stakeholders provided GAO with the following examples of their efforts: States. State health officials from all five selected states have implemented or are planning approaches that focus on integrating the use of MAT into primary care, such as by providing services for centralized intake and initial management of patients or through telehealth that connects patients in rural areas with addiction specialists in a different location. Private health insurers. Three private health insurers reported removing prior authorization requirements for MAT medications so patients can avoid a waiting period before receiving the medications. National associations. Officials told GAO that they are conducting outreach and training for their members and developing tools and resource guides. For example, one association developed a road map with strategies that state policymakers can use to address the opioid epidemic, including strategies for reducing the stigma associated with MAT through educating the public and potential providers. GAO recommends that HHS take two actions: (1) establish performance measures with targets related to expanding access to MAT, and (2) establish timeframes for its evaluation of its efforts to expand access to MAT. HHS concurred with both recommendations."], "all_classes": null, "length": 5601}
{"pred": "\nThe report discusses the Congressional rule known as the Holman rule, which separates policy questions from funding questions in legislation. The rule was established to prevent legislation from being tied up in debates over appropriations. The House rules have evolved over time, with the current version stating that a provision changing existing law may not be reported in a general appropriation bill unless it retrenches expenditures by reducing amounts of money covered by the bill. However, a separate order adopted for the 115th Congress provides additional guidance on what constitutes a retrenchment. The rule does not limit Congress's lawmaking authority but provides a limited exception to the general prohibition against legislation in appropriation measures. The House has interpreted the rule through precedents that have narrowed its application over time. The rule is intended to apply only when an obvious reduction of funds is achieved by the provision, such as the cessation of specific government activities or a specific reduction of total appropriations in the bill. The separate order allows for retrenchments resulting from a reduction of the number and salary of officers or the reduction of compensation of any person paid out of the Treasury. However, the rule does not apply to funds appropriated in other measures and retrenchments that are not directly related to the reduction of funds in the bill are not allowed. The House Parliamentarian is the definitive authority on the chamber's precedents and procedures.", "answers": ["Although congressional rules establish a general division of responsibility under which questions of policy are kept separate from questions of funding, House rules provide for exceptions in certain circumstances. One such circumstance allows for the inclusion of legislative language in general appropriations bills or amendments thereto for \"germane provisions that retrench expenditures by the reduction of amounts of money covered by the bill.\" This exception appears in clause 2(b) of House Rule XXI and is known as the Holman rule, after Representative William Holman of Indiana, who first proposed the exception in 1876. Since the period immediately after its initial adoption, the House has interpreted the Holman rule through precedents that have tended to incrementally narrow its application. Under current precedents, for a legislative provision or amendment to be in order, the legislative language in question must be both germane to other provisions in the measure and must produce a clear reduction of appropriations in that bill. In addition, the House adopted a separate order during the 115th Congress that provided for retrenchments of expenditures by a reduction of amounts of money covered by the bill to be construed as applying to: any provision or amendment that retrenches expenditures by— (1) the reduction of amounts of money in the bill; (2) the reduction of the number and salary of the officers of the United States; or (3) the reduction of the compensation of any person paid out of the Treasury of the United States. This separate order was not readopted for the 116th Congress. This report provides a history of this provision in House rules and an analysis of precedents that are illustrative of its possible application."], "all_classes": null, "length": 2095}
{"pred": "\nThis report summarizes the current state of federal efforts to address homelessness among runaway and homeless youth in the United States. The Runaway Youth Act of 1974 and subsequent reauthorizations have established the Runaway and Homeless Youth Program, which provides funding for programs like Basic Centers, Transitional Living Programs, and Street Outreach. These programs aim to provide temporary shelter, counseling, and other services to help youth transition to permanent housing. The program has evolved over time to address the needs of different subgroups of homeless youth, including LGBTQ youth. Funding has increased over the past decade, but there are still gaps in data on the number and characteristics of homeless youth. The US Interagency Council on Homelessness has developed a National Strategic Plan to End Homelessness, which includes goals for ending chronic homelessness and improving outcomes for youth. HHS has also provided funding for research on homeless youth and their needs. The report highlights the challenges homeless youth face, including mental health disorders, substance abuse, and sexual exploitation, and notes that more research is needed to better understand the causes of homelessness and how to help youth exit homelessness.", "answers": ["This report discusses runaway and homeless youth, and the federal response to support this population. There is no single definition of the terms \"runaway youth\" or \"homeless youth.\" However, both groups of youth share the risk of not having adequate shelter and other provisions, and may engage in harmful behaviors while away from a permanent home. Youth most often cite family conflict as the major reason for their homelessness or episodes of running away. A youth's sexual orientation, sexual activity, school problems, and substance abuse are associated with family discord. The precise number of homeless and runaway youth is unknown due to their residential mobility and overlap among the populations. The U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) is supporting data collection efforts, known as Voices of Youth Count, to better determine the number of homeless youth. The 2017 study found that approximately 700,000 youth ages 13 to 17 and 3.5 million young adults ages 18 to 25 experienced homelessness within a 12-month period because they were sleeping in places not meant for habitation, in shelters, or with others while lacking alternative living arrangements. From the early 20th century through the 1960s, the needs of runaway and homeless youth were handled locally through the child welfare agency, juvenile justice courts, or both. The 1970s marked a shift toward federal oversight of programs that help youth who had run afoul of the law, including those who committed status offenses (i.e., a noncriminal act that is considered a violation of the law because of the youth's age). The Runaway Youth Act of 1974 was enacted as Title III of the Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention Act (P.L. 93-415) to assist runaways through services specifically for this population. The act was amended over time to include homeless youth. It authorizes funding for services carried out under the Runaway and Homeless Youth Program (RHYP), which is administered by the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (HHS). The program was most recently authorized through FY2020 by the Juvenile Justice Reform Act of 2018 (P.L. 115-385). This law did not make other changes to the RHYP statute. Funding is discretionary, meaning provided through the appropriations process. FY2019 appropriations are $127.4 million. The RHYP program is made up of three components: the Basic Center Program (BCP), Transitional Living Program (TLP), and Street Outreach Program (SOP). The BCP provides temporary shelter, counseling, and after care services to runaway and homeless youth under age 18 and their families. In FY2017, the program served 23,288 youth, and in FY2018 it funded 280 BCP shelters (most recent figures available). The TLP is targeted to older youth ages 16 through 22 (and sometimes an older age). In FY2017, the TLP program served 3,517 youth, and in FY2018 it funded 299 grantees (most recent figures available). Youth who use the TLP receive longer-term housing with supportive services. The SOP provides education, treatment, counseling, and referrals for runaway, homeless, and street youth who have been subjected to, or are at risk of being subjected to, sexual abuse, sex exploitation, and trafficking. In FY2017, the SOP grantees made contact with 24,366 youth. The RHYP is a part of larger federal efforts to end youth homelessness through the U.S. Interagency Council on Homelessness (USICH). The USICH is a coordinating body made up of multiple federal agencies committed to addressing homelessness. The USICH's Opening Doors plan to end homelessness includes strategies for ending youth homelessness by 2020, including through collecting better data and supporting evidence-based practices to improve youth outcomes. Voices of Youth Count is continuing to report on characteristics of homeless youth. In addition to the RHYP, there are other federal supports to address youth homelessness. HUD's Youth Homelessness Demonstration Program is funding a range of housing options for youth, in selected urban and rural communities. Other federal programs have enabled homeless youth to access services, including those related to education and family violence."], "all_classes": null, "length": 8238}
{"pred": "\nThis report provides an overview of the FY2019 budget requests and appropriations for the International Trade Administration (ITA), the U.S. International Trade Commission (USITC), and the Office of the United States Trade Representative (USTR). The Administration requested a total of $590.8 million for the three trade-related agencies, which represents an 8.9% decrease from the FY2018 appropriated amount. The Administration proposed increasing some trade enforcement activities within ITA and USTR, while reducing funding for certain export promotion activities. The House and Senate Appropriations Committees largely declined the budget cuts requested by the Administration for these three trade agencies. For FY2019, Congress provided $647.0 million in funding for the three trade-related agencies, a 0.2% decrease from FY2018 appropriations. The report provides detailed information on the budget requests and appropriations for each agency, including funding levels, program areas, and specific activities.", "answers": ["The Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2019 (P.L. 116-6), was signed into law on February 15, 2019. The act included a total of $647.0 million in funding for three trade-related agencies under the Commerce, Justice, Science and Related Agencies (CJS) account—the International Trade Administration (ITA), the U.S. International Trade Commission (USITC), and the office of the United States Trade Representative (USTR). This represents a 0.2% decrease from FY2018 appropriations. For FY2019, the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2019, included $484.0 million in direct appropriations for ITA (a 0.4% increase from the FY2018 appropriation), $95.0 million in funding for USITC (a 1.4% increase), and a total of $68.0 million for USTR (a 0.2% decrease). The Administration's Request On February 12, 2018, the Trump Administration submitted its FY2019 budget request to Congress. The FY2019 proposal included a total of $590.8 million for the three CJS trade-related agencies, an 8.9% decrease from FY2018 total appropriated amounts for these agencies. The Administration requested reducing funding for all three trade-related agencies. For FY2019, the request included $440.1 million in direct funding for ITA (an 8.7% decrease from the FY2018 appropriation), $87.6 million for USITC (a 6.5% decrease), and $63.0 million for USTR (a 13.2% decrease). Congressional Actions In the spring of 2018, the House and Senate reported FY2019 CJS appropriations bills, which included proposed funding for ITA, USITC, and USTR. The reported bills did not adopt many of the Administration's budget reductions, and instead proposed funding levels that were more similar to the FY2018-enacted amounts. The House Committee on Appropriations reported H.R. 5952 on May 17, 2018. The House proposal recommended a total of $647.6 million for the three CJS trade-related agencies. This proposal was $56.8 million more (9.6%) than the Administration's request, and $0.7 million less (-0.1%) than the FY2018-enacted legislation. The House committee proposed $480.0 million in direct funding for ITA, $95.0 million for USTIC, and a total of $72.6 million for USTR, comprised of $57.6 million for salaries and expenses and an additional $15.0 million from the Trade Enforcement Trust Fund for trade enforcement activities as authorized by the Trade Facilitation and Trade Enforcement Act of 2015 (P.L. 114-125). The Senate Committee on Appropriations reported S. 3072 on June 14, 2018. The Senate committee-reported proposal recommended a total of $655.6 million for the three CJS trade-related agencies. This is $64.8 million (11.0%) more than the Administration's request and $7.3 million (1.1%) more than the FY2018-enacted appropriations. The Senate committee proposed $488.0 million in direct funding for ITA, $95 million for USITC, and a total of $72.6 million for USTR, comprised of $57.6 million for salaries and expenses and an additional $15.0 million from the Trade Enforcement Trust Fund for trade enforcement activities. After three continuing resolutions and a three-week lapse in funding, Congress passed the Consolidated Appropriations Act. 2019 (P.L. 116-6), which was signed into law on February 15, 2019. The act included a total of $647.0 million in funding for the three trade-related agencies, which represented a 0.2% decrease from FY2018 funding levels."], "all_classes": null, "length": 3802}
{"pred": "\nThe report discusses the long-term fiscal outlook for state and local governments in the United States. The report suggests that state and local governments will likely face a difference between revenue and spending during the next 50 years. The operating balance, which measures the sector's ability to cover its current expenditures out of current revenues, is projected to decline from about -1% of GDP to -3% of GDP over the next 50 years if current policies are maintained. Maintaining an operating balance at or above zero would require state and local governments to reduce spending by about 14.7% compared to current policies. The report highlights several factors that could affect the fiscal outlook, including economic growth, healthcare cost growth, and the rate of return on pension assets. The report also discusses the sensitivity of the results to alternative assumptions about population growth, GDP growth, healthcare cost growth, and pension returns. The report concludes that understanding the long-term fiscal outlook for state and local governments can help inform policy decisions and mitigate the impact of any potential fiscal pressures.", "answers": ["Fiscal sustainability presents a national challenge shared by all levels of government. Since 2007, GAO has published simulations of long-term fiscal trends in the state and local government sector, which have consistently shown that the sector faces long-term fiscal pressures. While most states have requirements related to balancing their budgets, deficits can arise because the planned annual revenues are not generated at the expected rate, demand for services exceeds planned expenditures, or both, resulting in a near-term operating deficit. This report updates GAO's state and local fiscal model to simulate the fiscal outlook for the state and local government sector. This includes identifying the components of state and local expenditures likely to contribute to the sector's fiscal pressures. In addition, this report identifies considerations related to federal policy and other factors that could contribute to uncertainties in the state and local government sector's long-term fiscal outlook. GAO's model uses the Bureau of Economic Analysis's National Income and Product Accounts as the primary data source and presents the results in the aggregate for the state and local sector as a whole. The model shows the level of receipts and expenditures for the sector until 2067, based on current and historical spending and revenue patterns. In addition, the model assumes that the current set of policies in place across state and local government remains constant to show a simulated long-term outlook. GAO's simulations suggest that the state and local government sector will likely face an increasing difference between revenues and expenditures during the next 50 years as reflected by the operating balance--a measure of the sector's ability to cover its current expenditures out of its current receipts. While both expenditures and revenues are projected to increase as a percentage of gross domestic product (GDP), a difference between the two is projected to persist because expenditures are expected to grow faster than revenues throughout the simulation period. GAO's simulations also suggest that growth in the sector's overall spending is largely driven by health care expenditures--in particular, Medicaid spending and spending on health benefits for state and local government employees and retirees. These expenditures are projected to grow as a share of GDP during the simulation period. GAO's simulations also suggest that revenues from personal income taxes and federal grants to states and localities will increase during the simulation period. However, revenues will grow more slowly than expenditures such that the sector faces a declining fiscal outlook. GAO also identified federal policy changes that could affect the state and local government sector's fiscal outlook. For example, the effects of the recently-enacted Tax Cuts and Jobs Act will likely depend on how states incorporate the Act into their state income tax rules. In addition, other factors, such as economic growth and rates of return on pension assets, could shift future fiscal outcomes for the sector."], "all_classes": null, "length": 8477}
{"pred": "\nThe report discusses the U.S. Marine Corps' Amphibious Combat Vehicle (ACV) program, which aims to replace the aging Amphibious Assault Vehicle (AAV). The ACV program has gone through several iterations, with the current version, ACV 1.1, intended to provide a more affordable and sustainable replacement for the AAV. The ACV 1.1 is designed to operate in surf zones up to 3 feet and land terrain, with a swim capability for shore-to-shore operations. The program has encountered some delays and cost growth, but is currently on track to meet development cost goals. The ACV 1.2 is planned to have greater amphibious capability, including higher water speeds and the ability to self-deploy from ships far from shore. The consolidation of the ACV 1.1 and ACV 1.2 variants may result in cost savings, but the impact on the ACV 2.0 program is unclear. The adoption of Expeditionary Advance Base Operations (EABO) could require changes to the ACV vehicles to enhance survivability, lethality, and C4ISR capabilities. The report provides details on the ACV program's acquisition timeline, cost estimates, and operational requirements.", "answers": ["On January 6, 2011, after spending approximately $3 billion in developmental funding, the Marine Corps cancelled the Expeditionary Fighting Vehicle (EFV) program due to poor reliability demonstrated during operational testing and excessive cost growth. Because the EFV was intended to replace the 40-year-old Amphibious Assault Vehicle (AAV), the Pentagon pledged to move quickly to develop a \"more affordable and sustainable\" vehicle to replace the EFV. The Amphibious Combat Vehicle (ACV) is intended to replace the AAV, incorporating some EFV capabilities but in a more practical and cost-efficient manner. In concert with the ACV, the Marines were developing the Marine Personnel Carrier (MPC) to serve as a survivable and mobile platform to transport Marines when ashore. The MPC was not intended to be amphibious like an AAV, EFV, or the ACV but instead would be required to have a swim capability for inland waterways such as rivers, lakes, and other water obstacles such as shore-to-shore operations in the littorals. Both vehicles were intended to play central roles in future Marine amphibious operations. On June 14, 2013, Marine leadership put the MPC program \"on ice\" due to budgetary pressures but suggested the program might be resurrected some 10 years down the road when budgetary resources might be more favorable. In what was described as a \"drastic shift,\" the Marines decided to \"resurrect\" the MPC in March 2014. The Marines designated the MPC as ACV Increment 1.1 and planned to acquire about 200 vehicles. The Marines also plan to develop ACV Increment 1.2, a tracked, fully amphibious version, and at the time planned to acquire about 470 vehicles and fund an ongoing high water speed study. Although ACV Increment 1.1 is to have a swim capability, another mode of transport (ship or aircraft) would be required to get the vehicles from ship to shore. The Marines are reportedly exploring the possibility of developing a high water speed ACV 2.0, which could accompany tanks and light armored vehicles into combat. On November 5, 2014, the Marines released a draft Request for Proposal (RFP) for ACV Increment 1.1. On November 24, 2015, the Marine Corps awarded BAE Systems and SAIC contracts to develop ACV 1.1 prototypes for evaluation. BAE's contract was for $103.8 million and SAIC's for $121.5 million, and each company was to build 16 prototypes to be tested over the next two years. Both BAE and SAIC delivered their prototypes early, and Engineering and Manufacturing Development (EMD) testing began mid-March 2017. In early December 2017, the Marines reportedly sent the ACV 1.1 down select request for proposals to BAE and Science Applications International Corporation (SAIC). On June 19, 2018, the Marine Corps selected BAE Systems to produce the ACV. The initial contract—valued at $198 million—was for low-rate production of 30 vehicles to be delivered by the autumn of 2019. On April 10, 2019, during testimony to the Senate Armed Services Committee, Navy and Marine Corps leadership announced that during the fall of 2018, ACV 1.1 prototypes demonstrated satisfactory water mobility performance in high surf conditions and, in doing so, met the full water mobility transition requirement for ACV 1.2 capability. As a result, ACV 1.1 and ACV 1.2 were to be consolidated into a single variant—the ACV—which is intended to replace all AAVs. Potential issues for Congress include the potential ramifications of the consolidation of the ACV 1.1 and ACV 1.2 programs and how the possible adoption of the Expeditionary Advance Base Operations (EABO) operational concept could affect the ACV program."], "all_classes": null, "length": 4254}
{"pred": "\nThe report discusses the strong relations between the United States and Israel in various areas, including military and homeland security capabilities, nuclear ambiguity, Iran and Hezbollah threats, Israeli-Palestinian issues, and U.S. aid and peace plan proposals. Israel relies on its military and homeland security capabilities to address potential threats, including Iran's nuclear program and Hezbollah's missile arsenal. The United States provides significant military aid to Israel, including a 10-year bilateral military aid MOU. Israel and the United States share concerns about Iran and Hezbollah, and Israel has taken steps to prevent Iranian and Hezbollah aggression in Syria. The U.S. has recognized Israel's sovereignty over the Golan Heights, which could impact Israeli-Syrian relations and the Israeli-Palestinian peace process. Israeli elections in April 2019 may influence the country's leadership and policies, particularly regarding the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and Iran.", "answers": ["Strong relations between the United States and Israel have led to bilateral cooperation in many areas. Matters of particular significance to U.S.-Israel relations include Israel's ability to address the threats it faces in its region. Shared U.S.-Israel concerns about Iran and its allies on the nuclear issue and in Syria and Lebanon. Israeli-Palestinian issues. Israeli domestic political issues, including elections scheduled for 2019. Israel relies on a number of strengths to manage potential threats to its security and existence. It maintains conventional military superiority relative to neighboring states and the Palestinians. It also takes measures to deter attack and defend its population and borders from evolving asymmetric threats such as rockets and missiles, cross-border tunneling, drones, and cyberattacks. Additionally, Israel has an undeclared but presumed nuclear weapons capability. Against a backdrop of strong bilateral cooperation, Israel's leaders and supporters routinely make the case that Israel's security and the broader stability of the region remain critically important for U.S. interests. A 10-year bilateral military aid memorandum of understanding (MOU)—signed in 2016—commits the United States to provide Israel $3.3 billion in Foreign Military Financing annually from FY2019 to FY2028, along with additional amounts from Defense Department accounts for missile defense. All of these amounts remain subject to congressional appropriations. Israeli officials seek to counter Iranian regional influence and prevent Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons. Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu released new Israeli intelligence on Iran's nuclear program in April 2018, days before President Trump announced the U.S. withdrawal from the 2015 international agreement that constrains Iran's nuclear activities. It is unclear whether Israel might take future military action in Iran if Iranian nuclear activities resume. Since 2018, Israel has conducted a number of military operations in Syria against Iran and its allies, including Lebanese Hezbollah. Israel and Iran also appear to be competing for military advantage over each other at the Israel-Lebanon border. Amid uncertainty in the area, in March 2019 President Trump recognized Israel's claim to sovereignty over the Golan Heights, changing long-standing U.S. policy that held—in line with U.N. Security Council Resolution 497 from 1981—the Golan was occupied Syrian territory whose final status was subject to Israel-Syria negotiation. The prospects for an Israeli-Palestinian peace process are complicated by many factors. Palestinian leaders cut off high-level political contacts with the Trump Administration after it recognized Jerusalem as Israel's capital in December 2017. U.S.-Palestinian tensions have since worsened amid U.S. cutoffs of funding to the Palestinians and diplomatic moves—including the May 2018 opening of the U.S. embassy to Israel in Jerusalem. Palestinian leaders interpreted these actions as prejudicing their claims to a capital in Jerusalem and to a just resolution of Palestinian refugee claims. Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu has welcomed these U.S. actions. The Trump Administration has suggested that it will release a proposed peace plan after Israeli elections, which are scheduled for April 9, 2019. Speculation continues about how warming ties between Israel and Arab Gulf states may affect Israeli-Palestinian diplomacy, though Saudi Arabia said that the U.S. policy change on the Golan Heights would negatively affect the peace process. Bouts of tension and violence between Israel and Hamas in Gaza have continued—reportedly accompanied by indirect talks between the two parties that are being brokered by Egypt and aim for a long-term cease-fire. Domestically, Israel is preparing for the April 9 elections, which are closely contested. Former top general Benny Gantz is combining with former Finance Minister Yair Lapid to challenge Netanyahu, whom the attorney general has recommended be indicted for corruption in three separate cases. The elections and subsequent government formation process will have significant implications for Israel's future leadership and policies."], "all_classes": null, "length": 3079}
{"pred": "\nThe report discusses the Department of Defense's (DOD) foreign currency budget rates and how they are revised. DOD sets foreign currency budget rates to determine its funding needs and calculate any gains or losses due to foreign currency fluctuations. The report reviews DOD's foreign currency budget rates for the period of fiscal years 2009 through 2017 and identifies years in which DOD revised its initial budget rates. The report compares DOD's budget rates with Treasury rates and finds that DOD's budget rates are generally within 10% of Treasury rates. The report also analyzes how revising the budget rates affects DOD's projected O&M and MILPERS funding needs and potential gains or losses due to foreign currency fluctuations.\n\nThe report finds that DOD has not effectively managed the Foreign Currency Fluctuations, Defense (FCFD) account to cover losses. The FCFD account is used to cover losses that the services experience due to foreign currency fluctuations. However, DOD does not analyze realized and projected losses to determine the appropriate size of the FCFD account balance. Instead, DOD maintains the account balance at the maximum level allowed by statute by using unobligated balances before they are canceled and are no longer available to DOD.\n\nThe report recommends that DOD conduct a review of the foreign currency rates used at disbursement to determine cost-saving opportunities. DOD should also analyze realized and projected losses to determine the necessary size of the FCFD account balance and use the results of this analysis as the basis for transfers of unobligated balances to the account.\n\nThe report also finds that DOD has not taken steps to reduce costs in selecting foreign currency rates at which to make disbursements. The report recommends that DOD develop guidance instructing the services in selecting rates used for disbursements in foreign currencies.\n\nThe report concludes that DOD's management of the FCFD account and foreign currency funds could be improved. The report makes four recommendations to DOD to address these issues.", "answers": ["DOD requested about $60 billion for fiscal years 2009 - 2017 to purchase goods and services overseas and reimburse service-members for costs incurred while stationed abroad. DOD uses foreign currency exchange rates to budget and pay (that is, disburse amounts) for these expenses. It also manages the FCFD account to mitigate a loss in buying power that results from foreign currency rate changes. GAO was asked to examine DOD's processes to budget for and manage foreign currency fluctuations. This report (1) describes DOD's revision of its foreign currency budget rates since 2009 and the relationship between the revised rates and projected O&M and MILPERS funding needs; (2) evaluates the extent to which DOD has taken steps to reduce costs in selecting foreign currency rates to disburse funds to liquidate O&M obligations, and determined whether opportunities exist to gain additional savings; and (3) assesses the extent to which DOD has effectively managed the FCFD account balance. GAO analyzed data on foreign currency rates, DOD financial management regulations, a non-generalizable sample of foreign currency disbursement data, and FCFD account balances. The Department of Defense (DOD) revised its foreign currency exchange rates (“budget rates”) during fiscal years 2014 through 2016 for each of the nine foreign currencies it uses to develop its Operation and Maintenance (O&M) and Military Personnel (MILPERS) budget request. These revisions decreased DOD's projected O&M and MILPERS funding needs. DOD's revision of the budget rates during these years also decreased the expected gains (that is, buying power) that would have resulted from an increase in the strength of the U.S. Dollar relative to other foreign currencies. DOD did not revise its budget rates in fiscal years 2009 through 2013. For fiscal year 2017, DOD changed its methodology for producing budget rates, resulting in rates that were more closely aligned with market rates. According to officials, that change made it unnecessary to revise the budget rates during the fiscal year. DOD has taken some steps to reduce costs in selecting foreign currency rates used to pay (that is, disburse amounts) for goods and services, but DOD has not fully determined whether opportunities exist to achieve additional savings. The Army has estimated potential savings of up to $10 million annually by using a foreign currency rate available 3 days in advance of paying for goods or services rather than a more costly rate available up to 5 days in advance. The Army has converted to the use of a 3-day advanced rate. GAO's analysis suggests that DOD could achieve cost savings if the services reviewed and consistently selected the most cost-effective foreign currency rates when paying for their goods and services. Absent a review, DOD is at risk for paying more than it would otherwise be required to conduct its transactions. DOD used the Foreign Currency Fluctuations, Defense (FCFD) account to cover losses (that is, less buying power) due to unfavorable foreign currency fluctuations in 6 of the 8 years GAO reviewed. Since 2012, DOD has maintained the FCFD account balance at the statutory limit of $970 million, largely by transferring unobligated balances before they are cancelled from certain DOD accounts into the FCFD. However, DOD has not identified the appropriate FCFD account balance needed to maintain program operations by routinely analyzing projected losses and basing any transfers into the account on those expected losses. Thus, DOD may be maintaining balances that are hundreds of millions of dollars higher than needed, and that could have been used for other purposes or returned to the Treasury Department (see figure). GAO is making four recommendations, including that DOD review opportunities to achieve cost savings by more consistently selecting the most cost-effective foreign currency rates used for the payment of goods and services, and analyze projected losses to manage the FCFD account balance. DOD generally concurred with the recommendations."], "all_classes": null, "length": 10667}
{"pred": "\nThe report from the Government Accountability Office (GAO) examines the progress and challenges in the Department of Homeland Security's (DHS) Chemical Facility Anti-Terrorism Standards (CFATS) program. The program aims to identify and prioritize high-risk chemical facilities based on their potential threat to communities. The GAO found that DHS has made progress in some areas, such as improving data sharing and risk assessment, but still faces challenges in others, like ensuring compliance with security plans. DHS has implemented an Expedited Approval Program for tier 3 and 4 facilities to streamline the security plan review process. However, the program has not yet been widely adopted. The GAO recommends that DHS improve its outreach and feedback mechanisms to better engage with stakeholders and industry. DHS has agreed with the recommendations and is taking steps to implement them. The report highlights areas where DHS has made progress and areas where more work is needed to improve the CFATS program.", "answers": ["Thousands of facilities have hazardous chemicals that could be targeted or used to inflict mass casualties or harm surrounding populations in the United States. In accordance with the DHS Appropriations Act, 2007, DHS established the CFATS program in 2007 to, among other things, identify and assess the security risk posed by chemical facilities. DHS inspects high-risk facilities after it approves facility security plans to ensure that the facilities are implementing required security measures and procedures. This statement summarizes progress and challenges related to DHS's CFATS program management. This statement is based on prior products GAO issued from July 2012 through June 2017, along with updates conducted in June 2018 on DHS actions to address prior GAO recommendations. To conduct the prior work, GAO reviewed relevant laws, regulations, and DHS policies for administering the CFATS program, how DHS assesses risk, and data on high-risk chemical facilities. GAO also interviewed DHS officials and reviewed information on DHS actions to implement its prior recommendations. The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) has made progress addressing challenges that GAO's past work identified to managing the Chemical Facility Anti-Terrorism Standards (CFATS) program. The following summarizes progress made and challenges remaining in key aspects of the program. Identifying high-risk chemical facilities. In July 2015, GAO reported that DHS used self-reported and unverified data to determine the risk of facilities holding toxic chemicals that could threaten surrounding communities if released. GAO recommended that DHS should better verify the accuracy of facility-reported data. DHS implemented this recommendation by revising its methodology so it now calculates the risk of toxic release, rather than relying on facilities to do so. Assessing risk and prioritizing facilities. In April 2013, GAO reported weaknesses in multiple aspects of DHS's risk assessment and prioritization approach. GAO made two recommendations for DHS to review and improve this process, including that DHS enhance its risk assessment approach to incorporate all of the elements of consequence, threat, and vulnerability associated with a terrorist attack involving certain chemicals. DHS launched a new risk assessment methodology in October 2016 and is currently gathering new or updated data from about 27,000 facilities to (1) determine which facilities should be categorized as high-risk because of the threat of sabotage, theft or diversion, or a toxic release and (2) assign those facilities deemed high risk to one of four risk-based tiers. GAO has ongoing work assessing these efforts and will report later this summer on the extent to which they fully address prior recommendations. Reviewing and approving facilities' site security plans . DHS is to review security plans and visit facilities to ensure their security measures meet DHS standards. In April 2013, GAO reported a 7 to 9 year backlog for these reviews and visits. In July 2015, GAO reported that DHS had made substantial progress in addressing the backlog—estimating that it could take between 9 and 12 months for DHS to review and approve security plans for the approximately 900 remaining facilities. DHS has since taken additional action to expedite these activities and has eliminated this backlog. Inspecting facilities and ensuring compliance. In July 2015, GAO reported that DHS conducted compliance inspections at 83 of the 1,727 facilities with approved security plans. GAO found that nearly half of the inspected facilities were not fully compliant with their approved security plans and that DHS did not have documented procedures for managing facilities' compliance. GAO recommended that DHS document procedures for managing compliance. As a result, DHS has developed an enforcement procedure and a draft compliance inspection procedure and expects to finalize the compliance inspection procedure by the end of fiscal year 2018. GAO has made various recommendations to strengthen DHS's management of the CFATS program, with which DHS has generally agreed. DHS has implemented or described planned actions to address most of these recommendations."], "all_classes": null, "length": 2363}
{"pred": "\nThe report examines the Office of Surface Mining Reclamation and Enforcement's (OSMRE) oversight of financial assurances for coal mine reclamation. OSMRE requires coal mine operators to provide financial assurance to ensure that they can complete reclamation of disturbed land after mining. The report finds that OSMRE faces challenges in managing self-bonding, unanticipated reclamation costs, and the financial stability of surety companies. Self-bonding poses a risk to the government and states as operators may enter bankruptcy and not provide sufficient financial assurance for reclamation. OSMRE has taken steps to address these challenges but Congress should consider amending the law to eliminate self-bonding as a type of financial assurance for coal mine reclamation. The report highlights the following key findings:\n\n- OSMRE requires coal mine operators to provide financial assurance to ensure reclamation of disturbed land.\n- OSMRE uses surety bonds, collateral bonds, and self-bonds as financial assurance.\n- OSMRE conducts inspections to ensure operators have sufficient financial assurance.\n- OSMRE faces challenges in managing self-bonding due to operators' financial health, difficulty determining eligibility, and difficulty replacing self-bonds with other assurances.\n- Unanticipated reclamation costs may arise late in a mine's lifespan and operators may not have sufficient funds.\n- Surety bonds are not well-suited to provide assurance for long-term water pollution costs.\n\nIn summary, the report highlights the challenges OSMRE faces in managing financial assurances for coal mine reclamation, particularly self-bonding, and recommends Congress consider amending the law to eliminate self-bonding as a type of financial assurance.", "answers": ["Coal accounts for 17 percent of domestic energy production. SMCRA requires coal mine operators to reclaim lands that were disturbed during mining and to submit a financial assurance in an amount sufficient to ensure that adequate funds will be available to complete reclamation if the operator does not do so. Recent coal company bankruptcies have drawn attention to whether financial assurances obtained by OSMRE and state agencies will be adequate to reclaim land once coal mining operations have ceased. GAO was asked to review management of financial assurances for coal mine reclamation. This report describes, among other things, the amounts and types of financial assurances held for coal mine reclamation in 2017 and the challenges that OSMRE and state agencies face in managing these financial assurances. GAO collected and analyzed data from OSMRE and 23 state agencies; reviewed federal laws, regulations, and directives; and interviewed OSMRE and state agency officials and representatives from organizations associated with the mining and financial assurance industries and environmental organizations. State agencies and the Department of the Interior's Office of Surface Mining Reclamation and Enforcement (OSMRE) reported holding approximately $10.2 billion in surety bonds (guaranteed by a third party), collateral bonds (guaranteed by a tangible asset, such as a certificate of deposit), and self-bonds (guaranteed on the basis of a coal operator's own finances) as financial assurances for coal mine reclamation. OSMRE and state agencies face several challenges in managing financial assurances, according to the stakeholders GAO interviewed. Specifically, Obtaining additional financial assurances from operators for unanticipated reclamation costs, such as long-term treatment for water pollution, can be difficult. Determining the financial stability of surety companies has been challenging in certain instances. Self-bonding presents a risk to the government because it is difficult to (1) ascertain the financial health of an operator, (2) determine whether the operator qualifies for self-bonding, and (3) obtain a replacement for existing self-bonds when an operator no longer qualifies. In addition, some stakeholders said that the risk from self-bonding is greater now than when the practice was first authorized under the Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act (SMCRA). GAO's previous work examining environmental cleanup found that the financial risk to government and the amount of oversight needed for self-bonds are relatively high compared to other forms of financial assurances. GAO also previously reviewed federal financial assurance requirements for various energy and mineral extraction sectors and found that coal mining is the only one where self-bonding was allowed. However, because SMCRA explicitly allows states to decide whether to accept self-bonds, eliminating the risk that self-bonds pose to the federal government and states would require SMCRA be amended. GAO recommends that Congress consider amending SMCRA to eliminate self-bonding. Interior neither agreed nor disagreed with GAO's recommendation."], "all_classes": null, "length": 6217}
{"pred": "\nThe report discusses the history and impact of funding gaps in the federal government. Funding gaps occur when Congress fails to enact appropriations bills or continuing resolutions (CRs) before the start of a new fiscal year or when a CR expires without being replaced. The Antideficiency Act prohibits the obligation or expenditure of funds without appropriations. However, the Civiletti letters from the Attorney General in 1980 clarified that agencies may continue to operate during a funding gap but must fulfill legal obligations connected with the orderly termination of agency operations. Most funding gaps do not result in a government shutdown, but they can have an impact on affected projects and activities. There have been 20 funding gaps since 19770, with the majority occurring between 1970 and 1995. The duration of funding gaps has varied from 1 to 34 days, with the longest occurring before 1980. Since then, funding gaps have been shorter, typically lasting a few days. The report summarizes the legislative history of 8 funding gaps, including the impact on furloughed personnel and the eventual resolution of the gaps through CRs or legislation.", "answers": ["The Antideficiency Act (31 U.S.C. 1341-1342, 1511-1519) generally bars the obligation of funds in the absence of appropriations. Exceptions are made under the act, including for activities involving \"the safety of human life or the protection of property.\" The interval during the fiscal year when appropriations for a particular project or activity are not enacted into law, either in the form of a regular appropriations act or a continuing resolution (CR), is referred to as a funding gap or funding lapse. Although funding gaps may occur at the start of the fiscal year, they may also occur any time a CR expires and another CR (or the regular appropriations bill) is not enacted immediately thereafter. Multiple funding gaps may occur within a fiscal year. When a funding gap occurs, federal agencies are generally required to begin a shutdown of the affected projects and activities, which includes the prompt furlough of non-excepted personnel. The general practice of the federal government after the shutdown has ended has been to retroactively pay furloughed employees for the time they missed, as well as employees who were required to come to work. Although a shutdown may be the result of a funding gap, the two events should be distinguished. This is because a funding gap may result in a total shutdown of all affected projects or activities in some instances but not others. For example, when funding gaps are of a short duration, agencies may not have enough time to complete a shutdown of affected projects and activities before funding is restored. In addition, the Office of Management and Budget has previously indicated that a shutdown of agency operations within the first day of the funding gap may be postponed if a resolution appears to be imminent. Since FY1977, 20 funding gaps occurred, ranging in duration from 1 day to 34 full days. These funding gaps are listed in Table 1. About half of these funding gaps were brief (i.e., three days or less in duration). Notably, many of the funding gaps do not appear to have resulted in a \"shutdown.\" Prior to the issuance of the opinions in 1980 and early 1981 by then-Attorney General Benjamin Civiletti, while agencies tended to curtail some operations in response to a funding gap, they often \"continued to operate during periods of expired funding.\" In addition, some of the funding gaps after the Civiletti opinions did not result in a completion of shutdown operations due to both the funding gap's short duration and an expectation that appropriations would soon be enacted. Some of the funding gaps during this period, however, did have a broader impact on affected government operations, even if only for a matter of hours. Two funding gaps occurred in FY1996, amounting to 5 days and 21 days. The chronology of regular and continuing appropriations enacted during FY1996 is illustrated in Figure 1. At the beginning of FY2014 (October 1, 2013), none of the regular appropriations bills had been enacted, so a government-wide funding gap occurred. It concluded on October 17, 2013, after lasting 16 full days. During FY2018, there was a funding gap when a CR covering all of the regular appropriations bills expired on January 19, 2018. It concluded on January 22, 2018, after lasting two full days. The most recent funding gap occurred during FY2019, when a CR covering federal agencies and activities funded in 7 of the 12 regular appropriations bills expired on December 21, 2018. It concluded on January 25, 2019, after lasting 34 full days. For a general discussion of federal government shutdowns, see CRS Report RL34680, Shutdown of the Federal Government: Causes, Processes, and Effects, coordinated by Clinton T. Brass."], "all_classes": null, "length": 2304}
{"pred": "\nThe report evaluates the progress the Department of Defense (DOD) has made in achieving efficiencies in its document services and identifies opportunities for further efficiencies. DOD has taken steps toward achieving efficiencies, including implementing a transformation plan for DLA Document Services, reducing the number of office print devices, and increasing electronic content management. However, the report identifies four areas where further gains may be possible: better managing fragmentation in printing and reproduction services, reducing overlap in procuring print devices, meeting goals to reduce the number of print devices, and consolidating locations that provide mission specialty printing. The report also found that DOD's O&M budget materials for printing and reproduction activities include information on non-printing activities that make up a much larger portion of its reported spending than printing does. In addition, these O&M budget materials omit information that would capture the full scope of DOD's document services mission, such as device procurement and electronic content management. The report recommends that DOD assess whether DLA Document Services' single manager role provides the best value and evaluate options to report more accurate funding information on its document services.", "answers": ["DOD has reported printing costs that totaled about $608 million, on average, during fiscal years 2010 through 2015. DLA Document Services has key DOD-wide responsibilities for (1) printing and reproduction, (2) print device procurement, and (3) electronic content management (e.g., digital document repositories). Other DOD components, including the military services, also maintain some document services capabilities at various locations. House Report 115-200 accompanying a bill for the National Defense Authorization Act for fiscal year 2018 included a provision for GAO to examine DOD's document services. This report evaluates (1) the progress DOD has made in achieving efficiencies in its document services and opportunities, if any, to achieve further efficiencies, and (2) the extent to which DOD reports accurate financial information about its document services to key stakeholders. GAO reviewed documents and interviewed officials regarding DOD's efficiency initiatives, including DLA Document Services' transformation plan; reviewed print device procurement contracts and pricing information; and analyzed DOD budget data for fiscal years 2012 through 2016. The Department of Defense (DOD) has taken steps to achieve efficiencies in its document services, including implementing a transformation plan to consolidate existing Defense Logistics Agency (DLA) Document Services facilities. However, GAO identified four areas where further gains may be possible: Managing fragmentation in printing and reproduction services. DOD has designated DLA Document Services as the single manager for printing and reproduction services, but DOD customers, citing concerns with DLA's services, have also obtained these services directly from the Government Publishing Office and via in-house print facilities (see fig.). DOD has not assessed DLA's performance in this role or whether additional efficiencies may be possible in light of DLA's transformation plan. Reducing overlap in procuring print devices. GAO found that DOD components used at least four different contract sources to acquire print devices. DOD has not assessed which acquisition approach represents the best value; doing so might better position DOD to further reduce its costs. Meeting goals to reduce the number of print devices. DOD and the military services have not demonstrated that they achieved established goals for reducing the number of print devices. Additional controls and assignment of oversight responsibilities to monitor progress could better enable DOD to achieve its cost savings goals, estimated to be millions of dollars annually. Consolidating DLA facilities. DLA is closing or consolidating 74 of its 112 facilities in the United States. However, GAO found that for four of seven types of specialty services, DLA plans to retain facilities that are responsible for less than 5 percent of the total revenue for each of those specialties, which suggests that further consolidations are possible. DOD includes the cost of non-printing activities, such as the purchase of advertising time for recruiting, within its budget materials for printing and reproduction. It does not include costs to acquire print devices and for electronic content management. As a result, DOD and the Congress lack the oversight into total document services costs needed to make informed decisions. GAO is making six recommendations, including that DOD evaluate options to achieve additional cost savings and other efficiencies in its document services and report more accurate budget data. DOD generally agreed with the recommendations."], "all_classes": null, "length": 8903}
{"pred": "\nThe federal government owns and leases millions of square feet of office and warehouse space across the country at a cost of billions of dollars annually. In response, the government has taken steps to improve real property management through initiatives like the Reduce the Footprint policy. The policy requires agencies to freeze their real property footprint and reduce their office and warehouse space. Agencies must set annual targets for reducing space and submit plans to GSA and OMB. The report reviews the approaches and challenges 24 CFO Act agencies identified to achieve their targets, as well as how GSA manages vacated space.\n\nThe report found that agencies identified the following approaches to reduce space:\n\n1. Consolidation: combining offices or operations into fewer locations\n\n2. Co-location: sharing space with other agencies\n\n3. Disposition of unneeded space: selling or disposing of properties\n\n4. Better utilization of existing space: using space more efficiently\n\n5. Teleworking and hoteling: enabling employees to work remotely\n\nThe report also found that agencies faced challenges in achieving their targets, including:\n\n1. Space reduction costs\n\n2. Mission delivery requirements\n\n3. Employee organization concerns\n\n4. Workload growth\n\nGSA manages vacated space by standardizing its processes and tracking space releases from agencies. The agency also tracks cost avoidance data for space reductions.\n\nThe report found that while agencies generally reduced space, they did not meet their targets in fiscal year 2016. However, agencies set ambitious targets and faced challenges like funding and timing. GSA manages vacated space and tracks cost avoidance data.\n\nIn summary, the report found that while agencies have made progress in reducing office and warehouse space, they face challenges in achieving their targets and GSA manages vacated space effectively.", "answers": ["The federal government continues to work to reduce its real property inventory and associated costs. GSA provides space for agencies in government-owned and commercially leased buildings. In 2015, the OMB issued a memorandum requiring the 24 agencies with chief financial officers to reduce their domestic office and warehouse space. These agencies are required to set annual reduction targets for a 5-year time period and update their real property plans annually. GAO was asked to review the implementation of this space reduction initiative. This report discusses: (1) the approaches and any challenges the 24 agencies identified to achieving their reduction targets for all their domestic office and warehouse space; (2) the extent these agencies reduced their space and met their fiscal year 2016 targets; and (3) how GSA manages vacated space it had leased to these agencies. GAO conducted a content analysis of the 24 agencies' real property plans for fiscal years 2016 and 2017 and analyzed agencies' data as submitted to GSA on their targets and reductions for fiscal year 2016, the only year for which data were available. GAO selected five agencies as case studies based on several factors, including size of the agencies' office and warehouse portfolio, agency reduction targets, and fiscal year 2016 reported reductions. GAO reviewed relevant documentation and interviewed officials from GSA, OMB, and GAO's case study agencies. GAO provided a draft of this product to GSA, OMB, and our case study agencies for comment. GAO incorporated technical comments, as appropriate. Most of the 24 agencies with chief financial officers reported to the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) and the General Services Administration (GSA) that they planned to consolidate their office and warehouse space and allocate fewer square feet per employee as the key ways to achieve their space reduction targets. For example, the Department of Agriculture reported it will consolidate staff from five component agencies in two office buildings. When complete, the space allocated per employee will average about 250 square feet down from a high of 420 square feet per employee. In taking these actions, the agencies most often identified the cost of space reduction projects as a challenge to achieving their targets. Agencies cited costs such as for space renovations to accommodate more staff and required environmental clean-up before disposing of property as challenges to completing projects. Some agencies required to maintain offices across the country reported that their mission requirements limit their ability to reduce their space. In fiscal year 2016, 17 of the 24 agencies reported they reduced their space, but had varying success achieving their first-year targets. Of the 17 agencies, 9 exceeded their target and reduced more space than planned, 7 missed their target (by anywhere between 2.8 and 96.7 percent), and 1 reduced space, despite a targeted increase. Agency officials said that it is not unusual for projects to shift to different years and that such shifts could lead to missing targets one year and exceeding them the next. GSA has processes to manage the space vacated by agencies that is leased through GSA. For example, starting in November 2016, GSA started tracking agencies' space release requests centrally to help standardize the process and established an e-mail address to which agencies can submit requests. GSA relies on regional offices to manage real property in their regions and to identify tenants for vacant space or to remove unused space from the inventory. GSA's regional officials said regular monitoring and coordinating with agencies minimizes the likelihood GSA is caught off guard by a return of space. These processes also help them to plan ahead. GSA met its 2016 performance goal to have an annual vacant space rate of no more than 3.2 percent in its federally owned and leased buildings. However, given the recent implementation of the space reduction initiative, it is too early to determine the extent to which agencies will return space to GSA prior to the end of their leases and the effect on GSA's inventory."], "all_classes": null, "length": 7578}
{"pred": "\nThe report analyzes the role of cash in the payment system and the potential impact of a reduced role for cash in the economy. Cash remains a frequently used payment system, but other payment systems are developing that offer their own advantages and costs. Various trends suggest that due to market preference or government policy, the role of cash in the payment system may decline, perhaps significantly, in coming years. If cash usage significantly declines, it could have both positive and negative effects on the economy and society. Proponents of noncash payment systems argue that cash serves as a safe asset and provides privacy, but opponents argue that cash provides a simple and robust payment mechanism that requires no ancillary technologies. The report examines the advantages and costs of cash and noncash payment systems, as well as the potential obstacles to their widespread adoption. It also analyzes the potential benefits and risks of a reduced role for cash, including improved efficiency, reduced crime, and increased ability for the Fed to implement monetary policy. However, opponents argue that cash provides important benefits, such as serving as a medium of exchange, unit of account, and store of value, and that eliminating cash would have adverse effects on certain financially vulnerable groups. The report concludes that while cash may be displaced by noncash payment systems, it is difficult to imagine conditions under which cash would be replaced entirely. Policymakers may face decisions about whether to impede or hasten the decline of cash and consider the implications of doing so.", "answers": ["Electronic forms of payment have become increasingly available, convenient, and cost efficient due to technological advances in digitization and data processing. Anecdotal reporting and certain analyses suggest that businesses and consumers are increasingly eschewing cash payments in favor of electronic payment methods. Such trends have led analysts and policymakers to examine the possibility that the use and acceptance of cash will significantly decline in coming years and to consider the effects of such an evolution. Cash is still a common and widely accepted payment system in the United States. Cash's advantages include its simplicity and robustness as a payment system that requires no ancillary technologies. In addition, it provides privacy in transactions and protection from cyber threats or financial institution failures. However, using cash involves costs to businesses and consumers who pay fees to obtain, manage, and protect cash and exposes its users to loss through misplacement, theft, or accidental destruction of physical currency. Cash also concurrently generates government revenues through \"profits\" earned by producing it and by acting as interest-free liabilities to the Federal Reserve (in contrast to reserve balances on which the Federal Reserve pays interest), while reducing government revenues by facilitating some tax avoidance. The relative advantages and costs of various payment methods will largely determine whether and to what degree electronic payment systems will displace cash. Traditional noncash payment systems (such as credit and debit cards and interbank clearing systems) involving intermediaries such as banks and central banks address some of the shortcomings of cash payments. These systems can execute payments over physical distance, allow businesses and consumers to avoid some of the costs and risks of using cash, and are run by generally trusted and closely regulated intermediaries. However, the maintenance and operation of legacy noncash systems involve their own costs, and the intermediaries charge fees to recoup those costs and earn profits. The time it takes to finalize certain transactions—including crediting customer accounts for check or electronic deposits—can lead to consumers incurring additional costs. In addition, these systems involve cybersecurity risks and generally require customers to divulge their private personal information to gain system access, which raises privacy concerns. To date, the migration away from cash has largely been in favor of traditional noncash payment systems; however, some observers predict new alternative systems will play a larger role in the future. Such alternative systems aim to address some of the inefficiencies and risks of traditional noncash systems, but face obstacles to achieving that aim and involve costs of their own. Private systems using distributed ledger technology, such as cryptocurrencies, may not serve the main functions of money well and face challenges to widespread acceptance and technological scalability. These systems also raise concerns among certain observers related to whether these systems could facilitate crime, provide inadequate protections to consumers, and may adversely affect governments' ability to implement or transmit monetary policy. The potential for increased payment efficiency from these systems is promising enough that certain central banks have investigated the possibility of issuing government-backed, electronic-only currencies—called central bank digital currencies (CBDCs)—in such a way that the benefits of certain alternative payment systems could be realized with appropriately mitigated risk. How CBDCs would be created and function are still matters of speculation at this time, and the possibility of their introduction raises questions about the appropriate role of a central bank in the financial system and the economy. If the relative benefits and costs of cash and the various other payment methods evolve in such a way that cash is significantly displaced as a commonly accepted form of payment, that evolution could have a number of effects, both positive and negative, on the economy and society. Proponents of reducing cash usage (or even eliminating it all together and becoming a cashless society) argue that doing so will generate important benefits, including potentially improved efficiency of the payment system, a reduction of crime, and less constrained monetary policy. Proponents of maintaining cash as a payment option argue that significant reductions in cash usage and acceptance would further marginalize people with limited access to the financial system, increase the financial system's vulnerability to cyberattack, and reduce personal privacy. Based on their assessment of the magnitude of these benefits and costs and the likelihood that market forces will displace cash as a payment system, policymakers may choose to encourage or discourage this trend."], "all_classes": null, "length": 9601}
{"pred": "\nThe federal government operates four regional power marketing administrations (PMAs) through the Department of Energy: Bonneville Power Administration (BPA), Southeastern Power Administration (SEPA), Southwestern Power Administration (SWPA), and Western Area Power Administration (WAPA). Each PMA operates in a distinct geographic area of the contiguous United States and markets electricity produced by federal dams. The PMAs aim to provide electricity at the lowest possible cost to preference customers, such as public utility districts and cooperatives. The PMAs have unique characteristics and face challenges such as declining wholesale power prices, aging infrastructure, and environmental concerns. The PMAs have taken steps to address these issues through strategic plans and financial management. Some proposals have been made to sell transmission assets owned and operated by the PMAs, which could potentially affect their congressional mandate to provide electricity at the lowest possible cost.", "answers": ["The federal government, through the Department of Energy, operates four regional power marketing administrations (PMAs), created by statute: the Bonneville Power Administration (BPA), the Southeastern Power Administration (SEPA), the Southwestern Power Administration (SWPA), and the Western Area Power Administration (WAPA). Each PMA operates in a distinct geographic area. Congressional interest in the PMAs has included diverse issues such as rate setting, cost and compliance associated with the Endangered Species Act (ESA; P.L. 93-205; 16 U.S.C. §§1531 et seq.), and questions of privatization of these federal agencies. In general, the PMAs came into being because of the government's need to dispose of electric power produced by dams constructed largely for irrigation, flood control, or other purposes, and to achieve small community and farm electrification—that is, providing service to customers whom it would not have been profitable for a private utility to serve. With minor exceptions, these agencies market the electric power produced by federal dams constructed, owned, and operated by the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (Corps) and the Bureau of Reclamation (BOR). By statute, PMAs must give preference to public utility districts and cooperatives (e.g., \"preference customers\"), and sell their power at cost-based rates set at the lowest possible rate consistent with sound business principles. The Federal Energy Regulatory Commission regulates PMA rates to ensure that they are set high enough to repay the U.S. Treasury for the portion of federal facility costs allocated to hydropower beneficiaries. With energy and capacity markets changing in the western United States (especially with the growing need to integrate increasing amounts of variable renewable sources), and the development of the Energy Imbalance Market in the West, BPA and WAPA may have to adapt their plans with regard to generation needs and how transmission systems are developed. In 2018, the Trump Administration proposed to sell the transmission assets (lines, towers, substations, and/or rights of way) owned and operated by the federal Power Marketing Administrations. The proposal suggested that \"eliminating or reducing\" the federal government's role in owning and operating transmission assets, and increasing the private sector's role, would \"encourage a more efficient allocation of economic resources and mitigate unnecessary risk to taxpayers.\" The resulting PMA entities would then contract with other utilities to provide transmission services for the delivery of federal power, similar to what SEPA does currently. Reportedly, the proposed sale of PMA assets was dropped after opposition to the plan emerged from stakeholders. Under Section 208 of the Urgent Supplemental Appropriations Act, 1986 (P.L. 99-349), the executive branch is prohibited from spending funds to study or draft proposals to transfer from federal control any portion of the assets of the PMAs unless specifically authorized by Congress. Environmental, fishing, and tribal advocates have sued the federal government over concerns that operating rules for hydropower dams on the Columbia and Snake Rivers (i.e., the National Marine Fisheries Service Biological Opinion) are inadequate to ensure survival of species threatened or endangered under the ESA. In 2016, a federal judge overturned a previous management plan for the dams, finding that it would not be sufficient to protect salmon runs, and ordered a new management plan that could include removing the dams. However, in 2018, President Trump issued a Presidential Memorandum accelerating the process for a new management plan, requiring the biological opinion to be ready by 2020. Since FY2011, power revenues associated with the PMAs have been classified as discretionary offsetting receipts (i.e., receipts that are available for spending by the PMAs), thus the agencies are sometimes noted as having a \"net-zero\" spending authority. Only the capital expenses of WAPA and SWPA require appropriations from Congress."], "all_classes": null, "length": 2817}
{"pred": "\nThe report discusses the role and responsibilities of the minority leader in the US House of Representatives. The minority leader is the head of the \"loyal opposition\" and is elected by the minority party every two years. The position is a relatively new development, emerging in the late 19th century as the party system became more organized. The minority leader has various formal and informal party responsibilities, including nominating party members to committees, appointing a leadership member to the Budget Committee, and campaigning for party incumbents and challengers. They also have strategic options to advance minority party objectives, such as cooperation, opposition, innovation, and participation. The minority leader also has institutional responsibilities, including serving on certain committees and attending meetings of the Intelligence Committee. The main goal of the minority leader is to recapture majority control of the House, but this is often difficult due to the minority party's limited influence and resources. The report concludes that the minority leader faces challenges in promoting and publicizing party priorities, managing intraparty conflict, and forging party unity, but ultimately the goal is to lead the party into majority status.", "answers": ["The House minority leader, the head of the \"loyal opposition,\" is elected every two years by secret ballot of his or her party caucus or conference. The minority leader occupies a number of important institutional and party roles and responsibilities, and his or her fundamental goal is to recapture majority control of the House. From a party perspective, the minority leader has a wide range of assignments, all geared toward retaking majority control of the House. Five principal party activities direct the work of the minority leader. First, he or she provides campaign assistance to party incumbents and challengers. Second, the minority leader devises strategies, in consultation with like-minded colleagues, to advance party objectives. Third, the minority leader works to promote and publicize the party's agenda. Fourth, the minority leader, if his or her party controls the White House, confers regularly with the President and his aides about issues before Congress, the Administration's agenda, and political events generally. Fifth, the minority leader strives to promote party harmony so as to maximize the chances for legislative and political success. From an institutional perspective, the rules of the House assign a number of specific responsibilities to the minority leader. For example, Rule XIII, clause 6, grants the minority leader (or a designee) the right to offer a motion to recommit with instructions; and Rule II, clause 6, states that the Inspector General shall be appointed by joint recommendation of the Speaker, majority leader, and minority leader. The minority leader also has other institutional duties, such as appointing individuals to certain federal or congressional entities."], "all_classes": null, "length": 4660}
{"pred": "\nThis report provides an overview of the legal landscape regarding Title IX and private rights of action for victims of sexual harassment and abuse in educational institutions. Title IX prohibits discrimination \"on the basis of sex\" in educational programs or activities receiving federal funding. While Title IX does not explicitly mention sexual harassment or abuse, federal courts have judicially implied private rights of action to hold educational institutions liable for such conduct. The Supreme Court has established two standards for liability: 1) actual notice of sexual harassment or abuse to an appropriate person, and 2) deliberate indifference in the school's response. The proposed Title IX regulations would clarify the definition of sexual harassment, require actual notice, and establish a deliberate indifference standard. The report discusses how federal courts have interpreted these standards in private rights of action cases, including requirements for actual notice, deliberate indifference, and due process protections for accused students. The proposed regulations would also provide new procedural requirements for schools to follow when investigating and determining responsibility for sexual harassment.", "answers": ["Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972 (Title IX) provides an avenue of legal relief for victims of sexual abuse and harassment at educational institutions. It bars discrimination \"on the basis of sex\" in an educational program or activity receiving federal funding. Although Title IX makes no explicit reference to sexual harassment or abuse, the Supreme Court and federal agencies have determined that such conduct can sometimes constitute discrimination in violation of the statute; educational institutions in some circumstances can be held responsible when a teacher sexually harasses a student or when one student harasses another. Title IX is mainly enforced (1) through private rights of action brought directly against schools by or on behalf of students subjected to sexual misconduct; and (2) by federal agencies that provide funding to educational programs. To establish liability in a private right of action, a party seeking damages for a Title IX violation must satisfy the standards set forth by the Supreme Court in Gebser v. Lago Vista Independent School District, decided in 1998, and Davis Next Friend LaShonda D. v. Monroe County Board of Education, decided the next year. Gebser provides that when a teacher commits harassment against a student, a school district is liable only when it has actual knowledge of allegations by an \"appropriate person,\" and so deficiently responds to those allegations that its response amounts to deliberate indifference to the discrimination. Davis instructs that, besides showing actual knowledge by an appropriate person and deliberate indifference, a plaintiff suing for damages for sexual harassment committed by a student must show that the conduct was \"so severe, pervasive, and objectively offensive\" that it denied the victim equal access to educational opportunities or benefits. Taken together, the Supreme Court's decisions set forth a high threshold for a private party seeking damages against an educational institution based on its response to sexual harassment. In turn, federal appellate courts have differed in how to apply the standards set in Gebser and Davis, diverging on the nature and amount of evidence sufficient to support a claim. In each of the last several presidential administrations, the Department of Education (ED) issued a number of guidance documents that instruct schools on their responsibilities under Title IX when addressing allegations of sexual harassment. These documents—while sometimes subject to change—generally reflected a different standard than the Supreme Court case law addressing private rights of action for damages for sexual abuse or harassment (the Court in Davis acknowledged that the threshold for liability in a private right of action could be higher than the standard imposed in the administrative enforcement context). Those guidance documents had, among other things, established that sometimes a school could be held responsible for instances of sexual harassment by a teacher, irrespective of actual notice; and schools could be held responsible for student-on-student harassment if a \"responsible employee\" knew or should have known of the harassment (constructive notice). ED's previous guidance also instructed educational institutions that they sometimes could be responsible for responding to incidents of sexual harassment occurring off campus. ED also cautioned schools on the use of mediation to resolve allegations of sexual harassment. With regard to the procedures used by schools to resolve sexual harassment allegations, ED informed schools that they must use the preponderance of the evidence standard to establish culpability, and the agency strongly discouraged schools from allowing parties in a hearing to personally cross-examine one another. In response to guidance from ED, as well as increased oversight from the department's Office for Civil Rights (OCR) between 2011 and 2016, schools developed several procedures to ensure that their responses to allegations of sexual harassment and assault complied with Title IX. A number of students faced with disciplinary action by public universities raised constitutional challenges to the Title IX procedures used to find them responsible for sexual misconduct, arguing that universities violated the Due Process Clause in handling their case. ED issued a notice of proposed rulemaking in late 2018, after revoking some of its previous guidance to schools in 2017. The proposed regulations would, in several ways, tether the administrative requirements for schools to the standard set by the Supreme Court in Gebser and Davis. In doing so, the proposed regulations would depart from the standards set by ED in previous guidance documents (some of which have since been rescinded). The new regulations would require \"actual notice,\" rather than constructive notice, of harassment by an education institution to trigger a school's Title IX responsibilities, and provide that a school's response to allegations of sexual harassment will violate Title IX only if it amounts to deliberate indifference. In addition, the new regulations would more narrowly define what conduct qualifies as sexual harassment under Title IX, and also impose new procedural requirements, which appear to reflect due process concerns, when schools investigate sexual harassment or assault allegations and make determinations of culpability."], "all_classes": null, "length": 14692}
{"pred": "\nThe National Science Foundation (NSF) relies on two programs to bring rotators into the agency: the Intergovernmental Personnel Act (IPA) program and the Volunteer Service Experience (VSEE) program. Rotators in the IPA program differ from VSEE rotators in terms of their employment status and compensation. NSF enters into written agreements with rotators' home institutions for all IPA assignments, detailing salaries, benefits, and cost-sharing amounts. NSF reimburses home institutions for rotators' full salaries and benefits, but does not cap rotators' salaries. In contrast, VSEE rotators are federal employees and receive salaries directly from NSF, but are not eligible for certain benefits. NSF's policy is to set salaries for VSEE rotators that are generally comparable to their salaries at their home institutions. NSF uses both IPA and VSEE rotators in program director positions, which are staff-level positions. NSF officials told us that they have not considered or adopted any cost-management strategies related to VSEE rotators. NSF has adopted three strategies to manage rotator costs in fiscal year 2017: obtaining a minimum 10% cost-share from each IPA rotator's home institution, limiting IPA rotators' paid trips to their home institutions to 12 per year, and no longer reimbursing IPA rotators for consulting income that they forgo while at NSF. NSF officials told us that they expect to issue a report with the results of evaluations of all three strategies in December 2018. NSF has not fully evaluated or developed plans to evaluate the results of its IPA and VSEE rotator programs in terms of progress toward human capital goals and programmatic results. GAO recommends that NSF complete the development of an agency-wide workforce strategy for balancing its use of IPA and VSEE rotators with permanent staff as part of its current agency reform planning efforts or updates to its human capital operating plan. NSF concurred with the recommendations and stated that implementation will enhance efforts to fulfill the agency's mission and strengthen its workforce.", "answers": ["NSF has identified potential benefits and challenges associated with its use of rotators. Benefits include fresh perspectives and close connections to the scientific community, while challenges include staffing turnover and higher costs for some rotators compared with permanent employees. GAO was asked to review NSF's use and management of the IPA and VSEE rotator programs, among other things. This report examines (1) the number, costs, and uses of NSF rotators for fiscal year 2008 through fiscal year 2017; (2) the strategies NSF has used to manage rotator costs and the results of these efforts; and (3) the extent to which NSF has a workforce strategy for using rotators and has evaluated the results of its rotator programs. GAO analyzed summary-level data on NSF's rotators; reviewed key documents; interviewed NSF officials; conducted semistructured interviews with a nongeneralizable sample of rotators and permanent federal employees selected from different scientific directorates within NSF; and compared NSF's management of the program to key principles for effective strategic workforce planning. The numbers of rotators—outside scientists, engineers, and educators on temporary assignment—at the National Science Foundation (NSF) and their costs in proportion to other staff remained relatively stable in fiscal years 2008 through 2017. Most rotators joined NSF under its Intergovernmental Personnel Act (IPA) mobility program. IPA rotators comprised about 12 percent of NSF's workforce and 17 percent of staff costs on average and were not subject to a federal salary cap. They remain employees of their home institutions, with NSF reimbursing the institutions for most of their salaries and benefits. The remaining rotators are considered temporary federal employees under the Visiting Scientist, Engineer, and Educator (VSEE) program; their salaries could not exceed the federal maximum for their positions. Beginning in fiscal year 2017, NSF adopted IPA rotator program cost management strategies expected to achieve the greatest savings with the least harm to recruitment, but NSF officials said it is too soon to determine the full results. For example, for new IPA rotators who had not yet begun negotiating their assignments, NSF began requiring their home institutions to pay for 10 percent of the rotators' salary and benefits. NSF officials told GAO they expect to issue a report evaluating the strategies in December 2018. NSF's IPA program steering committee recommended developing a workforce strategy for balancing the agency's use of rotators with federal staff, but as of June 2018, NSF had not developed a strategy or fully evaluated the IPA and VSEE rotator programs' results, as called for by GAO's key principles for effective strategic workforce planning. NSF officials said they recognized the value of a workforce strategy but were focusing instead on other workforce planning efforts, and they had not fully evaluated program results in part because rotators are blended into the agency's permanent workforce, making a separate evaluation difficult. Without a workforce strategy and evaluation of results, NSF is limited in its ability to manage and, if warranted, adjust its use of rotators. GAO recommends that NSF develop an agency-wide strategy for balancing the agency's use of rotators with permanent staff and evaluate the contributions of its rotator programs toward NSF's human capital goals and programmatic results. NSF agreed with GAO's recommendations."], "all_classes": null, "length": 5856}
{"pred": "\nThe report provides an overview of the current state of the housing market and mortgage finance system in the United States. It discusses trends in housing prices, mortgage interest rates, affordability, and housing inventory. It also highlights issues related to housing assistance programs, tax provisions, and disaster response and recovery programs. The report provides context for the housing policy issues that may be of interest during the 116th Congress. Key issues include housing finance reform, affordability, and the potential for changes to Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac. The report also discusses the impact of disasters on housing assistance programs and the need for reauthorization of Native American housing programs.", "answers": ["The 116th Congress may consider a variety of housing-related issues. These could include topics related to housing finance, federal housing assistance programs, and housing-related tax provisions, among other things. Particular issues that may be of interest during the Congress include the following: The status of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, two government-sponsored enterprises (GSEs) that have been in conservatorship since 2008. Congress might consider comprehensive housing finance reform legislation to resolve the status of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac. Furthermore, a new director for the Federal Housing Finance Agency (FHFA), Fannie Mae's and Freddie Mac's regulator and conservator, was sworn in on April 15, 2019. Congress may take an interest in any administrative changes that FHFA might make to Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac under new leadership. Appropriations for federal housing programs, including programs at the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) and rural housing programs administered by the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA), particularly in light of discretionary budget caps that are currently scheduled to decrease for FY2020. Oversight of the implementation of certain changes to federal assisted housing programs that were enacted in prior Congresses, such as expansions of HUD's Moving to Work (MTW) program and Rental Assistance Demonstration (RAD) program. Considerations related to housing and the federal response to major disasters, including oversight of the implementation of certain changes related to Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) assistance that were enacted in the previous Congress. Consideration of legislation related to certain federal housing programs that provide assistance to Native Americans living in tribal areas. Consideration of legislation to extend certain temporary tax provisions that are currently expired, including housing-related provisions that provide a tax exclusion for canceled mortgage debt and allow for the deductibility of mortgage insurance premiums, respectively. Housing and mortgage market conditions provide context for these and other issues that Congress may consider, although housing markets are local in nature and national housing market indicators do not necessarily accurately reflect conditions in specific communities. On a national basis, some key characteristics of owner-occupied housing markets and the mortgage market in recent years include increasing housing prices, low mortgage interest rates, and home sales that have been increasing but constrained by a limited inventory of homes on the market. Key characteristics of rental housing markets include an increasing number of renters, low rental vacancy rates, and increasing rents. Rising home prices and rents that have outpaced income growth in recent years have led to policymakers and others increasingly raising concerns about the affordability of both owner-occupied and rental housing. Affordability challenges are most prominent among the lowest-income renter households, reflecting a shortage of rental housing units that are both affordable and available to this population."], "all_classes": null, "length": 7818}
{"pred": "\nThis report discusses the issue of corporate inversions, where a U.S. company merges with a foreign company to reduce its tax liability. Inversions have been used to reduce taxes by shifting profits to the foreign company, where taxes are lower. Inversions have become more difficult since the U.S. government has limited the benefits of inversions through regulations and tax law changes. In recent years, some companies have still used mergers and acquisitions to invert, but at a lower level. The U.S. government has also proposed tax reforms to limit inversions further. The report discusses the history of proposals to limit inversions through legislation and regulations, including anti-inversion provisions, restrictions on interest deductions, and changes to the tax treatment of foreign source income. Some of these proposals have been adopted in recent tax law changes. The report concludes that while tax rate reductions may reduce the incentive for inversions, other factors like territorial tax systems and anti-abuse provisions are also important.", "answers": ["News reports in the late 1990s and early 2000s drew attention to a phenomenon sometimes called corporate \"inversions\" or \"expatriations\": instances where U.S. firms reorganize their structure so that the \"parent\" element of the group is a foreign corporation rather than a corporation chartered in the United States. The main objective of these transactions was tax savings, and they involved little to no shift in actual economic activity. Bermuda and the Cayman Islands (countries with no corporate income tax) were the locations of many of the newly created parent corporations. These types of inversions largely ended with the enactment of the American Jobs Creation Act of 2004 (JOBS Act; P.L. 108-357), which denied the tax benefits of an inversion if the original U.S. stockholders owned 80% or more of the new firm. The act effectively ended shifts to tax havens where no real business activity took place. However, two avenues for inverting remained. The act allowed a firm to invert if it has substantial business operations in the country where the new parent was to be located; the regulations at one point set a 10% level of these business operations. Several inversions using the business activity test resulted in Treasury regulations in 2012 that increased the activity requirement to 25%, effectively closing off this method. Firms could also invert by merging with a foreign company if the original U.S. stockholders owned less than 80% of the new firm. If the original U.S. shareholders owned less than 60%, the firm was not considered as inverting. Two features made a country an attractive destination: a low corporate tax rate and a territorial tax system that did not tax foreign source income. The U.K. joined countries such as Ireland, Switzerland, and Canada as targets for inverting when it adopted a territorial tax in 2009. At the same time, the U.K. also lowered its rate (from 25% to 20% by 2015). Inverted firms could reduce worldwide taxes by stripping taxable earnings out of the new U.S. subsidiary, largely through allocating debt to that subsidiary. Soon after, several high-profile companies indicated an interest in merging with a non-U.S. headquartered company, including Pfizer, Chiquita, AbbVie, and Burger King. This \"second wave\" of inversions again raised concerns about an erosion of the U.S. tax base. Chiquita and AbbVie canceled their plans in the wake of 2014 Treasury regulations, but Burger King and other firms completed merger plans. Pfizer subsequently terminated its planned merger with Allergan after Treasury regulations issued in 2016. Evidence suggests that these Treasury regulations have been an important factor in subsequently decreasing these merger-related inversions. Two policy options had been discussed in response: a general reform of the U.S. corporate tax and specific provisions to deal with tax-motivated international mergers. In December 2017, P.L. 115-97 (popularly known as the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act) lowered the corporate tax rate as part of broader tax reform which some argued would slow the rate of inversions. Other tax reform proposals suggested that if the United States moved to a territorial tax, the incentive to invert would be eliminated. There were concerns that a territorial tax could worsen the profit-shifting that already exists among multinational firms. P.L. 115-97, while moving in some ways to a territorial tax, also instituted a number of measures aimed at combatting profit shifting, including a global minimum tax on intangible income that limited the tax benefits of a territorial tax. The second option is to directly target inversions. The 2017 act included several provisions that discouraged inversions. In addition, further anti-inversion provisions have been introduced, most recently H.R. 5108 and S. 2459 in the 115th Congress, to treat all firms in which former U.S. shareholders have more than 50% ownership (or in which management and control is in the United States) as U.S. firms. These bills also provided that debt could also be allocated to the U.S. member of a worldwide operation in proportion to the U.S. ownership of assets."], "all_classes": null, "length": 9230}
{"pred": "\nThis report compares the costs of a specific United Nations peacekeeping operation in the Central African Republic (MINUSCA) to an estimated cost of a hypothetical, comparable operation implemented by the United States. The report focuses on the costs of a hypothetical US operation over the same time period as MINUSCA, from April 2014 through June 30, 2017. The US cost estimate was developed using a Department of Defense cost estimating tool and input from State and DOD officials. The report identifies several factors that contribute to the differences in costs between the UN operation and the US estimate, including:\n\n- Sourcing and transporting equipment and supplies, which is more expensive for the US due to airlifting materials from outside CAR.\n- Staffing and compensating military and police personnel, which is more expensive for the US due to paying full salaries and hardship duty pay for reservist personnel.\n- Facilities, which are less expensive for the UN due to local and in-country infrastructure.\n- Communications and intelligence systems, which are more expensive for the US due to meeting higher US standards.\n- Medical capability, which is more expensive for the US due to higher standards for medical care and evacuation.\n\nThe report also identifies stakeholder views on the relative strengths of UN and US peacekeeping operations. The UN benefits from greater international and local acceptance, access to global expertise, and ability to leverage assistance from multilateral donors and development banks. The US benefits from faster deployment, superior command and control, logistics, intelligence, and counterterrorism capabilities.\n\nOverall, the report finds that the US cost estimate is significantly higher than the UN costs for MINUSCA, due to differences in operational, structural, and doctrinal approaches. However, the report notes that the US cost estimate does not include costs for State diplomatic security and office space for civilian staff, which could further increase the total estimated US cost.", "answers": ["To promote international peace and security, the UN had 16 ongoing peacekeeping operations worldwide as of June 30, 2017, with a total budget of almost $8 billion in UN fiscal year 2017 and contributions of over 100,000 military, police, and civilian personnel from more than 120 countries. The United States is the largest financial contributor to UN peacekeeping operations, providing an average of about 28 percent of total funding annually. The Department of State Authorities Act, Fiscal Year 2017, includes a provision for GAO to compare the costs, strengths, and limitations of UN and U.S. peacekeeping operations. This report (1) compares the reported costs of a specific UN operation to the estimated costs of a hypothetical, comparable operation implemented by the United States; (2) identifies factors that affect cost differences; and (3) identifies stakeholder views on the relative strengths of UN and U.S. peacekeeping operations. GAO worked with the UN, DOD, and State to generate a cost estimate of a hypothetical U.S.-led operation in the Central African Republic comparable to MINUSCA. GAO developed this estimate using DOD's cost estimating tool for contingency operations and State data on civilian costs, assuming a U.S. operation using roughly the same levels of military and civilian personnel as MINUSCA. The cost estimate should not be construed as suggesting that the United States would likely implement such an operation in the Central African Republic or that it would implement such an operation in the same way. GAO is making no recommendations. Based on United Nations (UN) and Departments of Defense (DOD) and State (State) data, GAO estimates that it would cost the United States more than twice as much as it would cost the UN to implement a hypothetical operation comparable to the UN Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic (MINUSCA). MINUSCA cost the UN approximately $2.4 billion for the first 39 months of the operation. GAO estimates that a hypothetical U.S. peacekeeping operation in the Central African Republic of roughly the same size and duration would cost nearly $5.7 billion—almost eight times more than the $700 million the United States contributed to MINUSCA over the same time period. Various factors affect differences between the actual cost of MINUSCA and the estimated cost of a hypothetical, comparable U.S. operation in the Central African Republic. The United States and the UN would source and transport some supplies and equipment differently, affecting the cost of both operations; for example, the United States would airlift water into the Central African Republic, while the UN does not do so to the same extent. The United States also would incur the cost of civilian police and military reservist salaries, while the UN does not pay any troop or police salaries. Finally, some higher standards for facilities, intelligence, and medical services increase the U.S. cost estimate relative to UN costs for similar operational elements. UN and U.S. peacekeeping operations have various relative strengths, according to U.S. and UN officials. These officials said that, because the UN is a multilateral organization, UN peacekeeping operations have international acceptance and are more likely to be viewed as impartial. Officials also said that the UN enjoys global access to expertise and experience, and can leverage assistance from multilateral donors and development banks. Relative strengths of a U.S. peacekeeping operation would include faster deployment and superior command and control, logistics, intelligence, and counterterrorism capability, according to U.S. and UN officials."], "all_classes": null, "length": 5006}
{"pred": "\nThe Small Business Administration (SBA) has established size standards to determine which businesses are eligible for SBA assistance. The SBA defines a small business as one that is independently owned and operated and not dominant in its field of operation. The SBA uses two types of size standards: industry-specific size standards based on number of employees or annual receipts, and a combination of net worth and net income. The SBA has traditionally relied on an analysis of each industry's overall competitiveness and the competitiveness of firms within the industry to determine eligibility. However, there is no consensus on the economic factors that should be used to define a small business, and the SBA's initial size standards provided program eligibility to nearly all businesses. As a result, the SBA has undertaken periodic reviews of its size standards to increase their accuracy and prevent firms from losing eligibility due to inflation. The SBA has also adjusted its receipts-based size standards for inflation at least once every five years. Congress has several options related to the SBA's ongoing review of its size standards, including waiting for the SBA to issue proposed rules before providing input and targeting SBA resources to industries where smaller firms are struggling to remain competitive.", "answers": ["Small business size standards are of congressional interest because they have a pivotal role in determining eligibility for Small Business Administration (SBA) assistance as well as federal contracting and, in some instances, tax preferences. Although there is bipartisan agreement that the nation's small businesses play an important role in the American economy, there are differences of opinion concerning how to define them. The Small Business Act of 1953 (P.L. 83-163, as amended) authorized the SBA to establish size standards to ensure that only small businesses receive SBA assistance. The SBA currently uses two types of size standards to determine SBA program eligibility: industry-specific size standards and alternative size standards based on the applicant's maximum tangible net worth and average net income after federal taxes. The SBA's industry-specific size standards determine program eligibility for firms in 1,036 industrial classifications in 23 sub-industry activities described in the 2017 North American Industry Classification System (NAICS). The size standards are based on one of four measures: (1) number of employees, (2) average annual receipts in the previous three (may soon be the previous five) years, (3) average asset size as reported in the firm's four quarterly financial statements for the preceding year, or (4) a combination of number of employees and barrel per day refining capacity. Overall, about 97% of all employer firms qualify as small under the SBA's size standards. These firms represent about 30% of industry receipts. The SBA conducts an analysis of various economic factors, such as each industry's overall competitiveness and the competitiveness of firms within each industry, to determine its size standards. However, in the absence of precise statutory guidance and consensus on how to define small, the SBA's size standards have often been challenged, typically by industry representatives seeking to increase the number of firms eligible for assistance and by Members concerned that the size standards may not adequately target assistance to firms that they consider to be truly small. This report provides a historical examination of the SBA's size standards and assesses competing views concerning how to define a small business. It also discusses P.L. 111-240, the Small Business Jobs Act of 2010, which authorized the SBA to establish an alternative size standard using maximum tangible net worth and average net income after federal taxes for both the 7(a) and 504/CDC loan guaranty programs; established, until the SBA acted, an interim alternative size standard for the 7(a) and 504/CDC programs of not more than $15 million in tangible net worth and not more than $5 million in average net income after federal taxes (excluding any carry-over losses) for the two full fiscal years before the date of the application; and required the SBA to conduct a detailed review of not less than one-third of the SBA's industry size standards every 18 months beginning on the new law's date of enactment (September 27, 2010) and ensure that each size standard is reviewed at least once every five years. P.L. 112-239, the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2013, which directed the SBA not to limit the number of size standards and to assign the appropriate size standard to each NAICS industrial classification. This provision addressed the SBA's practice of limiting the number of size standards it used and combining size standards within industrial groups as a means to reduce the complexity of its size standards and to provide greater consistency for industrial classifications that have similar economic characteristics. P.L. 114-328, the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2017, which authorizes the SBA to establish different size standards for agricultural enterprises using existing methods and appeal processes. Previously, the small business size standard for agricultural enterprises was set in statute as having annual receipts not in excess of $750,000. P.L. 115-324, the Small Business Runway Extension Act of 2018, which directs federal agencies proposing a size standard (and, based on report language accompanying the act, presumably the SBA as well) to use the average annual gross receipts from at least the previous five years, instead of the previous three years, when seeking SBA approval to establish a size standard based on annual gross receipts. Legislation introduced during recent Congresses (including H.R. 33, the Small Business Regulatory Flexibility Improvements Act of 2017, and its Senate companion bill, S. 584, during the 115th Congress) to authorize the SBA's Office of Chief Counsel for Advocacy to approve or disapprove a size standard requested by a federal agency for purposes other than the Small Business Act or the Small Business Investment Act of 1958. The SBA's Administrator currently has that authority."], "all_classes": null, "length": 12598}
{"pred": "\nThe report examines the incidence and amount of early withdrawals from individual retirement accounts (IRAs) and 401(k) plans. It found that billions of dollars continue to leave the retirement system early, eroding or depleting retirement savings, especially if the retirement account represents the sole source of savings. Employers have implemented policies to balance the short-term benefits of providing participants early access to their accounts with the long-term need to build retirement savings. However, the way plan sponsors treat outstanding loans after a participant separates from employment has the potential to adversely affect retirement savings. The report recommends that the Secretary of Labor direct the Assistant Secretary for EBSA to revise the Form 500 to require plan sponsors to report qualified plan loan offsets as a separate line item distinct from other types of distributions. This would provide insight into the incidence and amount of unrepaid plan loans in 401(k) plans nationwide. The report also found that the incidence and amount of early withdrawals from IRAs and 401(k) plans can be reduced by simplifying the rollover process, limiting loan amounts to participant contributions, providing plan loan repayment options for separated participants, and incorporating emergency savings features into 401(k) plans.", "answers": ["Federal law encourages individuals to save for retirement through tax incentives for 401(k) plans and IRAs—the predominant forms of retirement savings in the United States. In 2017, U.S. plans and IRAs reportedly held investments worth nearly $17 trillion dollars. Federal law also allows individuals to withdraw assets from these accounts under certain circumstances. DOL and IRS oversee 401(k) plans, and collect annual plan data—including financial information—on the Form 5500. For both IRAs and 401(k) plans, GAO was asked to examine: (1) the incidence and amount of early withdrawals; (2) factors that might lead individuals to access retirement savings early; and (3) policies and strategies that might reduce the incidence and amounts of early withdrawals. To answer these questions, GAO analyzed data from IRS, the Census Bureau, and DOL from 2013 (the most recent complete data available); and interviewed a diverse range of stakeholders identified in the literature, including representatives of companies sponsoring 401(k) plans, plan administrators, subject matter experts, industry representatives, and participant advocates. In 2013 individuals in their prime working years (ages 25 to 55) removed at least $69 billion (+/- $3.5 billion) of their retirement savings early, according to GAO's analysis of 2013 Internal Revenue Service (IRS) and Department of Labor (DOL) data. Withdrawals from individual retirement accounts (IRA)—$39.5 billion (+/- $2.1 billion)—accounted for much of the money removed early, were equivalent to 3 percent (+/- 0.15 percent) of the age group's total IRA assets, and exceeded their IRA contributions in 2013. Participants in employer-sponsored plans, like 401(k) plans, withdrew at least $29.2 billion (+/- $2.8 billion) early as hardship withdrawals, lump sum payments made at job separation (known as cashouts), and loan balances that borrowers did not repay. Hardship withdrawals in 2013 were equivalent to about 0.5 percent (+/-0.06 percent) of the age group's total plan assets and about 8 percent (+/- 0.9 percent) of their contributions. However, the incidence and amount of certain unrepaid plan loans cannot be determined because the Form 5500—the federal government's primary source of information on employee benefit plans—does not capture these data. Stakeholders GAO interviewed identified flexibilities in plan rules and individuals' pressing financial needs, such as out-of-pocket medical costs, as factors affecting early withdrawals of retirement savings. Stakeholders said that certain plan rules, such as setting high minimum loan thresholds, may cause individuals to take out more of their savings than they need. Stakeholders also identified several elements of the job separation process affecting early withdrawals, such as difficulties transferring account balances to a new plan and plans requiring the immediate repayment of outstanding loans, as relevant factors. Stakeholders GAO interviewed suggested strategies they believed could balance early access to accounts with the need to build long-term retirement savings. For example, plan sponsors said allowing individuals to continue to repay plan loans after job separation, restricting participant access to plan sponsor contributions, allowing partial distributions at job separation, and building emergency savings features into plan designs, could help preserve retirement savings (see figure). However, they noted, each strategy involves tradeoffs, and the strategies' broader implications require further study. GAO recommends that, as part of revising the Form 5500, DOL and IRS require plan sponsors to report the incidence and amount of all 401(k) plan loans that are not repaid. DOL and IRS neither agreed nor disagreed with our recommendation."], "all_classes": null, "length": 9536}
{"pred": "\nThe report discusses the political and economic situation in Georgia. Georgia was part of the Soviet Union until it gained independence in 1991. It has since struggled with conflicts with Russia over the breakaway regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Georgia has a parliamentary system of government and has been recovering from economic decline after the Soviet Union collapsed. The country has good relations with the EU and NATO but has not yet been granted membership. The country has a unicameral legislature and presidential system. The government has exhibited internal tensions and disputes over judicial reforms and the timing of constitutional changes. The economy has been growing in recent years but still faces challenges. The country aspires to be a transit hub for trade between Europe and Asia. The US and Georgia have a close strategic partnership and provide significant aid to help Georgia's security and economic development.", "answers": ["Georgia is one of the United States' closest partners among the states that gained their independence after the USSR collapsed in 1991. With a history of strong economic aid and security cooperation, the United States has deepened its strategic partnership with Georgia since Russia's 2008 invasion of Georgia and 2014 invasion of Ukraine. U.S. policy expressly supports Georgia's sovereignty and territorial integrity within its internationally recognized borders, and Georgia is a leading recipient of U.S. aid to Europe and Eurasia. Many observers consider Georgia to be one of the most democratic states in the post-Soviet region, even as the country faces ongoing governance challenges. The center-left Georgian Dream-Democratic Georgia party (GD) has close to a three-fourths supermajority in parliament and governs with limited checks and balances. Although Georgia faces high rates of poverty and underemployment, its economy in 2017 and 2018 appeared to show stronger growth than it had in the previous four years. The GD led a coalition to victory in parliamentary elections in 2012 amid growing dissatisfaction with the former ruling party, Mikheil Saakashvili's center-right United National Movement, which came to power as a result of Georgia's 2003 Rose Revolution. In August 2008, Russia went to war with Georgia to prevent Saakashvili's government from reestablishing control over the regions of South Ossetia and Abkhazia, which broke away from Georgia in the early 1990s and became informal Russian protectorates. Congress has expressed firm support for Georgia's sovereignty and territorial integrity. The Countering Russian Influence in Europe and Eurasia Act of 2017 (P.L. 115-44, Title II, §253) states that the United States \"does not recognize territorial changes effected by force, including the illegal invasions and occupations\" of Abkhazia, South Ossetia, and other territories occupied by Russia. In September 2016, the House of Representatives passed H.Res. 660, which condemns Russia's military intervention and occupation of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. In February 2019, the Georgia Support Act (H.R. 598), which originally passed the House by unanimous consent in the 115th Congress (H.R. 6219), was reintroduced in the 116th Congress. The act would express support for Georgia's sovereignty, independence, and territorial integrity, as well as for its democratic development, Euro-Atlantic integration, and peaceful conflict resolution in Abkhazia and South Ossetia. The United States provides substantial foreign and military aid to Georgia each year. Since 2010, U.S. nonmilitary aid to Georgia has totaled around $64 million a year on average, in addition to a five-year Millennium Challenge Corporation grant of $140 million to support education. In FY2019, Congress appropriated almost $90 million in nonmilitary aid to Georgia. Since 2010, U.S. military aid to Georgia has been estimated at around $68 million a year on average. In FY2019, Congress appropriated $35 million in Foreign Military Financing and $2 million in International Military Education and Training funds. Defense assistance also includes a three-year, $35 million training initiative, the Georgia Defense Readiness Program."], "all_classes": null, "length": 5816}
{"pred": "\nThis report summarizes a GAO report on the impact of Medicare payment policies on two long-term care hospitals that specialize in treating patients with spinal cord injuries and brain injuries. The two hospitals, Craig Hospital and Shepherd Center, are classified as LTCHs for Medicare payment purposes. Medicare payment policies, including site-neutral payment rates, may affect the hospitals' ability to provide specialized care to patients. The report finds that:\n\n- The two hospitals treat different patient populations than most other LTCHs, with fewer patients meeting Medicare diagnosis groups that are common to other LTCHs.\n\n- The hospitals provide a higher volume of services and specialized programs to treat patients with spinal cord and brain injuries.\n\n- The hospitals have more staff with specialized training and clinical expertise in treating spinal cord and brain injuries.\n\n- The hospitals have a higher percentage of out-of-state admissions.\n\n- The hospitals are able to treat medically complex patients earlier in their recovery process and provide longer lengths of stay.\n\n- The hospitals have different payment criteria and are subject to site-neutral payment policies that may affect their payments.\n\nThe report concludes that the Medicare payment policies may result in fewer services provided and fewer patients served by the two qualifying hospitals and other LTCHs. However, the hospitals' ability to treat medically complex patients and provide specialized care may be an indicator of their expertise in treating these patients.", "answers": ["The Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services pays LTCHs for care provided to Medicare beneficiaries. There were about 400 LTCHs across the nation in 2016. The 21st Century Cures Act included a provision for GAO to examine certain issues pertaining to LTCHs. This report examines (1) the health care needs of Medicare beneficiaries who receive services from the two qualifying hospitals; (2) how Medicare LTCH payment polices could affect the two qualifying hospitals; and (3) how the two qualifying hospitals compare with other LTCHs and other facilities that may treat Medicare patients with similar conditions. GAO analyzed the most recently available Medicare claims and other data for the two qualifying hospitals and other facilities that treat patients with spinal cord injuries. GAO also interviewed HHS officials and stakeholders from the qualifying hospitals, other facilities that treat spinal cord patients, specialty associations, and others. GAO provided a draft of this report to HHS. HHS provided technical comments, which were incorporated as appropriate. We also provided the two qualifying hospitals summaries of information we collected from them, to confirm the accuracy of statements included in our draft report. We incorporated their comments, as appropriate. Spinal cord injuries may result in secondary complications that often lead to decreased functional independence and quality of life. The 21st Century Cures Act changed how Medicare pays certain long-term care hospitals (LTCH) that provide spinal cord specialty treatment. For these hospitals, the act included a temporary exception from how Medicare pays other LTCHs. Two LTCHs—Craig Hospital in Englewood, Colorado and Shepherd Center in Atlanta, Georgia—have qualified for this exception. GAO found that most Medicare beneficiaries treated at these two hospitals typically receive specialized care for multiple chronic conditions and other long-term complications that develop after initial injuries, such as pressure ulcers that can result in life-threatening infection. The two hospitals also provide specialty care for acquired brain injuries, such as traumatic brain injuries. GAO's simulations of Medicare payments to these two hospitals using claims data from two baseline years—fiscal years 2013 and 2016—illustrate potential effects of payment policies. LTCHs are paid under a two-tiered system for care provided to beneficiaries: they receive the LTCH standard federal payment rate—or standard rate—for certain patients discharged from the LTCH, and a generally lower rate—known as a “site-neutral” rate—for all other discharges. Under the temporary exception, Craig Hospital and Shepherd Center receive the standard rate for all discharges during fiscal years 2018 and 2019. Assuming their types of discharges remain the same as in fiscal years 2013 and 2016, GAO's simulations of Medicare payments in the baseline years indicate: Most of the discharges we examined would not qualify for the standard rate, if the exception did not apply. Medicare payments would generally decrease under fiscal year 2020 payment policy, once the exception expires. However, the actual effects of Medicare's payment policies on these two hospitals could vary based on factors, including the severity of patient conditions (e.g., Medicare payment is typically higher for more severe injuries), and whether hospitals' discharges meet criteria for the standard rate. Similarities and differences may exist between the two qualifying hospitals and other facilities that treat Medicare patients with spinal cord and brain injuries. Patients with spinal cord and brain injuries may receive care in other LTCHs, but GAO found that most Medicare beneficiaries at these other LTCHs are treated for conditions other than spinal cord and brain injuries. Certain inpatient rehabilitation facilities (IRF) also provide post-acute rehabilitation services to patients with spinal cord and brain injuries. While data limitations make a direct comparison between these facilities and the two qualifying hospitals difficult, GAO identified some similarities and differences. For example, officials from some IRFs we interviewed reported providing several of the same programs and services as the two qualifying hospitals to medically complex patients, but the availability of services and complexity of patients varied. Among other reasons, the different Medicare payment requirements that apply to LTCHs and IRFs affect the types of services they provide and the patients they treat."], "all_classes": null, "length": 8494}
{"pred": "\nThe Congressional Gold Medal is the highest civilian honor awarded by Congress to individuals or groups for their patriotic, humanitarian, and artistic achievements. Since the American Revolution, Congress has awarded gold medals to express public gratitude and perpetuate the memory of illustrious characters and events. While there are no permanent statutory provisions for the creation of Congressional Gold Medals, Congress has authorized them through legislative action when deemed appropriate. The first Congressional Gold Medals were awarded by the Continental Congress in the late 17000s, and since then, Congress has awarded gold medals for distinguished achievements, primarily for military contributions. In recent years, the number of gold medals awarded has increased, with an average of almost 20 per decade. Each Congress, legislation to award Congressional Gold Medals is introduced, with 52 bills introduced in the 113th Congress. Considerations for awarding gold medals include who should be honored, how many medals should be awarded, and whether specific design elements should be prescribed. While there are no formal rules for committee consideration of gold medal legislation, the Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs requires at least 67 cosponsors before considering a bill. A statutory limit on the number of gold medals authorized has been proposed but not adopted.", "answers": ["Senators and Representatives are frequently asked to support or sponsor proposals recognizing historic events and outstanding achievements by individuals or institutions. Among the various forms of recognition that Congress bestows, the Congressional Gold Medal is often considered the most distinguished. Through this venerable tradition—the occasional commissioning of individually struck gold medals in its name—Congress has expressed public gratitude on behalf of the nation for distinguished contributions for more than two centuries. Since 1776, this award, which initially was bestowed on military leaders, has also been given to such diverse individuals as Sir Winston Churchill and Bob Hope, George Washington and Robert Frost, Joe Louis and Mother Teresa of Calcutta. Congressional gold medal legislation generally has a specific format. Once a gold medal is authorized, it follows a specific process for design, minting, and awarding. This process includes consultation and recommendations by the Citizens Coinage Advisory Commission (CCAC) and the U.S. Commission of Fine Arts (CFA), pursuant to any statutory instructions, before the Secretary of the Treasury makes the final decision on a gold medal's design. Once the medal has been struck, a ceremony will often be scheduled to formally award the medal to the recipient. In recent years, the number of gold medals awarded has increased, and some have expressed interest in examining the gold medal awarding process. Should Congress want to make such changes, several individual and institutional options might be available. The individual options include decisions made by Members of Congress as to what individual or groups might be honored; potential specification of gold medal design elements; and where gold medals for groups might be housed once the award is made. The institutional options could include House, Senate, or committee rules for the consideration of gold medal legislation and whether statutory standards on the number of gold medals issued per year or per Congress might be established for gold medals."], "all_classes": null, "length": 3411}
{"pred": "\nThe report discusses the Cobra Dane radar system and its capabilities for ballistic missile defense, space surveillance, and intelligence gathering. Cobra Dane and other radar systems can provide information to ground-based interceptors to help them hit their targets. Cobra Dane can track and classify missile threats, but it does not currently have the capability to determine if a missile threat is successfully intercepted. The Air Force and Missile Defense Agency (MDA) have located Cobra Dane at Shemya Island, Alaska, which provides advantages for tracking missile threats from North Korea. However, MDA has determined that locating Cobra Dane at Clear Air Force Station, Alaska would provide additional operational advantages and cost savings. The Air Force plans to modernize Cobra Dane with three projects: redesigning parts for mission system replacement, traveling wave tubes, and transmitter groups. The Air Force and MDA will share funding for the operation and maintenance of Cobra Dane, with the Air Force responsible for funding the site at Shemya Island. The report also discusses how Cobra Dane's location affects its ability to contribute to the ballistic missile defense mission and how it may be replaced by other radar systems in the future.", "answers": ["First fielded in 1976 on Shemya Island in Alaska, the Cobra Dane radar faces growing sustainment challenges that DOD plans to address through modernization projects. Anticipating future needs, DOD began investing in new radar systems that share capabilities with Cobra Dane to support ballistic missile defense and space surveillance, including the LRDR (Alaska), the Space Fence (Marshall Islands), and the Pacific Radar (location to be determined). The conference report accompanying a bill for the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2018 included a provision that GAO review the Air Force's report to Congress on the operation and sustainment of Cobra Dane. This report identifies information included in the Air Force's report and describes additional information that GAO reviewed on (1) the capabilities of the Cobra Dane radar and other planned radars to meet DOD's mission requirements, (2) Cobra Dane's operational availability and the plan to mitigate the effect on those missions when Cobra Dane is not available, and (3) DOD's funding plan and project cost estimates for the operation and sustainment of Cobra Dane and its site at Shemya Island. GAO reviewed the Air Force report and related documentation, and interviewed relevant officials. In its January 2018 report to Congress, the Air Force reported how the Cobra Dane radar and the Long Range Discrimination Radar (LRDR) have shared and unique capabilities to support ballistic missile defense and space surveillance missions. The report noted that the respective locations of both radar systems affect their ability to provide those capabilities. The Department of Defense (DOD) also has other radar investments—the Pacific Radar and the Space Fence, which, according to DOD officials, may reduce DOD's reliance on Cobra Dane to provide ballistic missile defense and space surveillance capabilities. The Air Force's report to Congress noted that Cobra Dane met its requirement for operational availability, which refers to the percentage of time that the radar is able to meet its missions. GAO found that the Air Force has developed procedures to mitigate risks when Cobra Dane is not available. For example, U.S. Northern Command and Missile Defense Agency (MDA) officials stated that they can mitigate risks when Cobra Dane is not available by using the Sea-Based X-band radar to provide support for ballistic missile defense. The Air Force would face some limitations in its ability to conduct space surveillance if Cobra Dane were not available, as Cobra Dane tracks objects no other radar can track. However, MDA officials noted there are no plans to take Cobra Dane offline long enough to compromise space surveillance. The Air Force and MDA plan to contribute total funding of $278.6 million for the operation and sustainment of Cobra Dane, according to their fiscal year 2019 budget plans. Specifically, the Air Force and MDA plan to share funding for the operation and maintenance of the Cobra Dane radar and for three modernization projects that make up their sustainment plan for the radar. Further, the Air Force report noted that the Air Force also plans to provide $140 million in funding for the sustainment and maintenance of operational access to Cobra Dane's site at Shemya Island. In addition, GAO found that the Air Force developed a total cost estimate for one project—known as the transmitter group replacement—but not for its other two projects. Air Force officials plan to complete cost estimates for those two projects in conjunction with their fiscal year 2020 budget submission."], "all_classes": null, "length": 3043}
{"pred": "\nThe DEA within the Department of Justice is responsible for ensuring the availability of controlled substances for legitimate uses while preventing their diversion. To do this, the DEA requires entities that manufacture, distribute, or dispense controlled substances to register unless exempted. The DEA regulates these entities to limit diversion and prevent abuse. In 2010, the Disposal Act was amended to allow the public to deliver unused controlled substances to authorized collectors. The DEA was given responsibility for promulgating implementing regulations. As of April 2017, 23 of 89,500 eligible entities had registered to use disposal bins to collect unused prescription drugs. Most were pharmacies, followed by hospitals or clinics. Only 3% of pharmacies and other eligible entities had chosen to become DEA-authorized collectors of unused prescription drugs. Participation rates varied by state, with North Dakota having the highest rate at 32%. Costs, uncertainty over proper implementation, and participation in other disposal efforts were cited as reasons for the low participation. The DEA does not collect information on the amount and types of prescription drugs deposited into disposal bins. As of April 2017, about half of the country's population lived within 5 miles of a disposal bin. However, availability of nearby disposal bins varied significantly depending on whether in urban or rural areas. Stakeholders said that addressing cost issues, providing guidance, and resolving conflicts with other regulations could increase participation.", "answers": ["In 2015, 3.8 million Americans reported misusing prescription drugs within the last month, and deaths from prescription opioids have more than quadrupled since 1999. About half of the people who reported misusing prescription drugs in 2015 received them from a friend or relative. One way to help prevent this kind of diversion and potential misuse is by providing secure and convenient ways to dispose of unused, unneeded, or expired prescription medications. The Secure and Responsible Drug Disposal Act of 2010 authorizes pharmacies and other entities already authorized by DEA to handle controlled substances to also collect unused prescription drugs for disposal. In 2014, DEA finalized regulations for the implementation of the Act, establishing a voluntary process for eligible entities to become authorized collectors of unused prescription drugs using disposal bins. GAO was asked to review participation among authorized collectors that maintain disposal bins. In this report GAO describes (1) participation rates among entities eligible to collect unused prescription drugs and (2) factors that affect participation. GAO analyzed the most currently available DEA data from April 2017 on entities eligible to participate and those participating as authorized collectors. GAO also conducted interviews with DEA officials and a nongeneralizable sample of 11 stakeholder organizations selected to illustrate different types of authorized collectors and long-term care facilities. GAO is not making any recommendations. DEA provided technical comments, which GAO incorporated as appropriate. GAO found that about 3 percent of pharmacies and other entities eligible to collect unused prescription drugs for disposal have volunteered to do so. The Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) authorizes these entities to dispose of unused drugs to help reduce their potential misuse. Analysis of DEA data shows that as of April 2017, 2,233 of the 89,550 (2.49 percent) eligible entities—that is, certain entities already authorized by DEA to handle controlled substances—had registered with DEA to use disposal bins to collect unused prescription drugs. Most—about 81 percent—of the authorized collectors were pharmacies, followed by hospitals or clinics. GAO also found that participation rates varied by state, though in 44 states less than 5 percent of the state's pharmacies and other eligible entities had registered to become authorized collectors. Stakeholders cited several factors that may explain why relatively few pharmacies and other eligible entities have registered with DEA as authorized collectors of unused drugs. Most notably, stakeholders representing authorized collectors told GAO that because participation is voluntary, the cost associated with maintaining a disposal bin—which includes purchasing and installing the bin according to DEA requirements and paying for the destruction of its contents—is an important factor to weigh against potential benefits. DEA noted that availability of disposal by law enforcement agencies also contributes to low participation."], "all_classes": null, "length": 2930}
{"pred": "\nThe House of Representatives has rules that govern how bills and resolutions are taken up and considered on the floor. However, to expedite legislation, the House may temporarily set aside these rules for measures that are not otherwise privileged for consideration. This can be done by agreeing to a special order of business resolution or by adopting a motion to suspend the rules and pass the underlying measure. Most bills and resolutions that receive floor action in the House are called up and considered under suspension of the rules, which allows non-privileged measures to be raised without a special rule, waives points of order, limits debate, and prohibits floor amendments. Motions to suspend the rules and pass the measure require a two-thirds vote, so the procedure is typically reserved for bills and resolutions that can meet a supermajority threshold. The suspension procedure is established by clause 1 of House Rule XV and allows measures to be considered under suspension of the rules even if they would otherwise be subject to a point of order or have not been reported or referred to any calendar or previously introduced. Suspension measures are debatable for 40 minutes, with one-half in favor of the motion and one-half in opposition thereto. The Speaker may not entertain a motion to suspend the rules except on designated days, but suspension motions may be considered on other days by unanimous consent or under the terms of a special rule. The House Rules Committee may report a special rule that provides for floor consideration of a measure. In the 14th Congress, the majority of measures considered on the House floor were called up under suspension of the rules, with 62% of all measures being bills and 94% of suspension measures being sponsored by members of the majority party. Most suspension measures were referred to at least one House committee before their consideration on the chamber floor. The House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform was the committee of primary jurisdiction for the plurality of measures considered under suspension. The suspension procedure is commonly used to consider minority-sponsored legislation. Measures may be considered under suspension even if a committee never ordered them to be reported or wrote an accompanying committee report. The suspension procedure is limited to a maximum of 40 minutes of debate, but debate periods often exceed this limit due to procedural delays. Most suspension mot", "answers": ["Suspension of the rules is the most commonly used procedure to call up measures on the floor of the House of Representatives. As the name suggests, the procedure allows the House to suspend its standing and statutory rules in order to consider broadly supported legislation in an expedited manner. More specifically, the House temporarily sets aside its rules that govern the raising and consideration of measures and assumes a new set of constraints particular to the suspension procedure. The suspension of the rules procedure has several parliamentary advantages: (1) it allows nonprivileged measures to be raised on the House floor without the need for a special rule, (2) it enables the consideration of measures that would otherwise be subject to a point of order, and (3) it streamlines floor action by limiting debate and prohibiting floor amendments. Given these features, as well as the required two-thirds supermajority vote for passage, suspension motions are generally used to process less controversial legislation. In the 114th Congress (2015-2016), measures considered under suspension made up 62% of the bills and resolutions that received floor action in the House (743 out of 1,200 measures). The majority of suspension measures were House bills (83%), followed by Senate bills (11%) and House resolutions (4%). The measures covered a variety of policy areas but most often addressed government operations, such as the designation of federal facilities or amending administrative policies. Most measures that are considered in the House under the suspension procedure are sponsored by a House or Senate majority party member. However, suspension is the most common House procedure used to consider minority-party-sponsored legislation regardless of whether the legislation originated in the House or Senate. In 2015 and 2016, minority-party members sponsored 31% of suspension measures, compared to 9% of legislation subject to different procedures, including privileged business (17 measures), unanimous consent (21 measures), and under the terms of a special rule (one Senate bill). Most suspension measures are referred to at least one House committee before their consideration on the floor. The House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform (now called the Committee on Oversight and Reform) was the committee of primary jurisdiction for the plurality of suspension measures considered in the 114th Congress. Additional committees—such as Energy and Commerce, Homeland Security, Natural Resources, Foreign Affairs, and Veterans' Affairs—also served as the primary committee for a large number of suspension measures. Suspension motions are debatable for up to 40 minutes. In most cases, only a fraction of that debate time is actually used. In the 114th Congress, the average amount of time spent considering a motion to suspend the rules was 13 minutes and 10 seconds. The House adopted nearly every suspension motion considered in 2015 and 2016. Approval by the House, however, did not guarantee final approval in the 114th Congress. The Senate passed or agreed to 40% of the bills, joint resolutions, and concurrent resolutions initially considered in the House under suspension of the rules, and 276 measures were signed into law. This report briefly describes the suspension of the rules procedure, which is defined in House Rule XV, and provides an analysis of measures considered under this procedure during the 114th Congress. Figures and one table display statistics on the use of the procedure, including the prevalence and form of suspension measures, sponsorship of measures by party, committee consideration, length of debate, voting, resolution of differences between the chambers, and the final status of legislation. In addition, an Appendix illustrates trends in the use of the suspension procedure from the 110th to the 114th Congress (2007-2016)."], "all_classes": null, "length": 3420}
{"pred": "\nThe National Cemeteries Act of 1973 created the modern veterans' cemetery system within the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA). VA's National Cemetery Administration (NCA) manages most of the veterans' cemeteries in the US. NCA also provides funding through its Veterans Cemetery Grants Program to help establish, expand, or improve state and tribal veterans' cemeteries. NCA's plan aims to provide reasonable access to burial options for 95% of the veteran population. However, NCA has faced challenges in acquiring suitable land for new cemeteries, estimating costs, and using data to inform its grants program. NCA's cost estimates for some rural initiative sites have increased significantly above initial estimates. NCA's cost-estimating guidance does not fully incorporate the 12 steps identified in the GAO Cost Estimating and Assessment Guide. GAO recommends that VA update its cost-estimating procedures for cemetery construction projects to fully incorporate these steps to provide more reliable cost estimates. VA concurred with the recommendation.", "answers": ["The VA is responsible for ensuring that veterans have reasonable access to burial options in a national or state veterans' cemetery. In fiscal year 2018 VA estimated that about 92 percent of veterans had reasonable access to burial options, which was an increase from 90 percent in fiscal year 2014 but short of its goal of 96 percent by the end of fiscal year 2017. The House Appropriations Committee has expressed concerns that there are geographic pockets where veterans remain unserved by burial options. House Report 115-188 accompanying a bill for the Military Construction, Veterans Affairs, and Related Agencies Appropriations Act, 2018, includes a provision for GAO to examine veterans' access to burial options. This report (1) describes VA's plan for increasing reasonable access to burial options for veterans and (2) assesses VA's progress in implementing its plan and any challenges experienced. GAO reviewed applicable VA and NCA documents, compared NCA's cost-estimating practices with GAO's cost-estimating 12 steps, and met with cognizant officials regarding NCA's efforts to provide reasonable access to burial options. Within the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA), the National Cemetery Administration (NCA) has a plan to establish 18 new national cemeteries to increase reasonable access to burial options for veterans. NCA defines reasonable access as a national or state veterans' cemetery being located within 75 miles of veterans' homes. Key parts of NCA's plan include establishing 13 urban and rural initiative national cemeteries and awarding grant funds to state applicants for establishing new state veterans' cemeteries. NCA has made limited progress in implementing its plan to increase burial access and is years behind its original schedule for opening new cemeteries. For example, NCA has opened only two of its planned urban and rural initiative sites and is behind its original schedule for the other 11 (see fig. below). The primary factor delaying NCA's completion of these cemeteries has been challenges in acquiring suitable land. NCA has also been challenged in producing accurate estimates of construction costs for most of its rural initiative sites. Cost estimates have increased more than 200 percent (from about $7 million to $24 million) for these sites, and NCA's guidance for developing cost estimates for the cemeteries does not fully incorporate the 12 steps identified in cost-estimating leading practices—such as conducting a risk and uncertainty analysis or a sensitivity analysis. As a result, NCA is not well positioned to provide reliable and valid cost estimates to better inform decisions to enhance veterans' cemetery access. GAO recommends that NCA fully adopt cost-estimating leading practices into its procedures to assist in improving its cost estimates for establishing cemeteries. NCA concurred with our recommendation."], "all_classes": null, "length": 4681}
{"pred": "\nThis report examines how state and local election systems in the United States administer federal elections. It describes how election administration duties are distributed between the state and local levels, the structures of those systems, and how they interact with federal actions. The report focuses on the three main parts of election administration: voter registration, voting, and vote counting. It finds that while the federal government has some role in election administration, most of the work is done by state and local systems. The federal government provides some funding for election administration, but most costs are borne by states and localities. The report highlights variations in the structures of state and local election systems, including differences in leadership, relationship with state officials, and population size and density. These variations can affect how well federal requirements and funding are implemented. The report concludes by discussing considerations for Congress when proposing changes to election administration rules or structures.", "answers": ["The administration of elections in the United States is highly decentralized. Elections are primarily administered by thousands of state and local systems rather than a single, unified national system. States and localities share responsibility for most election administration duties. Exactly how responsibilities are assigned at the state and local levels varies both between and within states, but there are some general patterns in the distribution of duties. States typically have primary responsibility for making decisions about the rules of elections (policymaking). Localities typically have primary responsibility for conducting elections in accordance with those rules (implementation). Localities, with varying contributions from states, typically also have primary responsibility for paying for the activities and resources required to conduct elections (funding). The structures of the state and local systems that conduct elections also vary between and within states. Common variations include differences related to the leadership of the system, the relationship between local election officials and the state, and the population size and density of the jurisdiction the system serves. The leadership of a state or local election system may be elected or appointed, and both the leaders and the methods used to select them may be partisan, bipartisan, or nonpartisan. State officials may have more or less direct influence over local election officials, and the extent of their influence may be affected by other structural features of the state's election systems, such as the methods used to select local officials. Finally, larger election jurisdictions have different administrative advantages and challenges than smaller ones, and more urban jurisdictions have different advantages and challenges than more rural ones. These differences between jurisdictions may be reflected in structural features of the election systems that serve them, such as how the systems allocate resources and where they find specialized expertise. Understanding the duties and structures of state and local election systems may be relevant to Congress for at least two reasons. First, the way state and local election systems work can affect how well federal action on election administration serves its intended purposes. The effectiveness of federal action depends in part on how it is implemented. How it is implemented can depend, in turn, on how the state and local election systems that implement it work. Second, Congress can make or incentivize changes to the way state and local election systems work. Congress has a number of policy tools it can use to affect the administration of federal elections. The use of these tools can—either intentionally or unintentionally—affect the state and local election systems that administer federal elections."], "all_classes": null, "length": 3965}
{"pred": "\nThe Federal Railroad Administration (FRA) and the Federal Highway Administration (FHWA) oversee grade crossing safety. FRA focuses on railroad safety while FHWA focuses on highway safety. FRA has a Section 130 Program that provides funding for states to improve grade crossing safety. FHWA distributes the funds through a formula based on the number of grade crossings in each state. \n\nFRA has found that the number of grade crossing crashes and fatalities has remained steady since 2009 despite increased train and vehicle traffic. FRA has hired new grade crossing inspectors to address this issue. FRA is also working on developing new automated and connected vehicle technologies to reduce risky driver behavior at grade crossings.\n\nFHWA requires states to develop a grade crossing program that considers relative risk. FHWA officials review the methods that states use to select projects to ensure that risk is considered. FHWA also provides states with tools to help them select projects, such as the Grade Crossing Handbook and the Accident Prediction Model.\n\nStates face challenges in implementing and assessing projects due to program requirements and limited funding. FHWA has not conducted a comprehensive evaluation of the Section 130 Program to assess its effectiveness. FHWA officials said that an evaluation would help determine if the program requirements allow states to adequately address current and emerging safety issues.\n\nIn summary, FRA and FHWA have different roles in overseeing grade crossing safety but share a common goal of improving safety. However, states face challenges in implementing and assessing projects due to program requirements and limited funding. An evaluation of the Section 130 Program could help determine if the program is adequate to address current and emerging safety issues.", "answers": ["Crashes at highway-rail grade crossings are one of the leading causes of railroad-related deaths. According to FRA data, in 2017, there were more than 2,100 crashes resulting in 273 fatalities. Since 2009 crashes have occurred at a fairly constant rate. The federal government provides states funding to improve grade-crossing safety through FHWA's Section 130 Program. The persistence of crashes and deaths raises questions about the effectiveness of the federal grade-crossing-safety program. GAO was asked to review federal efforts to improve grade-crossing safety. This report examines: (1) the focus of FRA's grade-crossing-safety research, (2) how states select and implement grade-crossing projects and what data are available from FRA to inform their decisions, and (3) the challenges states reported in implementing and assessing projects and the extent to which FHWA assesses the program's effectiveness. GAO analyzed FRA data; reviewed FRA's, FHWA's, and states' documents; reviewed a study of states' selection of projects; and interviewed FRA and FHWA headquarters and field staff, and officials from a non-generalizable sample of eight states, selected to include a mix in the number of grade crossings and crashes, and geographic diversity. Research sponsored by the Federal Railroad Administration (FRA) has identified driver behavior as the main cause of highway-rail grade crossing crashes and that factors such as train and traffic volume can contribute to the risk of a crash. (See figure.) Over 70 percent of fatal crashes in 2017 occurred at grade crossings with gates. To meet the requirements of the federal grade-crossing program, states are responsible for selecting and ensuring the implementation of grade-crossing improvement projects. Most state DOT officials and other relevant transportation officials use local knowledge of grade crossings to supplement the results of models that rank grade crossings based on the risk of an accident. These states generally consider the same primary risk factors, such as vehicle and train traffic. FRA is taking steps to improve the data used in its model to help states assess risk factors at grade crossings. For example, FRA's grade-crossing inspectors will review and identify issues with railroad- and state-reported inventory data. FRA is currently developing guidelines, which it plans to finalize by the end of 2018, to implement these inspections as it has for other types of FRA inspections. Officials we spoke with in eight states reported challenges in pursuing certain types of projects that could further enhance safety, in part because of federal requirements. While safety has improved, many crashes occur at grade crossings with gates, and officials said there could be additional ways to focus program requirements to continue improving safety. States' and the Federal Highway Administration's (FHWA) reporting focuses on the program's funding and activity, such as the number and types of projects, yet the low number of crashes makes it difficult to assess the effectiveness of projects in reducing crashes and fatalities. FHWA reports the program has been effective in reducing fatalities by about 74 percent since 1975. However, since 2009, annually there have been about 250 fatalities—almost one percent of total highway fatalities. FRA expects future crashes to grow, in part, due to the anticipated increase in rail and highway traffic. An evaluation of the program should consider whether its funding and other requirements allow states to adequately address ongoing safety issues. FHWA officials said they are not required to perform such evaluations. GAO has previously reported on the importance of program evaluations to determine the extent to which a program is meeting its objectives. An evaluation of the program could lead FHWA to identify changes that could allow states to more strategically address problem areas. GAO recommends that FHWA evaluate the program's requirements to determine if they allow states the flexibility to address ongoing safety issues. The Department of Transportation concurred with GAO's recommendation."], "all_classes": null, "length": 7675}
{"pred": "\nThe report discusses the history and current eligibility requirements for the Purple Heart, a military decoration awarded to members of the US Armed Forces who have been wounded or killed in combat. The Purple Heart was first established in 1782 by George Washington and has been redefined and expanded over time by Congress and the President. Currently, the Purple Heart is awarded to any member of the US Armed Forces who has been wounded or died from wounds sustained under certain circumstances, including in action against an opposing armed force, while serving with friendly forces engaged in armed conflict, or as a result of an act of an enemy or opposing armed forces. However, there have been debates and legislation regarding expanding eligibility for the Purple Heart to include those wounded or killed in terrorist attacks, traumatic brain injuries, and other non-combat incidents. Congress has expanded eligibility in recent years, but some argue that expanding eligibility could dilute the award's meaning and honor for those who have already received it. The report discusses current legislation and controversies surrounding Purple Heart eligibility.", "answers": ["The Purple Heart is one of the oldest and most recognized American military medals, awarded to servicemembers who were killed or wounded by enemy action. The conflicts 2001 to the present have greatly increased the number of Purple Hearts awarded to servicemembers. Events over the past few years have spurred debate on the eligibility criteria for the Purple Heart. Shootings on U.S. soil and medical conditions such as traumatic brain injury (TBI) and post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) have prompted changes to the eligibility requirements for the Purple Heart. Some critics believe that these changes may lessen the value of the medal and the sacrifices of past recipients on the battlefield. In the past, efforts to modify the Purple Heart's eligibility requirements were contentious, and veterans groups were vocal concerning eligibility changes. While medal requirements are often left to the military and executive branch to decide, Congress is involved in Purple Heart eligibility, utilizing its constitutional power \"To Make Rules for the Government and Regulation of the land and naval Forces\" (U.S. Constitution, Article I, Section 8, clause 14). The Carl Levin and Howard P. \"Buck\" McKeon National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2015 (P.L. 113-291) included language that expands eligibility for the Purple Heart. Previous debates have raised several questions about the Purple Heart. In some respects, how an event is defined can determine eligibility: Is a servicemember the victim of a crime or a terrorist attack? Conversely, arguing that killed or wounded servicemembers \"should\" be eligible for the Purple Heart can redefine an event: Is the servicemember an advisor to a foreign military or a combatant? Are PTSD and other mental health conditions adequate injuries to warrant the Purple Heart? These are questions that Congress might consider if it chooses to act on this issue."], "all_classes": null, "length": 4754}
{"pred": "\nThe USDA's Food and Nutrition Service (FNS) is responsible for administering the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP) and ensuring that states comply with program rules. SNAP recipients are subject to work requirements, including registering for work, reporting to an employer, and participating in work programs. Able-bodied adults without dependents (ABWDs) are subject to additional work requirements. FNS provides funding for state SNAP Employment and Training (SNAP E&T) programs to help participants meet these requirements. States have increasingly moved from mandatory to voluntary SNAP E&T programs, which allows them to focus on serving motivated participants rather than sanctioning non-compliant individuals. FNS has taken steps to increase federal support of states' SNAP E&T programs by providing additional technical assistance and increasing the number of federal staff responsible for SNAP E&T. FNS relies on various information sources to oversee states' SNAP E&T programs, including participant outcome data reported by states. However, states have faced challenges in accurately reporting data, including limited data systems and incorrect interpretations of reporting definitions. FNS has taken steps to address these challenges, including providing technical assistance and developing a SNAP Fraud Framework. FNS has also taken steps to prevent, detect, and respond to retailer trafficking of SNAP benefits. Despite these efforts, trafficking remains a problem. FNS has proposed but not finalized rules to increase penalties for retailer trafficking. FNS's periodic estimates of the rate of retailer trafficking suggest an increase since the 2006 report, but there are limitations to these estimates.", "answers": ["SNAP is the largest federally funded nutrition assistance program. In fiscal year 2017, it provided about $63 billion in benefits. USDA and the states jointly administer SNAP and partner to address issues that affect program integrity, including improper payments and fraud. GAO has previously reported on various aspects of SNAP, including state SNAP E&T programs, improper payment rates, recipient fraud, and retailer trafficking. This testimony discusses GAO's prior and ongoing work on (1) SNAP E&T programs, including program participants, design, and USDA oversight, and (2) USDA's efforts to address SNAP program integrity, including improper payments, as well as recipient and retailer fraud. As part of its ongoing work on SNAP E&T programs, GAO analyzed E&T expenditures and participation data from fiscal years 2007 through 2016, the most recent data available; reviewed relevant research from USDA; and interviewed USDA and selected state and local officials. The prior work discussed in this testimony is based on four GAO products on E&T programs (GAO-03-388), improper payments (GAO-16-708T), recipient fraud (GAO-14-641), and retailer trafficking (GAO-07-53). Information on the scope and methodology of our prior work is available in each product. Overseen by the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) and administered by states, Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP) Employment and Training (E&T) programs served about 0.5 percent of the approximately 43.5 million SNAP recipients in an average month of fiscal year 2016, according to the most recent USDA data available. These programs are generally designed to help SNAP recipients increase their ability to obtain regular employment through services such as job search and training. Some recipients may be required to participate. According to USDA, about 14 percent of SNAP recipients were subject to work requirements in an average month of fiscal year 2016, while others, such as children and the elderly, were generally exempt from these requirements. States have flexibility in how they design their E&T programs. Over the last several years, states have 1) increasingly moved away from programs that mandate participation, 2) focused on serving able-bodied adults without dependents whose benefits are generally time-limited unless they comply with work requirements, and 3) partnered with state and local organizations to deliver services. USDA has taken steps to increase support and oversight of SNAP E&T since 2014, including collecting new data on participant outcomes from states. GAO has ongoing work reviewing SNAP E&T programs, including USDA oversight. USDA and the states partner to address issues that affect program integrity, including improper payments and fraud, and USDA has taken some steps to address challenges in these areas, but issues remain. Improper Payments. In 2016, GAO reviewed SNAP improper payment rates and found that states' adoption of program flexibilities and changes in federal SNAP policy in the previous decade, as well as improper payment rate calculation methods, likely affected these rates. Although USDA reported improper payment estimates for SNAP in previous years, USDA did not report an estimate for benefits paid in fiscal years 2015 or 2016 due to data quality issues in some states. USDA has since been working with the states to improve improper payment estimates for the fiscal year 2017 review. Recipient Fraud. In 2014, GAO made recommendations to USDA to address challenges states faced in combatting recipient fraud. For example, GAO found that USDA's guidance on the use of transaction data to uncover potential trafficking lacked specificity and recommended USDA develop additional guidance. Since then, USDA has provided technical assistance to some states, including on the use of data analytics. GAO has ongoing work reviewing states' use of data analytics to identify SNAP recipient fraud. Retailer Trafficking. In 2006, GAO identified several ways in which SNAP was vulnerable to retailer trafficking—a practice involving the exchange of benefits for cash or non-food items. For example, USDA had not conducted analyses to identify high-risk retailers and target its resources. Since then, USDA has established risk levels for retailers based on various factors. GAO has ongoing work assessing how USDA prevents, detects, and responds to retailer trafficking and reviewing the usefulness of USDA's estimates of the extent of SNAP retailer trafficking. GAO is not making new recommendations. USDA generally concurred with GAO's prior recommendations."], "all_classes": null, "length": 5657}
{"pred": "\nThe report discusses the potential for Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG) as a maritime fuel to reduce pollutant emissions from ships. LNG as an engine or \"bunker\" fuel could help the United States reduce harmful air emissions, it could create a new market for domestic natural gas and it could create economic opportunities in domestic shipbuilding. However, LNG bunkering operations would require specialized vessels and land-based infrastructure for LNG \"bunkering\" as well as appropriate regulatory oversight of the associated shipping and fueling operations. The storage, delivery, and use of LNG in shipping also has safety implications. The report discusses the potential for LNG bunkering to increase demand for low-sulfur fuels, which could increase fuel costs for vessels. The demand for LNG as a bunker fuel would be affected by how many vessels use the IMO sulfur standards that take effect in 2020. The report also discusses the potential environmental impacts of LNG production and transportation. The report concludes that while LNG bunkering could provide benefits, it is hard to predict the potential benefits or costs due to the uncertainty surrounding the future of LNG as a ship fuel. Congress could encourage the growth of LNG bunkering by providing tax incentives and addressing regulatory barriers.", "answers": ["The combination of growing liquefied natural gas (LNG) supplies and new requirements for less polluting fuels in the maritime shipping industry has heightened interest in LNG as a maritime fuel. The use of LNG as an engine (\"bunker\") fuel in shipping is also drawing attention from federal agencies and is beginning to emerge as an issue of interest in Congress. In 2008, the International Maritime Organization (IMO) announced a timeline to reduce the maximum sulfur content in vessel fuels to 0.5% by January 1, 2020. Annex VI of the International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships requires vessels to either use fuels containing less than 0.5% sulfur or install exhaust-cleaning systems (\"scrubbers\") to limit a vessel's airborne emissions of sulfur oxides to an equivalent level. An option for vessel operators to meet the IMO 2020 standards is to install LNG-fueled engines, which emit only trace amounts of sulfur. Adopting LNG engines requires more investment than installing scrubbers, but LNG-fueled engines may offset their capital costs with operating cost advantages over conventional fuels. Savings would depend on the price spread between LNG and fuel oil. Recent trends suggest that LNG may be cheaper in the long run than conventional fuels. LNG bunkering requires specialized infrastructure for supply, storage, and delivery to vessels. To date, the number of ports worldwide that have developed such infrastructure is limited, although growth in this area has accelerated. Early adoption of LNG bunkering is occurring in Europe where the European Union requires a core network of ports to provide LNG bunkering by 2030. LNG bunkering is also advancing in Asia, led by Singapore, the world's largest bunkering port. Asian countries, together with Australia and the United Arab Emirates, have about 10 coastal ports offering LNG bunkering, with another 15 projects in development. LNG bunkering in the United States currently takes place in Jacksonville, FL, and Port Fourchon, LA—with a third facility under development in Tacoma, WA. Bunkering of LNG-fueled cruise ships using barges also is planned for Port Canaveral, FL. The relative locations of other U.S. ports and operating LNG terminals suggest that LNG bunkering could be within reach of every port along the Eastern Seaboard and in the Gulf of Mexico. On the West Coast, the ports of Los Angeles and Long Beach, CA, are near the Costa Azul LNG terminal in Ensenada, MX. Seattle and Tacoma are adjacent to the proposed Tacoma LNG project. Since 2015, Jones Act coastal ship operators have taken steps to transition their fleets to use cleaner burning fuels, including LNG. Shippers of dry goods to Alaska, Hawaii, and Puerto Rico have taken delivery or have ordered LNG-fueled and LNG-capable vessels from U.S. shipyards in Philadelphia, PA, and Brownsville, TX. Another company operates five LNG-powered offshore supply vessels built in Gulfport, MS. Depending upon LNG conversions, the global LNG bunker fuel market could grow to several billion dollars by 2030. If U.S. LNG producers were to supply a significant share of this market—on the strength of comparatively low LNG production costs—LNG bunkering could increase demand for U.S. natural gas production, transportation, and liquefaction. Opportunities in LNG-related shipbuilding might be more limited, as most shipbuilding occurs overseas, although domestically-constructed LNG bunkering barges could be one area of economic growth. Finally, engineering and construction firms could benefit from new opportunities to develop port infrastructure for LNG storage and transfer. However, while vessel conversion to LNG fuel may increase demand for U.S.-produced natural gas, it partially could be offset by reduced demand for U.S.-produced crude oil or refined products. Furthermore, while LNG can reduce direct emissions from vessels, fugitive emissions and environmental impacts from natural gas production and transportation could reduce overall emissions benefits. While the LNG industry has experienced few accidents, the Coast Guard has been developing new standards to address unique safety and security risks associated with LNG in vessel operations. The overarching consideration about LNG bunkering in the United States is uncertainty about how the global shipping fleet will adapt to the IMO sulfur standards over time. This uncertainty complicates decisions related to both private investment and public policy. Although Congress has limited ability to influence global shipping, it could influence the growth of LNG bunkering through the tax code and regulation, or through policies affecting the LNG industry or domestic shipping industry as a whole. Evaluating the potential implications of LNG bunkering within the context of broader energy and environmental policies may become an additional consideration for Congress. If LNG bunkering expands significantly, Congress also may examine the adequacy of existing measures to ensure the safety and security of LNG vessels, storage, and related facilities."], "all_classes": null, "length": 8129}
{"pred": "\nThe Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) have been working together to reduce lead levels in drinking water in schools. In 2005, the EPA issued the 3Ts guidance for reducing lead in drinking water in schools. This guidance provides information on training school officials, testing drinking water in schools, and telling the school and broader community about these efforts. However, the report found that many school districts are not testing for lead in their drinking water. Only 43% of school districts tested for lead in school drinking water, and 37% found lead above their action level. School districts often remediate lead by replacing fixtures, flushing the water system, or providing bottled water. The EPA provides voluntary guidance to schools on how to test and remediate lead in drinking water, but some school districts reported that more information and funding would be helpful. The report surveyed 373 school districts and found that charter schools were less likely to test for lead in their drinking water. The EPA has provided funding to some states to help with testing and remediation efforts. The report recommends that the EPA provide clearer guidance on lead levels at which action should be taken, determine a schedule for regularly testing for lead in school drinking water, and provide information on the costs of testing and remediation.", "answers": ["No federal law requires testing of drinking water for lead in schools that receive water from public water systems, although these systems are regulated by the EPA. Lead can leach into water from plumbing materials inside a school. The discovery of toxic levels of lead in water in Flint, Michigan, in 2015 has renewed awareness about the danger lead exposure poses to public health, especially for children. GAO was asked to review school practices for lead testing and remediation. This report examines the extent to which (1) school districts are testing for, finding, and remediating lead in drinking water; (2) states are supporting these efforts; and (3) federal agencies are supporting state and school district efforts. GAO administered a web-based survey to a stratified, random sample of 549 school districts, the results of which are generalizable to all school districts. GAO visited or interviewed officials with 17 school districts with experience in lead testing, spread among 5 states, selected for geographic variation. GAO also interviewed federal and state officials and reviewed relevant laws and documents. An estimated 43 percent of school districts, serving 35 million students, tested for lead in school drinking water in 2016 or 2017, according to GAO's nationwide survey of school districts. An estimated 41 percent of school districts, serving 12 million students, had not tested for lead. GAO's survey showed that, among school districts that did test, an estimated 37 percent found elevated lead (lead at levels above their selected threshold for taking remedial action.) (See figure.) All school districts that found elevated lead in drinking water reported taking steps to reduce or eliminate exposure to lead, including replacing water fountains, installing filters or new fixtures, or providing bottled water. According to the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), at least 8 states have requirements that schools test for lead in drinking water as of 2017, and at least 13 additional states supported school districts' voluntary efforts with funding or in-kind support for testing and remediation. In addition, the five states GAO visited provided examples of technical assistance to support testing in schools. EPA provides guidance and other resources to states and school districts regarding testing and remediating lead in drinking water, and the Department of Education (Education) provides some of this information on its websites. School district officials that used EPA's written guidance said they generally found it helpful. Although EPA guidance emphasizes the importance of addressing elevated lead levels, GAO found that some aspects of the guidance, such as the threshold for taking remedial action, were potentially misleading and unclear, which can put school districts at risk of making uninformed decisions. In addition, many school districts reported a lack of familiarity with EPA's guidance, and their familiarity varied by region of the country. Education and EPA do not regularly collaborate to support state and school district efforts on lead in drinking water, despite agreeing to do so in a 2005 memorandum of understanding. Such collaboration could encourage testing and ensure that more school districts will have the necessary information to limit student and staff exposure to lead. GAO is making seven recommendations, including that EPA update its guidance on how schools should determine lead levels requiring action and for EPA and Education to collaborate to further disseminate guidance and encourage testing for lead. EPA and Education agreed with the recommendations."], "all_classes": null, "length": 14909}
{"pred": "\nThe report examines the use of Other Transaction Authorities (OTAs) by the Department of Defense. OTAs are contracts that are exempt from many federal procurement laws and regulations. The report discusses how OTAs are used, the benefits and risks of using OTAs, and the data available to assess their effectiveness. The report highlights several issues with the data available, including inconsistencies in how data is collected and reported. The report concludes that while OTAs have the potential to provide flexibility and speed up acquisition, more data and training are needed to ensure effective use. The report recommends that DOD take steps to improve its use of OTAs, including providing more training and education for personnel involved.", "answers": ["The Department of Defense (DOD) obligates more than $300 billion annually to buy goods and services, and to support research and development. Most of these acquisitions are governed by procurement statutes and regulations found in Title 10 (and parts of other select titles) of the United States Code, the Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR), and the Defense Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement. Under certain circumstances, DOD can enter into an other transaction (OT) agreement instead of a traditional contract. OT agreements are generally exempt from federal procurement laws and regulations. These exemptions grant government officials the flexibility to include, amend, or exclude contract clauses and requirements that are mandatory in traditional procurements (e.g., termination clauses, cost accounting standards, payments, audit requirements, intellectual property, and contract disputes). OT authorities also grant more flexibility to structure agreements in numerous ways, including joint ventures; partnerships; consortia; or multiple agencies joining together to fund an agreement encompassing multiple providers. Other transaction agreements are legally binding contracts; they are referred to as agreements to distinguish them from the traditional procurement contracts governed by the FAR and procurements laws. Other transaction authorities are set forth in two sections of law: 10 U.S.C. 2371—granting authority to use OTs for basic, applied, and advanced research projects. 10 U.S.C. 2371b—granting authority to use OTs for prototype projects and follow-on production. Under this authority, a prototype project can only be conducted if at least one nontraditional defense contractor significantly participates in the project; all significant participants are small businesses or nontraditional defense contractors; at least one-third of the total cost of the prototype project is provided by nongovernment participants; or the senior procurement acquisition official provides a written justification for using an OT. Follow-on production can only be conducted when the underlying prototype OT was competitively awarded, and the prototype project was successfully completed. OTs have the potential to provide significant benefits to DOD, including attracting nontraditional contractors with promising technological capabilities to work with DOD, establishing a mechanism to pool resources with other entities to facilitate development of, and obtain, state-of-the-art dual-use technologies, and offering a unique mechanism for DOD to invest in, and influence the direction of, technology development. A number of analysts warn that along with the potential benefits come significant risks, including potentially diminished oversight and exemption from laws and regulations designed to protect government and taxpayer interests. In FY2017, DOD obligated $2.1 billion on prototype OT agreements, representing less than 1% of contract obligations for the year. However, the use of OTs is expected to grow at a rapid pace, due in part to recent statutory changes expanding other transaction authorities. A number of analysts and officials have raised concerns that if DOD uses OTs in ways not intended by Congress—or is perceived to abuse the authority—Congress could clamp down on the authority. Generally, DOD lacks authoritative data that can be used to measure and evaluate the use of other transaction authorities."], "all_classes": null, "length": 14640}
{"pred": "\nThe report examines the current legal landscape governing data protection in the United States. While some concern over data breaches and privacy violations has raised national attention, the current legal protections are limited and complex. The federal government has enacted various laws to augment individual data protection rights, but these laws are limited to specific industries, types of data, or practices. The patchwork of federal laws and state laws creates a \"patchwork\" of data protection regimes. Some argue that Congress should consider a comprehensive federal data protection law modeled on the California Consumer Privacy Act (CCPA) or the European Union's General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR). However, other officials have criticized these laws as overly prescriptive and likely to result in negative unintended consequences. The report discusses legal considerations for any federal data protection legislation, including:\n\n1) The scope and nature of any legislative proposal. Different approaches could be used, such as a prescriptive or outcome-based approach.\n\n2) Defining the scope of protected information.\n\n3) Enforcement by a federal agency.\n\n4) Allowing individuals to enforce laws in court and satisfy Article III standing requirements.\n\n5) Federal preemption of state laws.\n\n6) The impact on First Amendment protections.\n\nThe report concludes that any comprehensive federal data protection law would likely involve numerous legal considerations and decisions.", "answers": ["Recent high-profile data breaches and other concerns about how third parties protect the privacy of individuals in the digital age have raised national concerns over legal protections of Americans' electronic data. Intentional intrusions into government and private computer networks and inadequate corporate privacy and cybersecurity practices have exposed the personal information of millions of Americans to unwanted recipients. At the same time, internet connectivity has increased and varied in form in recent years. Americans now transmit their personal data on the internet at an exponentially higher rate than in the past, and their data are collected, cultivated, and maintained by a growing number of both \"consumer facing\" and \"behind the scenes\" actors such as data brokers. As a consequence, the privacy, cybersecurity and protection of personal data have emerged as a major issue for congressional consideration. Despite the rise in interest in data protection, the legislative paradigms governing cybersecurity and data privacy are complex and technical, and lack uniformity at the federal level. The constitutional \"right to privacy\" developed over the course of the 20th century, but this right generally guards only against government intrusions and does little to shield the average internet user from private actors. At the federal statutory level, there are a number of statutes that protect individuals' personal data or concern cybersecurity, including the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act, Children's Online Privacy Protection Act, and others. And a number of different agencies, including the Federal Trade Commission (FTC), the Consumer Finance Protection Bureau (CFPB), and the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS), enforce these laws. But these statutes primarily regulate certain industries and subcategories of data. The FTC fills in some of the statutory gaps by enforcing a broad prohibition against unfair and deceptive data protection practices. But no single federal law comprehensively regulates the collection and use of consumers' personal data. Seeking a more fulsome data protection system, some governments—such as California and the European Union (EU)—have recently enacted privacy laws regulating nearly all forms of personal data within their jurisdictional reach. Some argue that Congress should consider creating similar protections in federal law, but others have criticized the EU and California approaches as being overly prescriptive and burdensome. Should the 116th Congress consider a comprehensive federal data protection law, its legislative proposals may involve numerous decision points and legal considerations. Points of consideration may include the conceptual framework of the law (i.e., whether it is prescriptive or outcome-based), the scope of the law and its definition of protected information, and the role of the FTC or other federal enforcement agency. Further, if Congress wants to allow individuals to enforce data protection laws and seek remedies for the violations of such laws in court, it must account for standing requirements in Article III, Section 2 of the Constitution. Federal preemption also raises complex legal questions—not only of whether to preempt state law, but what form of preemption Congress should employ. Finally, from a First Amendment perspective, Supreme Court jurisprudence suggests that while some privacy, cybersecurity, or data security regulations are permissible, any federal law that restricts protected speech, particularly if it targets specific speakers or content, may be subject to more stringent review by a reviewing court."], "all_classes": null, "length": 18048}
{"pred": "\nThe report evaluates the reliability of the US Census Bureau's 2020 life-cycle cost estimate using the GAO's Cost Estimating and Assessment Guide. The Bureau's 2017 estimate partially met three of the four characteristics of a reliable cost estimate: comprehensive, well-documented, accurate, and credible. However, the Bureau only partially met the criteria for well-documented, as some documentation was missing, inconsistent, or difficult to understand. The Bureau will need to address these issues to ensure that its estimate is fully documented. The Bureau substantially met the criteria for accuracy, credibility, and comprehensive estimates. The Bureau's 2017 estimate shows improvement over the 2015 estimate, but the Bureau still needs to fully meet the criteria for well-documented estimates to consider it reliable. The Bureau has made progress in developing guidance, processes, and policies for cost estimation, but still needs to fully implement these to ensure reliable estimates. The Bureau's 2017 estimate shows higher costs than the 2015 estimate, with increases in IT costs, response rates, and contingency allocations. The Bureau attributes the decrease in program management costs to changes in the categorization of costs associated with risks. The Secretary of Commerce agreed with the findings but did not concur that the 2017 estimate was not reliable.", "answers": ["In October 2017, the Department of Commerce (Commerce) announced that the projected life-cycle cost of the 2020 Census had climbed to $15.6 billion, a more than $3 billion (27 percent) increase over its 2015 estimate. A high-quality, reliable cost estimate is a key tool for budgeting, planning, and managing the 2020 Census. Without this capability, the Bureau is at risk of experiencing program cost overruns, missed deadlines, and performance shortfalls. GAO was asked to evaluate the reliability of the Bureau's life-cycle cost estimate. This report evaluates the reliability of the Bureau's revised life-cycle cost estimate for the 2020 Census and the extent to which the Bureau is using it as a management tool, and compares the 2015 and 2017 cost estimates to describe key drivers of cost growth. GAO reviewed documentary and testimonial evidence from Bureau officials responsible for developing the 2020 Census cost estimate and used its cost assessment guide ( GAO-09-3SP ) as criteria. Since 2015, the Census Bureau (Bureau) has made significant progress in improving its ability to develop a reliable cost estimate. While improvements have been made, the Bureau's October 2017 cost estimate for the 2020 Census does not fully reflect all the characteristics of a reliable estimate. (See figure.) Specifically, for the characteristic of being well-documented, GAO found that some of the source data either did not support the information described in the cost estimate or was not in the files provided for two of its largest field operations. In GAO's assessment of the 2015 version of the 2020 Census cost estimate, GAO recommended that the Bureau take steps to ensure that each of the characteristics of a reliable cost estimate is met. The Bureau agreed and has taken steps, but has not fully implemented this recommendation. A reliable cost estimate serves as a tool for program development and oversight, helping management make informed decisions. During this review, GAO found the Bureau used the cost estimate to inform decision making. Factors that contributed to cost fluctuations between the 2015 and 2017 cost estimates include: Changes in assumptions. Among other changes, a decrease in the assumed rate for self-response from 63.5 percent in 2015 to 60.5 percent in 2017 increased the cost of collecting responses from nonresponding housing units. Improved ability to anticipate and quantify risk. In general, contingency allocations designed to address the effects of potential risks increased overall from $1.3 billion in 2015 to $2.6 billion in 2017. An overall increase in information technology (IT) costs. IT cost increases, totaling $1.59 billion, represented almost 50 percent of the total cost increase from 2015 to 2017. GAO is not making any new recommendations but maintains its earlier recommendation—that the Secretary of Commerce direct the Bureau to take specific steps to ensure its cost estimate meets the characteristics of a high-quality estimate. In its response to this report, Commerce generally agreed with the findings related to cost estimation improvements, but disagreed that the cost estimate was not reliable. However, until GAO's recommendation is fully implemented the cost estimate cannot be considered reliable."], "all_classes": null, "length": 6712}
{"pred": "\nThis report provides historical information on the salaries of Members of Congress since 1789 and how they have been adjusted over the years. It details the different methods by which Member pay can be adjusted, including through legislation, the Employment Cost Index, and automatic adjustments based on General Schedule pay increases. The report also discusses how legislation has been introduced to either prohibit or limit Member pay adjustments, and how some Members have chosen to return their salaries to the Treasury during government shutdowns. Since 1992, the salary of Members of Congress has been adjusted annually based on changes in the Employment Cost Index, with actual adjustments varying from the projected adjustments due to legislation and limitations on the percentage increase in General Schedule pay. If Members had received every adjustment prescribed by the ECI formula since 1992, their current salary would be $210,900. The report provides a summary of laws that have delayed or prohibited Member pay adjustments over the years.", "answers": ["Congress is required by Article I, Section 6, of the Constitution to determine its own pay. In the past, Congress periodically enacted specific legislation to alter its pay; the last time this occurred affected pay in 1991. More recently, pay has been determined pursuant to laws establishing formulas for automatic adjustments. The Ethics Reform Act of 1989 established the current automatic annual adjustment formula, which is based on changes in private sector wages as measured by the Employment Cost Index (ECI). The adjustment is automatic unless denied statutorily, although the percentage may not exceed the percentage base pay increase for General Schedule (GS) employees. Member pay has since been frozen in two ways: (1) directly, through legislation that freezes salaries for Members but not for other federal employees, and (2) indirectly, through broader pay freeze legislation that covers Members and other specified categories of federal employees. Members of Congress last received a pay adjustment in January 2009. At that time, their salary was increased 2.8%, to $174,000. A provision in P.L. 111-8 prohibited any pay adjustment for 2010. Under the pay adjustment formula, Members were originally scheduled to receive an adjustment in January 2010 of 2.1%, although this would have been revised downward automatically to 1.5% to match the GS base pay adjustment. Members next were scheduled to receive a 0.9% pay adjustment in 2011. The pay adjustment was prohibited by P.L. 111-165. Additionally, P.L. 111-322 prevented any adjustment in GS base pay before December 31, 2012. Since the percentage adjustment in Member pay may not exceed the percentage adjustment in the base pay of GS employees, Member pay was also frozen during this period. If not limited by GS pay, Member pay could have been adjusted by 1.3% in 2012. The ECI formula established a maximum potential pay adjustment in January 2013 of 1.1%. P.L. 112-175 extended the freeze on GS pay rates for the duration of this continuing resolution, which also extended the Member freeze since the percentage adjustment in Member pay may not exceed the percentage adjustment in GS base pay. Subsequently, Member pay for 2013 was further frozen in P.L. 112-240. The maximum potential 2014 pay adjustment of 1.2%, or $2,100, was denied by P.L. 113-46. The maximum potential January 2015 Member pay adjustment was 1.6%, or $2,800. President Obama proposed a 1.0% increase in the base pay of GS employees, which would automatically have limited any Member pay adjustment to 1.0%. P.L. 113-235 contained a provision prohibiting any Member pay adjustment. The maximum potential January 2016 pay adjustment of 1.7%, or $3,000, would have been limited to 1.0%, or $1,700, due to the GS base pay increase. Member pay for 2016 was frozen by P.L. 114-113. The maximum potential January 2017 pay adjustment of 1.6%, or $2,800, would have been limited to 1.0%, or $1,700, due to the GS base pay increase. Member pay for 2017 was frozen by P.L. 114-254. The maximum potential January 2018 pay adjustment of 1.8%, or $3,100, was automatically limited to 1.4%, or $2,400, before being frozen by P.L. 115-141. The maximum potential January 2019 pay adjustment of 2.3%, or $4,000, was automatically limited to 1.4%, or $2,400, before being frozen at the 2009 level by P.L. 115-244. The maximum potential January 2020 pay adjustment is 2.6%, or $4,500. If Members of Congress had received every adjustment prescribed by the ECI formula since 1992, and the 2 U.S.C. §4501 limitation regarding the percentage base pay increase for GS employees remained unchanged, the 2019 salary would be $210,900. When adjusted for inflation, Member salaries have decreased 15% since the last pay adjustment in 2009. Both the automatic annual adjustments and funding for Members' salaries are provided pursuant to other laws (2 U.S.C. §4501)—not the annual appropriations bills—and a provision prohibiting a scheduled adjustment could be included in any bill, or introduced as a separate bill."], "all_classes": null, "length": 5069}
{"pred": "\nThe report examines the Department of Defense's policies and practices related to preventing and responding to unwanted sexual behaviors, including sexual harassment and sexual assault. The report finds that while DOD has policies that include some of the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention's principles for preventing sexual violence, there are gaps in the policies. Specifically, the policies do not include key elements like anonymous reporting of sexual harassment and CDC's risk and protective factors. The report also finds that DOD has inconsistent data elements and definitions for sexual harassment incidents across the military services, which makes it difficult to report data department-wide. The report recommends that DOD fully include the CDC principles in its sexual harassment policy, include mechanisms for anonymous reporting, and standardize data elements and definitions for maintaining and reporting sexual harassment incidents. The report also recommends that DOD incorporate all key elements of a long-term, results-oriented strategic planning framework into its overarching prevention strategy. The report concludes that improving data collection and standardizing policies could help DOD better coordinate and integrate prevention efforts and ultimately reduce unwanted sexual behaviors.", "answers": ["Unwanted sexual behaviors in the military—including sexual harassment, sexual assault, and domestic violence involving sexual assault—undermine core values, unit cohesion, combat readiness, and public goodwill. Recent studies suggest that these behaviors are part of a “continuum of harm,” which DOD defines as a range of interconnected, inappropriate behaviors that are connected to the occurrence of sexual assault and that support an environment that tolerates these behaviors. Senate Report 114-255 included a provision for GAO to review efforts by DOD to prevent unwanted sexual behaviors in the military. GAO assessed the extent to which DOD has (1) policies on sexual harassment that include CDC principles and relevant legislative elements; (2) processes for maintaining and reporting consistent data on incidents of unwanted sexual behaviors; and (3) overarching efforts, including a prevention strategy, to address unwanted sexual behaviors across the continuum of harm. GAO reviewed DOD policies and pertinent databases, and interviewed agency officials. The Department of Defense's (DOD) policies on sexual harassment include some but not all of the Centers for Disease Control's (CDC) principles for preventing sexual violence and include most relevant legislative elements. GAO identified six principles from CDC's framework for preventing sexual violence, which CDC defines as including sexual harassment. GAO found that Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) and military service policies generally include CDC's principles regarding prevention strategies, but none address risk and protective factors, which identify conditions or behaviors that might heighten or lower the risk of sexual harassment victimization or perpetration, respectively. Additionally, a statutory provision in fiscal year 2013 mandated that DOD, among other things, develop a comprehensive sexual harassment policy that includes prevention training, mechanisms for anonymous reporting, and mechanisms for resolving incidents of sexual harassment. OSD and service policies are generally consistent with those required elements except for the inclusion of anonymous reporting. DOD is developing a new department-wide policy that will address sexual harassment, but it is too early to determine how the policy will address these issues. Without policies that include CDC's principles and mechanisms for anonymous reporting, DOD may miss opportunities to address and potentially reduce incidents of unwanted sexual behaviors. Finally, a statutory change in fiscal year 2017 redefined sexual harassment for certain purposes so it is no longer defined solely as a form of sex discrimination but is recognized also as an adverse behavior on the spectrum of behavior that can contribute to an increase in the incidence of sexual assault. While officials indicated a need to update policies, they were unclear on the full implications, if any, of this change. DOD has processes for maintaining and reporting consistent data on incidents of unwanted sexual behaviors including sexual assault and incidents of domestic violence that involve sexual assault, but does not have similar processes for maintaining and reporting data on incidents of sexual harassment. Specifically, DOD uses centralized databases to maintain and report data on incidents of sexual assault and domestic violence that involve sexual assault, but relies on military service-specific databases for information on incidents of sexual harassment. DOD has not established standard data elements and definitions to guide the services in maintaining and reporting data on sexual harassment. Inconsistencies in data elements and definitions generally mean that one service may be maintaining data that is more or less detailed than, or that differs from, the data maintained by other services. Such inconsistencies may create difficulties in reporting department-wide sexual harassment data, since the individual service data must be adapted to fit reporting requirements. DOD has several overarching efforts to address unwanted sexual behaviors across the continuum of harm, including developing an overarching prevention strategy. However, it is unclear whether the strategy under development will contain key elements for long-term and results-oriented strategic planning such as long-term goals, strategies to achieve goals, and metrics to gauge progress. Without incorporating these elements into its overarching prevention strategy, DOD may not be in a position to effectively coordinate and integrate prevention activities and reduce instances of unwanted sexual behaviors. GAO recommends that DOD fully include in its new policy on sexual harassment CDC's principles for sexual violence prevention and mechanisms for anonymous reporting, develop standard data elements and definitions for reporting sexual harassment incidents, and incorporate in its overarching prevention strategy elements key for a long-term, results-oriented strategy. DOD generally concurred with the recommendations."], "all_classes": null, "length": 10143}
{"pred": "\nThe report evaluates the Secret Service's implementation of IT oversight responsibilities, workforce planning and management practices, and performance and progress monitoring practices for the Information Integration and Technology Transformation (IITT) investment. The Secret Service CIO has implemented 14 of 15 selected component-level IT oversight responsibilities, including developing a detailed IT strategic plan and ensuring all component IT policies are in compliance with DHS directives. However, the Secret Service has not fully implemented all 15 workforce planning and management practices for its IT workforce, including strategic planning, recruitment and hiring, training and development, employee morale, and performance management. The Secret Service has also not fully implemented all 4 practices for monitoring and controlling the IITT investment, including measuring and monitoring agile projects on velocity, development progression, product quality, and post-deployment user satisfaction. The report recommends the Secret Service ensure the CIO establishes an IT acquisition review process to enable component and DHS review of IT contracts, update the enterprise governance policy to specify the CIO's role, and implement product quality and post-deployment user satisfaction metrics in the modular outcomes and target measures for agile projects.", "answers": ["Commonly known for protecting the President, the Secret Service also plays a leading role in investigating and preventing financial and electronic crimes. To accomplish its mission, the Secret Service relies heavily on the use of IT infrastructure and systems. In 2009, the component initiated the IITT investment—a portfolio of programs and projects that are intended to, among other things, improve systems availability and security in support of the component's business operations. GAO was asked to review the Secret Service's oversight of its IT portfolio and workforce. This report discusses the extent to which the (1) CIO implemented selected IT oversight responsibilities, (2) Secret Service implemented leading IT workforce planning and management practices, and (3) Secret Service and DHS implemented selected performance monitoring practices for IITT. GAO assessed agency documentation against 14 selected component CIO responsibilities established in DHS policy; 15 selected leading workforce planning and management practices within 5 topic areas; and two selected leading industry project monitoring practices that, among other things, were, in GAO's professional judgment, of most significance to managing IITT. The U.S. Secret Service (Secret Service) Chief Information Officer (CIO) fully implemented 11 of 14 selected information technology (IT) oversight responsibilities, and partially implemented the remaining 3. The CIO partially implemented the responsibilities to establish a process that ensures the Secret Service reviews IT contracts; ensure that the component's IT policies align with the Department of Homeland Security's (DHS) policies; and set incremental targets to monitor program progress. Additional efforts to fully implement these 3 responsibilities will further position the CIO to effectively manage the IT portfolio. Of the 15 selected practices within the 5 workforce planning and management areas, the Secret Service fully implemented 3 practices, partly implemented 8, and did not implement 4 (see table). Within the strategic planning area, the component partly implemented the practice to, among other things, develop IT competency needs. While the Secret Service had defined general core competencies for its workforce, the Office of the CIO (OCIO) did not identify all of the technical competencies needed to support its functions. As a result, the office was limited in its ability to address any IT competency gaps that may exist. Also, while work remains to improve morale across the component, the Secret Service substantially implemented the employee morale practices for its IT staff. Secret Service officials said the gaps in implementing the workforce practices were due to, among other things, their focus on reorganizing the IT workforce within OCIO. Until the Secret Service fully implements these practices for its IT workforce, it may be limited in its ability to ensure the timely and effective acquisition and maintenance of the component's IT infrastructure and services. Of the two selected IT project monitoring practices, DHS and the Secret Service fully implemented the first practice to monitor the performance of the Information Integration and Technology Transformation (IITT) investment. In addition, for the second practice—to monitor projects on incremental development metrics—the Secret Service fully implemented the practice on one of IITT's projects and partially implemented it on another. In particular, OCIO did not fully measure post-deployment user satisfaction with the system on one project. OCIO plans to conduct a user satisfaction survey of the system by September 2018, which should inform the office on whether the system is meeting users' needs. GAO is making 13 recommendations, including that the Secret Service establish a process that ensures the CIO reviews all IT contracts, as appropriate; and identify the skills needed for its IT workforce. DHS concurred with all recommendations and provided estimated dates for implementing each of them."], "all_classes": null, "length": 14900}
{"pred": "\nThe report examines patterns in disciplinary actions among public schools, challenges faced by schools in addressing student behavior, and actions taken by the Department of Education and Department of Justice to identify and address discipline disparities and discrimination. The report analyzes data from the Civil Rights Data Collection (CRDC) for school year 2013-14. \n\nFindings:\n\n- Disciplinary actions were disproportionately applied to Black students, boys, and students with disabilities compared to their representation in the overall student population. \n- Schools with higher poverty rates had higher rates of discipline for Black students, boys, and students with disabilities.\n- Alternative schools had higher rates of discipline for Black students, boys, and students with disabilities.\n- Schools with lower poverty rates had higher rates of discipline for White students.\n- Schools with special education programs had higher rates of discipline for Black students, boys, and students with disabilities.\n- Schools with charter programs had higher rates of discipline for Black students, boys, and students with disabilities.\n\nThe report also found that:\n\n- Schools face challenges in addressing student behavior due to poverty, mental health issues, and family dysfunction.\n- Schools are implementing alternative discipline models to reduce exclusionary discipline.\n- The Department of Education and Department of Justice have taken actions to identify and address discipline disparities and discrimination.\n\nRecommendations:\n\n- Schools should implement alternative discipline models to reduce exclusionary discipline.\n- Schools should address disparities in discipline by analyzing data and implementing targeted interventions.\n- The Department of Education and Department of Justice should continue to monitor and enforce federal civil rights laws related to school discipline.", "answers": ["Research has shown that students who experience discipline that removes them from the classroom are more likely to repeat a grade, drop out of school, and become involved in the juvenile justice system. Studies have shown this can result in decreased earning potential and added costs to society, such as incarceration and lost tax revenue. Education and Justice are responsible for enforcing federal civil rights laws that prohibit discrimination in the administration of discipline in public schools. GAO was asked to review the use of discipline in schools. To provide insight into these issues, this report examines (1) patterns in disciplinary actions among public schools, (2) challenges selected school districts reported with student behavior and how they are approaching school discipline, and (3) actions Education and Justice have taken to identify and address disparities or discrimination in school discipline. GAO analyzed discipline data from nearly all public schools for school year 2013-14 from Education's Civil Rights Data Collection; interviewed federal and state officials, as well as officials from a total of 5 districts and 19 schools in California, Georgia, Massachusetts, North Dakota, and Texas. We selected these districts based on disparities in suspensions for Black students, boys, or students with disabilities, and diversity in size and location. We also reviewed federal laws and a non-generalizable sample of seven recently resolved federal school discipline investigations (selected in part based on the type of alleged discrimination). We incorporated technical comments from the agencies as appropriate. Black students, boys, and students with disabilities were disproportionately disciplined (e.g., suspensions and expulsions) in K-12 public schools, according to GAO's analysis of Department of Education (Education) national civil rights data for school year 2013-14, the most recent available. These disparities were widespread and persisted regardless of the type of disciplinary action, level of school poverty, or type of public school attended. For example, Black students accounted for 15.5 percent of all public school students, but represented about 39 percent of students suspended from school—an overrepresentation of about 23 percentage points (see figure). Officials GAO interviewed in all five school districts in the five states GAO visited reported various challenges with addressing student behavior, and said they were considering new approaches to school discipline. They described a range of issues, some complex—such as the effects of poverty and mental health issues. For example, officials in four school districts described a growing trend of behavioral challenges related to mental health and trauma. While there is no one-size-fits-all solution for the issues that influence student behavior, officials from all five school districts GAO visited were implementing alternatives to disciplinary actions that remove children from the classroom, such as initiatives that promote positive behavioral expectations for students. Education and the Department of Justice (Justice) documented several actions taken to identify and address school discipline issues. For example, both agencies investigated cases alleging discrimination. Further, to help identify persistent disparities among the nation's schools, Education collects comprehensive data on school discipline every other year through its Civil Rights Data Collection effort."], "all_classes": null, "length": 11834}
{"pred": "\nThe federal government owns over 64 million acres of land, mostly in the western states. Four federal agencies - the National Park Service, Fish and Wildlife Service, Bureau of Land Management, and U.S. Forest Service - administer 95% of this land. However, these agencies have varying levels of authority to acquire and dispose of land. The National Park Service has limited authority to acquire new park units or dispose of park lands, while the Bureau of Land Management has broad authority for both acquisitions and disposals. The other two agencies have more limited authorities. The agencies have different standing authorities for accepting land gifts and using eminent domain. The agencies also have different authorities for disposing of land, with the Bureau of Land Management having the broadest disposal authority. The report discusses the specific land acquisition and disposal authorities for each agency and how they have been used in the past. The report also notes that the extent of federal land ownership remains controversial and that Congress has considered various measures to establish, modify, or eliminate the use of these authorities.", "answers": ["The federal government owns roughly 640 million acres, heavily concentrated in 12 western states. Four agencies—the National Park Service (NPS), Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS), and Bureau of Land Management (BLM) in the Department of the Interior, and the U.S. Forest Service (FS) in the Department of Agriculture—administer about 95% of those lands. The extent to which each of these four federal agencies have authority to acquire and dispose of land varies considerably. The BLM has relatively broad authority for both acquisitions and disposals under the Federal Land Policy and Management Act of 1976 (FLPMA). The agency also has other authorities for disposing of land, including two laws that allow the agency to retain the proceeds for subsequent land acquisition, among other purposes, and a law that allows transfers to governmental units and other entities for public purposes. By contrast, the NPS has no general authority to acquire land to create new park units or to dispose of park lands. The FS authority to acquire lands is mostly limited to lands within or contiguous to the boundaries of a national forest. The agency has various authorities to dispose of land, but they are relatively constrained and infrequently used. The FWS has various authorities to acquire lands but no general authority to dispose of its lands. The agency frequently uses acquisition authority under the Migratory Bird Conservation Act of 1929 because of the availability of funding through the Migratory Bird Conservation Fund. The nature of the acquisition and disposal authorities of the four federal agencies also varies. In general, the acquisition authorities are designed to allow the four agencies to bring into federal ownership lands that many contend could benefit from federal management. Disposal authorities generally are designed to allow agencies to convey land that is no longer needed for a federal purpose or that might be chiefly valuable for another purpose. Some of the authorities specify particular circumstances where they can be used, such as the conveyance of FS land for educational purposes and the disposal of BLM land for recreation and public purposes. Congress often faces questions on the adequacy of existing acquisition and disposal authorities; the nature, extent, and location of their use; and the extent of federal land ownership overall. The current acquisition and disposal authorities form the backdrop for consideration of measures to establish, modify, or eliminate authorities, or to provide for the acquisition or disposal of particular lands. In some cases, Congress enacts bills to provide authority to acquire or dispose of particular parcels where no standing authority exists and, in other cases, to direct or facilitate land transactions. Congress also addresses acquisition and disposal policy in the context of debates on the role and goals of the federal government in owning and managing land generally, and it has considered broader measures to dispose of lands or to promote acquisition. Other issues for Congress pertain to the sources and levels of funds for land acquisition. The Land and Water Conservation Fund (LWCF) is the primary source of funding for land acquisition. Congress has considered diverse measures related to the LWCF, such as legislation to make LWCF funding permanent and bills to direct LWCF monies to additional, nonacquisition purposes. Additionally, the FWS has the Migratory Bird Conservation Fund, an account with mandatory spending authority supported by revenue from three sources. The BLM also has mandatory spending authorities that allow the proceeds from land sales to be used for land acquisition, among other purposes."], "all_classes": null, "length": 4882}
{"pred": "\nThe report discusses the complicated rules and procedures that govern the legislative process in the House of Representatives. The House has a manual of rules that is over 1,000 pages long and is supplemented by 30 volumes of precedents. However, the rules are largely predictable and follow similar patterns. The House generally allows a majority to work its will on the floor, but does not enable the minority to filibuster or use other parliamentary devices to prevent the majority from prevailing without undue delay. The House rules limit debate and amendments to ensure that the majority can act promptly. Most legislation is considered in Committee of the Whole, where debate and amendments are more flexible. Special rules can be reported by the Rules Committee to set ground rules for consideration of a particular bill. The House has procedures for dealing with differences between the House and Senate versions of a bill, including conference committees. The House also has rules for voting and quorums. The report concludes by summarizing the key points of the House's procedures and highlighting the role of the Parliamentarian in providing expert assistance.", "answers": ["The daily order of business on the floor of the House of Representatives is governed by standing rules that make certain matters and actions privileged for consideration. On a day-to-day basis, however, the House can also decide to grant individual bills privileged access to the floor, using one of several parliamentary mechanisms. The standing rules of the House include several different parliamentary mechanisms that the body may use to act on bills and resolutions. Which of these will be employed in a given instance usually depends on the extent to which Members want to debate and amend the legislation. In general, all of the procedures of the House permit a majority of Members to work their will without excessive delay. The House considers most legislation by motions to suspend the rules, with limited debate and no floor amendments, with the support of at least two-thirds of the Members voting. Occasionally, the House will choose to consider a measure on the floor by the unanimous consent of Members. The Rules Committee is instrumental in recommending procedures for considering major bills and may propose restrictions on the floor amendments that Members can offer or bar them altogether. Many major bills are first considered in Committee of the Whole before being passed by a simple majority vote of the House. The Committee of the Whole is governed by more flexible procedures than the basic rules of the House, under which a majority can vote to pass a bill after only one hour of debate and with no floor amendments. Although a quorum is supposed to be present on the floor when the House is conducting business, the House assumes a quorum is present unless a quorum call or electronically recorded vote demonstrates that it is not. However, the standing rules preclude quorum calls at most times other than when the House is voting. Questions are first decided by voice vote, although any Member may then demand a division vote. Before the final result of a voice or division vote is announced, Members can secure an electronically recorded vote instead if enough Members desire it or if a quorum is not present in the House. The constitutional requirements for making law mean that each chamber must pass the same measure with the identical text before transmitting it to the President for his consideration. When the second chamber of Congress amends a measure sent to it by the first chamber, the two chambers must resolve legislative differences to meet this requirement. This can be accomplished by shuttling the bill back and forth between the House and Senate, with each chamber proposing amendments to the position of the other, or by establishing a conference committee to try to negotiate a compromise version of the legislation."], "all_classes": null, "length": 6694}
{"pred": "\nThis report discusses the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) overtime provisions for executive, administrative, and professional (EAP) employees. The FLSA defines and delimits these exemptions through regulations authorized by Congress. The current salary threshold for the EAP exemption is $45 per week. The proposed 2019 rule would increase the salary threshold to $679 per week, which would expand overtime coverage to more EAP employees. The 2019 rule would also formally rescind the 2016 final rule, which was invalidated by a court decision. The proposed rule would provide updates to the salary thresholds every four years based on survey data. The report discusses how the FLSA applies to different types of employers, including nonprofits, institutions of higher education, and state and local governments. It also covers the application of the FLSA to U.S. territories. The report notes that the proposed rule would likely affect around 4.9 million workers who are currently exempt under the EAP exemptions.", "answers": ["The Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA), enacted in 1938, is the main federal law that establishes general wage and hour standards for most, but not all, private and public sector employees. Among other protections, the FLSA establishes that covered nonexempt employees must be compensated at one-and-a-half times their regular rate of pay for each hour worked over 40 hours in a workweek. The FLSA also establishes certain exemptions from its general labor market standards. One of the major exemptions to the overtime provisions in the FLSA is for bona fide \"executive, administrative, and professional\" employees (the \"EAP\" or \"white collar\" exemptions). The FLSA grants authority to the Secretary of Labor to define and delimit the EAP exemption \"from time to time.\" To qualify for this exemption from the FLSA's overtime pay requirement, an employee must be salaried (the \"salary basis\" test); perform specified executive, administrative, or professional duties (the \"duties\" test); and earn above an established salary level threshold (the \"salary level\" test). In March 2019, the Secretary of Labor published a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (NPRM) to make changes to the EAP exemptions. The 2019 proposed rule would become effective around January 2020. The major changes in the 2019 proposed rule include increasing the standard salary level threshold from the previous level of $455 per week to $679 per week and committing the Department of Labor (DOL) to updating the EAP exemptions every four years through the rulemaking process. The 2019 proposed rule does not change the duties and responsibilities that employees must perform to be exempt. Thus, the 2019 proposed rule would affect EAP employees at salary levels between $455 and $679 per week in 2020. DOL estimates that about 4.9 million workers would be affected in the first year, including about 1.3 million EAP employees who would become newly entitled to overtime pay and an additional 3.6 million workers who would have overtime protection clarified and thereby strengthened. This report answers frequently asked questions about the overtime provisions of the FLSA, the EAP exemptions, and the 2019 proposed rule that would define and delimit the EAP exemptions."], "all_classes": null, "length": 3568}
{"pred": "\nThe report summarizes the FY2019 budget request for the Department of State and related agencies. The report details the Administration's request for funding for various accounts within the Department of State and Related Agencies appropriation, including the Diplomatic Programs account, the Embassy Security, Construction, and Maintenance account, Contributions to International Organizations, and Contributions for International Peacekeeping Activities. The report also discusses proposed changes to certain accounts, such as the elimination of the Emergency Refugee and Migration Assistance account and the consolidation of the Overseas Private Investment Corporation and Development Credit Authority into a new Development Finance Institution. The report also provides information on foreign aid funding by type and top country recipients. The report notes that Congress did not adopt many of the proposed changes to foreign aid accounts, including the elimination of the Emergency Refugee and Migration Assistance account and the consolidation of certain accounts. The report concludes by summarizing the funding levels for various accounts and programs within the Department of State and Related Agencies appropriation as provided in the enacted FY2019 legislation, P.L. 16-6.", "answers": ["The Trump Administration submitted to Congress its FY2019 budget request on February 12, 2018. The proposal included $41.86 billion for the Department of State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs (SFOPS). Of that amount, $13.26 billion was for State Department operations, international broadcasting, and related agencies, and $28.60 billion for foreign operations. With the enactment of the Bipartisan Budget Act of 2018 (BBA; P.L. 115-123, February 9, 2018), which raised discretionary spending limits set by the Budget Control Act of 2011 (BCA; P.L. 112-25), the Administration's FY2019 foreign affairs funding request was entirely within enduring (base) funds; no Overseas Contingency Operations (OCO) funding was included the SFOPS request for the first time since FY2012. The FY2019 request would have represented a 23.3% decrease in SFOPS funding compared with FY2018 actual funding levels. The proposed State and related agency funding would have been 18.7% below FY2018 funding and the foreign operations funding would have been reduced by 25.2%. In the State and related programs budget, cuts were proposed for several accounts, including the diplomatic security accounts, contributions to international organizations, and contributions for international peacekeeping activities. In the foreign operations budget, cuts would have been applied across all accounts, with disproportionately large cuts proposed for humanitarian assistance, multilateral assistance, and funding for bilateral development programs focused on agriculture, education, and democracy promotion. Both the House and Senate appropriations committees approved FY2019 SFOPS bills that included funding at higher levels than the Administration requested and closer to FY2018 funding. H.R. 6385, approved by the House appropriations committee on June 20, 2018, would have funded SFOPS accounts at $54.177 billion. S. 3108, approved by the Senate appropriations committee on June 21, 2018, would have provided $54.602 billion for SFOPS accounts. FY2019 began with seven appropriations bills, including SFOPS, unfinished. Congress and the President approved continuing resolutions to fund the affected federal agencies through December 21, 2018 at the FY2018 level (P.L. 115-245, Division C and P.L. 115-298). After December 21, a partial shutdown of the government, including SFOPS funded agencies, occurred. On January 25, 2019, an agreement was reached to continue funding for SFOPS and other appropriations that had lapsed through February 15, at the FY2018 level (P.L. 116-5). On February 14, Congress passed, and the President later signed into law, a full year omnibus appropriation that included SFOPS funding (P.L. 116-6, Division F). P.L. 116-6 included a total of $54.377 billion for SFOPS accounts in FY2019, a 0.3% decrease from the FY2018 funding level and about 30% more than the Administration's request. Of that enacted total, $8.0 billion, or 14.7%, was designated as OCO. This report provides an account-by-account comparison of the FY2019 SFOPS request, House and Senate SFOPS legislation and the final FY2019 SFOPS appropriation to FY2018 funding in Appendix A. The International Affairs (function 150) budget in Appendix B provides a similar comparison. This report will not be further updated unless there is further congressional activity on FY2019 appropriations."], "all_classes": null, "length": 7853}
{"pred": "\nThe report examines vacancies in the Department of State's Foreign Service staffing at overseas posts. The Department of State has persistent vacancies in both generalist and specialist positions at overseas posts, with 13% of overseas Foreign Service positions vacant as of March 2018. Specialist positions remain vacant at a higher rate, particularly security officers, office management specialists, and information management. Vacancies in specialist positions at overseas posts present additional challenges because specialized skills and competencies are often required to perform the work of these positions. The Department lacks an integrated action plan to guide its efforts to address persistent Foreign Service vacancies, which could help State address its staffing gaps and improve its ability to achieve U.S. foreign policy goals. The Secretary of State should develop an integrated action plan that defines the root causes of persistent Foreign Service vacancies at overseas posts and provides corrective measures to reduce such vacancies.", "answers": ["State staffs Foreign Service employees to more than 270 embassies and consulates worldwide to advance U.S. foreign policy and economic interests. In 2009 and 2012, GAO identified ongoing Foreign Service staffing gaps. GAO was asked to review State's Foreign Service staffing. This report examines (1) vacancies in State's Foreign Service staffing at overseas posts, (2) reported effects of Foreign Service vacancies on diplomatic readiness, and (3) State's efforts to address Foreign Service vacancies. To address these objectives, GAO analyzed State's Global Employment Management System data as of March 2018. The system includes information on Foreign Service and Civil Service positions, including the total number of authorized Foreign Service positions and whether each position is filled or vacant. GAO also reviewed its relevant prior reports and State workforce planning documents. In addition, GAO interviewed State staff at 10 overseas posts, selected on the basis of large numbers of Foreign Service vacancies and diversity in the types of Foreign Service positions that were vacant at these posts, among other factors. The Department of State's (State) data show persistent Foreign Service vacancies at overseas posts since 2008. According to the data, 13 percent of overseas Foreign Service positions were vacant as of March 2018. This percentage is similar to the percentages GAO reported for 2008 and 2012, when 14 percent of these positions were vacant. In addition, State's data show persistent vacancies at overseas posts in generalist positions that help formulate and implement U.S. foreign policy and in specialist positions that support and maintain the functioning of overseas posts. State's data also show persistent Foreign Service vacancies at overseas posts with State's highest foreign policy priorities and in regions with security risks that could threaten U.S. foreign policy interests. According to staff at overseas posts, Foreign Service vacancies adversely affect State's ability to carry out U.S. foreign policy. Staff at overseas posts told us that vacancies increase workloads, contributing to low morale and higher stress for Foreign Service staff and that vacancies in Political and Economic positions—20 percent and 16 percent, respectively—limit the reporting on political and economic issues that posts are able to provide to State headquarters. Notably, officials also stated that vacancies in specialist positions may heighten security risks at overseas posts and disrupt post operations. For instance, some overseas post staff said that vacancies in Information Management positions had increased the vulnerability of posts' computer networks to potential cybersecurity attacks and other malicious threats. State described various efforts—implemented by multiple offices in the department —to help address overseas Foreign Service vacancies, but these efforts are not guided by an integrated action plan to reduce persistent vacancies. An example of State's efforts is the “Hard-to-Fill” program, which allows Civil Service staff an opportunity to fill a Foreign Service vacancy on a single overseas tour. According to GAO's 2017 High-Risk Series report, an agency should design and implement an action plan—integrated across its relevant offices—that defines the root causes of all skills gaps and suggests corrective measures. However, State has not developed such an action plan for reducing persistent overseas Foreign Service vacancies. Without developing an integrated action plan, overseas Foreign Service vacancies may persist. As a result, State's ability to achieve U.S. foreign policy goals and help ensure secure and efficient operations could be adversely impacted. GAO recommends that State develop an integrated action plan that defines the root causes of persistent Foreign Service vacancies at overseas posts and suggests corrective measures to reduce such vacancies. State concurred with our recommendation and noted that it will take steps to develop an integrated action plan."], "all_classes": null, "length": 5041}
{"pred": "\nThe report discusses the Strategic Petroleum Reserve (SPR) and its role in protecting the US economy from petroleum supply disruptions. The SPR currently holds 695 million barrels of crude oil, mostly in storage caverns along the Gulf Coast. The SPR is owned by the federal government and maintained by Fluor Federal Petroleum Operations LLC. The SPR is used to meet the US's International Energy Program Agreement obligation to hold 90 days of net imports of crude oil and petroleum products. The US currently meets its 90-day reserve obligation through the SPR, but as it becomes a net exporter, it will no longer have this obligation. The SPR has been used 10 times in response to domestic supply disruptions and 3 times in response to international supply disruptions. The report identifies several areas where the SPR could be improved:\n\n1. The SPR should be periodically reviewed to take into account changes in market conditions and private sector response. The current review was conducted over a decade ago.\n\n2. The SPR should consider regional petroleum product reserves to help mitigate supply disruptions in vulnerable regions. The Quadrennial Energy Review of 2015 recommended this.\n\n3. The SPR should consider disposition options for potentially excess assets, including leasing storage capacity to private industry.\n\n4. The SPR should have a long-term target for its size and configuration to better inform modernization plans and reduce waste.\n\nIn summary, the report identifies several areas where the SPR could be improved to better meet its mission of protecting the US economy from petroleum supply disruptions. Periodic reviews, consideration of regional petroleum product reserves, and disposition options for excess assets could help modernize the SPR and make it more efficient.", "answers": ["More than 4 decades ago, Congress authorized the creation of the SPR to reduce the impact of disruptions in supplies of petroleum products. DOE manages the SPR. As a member of the International Energy Agency, the United States is obligated to maintain reserves equivalent to at least 90 days of the previous year's net imports (imports minus exports). The SPR's storage and related infrastructure is aging, and DOE has plans to modernize these facilities. Since 2015, Congress has mandated crude oil sales. As of March 2018, the SPR held about 665 million barrels of crude oil. GAO was asked to examine the SPR's ability to meet U.S. energy security needs. This report examines, among other things, the extent to which (1) DOE has identified the optimal size of the SPR, and (2) DOE's plans for modernizing the SPR take into account the effects of congressionally mandated crude oil sales. GAO reviewed DOE's plans and studies, and interviewed agency officials and nine experts selected based on prior work, referrals, and a literature review. The Department of Energy (DOE) has not identified the optimal size of the Strategic Petroleum Reserve (SPR). In 2016, DOE completed a long-term strategic review of the SPR after its last comprehensive examination conducted in 2005. The 2016 review examined the benefits of several SPR sizes, but it did not identify an optimal size and its review was limited in several ways. In particular, DOE did not fully consider recent and expected future changes in market conditions, such as the implications of falling net imports, or the role that increased levels of private reserves (reserves held by private companies for their own purposes) may play in responding to supply disruptions. These changes have contributed to SPR and private reserves reaching historically high levels on a net imports basis (see figure). These changes are expected to continue to evolve—according to government projections, the United States will become a net exporter in the late 2020s before again becoming a net importer between 2040 and 2050. GAO has found that agencies should reexamine their programs if conditions change. Without addressing the limitations of its 2016 review and periodically performing reexaminations in the future, DOE cannot be assured that the SPR will be sized appropriately into the future. DOE has taken steps to take into account congressionally mandated sales of SPR crude oil in its $1.4 billion modernization plans for SPR's infrastructure and facilities. The SPR is projected to hold 405 million barrels of oil by the end of fiscal year 2027. However, DOE's current plans are based on information analyzed prior to recently mandated sales. According to DOE officials, the agency began a study in March 2018 to assess the effects of these sales on the SPR's modernization. However, this study is not examining all options for handling any excess SPR assets that may be created by currently mandated sales or any additional sales that may be mandated in the future, inconsistent with an agency order on real property asset management that calls for identifying excess assets. For example, DOE does not plan to examine the potential to lease unused SPR storage capacity to the private sector because DOE is not currently authorized to enter into such leases, according to agency officials. If authorized, leasing capacity could generate revenues that could help offset the costs of modernization. By not examining a full range of options, DOE risks missing beneficial ways to modernize the SPR while saving taxpayer resources. GAO is making four recommendations, including that DOE (1) supplement the 2016 review by conducting an additional analysis, (2) ensure that the agency periodically reexamines the size of the SPR, and (3) consider a full range of options for handling potentially excess assets as it conducts its study, among other things. DOE agreed with two, partially agreed with one, and disagreed with another recommendation on refined product reserve studies. GAO maintains that the recommendations are valid."], "all_classes": null, "length": 7913}
{"pred": "\nThe report discusses the challenges faced by the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) in implementing its Medical Supply Program-Next Generation (MSPV-NG) program. The program aims to standardize medical supplies across VA medical centers to improve buying power, simplify supply chain management, and provide clinical consistency. However, the program has faced delays and challenges in achieving its goals due to a lack of strategy, leadership instability, and insufficient staffing. The initial requirements development process was limited to prior supply purchases and did not involve clinicians, resulting in a formulary that did not meet medical center needs. Medical centers have struggled to implement the formulary due to incomplete guidance and lack of standardized supplies. VA has made some changes to improve the program, including incorporating clinical input in requirements development and prioritizing supply categories for standardization. However, the program still faces challenges in achieving its goals of cost avoidance and utilization of the MSPV-NG formulary. VA plans to replace the current MSPV-NG contract and formulary process with a new approach, but it will likely take time to fully address existing shortcomings. The report recommends that VA develop a clear strategy and prioritize clinical input in requirements development to improve the program.", "answers": ["VA spends hundreds of millions of dollars annually on medical supplies to meet the health care needs of about 7 million veterans. To provide a more efficient, cost-effective way for its medical centers to order supplies, the VA established the MSPV-NG program. The program's goals include involving clinicians in requirements development, leveraging buying power when making competitive awards, and consolidating supplies used across medical centers. VA began developing requirements in early 2015 and launched the program in December 2016. This testimony summarizes key information contained in GAO's November 2017 report, GAO-18-34 . Specifically, it addresses the extent to which VA's implementation of MSPV-NG has been effective in meeting program goals. GAO analyzed VA's requirements development and contracting processes, and identified key supply chain practices cited by four leading hospital networks. GAO also met with contracting and clinical officials at six medical centers, selected based on high dollar contract obligations in fiscal years 2014-2016 and geographic representation. The Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) established the Medical Surgical Prime Vendor-Next Generation (MSPV-NG) program to provide an efficient, cost-effective way for its facilities to order supplies, but its initial implementation did not have an overarching strategy, stable leadership, and workforce capacity that could have facilitated medical center buy-in for the change. VA also developed requirements for a broad range of MSPV-NG items with limited clinical input. Further, starting in June 2015, VA planned to award competitive contracts, but instead, 79 percent of the items available for purchase under MSPV-NG were added through non-competitive agreements. (See figure). As a result, the program did not meet the needs of medical centers, and usage remained below VA's 40 percent target. (See figure.) VA has taken steps to address some deficiencies and is developing a new approach to the program. However, VA will likely continue to face challenges in meeting its goals until it fully addresses these existing shortcomings. GAO made 10 recommendations in its November 2017 report, including that VA develop an overarching strategy, expand clinician input in requirements development, and establish a plan for awarding future competitive contracts. VA agreed with GAO's recommendations."], "all_classes": null, "length": 2869}
{"pred": "\nThe report discusses the Navy's policies and practices for naming its ships. The Navy has traditionally named ships after people, places, battles, and events. However, there are no fixed policies for naming different classes of ships. The Navy has named ships years before they are procured, but this can deprive future Secretaries of the opportunity to choose a name. Congress has expressed its sense regarding potential ship names, and the Navy considers this input when making naming decisions. The Navy names ships to honor deserving Americans and to inspire the crew. The report concludes that current ship naming policies and practices are consistent with Navy ship naming customs and traditions, but fixed policies would not improve them. The Naval History and Heritage Command will develop and publish a list of current type naming rules to help Americans better understand the naming process.", "answers": ["Names for Navy ships traditionally have been chosen and announced by the Secretary of the Navy, under the direction of the President and in accordance with rules prescribed by Congress. Rules for giving certain types of names to certain types of Navy ships have evolved over time. There have been exceptions to the Navy's ship-naming rules, particularly for the purpose of naming a ship for a person when the rule for that type of ship would have called for it to be named for something else. Some observers have perceived a breakdown in, or corruption of, the rules for naming Navy ships. On July 13, 2012, the Navy submitted to Congress a 73-page report on the Navy's policies and practices for naming ships. For ship types now being procured for the Navy, or recently procured for the Navy, naming rules can be summarized as follows: The first Ohio replacement ballistic missile submarine (SSBN-826) has been named Columbia in honor of the District of Columbia, but the Navy has not stated what the naming rule for these ships will be. Virginia (SSN-774) class attack submarines are being named for states. Aircraft carriers are generally named for past U.S. Presidents. Of the past 14, 10 were named for past U.S. Presidents, and 2 for Members of Congress. Destroyers are being named for deceased members of the Navy, Marine Corps, and Coast Guard, including Secretaries of the Navy. The Navy has not yet announced a naming rule for its planned new class of FFG(X) frigates, the first of which the Navy wants to procure in FY2021. Previous classes of U.S. Navy frigates, like Navy destroyers, were generally named for naval leaders and heroes. Littoral Combat Ships (LCSs) are being named for regionally important U.S. cities and communities. Amphibious assault ships are being named for important battles in which U.S. Marines played a prominent part, and for famous earlier U.S. Navy ships that were not named for battles. San Antonio (LPD-17) class amphibious ships are being named for major U.S. cities and communities, and cities and communities attacked on September 11, 2001. John Lewis (TAO-205) class oilers are being named for people who fought for civil rights and human rights. Expeditionary Fast Transports (EPFs) are being named for small U.S. cities. Expeditionary Transport Docks (ESDs) and Expeditionary Sea Bases (ESBs) are being named for famous names or places of historical significance to U.S. Marines. Navajo (TATS-6) class towing, salvage, and rescue ships are being named for prominent Native Americans or Native American tribes. Since 1974, at least 21 U.S. military ships have been named for persons who were living at the time the name was announced. The most recent instance occurred on May 6, 2019, when the Navy announced that it was naming the destroyer DDG-51 for former Senator Sam Nunn. Members of the public are sometimes interested in having Navy ships named for their own states or cities, for older U.S. Navy ships (particularly those on which they or their relatives served), for battles in which they or their relatives participated, or for people they admire. Congress has long maintained an interest in how Navy ships are named, and has influenced the naming of certain Navy ships. The Navy suggests that congressional offices wishing to express support for proposals to name a Navy ship for a specific person, place, or thing contact the office of the Secretary of the Navy to make their support known. Congress may also pass legislation relating to ship names. Measures passed by Congress in recent years regarding Navy ship names have all been sense-of-the-Congress provisions."], "all_classes": null, "length": 9736}
{"pred": "\nThe report examines carbon tax design issues and potential impacts of a carbon tax or emissions fee on GHG emissions. The report focuses on the policy considerations and potential impacts of using a carbon tax or emissions fee to control GHG emissions. The key human-related GHG is CO2, which is generated primarily through the combustion of fossil fuels. A carbon tax could apply either directly to GHG emissions or to the materials - based on their carbon contents - that ultimately generate the emissions. A carbon price on emissions or their emissions inputs - mainly fossil fuels - would increase the relative price of the more carbon-intensive energy sources, particularly coal. This result could spur innovation in less carbon-intensive technologies and stimulate other behavior that may decrease emissions. The energy price increases could also have both economy-wide impacts and negative effects on specific industries and particular demographic groups. A carbon tax approach has received some attention and debate in recent years. In the 11th Congress, Members introduced nine carbon tax or fee proposals. Outside of Congress, the Climate Leadership Council - a bipartisan group of former policymakers and industry leaders - published a conceptual carbon tax approach in 2017 that generated some interest. Some of the industry leaders on the council represent major energy companies, including Shell, BP, and ExxonMobil. On the other hand, many Members have expressed their opposition to a carbon tax. Starting in the 12th Congress and going through the 115th Congress, Members have introduced resolutions in both the House and Senate expressing the view that a carbon tax would be detrimental to the United States. The report discusses carbon tax design issues, including the point of taxation, the rate of taxation, and potential border carbon adjustments. The report also discusses additional considerations associated with a carbon tax program, including estimates of GHG emissions, federal revenue, and fossil fuel prices and changes in energy use. The report concludes that policymakers would face challenging decisions regarding the distribution of the new carbon tax revenues. Depending on the level of the tax, some economic analyses indicate that the distribution of tax revenue could yield greater economic impacts than the direct impacts of the tax. Policymakers would encounter trade", "answers": ["The U.S. Fourth National Climate Assessment, released in 2018, concluded that \"the impacts of global climate change are already being felt in the United States and are projected to intensify in the future—but the severity of future impacts will depend largely on actions taken to reduce greenhouse gas [GHG] emissions and to adapt to the changes that will occur.\" Members of Congress and stakeholders articulate a wide range of perspectives over what to do, if anything, about GHG emissions, future climate change, and related impacts. If Congress were to consider establishing a program to reduce GHG emissions, one option would be to attach a price to GHG emissions with a carbon tax or GHG emissions fee. In the 115th Congress, Members introduced nine bills to establish a carbon tax or emissions fee program. However, many Members have expressed their opposition to such an approach. In particular, in the 115th Congress, the House passed a resolution \"expressing the sense of Congress that a carbon tax would be detrimental to the United States economy.\" Multiple economic studies have estimated the emission reductions that particular carbon tax would achieve. For example, a 2018 study analyzed various impacts of four carbon tax rate scenarios: a $25/metric ton of CO2 and $50/metric ton of CO2 carbon tax, increasing annually by 1% and 5%. The study concluded that each of the scenarios would likely achieve the U.S. GHG emission reduction target pledged under the international Paris Agreement (at least in terms of CO2 emissions). A carbon tax system would generate a new revenue stream, the magnitude of which would depend on the scope and rate of the tax, among other factors. In 2018, the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) estimated that a $25/metric ton carbon tax would yield approximately $100 billion in its first year. CBO projected that federal revenue would total $3.5 trillion in FY2019. Policymakers would face challenging decisions regarding the distribution of the new carbon tax revenues. Congress could apply revenues to support a range of policy objectives but would encounter trade-offs among the objectives. The central trade-offs involve minimizing economy-wide costs, lessening the costs borne by specific groups—particularly low-income households and displaced workers in certain industries (e.g., coal mining)—and supporting other policy objectives. A primary argument against a carbon tax regards it potential economy-wide impacts, often measured as impacts to the U.S. gross domestic product (GDP). Some may argue that projected impacts should be compared with the climate benefits achieved from the program as well as the estimated costs of taking no action. The potential impacts would depend on a number of factors, including the program's magnitude and design and, most importantly, the use of carbon tax revenues. In general, economic literature finds that some of the revenue applications would reduce the economy-wide costs from a carbon tax but may not eliminate them entirely. In addition, some studies cite particular economic modeling scenarios in which certain carbon tax revenue applications produce a net increase in GDP compared to a baseline scenario. These scenarios involve using carbon tax revenues to offset reductions in other tax rates (e.g., corporate income or payroll taxes). Although economic models generally indicate that these particular revenue applications would yield the greatest benefit to the economy overall, the models also find that lower-income households would likely face a disproportionate impact under such an approach. As lower-income households spend a greater proportion of their income on energy needs (electricity, gasoline), these households are expected to experience disproportionate impacts from a carbon tax if revenues were not recycled back to them in some fashion (e.g., lump-sum distribution). A price on GHG emissions could create a competitive disadvantage for some industries, particularly \"emission-intensive, trade-exposed industries.\" Policymakers have several options to address this concern, including establishing a \"border carbon adjustment\" program, which would levy a fee on imports from countries without comparable GHG reduction programs. Alternatively, policymakers could allocate (indefinitely or for a period of time) some of the carbon tax revenues to selected industry sectors or businesses. Relatedly, a carbon tax system is projected to disproportionately impact fossil fuel industries, particularly coal, and the communities that rely on their employment. To alleviate these impacts, policymakers may consider using some of the revenue to provide transition assistance to employees or affected communities."], "all_classes": null, "length": 8507}
{"pred": "\nThe report discusses the financial challenges facing the Postal Retiree Health Benefits Fund (RHB Fund), which covers health insurance for postal retirees. The fund is facing a growing financial gap due to USPS's inadequate payments. The fund could be depleted in as little as 12 years, and USPS may be unable to cover its share of retiree health insurance premiums if it continues to miss payments. The RHB Fund is on an unsustainable path and is projected to be depleted in fiscal year 2030 based on current trends. USPS has missed payments totaling $38 billion since 2010 and has not made payments of $6.9 billion in fiscal year 2017 and 2018. OPM has started drawing from the fund to pay USPS's share of premiums, which will continue to exceed the fund's income from interest. The report identifies eight potential policy approaches to address the financial sustainability of the RHB Fund, including shifting costs to the federal government, reducing benefits or increasing costs for retirees, changing how benefits are financed, and investing outside assets. However, USPS has expressed concerns about some of the proposed approaches, including investing outside of U.S. Treasury securities. The report concludes that congressional action is necessary to achieve a financially sustainable RHB Fund.", "answers": ["USPS is required to prefund its share of health benefits costs for its retirees. To do so, USPS is required to make payments into the RHB Fund, which is administered by OPM. However, USPS has not made any payments to the fund since fiscal year 2010. At the end of fiscal year 2017, USPS had missed $38.2 billion in payments, leaving the fund 44 percent funded. Pursuant to law, beginning in fiscal year 2017, OPM started drawing from the fund to cover USPS's share of postal retirees' health benefits premiums. GAO was asked to review issues related to the sustainability of the RHB Fund. This report examines (1) the financial outlook for the RHB Fund and (2) policy approaches for postal retiree health benefits, among other topics. GAO evaluated financial projections for the RHB Fund from OPM. GAO reviewed laws and regulations and identified policy approaches primarily by identifying legislative proposals, and literature on actions of companies and state governments to address retiree health benefits. These approaches are not exhaustive or mutually exclusive. GAO also interviewed experts in retiree health benefits and postal stakeholders, chosen on the basis of relevant publications and prior GAO work, and interviewed and obtained written responses from OPM and USPS officials. The financial outlook of the Postal Service Retiree Health Benefits Fund (RHB Fund) is poor. At the end of fiscal year 2017, the fund's assets declined to $49.8 billion and unfunded liabilities rose to $62.2 billion. Based on Office of Personnel Management (OPM) projections requested by GAO, the fund is on track to be depleted in fiscal year 2030 if the United States Postal Service (USPS) continues to make no payments into the fund. Annual payments of $1 billion or $2 billion into the fund would extend the projected depletion date by 2 to 5 years (see figure). USPS has said that its required payments to the fund are unaffordable relative to its current financial situation and outlook. For the past 11 years USPS has incurred large operating losses that it expects will continue. Additionally, USPS has stated that its opportunities for revenue generation and cost-cutting are limited. USPS reported that it did not make required fund payments in 2017 in order to preserve liquidity and cover operational costs. If the fund becomes depleted, USPS would be required by law to make the payments necessary to cover its share of health benefits premiums for current postal retirees. Current law does not address what would happen if the fund becomes depleted and USPS does not make payments to cover those premiums. Depletion of the fund could affect postal retirees as well as USPS, customers, and other stakeholders, including the federal government. About 500,000 postal retirees receive health benefits and OPM expects that number to remain about the same through 2035. GAO identified three categories of policy approaches for postal retiree health benefits, based on legislative proposals and pertinent literature. First, some approaches, such as generally requiring eligible postal retirees to participate in Medicare, would shift costs to the federal government. Second, some approaches would reduce benefits or increase costs to postal retirees and/or employees. Third, some approaches would change how benefits are financed (see table). All of these approaches have different potential effects and would require congressional action. Thus, it is up to Congress to consider the merits of different approaches and determine the most appropriate action to take. It would be preferable to take action when careful consideration is possible, rather than wait until lack of adequate funding could disrupt postal retiree health benefits. Congress should consider passing legislation to put postal retiree health benefits on a more sustainable financial footing. USPS agreed that congressional action is needed and offered views on some policy approaches discussed in this report."], "all_classes": null, "length": 5219}
{"pred": "\nThe report summarizes the findings of an investigation by the Government Accountability Office (GAO) into how infants with neonatal abstinence syndrome (NAS) are treated in hospitals and non-hospital settings. NAS occurs when infants are exposed to opioids in the womb and can experience withdrawal symptoms after birth. The report found that:\n\n- Hospitals and non-hospital settings use different approaches to treat NAS, including rooming-in and non-pharmacological interventions like breastfeeding.\n\n- Medicaid pays for NAS treatment services in hospitals and non-hospital settings, but the payment amounts vary.\n\n- Stakeholders identified several challenges in treating NAS, including the use of multiple substances by pregnant women, stigma faced by women who use opioids, and limited coordination of care.\n\n- HHS lacks a comprehensive plan to implement its recommendations for addressing NAS.\n\nThe report recommends that HHS develop a plan to guide implementation of its NAS-related recommendations, including priorities, timeframes, roles and responsibilities, and methods for assessing progress.\n\nIn summary, the report highlights the different approaches used to treat NAS in hospitals and non-hospital settings, the variability in Medicaid payment amounts, and the challenges faced in addressing NAS. It also recommends that HHS develop a comprehensive plan to implement its recommendations to improve NAS treatment.", "answers": ["As the opioid crisis has increased in recent years, so has the number of pregnant women who use opioids, which can result in NAS. A recent peer-reviewed study found that cases of NAS have grown nearly five-fold between 2000 and 2012 and that most infants with NAS are covered under Medicaid. The Comprehensive Addiction and Recovery Act of 2016 includes a provision for GAO to examine NAS in the United States and related treatment services covered under Medicaid. This report 1) describes the hospital and non-hospital settings for treating infants with NAS and how Medicaid pays for services, 2) describes recommended practices and challenges for addressing NAS, and 3) examines HHS's strategy for addressing NAS. GAO reviewed HHS documentation and interviewed HHS officials. GAO also conducted site visits to four states—Kentucky, Vermont, West Virginia, and Wisconsin—selected based on several factors, including incidence rates of NAS and geographic variation. GAO interviewed stakeholders from 32 organizations, including health care providers and state officials in the selected states. The prenatal use of opioids or other drugs can produce a withdrawal condition in newborns known as neonatal abstinence syndrome (NAS). Health care providers, state officials, and other stakeholders told GAO that most infants with NAS are treated in the hospital—such as in a neonatal intensive care unit—though some may be referred to a non-hospital setting—such as a neonatal withdrawal center with nursery rooms—to complete their treatment. The table below provides more information on settings for treating infants with NAS and on how Medicaid pays for services in these settings. According to stakeholders GAO interviewed and literature reviewed, there are several recommended practices and challenges associated with addressing NAS. The most frequently recommended practices included prioritizing non-pharmacologic treatment to infants—treatment that does not involve medications—such as allowing the mother to reside with the infant during treatment; educating mothers and health care providers on treatment of NAS, among other things; and using a protocol in the hospital or non-hospital setting for screening and treating infants with NAS. The most frequently cited challenges included the maternal use of multiple drugs—or polysubstance use—as it can exacerbate NAS symptoms; stigma faced by pregnant women who use opioids; hospital staff burden and limited physical capacity to care for infants with NAS; limited coordination of care for mothers and infants with NAS; and gaps in research and data on NAS, such as research on the long-term effects of the condition. In May 2017, the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) published a strategy document that makes key recommendations to address NAS. The Strategy recommends, for example, that health care providers receive continuing education on managing and treating infants with NAS and promote non-pharmacologic treatment. According to HHS officials, these recommendations will inform planning and policy across the department. However, HHS has yet to determine how and when the recommendations will be implemented, including establishing priorities; the roles and responsibilities of other federal, state, and public stakeholders; implementation timeframes; and methods for assessing progress. HHS officials told GAO that they expect to develop an implementation plan sometime in 2017 but had no timeline for doing so. Without a plan that clearly specifies how HHS will implement the Strategy and assess its progress, the department increases the risk that its recommendations for addressing NAS will not be implemented. HHS should expeditiously develop a plan for implementing the recommendations included in its strategy related to addressing NAS. HHS concurred that it should expeditiously address NAS, but noted implementation of the strategy is contingent on funding."], "all_classes": null, "length": 9838}
{"pred": "\nThe Federal Trade Commission (FTC) has been using its authority under the Federal Trade Commission Act to protect consumers from unfair and deceptive practices related to Internet privacy. However, the FTC Act does not provide specific privacy protections for consumers. The FTC has relied on its unfair and deceptive practices authority to address Internet privacy issues, but this approach has limitations. The FTC has also used its COPPA authority to police the collection and use of personal information from children by online services. \n\nFTC has filed 101 enforcement actions between 2008 and 2018 against Internet content providers and software developers for violations of the FTC Act or COPPA. Most of these cases involved Internet service providers. FTC has settled with companies in these cases, requiring them to make changes in their privacy policies or practices. FTC has also levied civil penalties against companies for violating settlement agreements.\n\nFTC's current approach has limitations due to its reliance on its unfair and deceptive practices authority. FTC cannot define what constitutes unfair and deceptive practices related to privacy and data security. There are also limited privacy protections under federal law for consumer data used for marketing purposes.\n\nFTC has recommended that Congress enact comprehensive privacy legislation to provide specific privacy protections for consumers. This legislation could establish general requirements for Internet privacy practices of all sectors, provide APA section 553 notice-and- comment rulemaking authority, and civil penalty authority for initial violations of a statute.\n\nFTC has also identified three main actions that could better protect Internet privacy: enactment of an overarching federal privacy statute, APA section 553 notice-and- comment rulemaking authority, and civil penalty authority for initial violations of a statute.\n\nFTC has been addressing Internet privacy through its unfair and deceptive practices authority, but comprehensive legislation could enhance consumer protections and provide more certainty in the marketplace. Issues to be considered include which agency or agencies should oversee Internet privacy, what authorities an agency or agencies should have, and how to balance consumers' need for privacy with industry's ability to provide services and innovate.", "answers": ["In April 2018, Facebook disclosed that a Cambridge University researcher may have improperly shared the data of up to 87 million of its users with a political consulting firm. This disclosure followed other recent incidents involving the misuse of consumers' personal information from the Internet, which is used by about three-quarters of Americans. GAO was asked to review federal oversight of Internet privacy. This report addresses, among other objectives: (1) how FTC and FCC have overseen consumers' Internet privacy and (2) selected stakeholders' views on the strengths and limitations of how Internet privacy currently is overseen and how, if it all, this approach could be enhanced. GAO evaluated FTC and FCC Internet privacy enforcement actions and authorities and interviewed representatives from industry, consumer advocacy groups, and academia; FTC and FCC staff; former FTC and FCC commissioners; and officials from other federal oversight agencies. Industry stakeholders were selected to represent different sectors, and academics were selected because of their expertise in privacy, consumer protection, and regulatory issues. The United States does not have a comprehensive Internet privacy law governing the collection, use, and sale or other disclosure of consumers' personal information. At the federal level, the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) currently has the lead in overseeing Internet privacy, using its statutory authority under the FTC Act to protect consumers from unfair and deceptive trade practices. However, to date FTC has not issued regulations for Internet privacy other than those protecting financial privacy and the Internet privacy of children, which were required by law. For FTC Act violations, FTC may promulgate regulations but is required to use procedures that differ from traditional notice-and-comment processes and that FTC staff said add time and complexity. In the last decade, FTC has filed 101 enforcement actions regarding Internet privacy; nearly all actions resulted in settlement agreements requiring action by the companies. In most of these cases, FTC did not levy civil penalties because it lacked such authority for those particular violations. The Federal Communications Commission (FCC) has had a limited role in overseeing Internet privacy. From 2015 to 2017, FCC asserted jurisdiction over the privacy practices of Internet service providers. In 2016, FCC promulgated privacy rules for Internet service providers that Congress later repealed. FTC resumed privacy oversight of Internet service providers in June 2018. Stakeholders GAO interviewed had varied views on the current Internet privacy enforcement approach and how it could be enhanced. Most Internet industry stakeholders said they favored FTC's current approach—direct enforcement of its unfair and deceptive practices statutory authority, rather than promulgating and enforcing regulations implementing that authority. These stakeholders said that the current approach allows for flexibility and that regulations could hinder innovation. Other stakeholders, including consumer advocates and most former FTC and FCC commissioners GAO interviewed, favored having FTC issue and enforce regulations. Some stakeholders said a new data-protection agency was needed to oversee consumer privacy. Stakeholders identified three main areas in which Internet privacy oversight could be enhanced: Statute . Some stakeholders told GAO that an overarching Internet privacy statute could enhance consumer protection by clearly articulating to consumers, industry, and agencies what behaviors are prohibited. Rulemaking . Some stakeholders said that regulations can provide clarity, enforcement fairness, and flexibility. Officials from two other consumer protection agencies said their rulemaking authority assists in their oversight efforts and works together with enforcement actions. Civil penalty authority. Some stakeholders said FTC's Internet privacy enforcement could be more effective with authority to levy civil penalties for first-time violations of the FTC Act. Comprehensive Internet privacy legislation that establishes specific standards and includes traditional notice-and-comment rulemaking and broader civil penalty authority could enhance the federal government's ability to protect consumer privacy. Congress should consider developing comprehensive legislation on Internet privacy that would enhance consumer protections and provide flexibility to address a rapidly evolving Internet environment. Issues that should be considered include what authorities agencies should have in order to oversee Internet privacy, including appropriate rulemaking authority."], "all_classes": null, "length": 10178}
{"pred": "\nThe report discusses the FBI's current facilities and the challenges they face. The FBI's headquarters, the Hoover Building, does not fully support the agency's long-term security, space, and building condition requirements. Since the report was issued in 2010, the assessment of the Hoover Building has not materially changed. Security concerns have arisen due to the FBI's expanded mission and workforce, and the agency now operates in annexes in the National Capital Region. The FBI also occupies space leased from foreign owners in at least six different locations, which presents security risks. The Hoover Building is in poor condition and has significant recapitalization needs. GSA has limited experience in successfully completing swap exchange transactions and has cancelled several recently proposed swap exchanges. GSA has identified alternative approaches to funding real property projects, including upfront funding, land swaps, and public-private partnerships. However, changes to the budgetary structure may also help agencies meet their real property needs. The report recommends that GSA develop criteria for determining when to solicit market interest in a swap exchange and incorporate risk assessment and management practices into decisions.", "answers": ["GSA, which manages federal real property on behalf of other federal agencies, faces challenges in funding new construction projects due to budget constraints—including obtaining upfront funding—among other reasons. One type of transaction, called a swap exchange, enables GSA to apply the value of federal property to finance construction without relying on appropriated funds. Under such an exchange, GSA transfers the title of the unneeded property to a private investor after receiving the agreed upon construction services at another location. GSA proposed a swap exchange procurement for construction of a new FBI headquarters building in exchange for the Hoover Building and appropriations to compensate for the difference in value between the Hoover Building and the new building. GSA cancelled this procurement in July 2017 due to lack of funding. This statement addresses (1) GSA's and FBI's assessments of the Hoover Building, (2) GSA efforts to implement swap exchanges, and (3) alternative approaches to funding real property projects. It is based on GAO's body of reports on real property from 2011 to 2017, and selected updates from GSA. In November 2011, GAO reported that, according to General Services Administration (GSA) and Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) assessments, the FBI's headquarters building (Hoover Building) and its accompanying facilities in Washington, D.C., did not fully support the FBI's long-term security, space, and building condition requirements. Since GAO's report, the assessments have not materially changed, for example: Security: GAO's prior work noted that the dispersion of staff in annexes creates security challenges, including where some space was leased by the FBI and other space was leased by nonfederal tenants. Earlier this year, GAO reported the FBI is leasing space in D.C. from foreign owners. Space : In 2011, GAO reported that FBI and GSA studies showed that much of the Hoover Building is unusable. GSA noted in its fiscal year 2017 project prospectus for the FBI headquarters consolidation that the Hoover Building cannot be redeveloped to meet the FBI's current needs. Building Condition: In GAO's 2011 report, GAO noted that the condition of the Hoover Building was deteriorating, and GSA assessments identified significant recapitalization needs. Since GAO's report and in response to GAO's recommendation, GSA has evaluated its approach to maintaining the building and completed some repairs to ensure safety. GSA has limited experience in successfully completing swap exchange transactions and chose not to pursue several proposed swap exchanges, most recently the planned swap exchange for the Hoover Building. GSA has developed criteria for determining when to solicit market interest in a swap exchange, in response to recommendations in GAO's 2014 report. In addition, GSA officials told GAO that they planned to improve the swap exchange process, including the property appraisal process, outreach to stakeholders to identify potential risks associated with future projects, and to the extent possible, mitigate such risks. Nevertheless, several factors may continue to limit use of swap exchanges, including market factors, such as the availability of alternative properties and an investor's approach for valuing properties. For example, in reviewing a proposed swap exchange in Washington, D.C., GAO found in a 2016 report that the proposals from two firms valued the two federal buildings involved in the proposed swap substantially less than GSA's appraised property value. In a 2014 report, GAO identified a number of alternative approaches to funding real property projects. Congress has provided some agencies with specific authorities to use alternative funding mechanisms—including the use of private sector funds or land swaps—for the acquisition, renovation, or disposal of federal real property without full, upfront funding, though GAO has previously reported that upfront funding is the best way to ensure recognition of commitments made in budgeting decisions and maintain fiscal controls. GAO has reported that projects with alternative funding mechanisms present multiple forms of risk that are shared between the agency and any partner or stakeholder. In addition, alternative budgetary structures could be established, such as changing existing or introducing new account structures to fund real property projects. GAO has made recommendations in the past to GSA on various real property issues, including to develop additional guidance for swap exchanges and to evaluate its approach to maintaining the Hoover Building. GSA agreed with these two recommendations and addressed them."], "all_classes": null, "length": 2284}
{"pred": "\nThe report discusses the Unemployment Insurance (UI) system in the United States, which has two primary objectives: providing temporary, partial wage replacement for involuntarily unemployed workers and stabilizing the economy during recessions. The UI system provides benefits for eligible unemployed workers through various programs, including the Unemployment Compensation (UC) program, Unemployment Compensation for Federal Employees (UCFE), and Unemployment Compensation for Ex-Servicemembers (UCX). The report highlights the following key points:\n\n1. The UI system is funded by federal taxes under the Federal Unemployment Tax Act (FUTA) and state payroll taxes under each state's State Unemployment Tax Act (SUTA).\n\n2. The UI program has eligibility requirements that ensure benefits are directed towards workers with significant labor market experience and who are unemployed due to economic conditions.\n\n3. The report discusses the Extended Benefit (EB) program, which provides additional weeks of benefits if certain economic conditions exist within a state.\n\n4. The report mentions proposals to provide new authority to pay Unemployment Compensation for Excepted Federal Employees During a Government Shutdown to excepted federal workers who are working without pay during a lapse in appropriations.\n\n5. The report notes that fewer than half of states have sufficient funds in their accounts to pay for UI benefits during a recession, and provides a loan mechanism within the Unemployment Trust Fund (UTF) for insolvent states.\n\n6. The report highlights the Reemployment Services and Eligibility Assessment (RESEA) program, which provides funding to states to conduct in-person interviews with UI claimants to ensure compliance with eligibility rules and provide reemployment services.\n\n7. The report mentions proposed changes to the UI system in the President's budget for FY2020, including a new standard for state account balances within the UTF, a new benefit for paid parental leave, and additional integrity measures.\n\n8. The report discusses the existing authority for states to conduct drug testing of UI applicants and a proposed rule to reissue the drug testing rule.\n\n9. The report mentions proposed legislation to provide UCF", "answers": ["The 116th Congress has begun to consider several issues related to two programs in the unemployment insurance (UI) system: Unemployment Compensation (UC) and Unemployment Compensation for Federal Employees (UCFE). The lapse in federal appropriations that occurred from December 22, 2018, to January 25, 2019, created a partial government shutdown. As a result, agencies without funding furloughed many federal employees, and many federal employees excepted from furlough were working without pay during the lapse in appropriations. Furloughed federal employees may be eligible for UCFE benefits. Private-sector workers who are furloughed or laid off due to the partial government shutdown because they were employed by government contractors may be eligible for regular UC benefits. But, according to guidance from the U.S. Department of Labor (DOL), excepted federal employees who are performing services (without pay) would generally be ineligible for UCFE benefits based on states' definitions of \"unemployment.\" In this climate, there has been congressional interest in assisting furloughed and excepted federal employees through the UI system. UI legislative issues currently facing the 116th Congress include the following: the effects of the FY2019 sequester order on UI programs and benefits, the role of UI in providing temporary income replacement during a government shutdown, state fiscal concerns related to financing UC benefits, reemployment services and eligibility assessments (RESEA), potential consideration of the UI proposals included in the President's FY2020 budget, and congressional oversight related to a proposed UC drug testing rule reissued by DOL after previously being disapproved using the Congressional Review Act. In the 116th Congress, policymakers have introduced legislation related to UCFE benefits in response to the recent partial government shutdown (S. 165, H.R. 720, H.R. 725, and H.R. 1117), legislation to provide self-employment and relocation assistance benefits (S. 136 and H.R. 556), legislation to require that states consider an individual who quit employment because of sexual harassment, domestic violence, sexual assault, or stalking to be eligible for UC benefits (H.R. 1585), and legislation to amend Title III of the Social Security Act to extend RESEA to all UC claimants (H.R. 1759). For a brief overview of UC, see CRS In Focus IF10336, The Fundamentals of Unemployment Compensation."], "all_classes": null, "length": 3509}
{"pred": "\nThe report examines how the Federal Bureau of Prisons (BOP) has used its authority to pay retention incentives to retain employees. BOP has used retention incentives to supplement salaries of correctional officers and medical professionals, particularly at institutions in California. BOP has not strategically planned for how retention incentives can be used to meet long-term human capital goals. BOP has not evaluated the effectiveness of its use of retention incentives. BOP officials agree that evaluating the effectiveness of retention incentives would help them be more strategic about their human capital needs. BOP should include in its upcoming strategic human capital operating plan how human capital flexibilities, including retention incentives, will be used to meet its human capital goals. BOP should also evaluate the effectiveness of its use of retention incentives to determine if adjustments are needed.\n\nBOP has used retention incentives to retain employees, particularly medical professionals. BOP has allocated retention incentive expenditures primarily to institutions in California. BOP has not established measures to evaluate the effectiveness of its use of retention incentives. BOP officials agree that evaluating the effectiveness of retention incentives would help them be more strategic about their human capital needs.\n\n", "answers": ["BOP is the largest employer within DOJ and is responsible for the care and custody of an inmate population of about 186,000. BOP has faced challenges retaining staff at correctional facilities, although it has used retention incentives, along with other human capital flexibilities. GAO was asked to review BOP's use of retention incentives. This report addresses: (1) how BOP used its authority to pay retention incentives; (2) internal controls BOP has in place for the use of retention incentives; and (3) the extent to which BOP plans for and evaluates the use of retention incentives. GAO obtained employee-level retention incentive expenditure data from DOJ's Justice Management Division for fiscal years 2012 through 2016. GAO also reviewed agency documentation, such as policy statements and 40 randomly selected retention incentive application packet case files from fiscal years 2014 through 2016. GAO also interviewed officials from BOP's Central Office and four correctional facilities that use retention incentives, selected to reflect variation in the number and types of employees receiving retention incentives, BOP regions, and BOP institution security levels. From fiscal years 2012 to 2016, the Department of Justice's (DOJ) Federal Bureau of Prisons' (BOP) total retention incentive expenditures generally increased from $10.7 to $14.0 million and the number of employees receiving retention incentives increased from 2,024 to 2,460. During those five years, BOP spent more than 97 percent of its total retention incentive expenditures on employees at four BOP institutions in California and for medical professionals nationwide. Further, total retention incentive expenditures for medical professionals increased by an average of 21 percent per year (see figure). According to BOP officials, BOP uses retention incentives, for example, to supplement BOP's medical professionals' salaries which are generally lower than private sector salaries. BOP has a variety of internal controls in place throughout the retention incentive process that help ensure retention incentive applications and approvals meet requirements. For example, each application goes through multiple levels of review to verify its accuracy and completeness. BOP takes steps to determine workforce needs and how to fill those needs, but has not strategically planned for and evaluated its use of retention incentives. According to BOP, planning for human capital needs is conducted at institutions during quarterly meetings, but discussions about these incentives respond to short-term staffing situations rather than proactively addressing future staffing needs. Including human capital goals and strategies in BOP's human capital plan would create a roadmap so the agency could move from being reactive to its current workforce needs to being strategic in trying to achieve its long-term workforce goals. Additionally BOP has not evaluated the effectiveness of its use of retention incentives in retaining staff. As a result, BOP does not know whether retention incentives have contributed to employees' retention in relation to other incentives used by BOP. Consistent with key principles for strategic human capital planning, planning for and evaluating the use of retention incentives could help BOP better determine if these incentives are an efficient and effective means by which to retain staff. GAO recommends that BOP (1) include human capital goals and how retention incentives will be used to achieve these goals in its human capital plan; and (2) evaluate the use of retention incentives. BOP concurred with GAO's recommendations."], "all_classes": null, "length": 6244}
{"pred": "\nThe National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) has seen a significant increase in safety defect vehicle recalls since 20111, with over 8 million vehicles recalled due to faulty ignition switches in 2014. NHTSA has taken steps to improve its system for identifying and addressing defective vehicles, including providing additional notification methods to consumers beyond First Class Mail. However, a recent report found that consumers still face challenges using publicly available recall information on NHTSA's website, including difficulty finding and using the auto recall areas of NHTSA.gov. The report recommends that NHTSA determine a completion date for its website consolidation effort and take interim steps to improve the usability of the website. The report also found that consumers prefer to receive notifications by multiple methods, but only a small percentage actually received notifications beyond First Class Mail. Industry stakeholders also use publicly available recall information differently, with some using additional methods to reach consumers. The report concludes that NHTSA should use data collected from manufacturers to identify best practices for recall completion rates and improve its public awareness efforts.", "answers": ["The number of vehicles affected by safety defect recalls increased sharply in recent years—from nearly 13 million in 2011 to over 51 million in 2016. Once a defect is identified, auto manufacturers are required to send written notification to vehicle owners by mail. NHTSA also aims to enhance awareness of auto recalls by providing information on its website, NHTSA.gov . The Fixing America's Surface Transportation Act includes a provision requiring GAO to study the use of publicly available safety recall information. This report addresses: (1) how consumers and industry stakeholders use such information and (2) how easy to use do consumers find the auto recall areas of NHTSA.gov, among other objectives. To understand consumers' use of auto recall information and to test website usability, GAO conducted 12 focus groups with 94 consumers who had a recall. Focus groups were held in six locations selected for population and geographic variation. GAO identified key website usability practices and requested an evaluation by website usability professionals. GAO reviewed statutes, regulations, and NHTSA documents, and interviewed industry stakeholders—including 10 manufacturers selected based on sales market share and other factors. Consumers, manufacturers, and auto dealers use publicly available auto recall information differently. For example, the 94 consumers in 12 focus groups that GAO conducted used this information to decide whether to repair their vehicles. These consumers overwhelmingly cited safety risk and convenience as the two most influential factors they considered. Most consumers reported a preference for receiving recall notification by at least one electronic means, such as by e-mail or text message, in addition to mail. However, only 7 of 94 consumers reported receiving electronic notifications, suggesting a gap between the industry's auto recall notification practices and consumers' preferences. (See fig.). In response to a mandate in law, in September 2016, the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) issued a proposed rule that, if finalized, would require manufacturers to notify consumers about auto recalls by electronic means in addition to mail. Most consumers in GAO's focus group website usability tests found the auto recall areas of NHTSA's website—NHTSA.gov—easy to use; however, some consumers experienced difficulties when asked to complete auto recall related tasks. For example, when consumers attempted to search for recalls affecting their specific vehicles, some found the search results confusing, leading them to question the accuracy of the results. Similarly, some consumers were hampered in searching for recalls by their vehicles' year, make, and model because the website did not always display model options using plain language. GAO found that the auto recall areas of NHTSA.gov do not always reflect federal and industry key website usability practices, and that an independent evaluation conducted by website usability professionals at GAO's request identified similar issues. NHTSA is in the process of consolidating its websites and plans to conduct a website usability study of NHTSA.gov with consumers after the consolidation is complete. However, the agency has not determined a completion date for the consolidation effort—an essential step for organizations to effectively guide their information technology efforts. Without establishing a completion date and taking interim steps to improve the usability of NHTSA.gov, consumers will likely continue to experience difficulties, which may limit the effectiveness of the website's primary means of providing consumers with information about recalls affecting their vehicles. GAO recommends that NHTSA determine a completion date for its website consolidation effort and take interim steps to improve the usability of NHTSA.gov by addressing the website usability difficulties GAO identified. The Department of Transportation concurred with the recommendations."], "all_classes": null, "length": 7642}
{"pred": "\nThe report discusses the use of cluster munitions in military operations and the controversy surrounding their use. Cluster munitions are weapons that disperse smaller submunitions over a wide area, killing or destroying multiple targets with a single munition. They are considered an \"economy of force\" weapon, but have been criticized for leaving behind large numbers of unexploded submunitions that can remain hazardous for decades. Many countries have banned or restricted the use of cluster munitions due to civilian casualties and environmental damage. The United States has a policy of using cluster munitions but has suspended their use in Iraq and Afghanistan. The US has also developed new \"sensor-fuzed\" submunitions that are designed to reduce the number of unexploded submunitions. However, some argue that cluster munitions are becoming less relevant in the era of precision weapons and may be losing their military utility. The US has recently revised its policy on cluster munitions, allowing combatant commanders to use them even if they do not meet the 1% unexploded submunitions standard. This could affect US military operations and international treaties. The report also notes that US law prohibits providing military assistance or exporting cluster munitions that result in more than 1% unexploded submunitions.", "answers": ["Cluster munitions are air-dropped or ground-launched weapons that release a number of smaller submunitions intended to kill enemy personnel or destroy vehicles. Cluster munitions were developed in World War II and are part of many nations' weapons stockpiles. Cluster munitions have been used frequently in combat, including the early phases of the current conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan. Cluster munitions have been highly criticized internationally for causing a significant number of civilian deaths, and efforts have been undertaken to ban and regulate their use. The Department of Defense (DOD) continues to view cluster munitions as a military necessity but in 2008 instituted a policy to reduce the failure rate of cluster munitions to 1% or less after 2018. In November 2017, a new DOD policy was issued that essentially reversed the 2008 policy. Under the new policy, combatant commanders can use cluster munitions that do not meet the 1% or less unexploded submunitions standard in extreme situations to meet immediate warfighting demands. In addition, the new policy does not establish a deadline to replace cluster munitions exceeding the 1% rate and states that DOD \"will retain cluster munitions currently in active inventories until the capabilities they provide are replaced with enhanced and more reliable munitions.\" Potential issues for Congress include cluster munitions in an era of precision weapons, other weapons in lieu of cluster munitions, and the potential impact of DOD's 2017 revised cluster munitions policy."], "all_classes": null, "length": 3162}
{"pred": "\nThe report summarizes the findings of an audit of the Federal Emergency Management Agency's (FEMA) Public Assistance (PA) program. The audit found that FEMA has implemented a new delivery model for the PA program to improve efficiency and effectiveness. However, FEMA still faces challenges in workforce management, information sharing, and hazard mitigation. FEMA has developed new positions and training programs to address these challenges, but more work is needed to fully assess the workforce needed for the new delivery model. FEMA also needs to establish procedures to standardize hazard mitigation planning at the joint field offices. The audit recommends that FEMA complete a workforce staffing assessment, establish controls for tracking the FAC-Trax system, establish system testing criteria, standardize hazard mitigation planning, and develop performance measures to better align with FEMA's strategic goals for hazard mitigation.", "answers": ["FEMA, an agency of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), has obligated more than $36 billion in PA grants to state, local, and tribal governments to help communities recover and rebuild after major disasters since 2009. Further, costs are rising with disasters, such as Hurricanes Harvey, Irma, and Maria in 2017. FEMA recently redesigned how the PA program delivers assistance to state and local grantees to improve operations and address past challenges identified by GAO and others. FEMA tested the new delivery model in selected disasters and announced implementation in September 2017. GAO was asked to assess the redesigned PA program. This report examines, among other things, the extent to which FEMA's new delivery model addresses (1) past workforce management challenges and assesses future workforce needs; and (2) past information sharing challenges and key IT management controls. GAO reviewed FEMA policy, strategy, and implementation documents; interviewed FEMA and state officials, PA program applicants, and other stakeholders; and observed implementation of the new model at one test location following Hurricane Matthew in 2016. The Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) redesigned the Public Assistance (PA) grant program delivery model to address past challenges in workforce management, but has not fully assessed future workforce staffing needs. GAO and others have previously identified challenges related to shortages in experienced and trained FEMA PA staff and high turnover among these staff. These challenges often led to applicants receiving inconsistent guidance and to PA project delays. As part of its new model, FEMA is creating consolidated resource centers to standardize and centralize PA staff responsible for managing grant applications, and new specialized positions, such as hazard mitigation liaisons, program delivery managers, and site inspectors, to ensure more consistent guidance to applicants. However, FEMA has not assessed the workforce needed to fully implement the new model, such as the number of staff needed to fill certain new positions, or to achieve staffing goals for supporting hazard mitigation on PA projects. Fully assessing workforce needs will help to ensure that FEMA has the people and the skills needed to fully implement the new PA model and help to avoid the long-standing workforce challenges the program encountered in the past. FEMA designed a new PA information and case management system—called the FEMA Applicant Case Tracker (FAC-Trax)—to address past information sharing challenges, such as difficulties in sharing grant documentation among FEMA, state, and local officials and tracking the status of PA projects, but additional actions could better ensure effective implementation. Both FEMA and state officials involved in testing of the new model stated that the new information system allows them to better manage and track PA applications and documentation, which could lead to greater transparency and efficiencies in the program. Further, GAO found that this new system fully addresses two of four key information technology (IT) management controls—project planning and risk management—that are necessary to ensure systems work effectively and meet user needs. However, GAO found that FEMA has not fully addressed the other two controls—requirements development and systems testing and integration. By better analyzing progress on high-level user requirements, for example, FEMA will have greater assurance that FAC-Trax will meet user needs and achieve the goals of the new delivery model. GAO is making five recommendations, including that FEMA assess the workforce needed for the new delivery model and improve key IT management controls for its new information sharing and case management system, FAC-Trax. DHS concurred with all recommendations."], "all_classes": null, "length": 12046}
{"pred": "\nThe report summarizes the budget request for the Department of Energy and related agencies for FY2020. The Department of Energy budget request includes $38.02 billion, a $6.4 billion decrease from the FY2019 enacted level. The budget proposes substantial reductions from the FY2019 enacted level for DOE research and development programs, including a reduction of $178 million (-24%) in fossil fuels and $502 million (-38%) in nuclear energy. The budget also proposes to terminate the Formerly Utilized Sites Remedial Action Program from USACE to DOE. The Bureau of Reclamation budget request includes $46.6 million, a $29% decrease from FY2019. The National Nuclear Security Administration budget request includes $12 million for the Yucca Mountain nuclear waste repository, a $12 million increase from FY2019. The Appalachian Regional Commission budget request includes $70 million, a $10 million increase from FY2019. The report provides details on the funding history for various programs within DOE and related agencies.", "answers": ["The Energy and Water Development appropriations bill provides funding for civil works projects of the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (USACE); the Department of the Interior's Bureau of Reclamation (Reclamation) and Central Utah Project (CUP); the Department of Energy (DOE); the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC); and several other independent agencies. DOE typically accounts for about 80% of the bill's funding. President Trump submitted his FY2020 detailed budget proposal to Congress on March 18, 2019 (after submitting a general budget overview on March 11). The budget requests for agencies included in the Energy and Water Development appropriations bill total $38.02 billion—$6.64 billion (15%) below the FY2019 appropriation. The largest exception to the overall decrease proposed for energy and water programs is a $1.309 billion increase (12%) for DOE nuclear weapons activities. For FY2019, the conference agreement on H.R. 5895 (H.Rept. 115-929) provided total Energy and Water Development appropriations of $44.66 billion—3% above the FY2018 level, excluding supplemental funding, and 23% above the FY2019 request. It was signed by the President on September 21, 2018 (P.L. 115-244). Emergency supplemental appropriations totaling $17.419 billion were provided to USACE and DOE for hurricane response by the Bipartisan Budget Act of 2018 (P.L. 115-123), signed February 9, 2018. Major Energy and Water Development funding issues for FY2020 are listed below. They were selected based on the total funding involved, the percentage of proposed increases or decreases, and potential impact on broader public policy considerations. Water Agency Funding Reductions. The Trump Administration requested reductions of 31% for USACE and 29% for Reclamation for FY2020 from the FY2019 enacted levels. The largest reductions would be from USACE Operation and Maintenance (-48%) and Reclamation's Water and Related Resources account (-31%). Similar reductions proposed by the Administration for FY2019 were not enacted. Power Marketing Administration (PMA) Reforms. DOE's FY2020 budget request includes mandatory proposals to sell PMA electricity transmission lines and other assets, repeal certain PMA borrowing authority, and eliminate cost-based limits on the electricity rates charged by the PMAs. The proposals would need to be enacted in authorizing legislation. Termination of Energy Efficiency Grants. DOE's Weatherization Assistance Program and State Energy Program would be terminated under the FY2020 budget request. The Administration had proposed to eliminate the grants in FY2018 and FY2019, but Congress continued funding. Reductions in Energy Research and Development. Under the FY2020 budget request, DOE research and development appropriations would be reduced for energy efficiency and renewable energy (EERE) by 83%, nuclear energy by 38%, and fossil energy by 24%. Similar reductions proposed by the Administration for FY2019 were not enacted. Nuclear Waste Repository. The Administration's budget request would provide new funding for the first time since FY2010 for a proposed nuclear waste repository at Yucca Mountain, NV. DOE would receive $116 million to seek an NRC license for the repository and develop interim waste storage capacity. NRC would receive $38.5 million to consider DOE's repository license application. Similar Administration funding requests for FY2018 and FY2019 were not enacted. Elimination of Advanced Research Projects Agency—Energy (ARPA-E). The Trump Administration proposes no new appropriations for ARPA-E in FY2020 and to cancel $287 million in unobligated balances from previous appropriations. Similar proposals to terminate ARPA-E in FY2018 and FY2019 were not enacted. Loan Programs Termination. The FY2020 budget request would terminate DOE's Title 17 Innovative Technology Loan Guarantee Program, the Advanced Technology Vehicles Manufacturing Loan Program, and the Tribal Energy Loan Guarantee Program. Administration proposals to eliminate the programs were not included in the enacted appropriations measures for FY2018 and FY2019. Weapons Activities. The FY2020 budget request for DOE Weapons Activities is 12% greater than it was in FY2019 ($12.4 billion vs. $11.1 billion), in contrast to a proposed 10% reduction in DOE's total funding. Notable proposed increases would be used for warhead life extension programs and preparations for increase production of plutonium pits (warhead cores)."], "all_classes": null, "length": 8323}
{"pred": "\nThe Public Safety Officers' Benefits (PSOB) program provides cash benefits to federal, state, and local law enforcement officers, firefighters, and emergency medical services personnel who are killed or permanently disabled in the line of duty. The program also provides higher education assistance to the spouses and children of these officers through the Public Safety Officers' Educational Assistance (PSOE) program. The PSOB program is administered by the Department of Justice (DOJ) Bureau of Justice Assistance (BJA) and funded by Congress through the annual Departments of Commerce and Justice, Science, and Related Agencies Appropriations Act. To be eligible for PSOB benefits, a person must have served in one of the following categories of public safety officers: law enforcement officer, firefighter, or chaplain. The program covers deaths or disabilities resulting from personal injuries sustained in the line of duty, including traumatic physical wounds, chemicals, radiation, and infectious diseases. The PSOB benefit amount is adjusted annually to reflect changes in the cost of living. PSOB death and disability benefits are paid in addition to any other workers' compensation or life insurance benefits and are not subject to federal income tax. PSOB death benefits are paid to the eligible spouse and children, while PSOE benefits are paid to the spouse or children to defray education costs. Applications for PSOB and PSOE benefits must be filed with the PSOB office, which determines eligibility and commences payment. A claimant who is dissatisfied with a benefit denial may request a reconsideration or de novo hearing. The PSOB program is funded through mandatory spending for death benefits and discretionary appropriations for disability and education benefits.", "answers": ["The Public Safety Officers' Benefits (PSOB) program provides cash benefits to federal, state, and local law enforcement officers; firefighters; employees of emergency management agencies; and members of emergency medical services agencies who are killed or permanently and totally disabled as the result of personal injuries sustained in the line of duty. The Public Safety Officers' Educational Assistance (PSOEA) program, a component of the PSOB program, provides higher-education assistance to the children and spouses of public safety officers killed or permanently disabled in the line of duty. The PSOB and PSOEA programs are administered by the Department of Justice (DOJ), Bureau of Justice Assistance (BJA). However, claimants dissatisfied with denials of benefits may pursue administrative appeals within DOJ and may seek judicial review before the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit. Each year, Congress appropriates funding for PSOB death benefits, which is considered mandatory spending, and for PSOB disability benefits and PSOEA benefits, which is subject to annual appropriations. For FY2019, the one-time lump-sum PSOB death and disability benefit is $359,316 and the PSOEA monthly benefit for a student attending an educational institution full-time is $1,224. In FY2017, the DOJ approved 399 claims for PSOB death benefits, 82 claims for PSOB disability benefits, and 601 claims for PSOEA benefits."], "all_classes": null, "length": 2857}
{"pred": "\nThe Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) was audited by the Government Accountability Office (GAO) to assess the effectiveness of CDC's information security program and controls to protect its information systems. The GAO found that CDC had not consistently implemented key elements of its information security program, including:\n\n- Identifying and assessing risks to its systems and information\n- Implementing appropriate access controls\n- Implementing logging and monitoring controls\n- Testing and evaluating security controls\n\nCDC had also not consistently addressed technical control deficiencies and remedial actions in a timely manner. CDC had partially implemented 20 of the 184 recommendations made in the GAO's June 2018 report, but the remaining 62 recommendations remained open. CDC had not provided evidence that it had implemented the remaining 62 recommendations.\n\nGAO found that CDC had not adequately addressed threats, technical constraints, and the changing threat environment in its system risk assessments. CDC had also not documented detailed technical requirements in policies and procedures.\n\nGAO recommended that CDC:\n\n- Evaluate system impact level categorizations to ensure they reflect the current operating environment\n- Update risk assessments to identify threats and the likelihood of impact of the threat on the environment\n- Update facility risk assessments\n- Implement the remaining 10 information security program-related recommendations\n- Remediate POA&Ms in a timely manner\n\nCDC concurred with the recommendations and stated that it is restructuring and streamlining its cyber program and IT infrastructure.\n\nIn summary, the GAO found that CDC had not consistently implemented key elements of its information security program and had not adequately addressed technical control deficiencies and recommendations. CDC concurred with the recommendations and stated that it is taking steps to improve its information security program.", "answers": ["CDC is responsible for detecting and responding to emerging health threats and controlling dangerous substances. In carrying out its mission, CDC relies on information technology systems to receive, process, and maintain sensitive data. Accordingly, effective information security controls are essential to ensure that the agency's systems and information are protected from misuse and modification. GAO was asked to examine information security at CDC. In June 2018, GAO issued a limited official use only report on the extent to which CDC had effectively implemented technical controls and an information security program to protect the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of its information on selected information systems. This current report is a public version of the June 2018 report. In addition, for this public report, GAO determined the extent to which CDC has taken corrective actions to address the previously identified security program and technical control deficiencies and related recommendations for improvement. For this report, GAO reviewed supporting documents regarding CDC's actions on previously identified recommendations and interviewed personnel at CDC. As GAO reported in June 2018, the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) implemented technical controls and an information security program that were intended to safeguard the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of its information systems and information. However, GAO identified control and program deficiencies in the core security functions related to identifying risk, protecting systems from threats and vulnerabilities, detecting and responding to cyber security events, and recovering system operations (see table below). GAO made 195 recommendations to address these deficiencies. As of August 2018, CDC had made significant progress in resolving many of the security deficiencies by implementing 102 of 184 (about 55 percent) technical control recommendations, and partially implementing 1 of 11 information security program recommendations made in the June 2018 report. The figure shows the status of CDC's efforts to implement the 195 recommendations. Additionally, CDC has created remedial action plans to implement the majority of the remaining open recommendations by September 2019. Until CDC implements these recommendations and resolves the associated deficiencies, its information systems and information will remain at increased risk of misuse, improper disclosure or modification, and destruction."], "all_classes": null, "length": 10203}
{"pred": "\nThe report details the history of US involvement in the conflict in Yemen since 2015, specifically the Saudi-led coalition's intervention in 2015. The US provided logistical and intelligence support to the coalition without taking direct military action. However, as the conflict intensified, Congress began to take a more active role in debating and overseeing US policy in Yemen. Members expressed concern over US involvement in the coalition's operations, particularly civilian casualties, and sought to limit US arms sales to Saudi Arabia. The Obama Administration took some steps to limit US support for the coalition, but the Trump Administration has signaled strong support for the coalition's operations. In 2018, Congress passed legislation to place conditions on US assistance to the coalition and direct the President to remove US forces from hostilities in Yemen. The conflict in Yemen remains ongoing, with humanitarian conditions worsening and international pressure mounting. Congress continues to debate US policy in Yemen and how to address the crisis.", "answers": ["This product provides an overview of the role Congress has played in shaping U.S. policy toward the conflict in Yemen. Summary tables provide information on legislative proposals considered in the 115th and 116th Congresses. Various legislative proposals have reflected a range of congressional perspectives and priorities, including with regard to the authorization of the activities of the U.S. Armed Forces related to the conflict; the extent of U.S. logistical, material, advisory, and intelligence support for the coalition led by Saudi Arabia; the approval, disapproval, or conditioning of U.S. arms sales to Saudi Arabia; the appropriation of funds for U.S. operations in support of the Saudi-led coalition; the conduct of the Saudi-led coalition's air campaign and its adherence to international humanitarian law and the laws of armed conflict; the demand for greater humanitarian access to Yemen; the call for a wider government assessment of U.S. policy toward Yemen and U.S. support to parties to the conflict; the nature and extent of U.S.-Saudi counterterrorism and border security cooperation; and the role of Iran in supplying missile technology and other weapons to the forces of the Houthi movement. The 116th Congress may continue to debate U.S. support for the Saudi-led coalition and Saudi Arabia's conduct of the war in Yemen, where fighting has continued since March 2015. The war has exacerbated a humanitarian crisis in Yemen that began in 2011; presently, the World Food Program reports that 20 million Yemenis face hunger in the absence of sustained food assistance. The difficulty of accessing certain areas of Yemen has made it hard for governments and aid agencies to count the war's casualties. Data collected by the U.S. and European-funded Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED) suggest that 60,000 Yemenis have been killed since January 2016. The Trump Administration has opposed various congressional proposals, including initiatives to reject or condition proposed U.S. arms sales or to require an end to U.S. military support to Saudi-led coalition operations in Yemen. Many in Congress have condemned the October 2018 murder of Saudi journalist Jamal Khashoggi by Saudi government personnel, and in general, the incident appears to have exacerbated existing congressional concerns about Saudi leaders and the pace, scope, and direction of change in the kingdom's policies. This product includes legislative proposals considered during the 115th and 116th Congresses. It does not include references to Yemen in Iran sanctions legislation, which are covered in CRS Report RS20871, Iran Sanctions. For additional information on the war in Yemen and Saudi Arabia, please see the following CRS products. CRS Report R43960, Yemen: Civil War and Regional Intervention. CRS Report RL33533, Saudi Arabia: Background and U.S. Relations. CRS Insight IN10729, Yemen: Cholera Outbreak."], "all_classes": null, "length": 4993}
